UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The Technical Services

THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS: MOVEMENTS, TRAINING, AND SUPPLY

by

Chester Wardlow

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. . . to Those Who Served

Foreword

The history of World War II is making increasingly clear the central fact that the tightest rein on the military effort of the United States in that war was imposed by transportation. As long as this nation fights overseas the same situation is likely to reoccur—a prospect that gives a special importance to the exposition of the subject in this series. The Army promptly recognized the importance of transportation when, as in World War I, it centralized its supervision of this branch of its vast logistical effort in a Chief of Transportation and created (in July 1942) a Transportation Corps.

The Army did not, and could not, control all the factors that entered into the movement of its men, munitions, and supplies. The larger story the reader must seek elsewhere— in the two volumes on *Global Logistics and Strategy* and in the theater volumes of the U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Here the story is told from the records and point of view of the Army's Chief of Transportation, Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross. In this volume, the second in the group of three Transportation Corps volumes, Mr. Wardlow passes to the policies and methods adopted to move men and matériel within the continental United States and out to theaters of operations—the core of General Gross's mission—and to provide the Transportation Corps' quota of equipment and trained soldiers necessary to accomplish its oversea mission.

ALBERT C. SMITH
Maj. Gen., U. S. A.
Chief of Military History

Washington, D. C.
7 June 1954

The Author

Mr. Chester Wardlow was pursuing graduate studies in Political Science at the University of Chicago when the United States entered World War I. In 1918, employed by the Shipping Board, he went overseas with the mission that became the American Section of the Allied Maritime Transport Council. From 1921 until 1935 he was connected with private shipping organizations. During the period 1935–41 he held the office of Sole Arbiter of the Trans-Atlantic Passenger Conference. In 1941 Mr. Wardlow was employed as Coordinator of Transportation for the Army and remained in that position until 1946. From 1946 until his retirement in 1954 he was the Chief Historian of the Transportation Corps. He is the author of the first volume of the Transportation Corps subseries in the U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, published in 1951.

Preface

The purpose of this volume is twofold: to present and evaluate the machinery and the procedures employed by the Army Chief of Transportation in moving troops and military matériel within the United States and from the United States to the oversea theaters of operations, and to outline the methods used and the problems encountered by the Chief of Transportation in training the troops and providing the equipment and supplies needed to maintain effective transportation services in the oversea commands.

The movement of troops and matériel was the basic and distinctive function of the Chief of Transportation, and for that reason the greater part of the book has been devoted to that aspect of his work. Training and supply functions were performed by other technical services as well as by the Transportation Corps, and since all technical services worked under the general direction of Army Services Forces headquarters, there was considerable similarity in the methods employed and the standards enforced. The discussion of training and supply is therefore confined to those aspects in which the Chief of Transportation had unique responsibilities or encountered exceptional problems.

Much of this account is presented by simply stating what the functions of the Chief of Transportation were and how he performed them, although his operating difficulties and his disagreements with other agencies are treated as fully as seems warranted. During the prewar emergency period, as the United States steadily drifted toward open belligerency, one of the handicaps suffered by those concerned with military transportation was the lack of an adequate record of how the Transportation Service had functioned in World War I. The documented account given here should in large measure obviate a similar lack if the nation should again become involved in a major conflict.

In the interest of completeness some matters that were discussed in *The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations* are dealt with again, but the second treatment has been kept as brief as practicable and cross referenced to that volume. Since the discussion of movements, training, and supply activities can be better understood if the reader has some knowledge of the background of the Transportation Corps, its relations with other agencies, and the broad policies of the Chief of Transportation, these aspects of the Transportation Corps story are reviewed briefly in the introduction.

Valuable information and opinions have been obtained from officers and civilian experts who were on the staff of the Chief of Transportation during the war and were still accessible for interviews while this volume was in preparation. The assistance of those who have contributed personally or through their writings, and whose names therefore appear in the footnotes, is gratefully acknowledged. It must be emphasized, however, that the author bears responsibility for interpretations of fact and any inadvertent errors or omissions.

The statistics used in this book have been drawn so far as possible from compilations prepared in the Office of the Comptroller of the Army for the statistical volume to be published in this series. Special credit is due Mr. George M. Adams of that office, who by recourse to the original sources has done a thorough job of verifying, correcting, and amplifying the statistics compiled in the Office of the Chief of Transportation during the war. Mr. George R. Powell of the same office has given valuable assistance in the presentation of statistical data and the preparation of graphic charts.

Special thanks are also due Leo J. Meyer, Colonel, Transportation Corps Reserve, Deputy Chief Historian, who read the manuscript and offered helpful suggestions in the light of his wartime experience with Army transportation, and to Marie Premauer, who aided substantially in locating source material and verifying citations in addition to typing the manuscript. Helen McShane Bailey carried out the final editing, Allen R. Clark copy edited the manuscript, and Margaret E. Tackley selected and prepared the photographs.

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7 June 1954

CHESTER WARDLOW

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Southern Pacific Railroad: page 23.
Santa Fe Railroad: pages 52, 53.
U.S. Maritime Commission: page 92 (middle).
Association of American Railroads: page 270.
Life Photo, Peter Stackpole: page 300.
American Locomotive Company: page 464.

THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS:
MOVEMENTS,
TRAINING, AND SUPPLY

Introduction [1]

One of the facts stamped indelibly on the minds of military men by World War II is that transportation plays a key role in global warfare. In a conflict fought on foreign soil, success is absolutely dependent on the number of soldiers and the quantity of matériel that can be moved to the oversea commands and the timeliness with which they are delivered.

The primary consideration is transoceanic transportation, for in wartime the capacity needed to move troops and cargo far exceeds the capacity required for peacetime traffic. But traffic within the zone of interior also expands rapidly under a war economy, and means must be found for handling military movements promptly while at the same time accommodating essential civilian traffic. In the oversea areas where the forces come to grips with the enemy, the ports of entry and the inland lines of communication must be kept operative, notwithstanding the efforts of the enemy to destroy the facilities and the uncertain value of local civilian labor.

The shipping problem was an especially vital one in World War II, as in the previous great conflict, because while the Allies were heavily dependent upon ocean transport, Germany was not. The Germans, who under the Allied plan of strategy were to be defeated before the war effort was turned fully against Japan, struck heavy blows at Allied shipping in the Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the Mediterranean. Their submarines were so effective for a time that serious doubts arose in the minds of Allied leaders whether a sufficiently large fleet of troop and cargo vessels could be built up to meet the requirements of victory in a multifront war. Such a fleet was achieved nevertheless through the unprecedented performance of the United States in constructing new vessels, the increasingly effective Allied campaign waged against the U-boat, and the economies effected by bringing virtually all shipping available to the Western Allies under the control of the British and U.S. Governments and closely co-ordinating the operations of the two pools. The shipping situation began to improve perceptibly in the spring of 1943; yet up to the time of Germany's surrender there never was a surplus of vessels. In fact, there never was enough shipping to satisfy those who were directing the expanding Allied war effort.

Although excellent results in the effective employment of the Allied cargo fleets were accomplished through the co-ordinating work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, individual vessels were not always used to capacity. During the early years of the war when the production of military supplies in the United States was lagging, sufficient cargo was not always delivered to the ports to fill the ships that were destined for low-priority theaters. Even when matériel was available at depots, camps, and manufacturing plants, the process of assembling at the ports highly diversified cargoes from many sources in such a manner as to avoid port congestion and yet have the cargoes ready for loading in accordance with theater priorities and convoy schedules was a complicated one, and some supplies did not arrive as planned either because of late shipment or because of unexpectedly long time in transit. The preponderance of bulky and light items over compact and heavy items in Army cargoes frequently made it impossible for the ports of embarkation to load vessels to their dead-weight capacities, even though their cargo spaces were full.

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[1] This brief explanation of the background of the Transportation Corps, the fundamental problems that confronted the Chief of Transportation, and the establishment that functioned under his command is essentially a recapitulation of information presented in Chester Wardlow, *The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951). Many of the problems and relationships will be referred to again in the last chapter of this volume, where some observations and conclusions regarding the activities and accomplishments of the Transportation Corps in connection with movements, training, and supply will be presented.

The most serious waste of shipping came about through holding cargo vessels idle in the theaters. While such detentions sometimes were caused by unforeseen military developments, too often they were attributable to the failure of theater commanders to keep the tonnages that they sought to have delivered at particular ports within the capacities of the ports to receive, or to the deliberate use of vessels as floating warehouses. This problem became especially acute in the fall of 1944, and it was not cleared up until the President peremptorily directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to bring the situation under control.

According to prewar plans the Navy was to operate all ocean-going vessels needed by the armed forces if the United States should become a belligerent. The Army actually began turning over its transports to the Navy in the spring of 1941, but it soon became apparent that the Navy was not in a position to provide enlisted crews for a large number of merchant vessels because of the heavy demand for combatant crews. Soon after Pearl Harbor, therefore, the two services agreed that the Army should man and operate the vessels that it owned or controlled under bareboat charter and call directly on the U.S. Maritime Commission for the allocation of such additional vessels as it might require. During the ensuing year efforts were made to achieve an arrangement under which either the Navy or the Army would control all military shipping, since that was recognized as more economical than the operation of separate fleets, but the two departments could not agree on a plan. The bulk of the shipping was therefore operated by agents of the War Shipping Administration, which took over the operating responsibilities of the Maritime Commission in February 1942, and the vessels were allocated to the Army and the Navy in accordance with their requirements. Under subsequent agreements the Navy manned a considerable number of vessels that were to be employed by the Army in the forward areas, and the two services freely interchanged ship space for both troops and cargo moving between the zone of interior and the theaters.

The Maritime Commission was the agency designated by the President to procure the additional shipping required for the war effort. Its achievement in developing new shipyards and expanding old ones to produce a total of 55,000,000 dead-weight tons of new vessels was outstanding. Since most of these vessels were intended for military use, close collaboration was necessary between the military authorities and the Maritime Commission to insure that the right balance was maintained between troop capacity, dry cargo capacity, and bulk oil capacity. During the latter part of the war, with extensive amphibious operations against the Japanese in prospect, many specialized vessels were built to transport troops and cargoes in assault actions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff represented the armed forces in determining military shipping requirements. In order to facilitate collaboration a representative of the Maritime Commission was designated an associate member of the Joint Military Transportation Committee, which worked out programs to provide the numbers and types of vessels required to support future military undertakings. Because adequate shipping was a prerequisite to victory, the shipbuilding program was given a high priority in the allocation of steel and other scarce materials and components.

Since the Army depended heavily on the War Shipping Administration (WSA) for the allocation of ships to carry its troops and cargoes overseas and to move them between bases within the theaters, the working arrangements between the Army Chief of Transportation and the War Shipping Administration were of high importance. After an unsatisfactory start, during a period when procedures were being worked out and the supply of vessels was critically short, this relationship developed into a very successful collaboration. On the operating level, where ships and cargoes were matched, an efficient working arrangement was achieved. The Army frequently did not get the number of vessels it asked for, and it sometimes complained vigorously regarding the number of ships the WSA allocated to transport lend-lease cargoes and to support the British import program, but the policies governing these allocations were set by the President and the WSA had little latitude in carrying them out.

The most acute disagreement between the WSA and the Army came to a head in December 1942, when the civilian shipping agency obtained an order from the President directing it to assume control of the loading of military cargoes at U.S. ports. The purpose of the order was to utilize ship capacities more fully by loading a mixture of military and lend-lease cargoes, thus obtaining a better balance of light and heavy items. The Army and the Navy saw serious objections to placing the loading of military freight in the hands of a large number of civilian agents of the WSA and were successful in having the order shelved. The Army recognized the merit of the War Shipping Administration's objective, however, and arranged to co-operate with that agency more fully in mixing military and lend-lease shipments.

The domestic carriers were required under the Interstate Commerce Act to give military traffic precedence over all other types of traffic upon demand of the President. No such formal demand was made, but there was general recognition of the fact that military traffic should not be delayed. The railroads, which carried the bulk of the Army's personnel and freight, worked in very close co-operation with the Chief of Transportation and took extraordinary measures to move Army shipments promptly and to expedite them when necessary. Transportation Corps officers concerned with troop and freight movements frequently complained of delayed deliveries and unsuitable equipment, but they recognized that the railroads were confronted with severe wartime operating problems and with an unprecedented volume of civilian and military traffic.

There was a less sympathetic attitude toward the Office of Defense Transportation (ODT), which the President established soon after Pearl Harbor to exercise a broad control over all domestic transportation. The Chief of Transportation felt that the ODT was not sufficiently aggressive in arranging for the construction of additional rail and motor equipment to meet the wartime need, and that it was too slow in curtailing regular railway passenger services in order to make available more adequate transportation facilities for troops. The Director of Defense Transportation, on the other hand, censured the armed forces for their unwillingness to allow a larger amount of scarce materials to be diverted from the military programs to the construction of transportation equipment for domestic services.

When the war began there was a notable absence of established methods of co-operation between the Army and the Navy. Aside from the plan to place all military shipping under naval operation in the event of war—a plan that was not carried out—virtually nothing had been done to co-ordinate the transportation activities of the two services. Agreement was even lacking as to the assignment and equipment of vessels for joint amphibious operations. The Naval Transportation Service and the Army Transport Service were being operated entirely independently and were competing with each other for additional ships. Separate port establishments were being maintained. There was no co-ordination of domestic movements of personnel and supplies beyond that which was provided by the railroads in their own interest. Floating equipment and marine supplies were procured separately and little information was exchanged. During the war considerable progress was made in the orderly allocation of vessels to meet strategic needs, the joint use of ships and ship repair facilities, the harmonization of marine procurement programs, and the reduction of duplicate supply shipments to the theaters, but at the end of hostilities separate steamship services were still being maintained and virtually nothing had been accomplished to synchronize domestic troop and supply movements or to eliminate duplicate port operations. The traditional independence of the Army and the Navy, the fact that the control of Army shipping operations and inland traffic movements was more centralized than was the case with the Navy, and the difficulty of adopting new procedures while working under wartime pressures limited the co-operation that the two services could develop after the war had started.

The fact that the Army transportation service, established in March 1942 and converted into the Transportation Corps in the following July, was a wartime creation had a definite influence on its relations with other elements of the War Department. Aside from the necessity of developing an adequate organization in the face of wartime manpower shortages and establishing procedures to govern all phases of the wartime transportation activity, the Chief of Transportation had to define and defend his position as the chief transportation officer of the new Services of Supply (later renamed Army Service Forces).

World War I had demonstrated the need for a unified Army transportation service, and strong recommendations were made for the continuance of such a service after the war was over. But the hope that there would be no more great wars and the desire to cut government spending led Congress to disregard this recommendation when enacting the National Defense Act of 1920. As a result, World War II found transportation responsibilities scattered among several Army agencies—the Supply Division (G-4) of the General Staff, The Quartermaster General, the Chief of Engineers, the Chief of Ordnance, and the ports of embarkation. The creation of a Chief of Transportation in the War Department reorganization of 9 March 1942 did not mean that all transportation functions were placed under his control, but it did provide greater concentration of responsibility than had existed previously, and the scope of his authority was extended as the war progressed.[2]

In assuming the office of Chief of Transportation, Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Charles P. Gross had two broad objectives—to establish a service that would embrace as many of the transportation functions of the War Department as circumstances would permit, and to maintain unbroken control of troop and supply movements from their points of origin at camps, depots, and factories in the zone of interior until their arrival at the oversea ports of debarkation. There obviously was a close interrelationship between these two purposes.

The first objective was largely but not completely accomplished. After the first year of the war the Chief of Transportation was responsible for all arrangements with the commercial rail, highway, and water carriers in the zone of interior, and for the provision of shipping and the operation of ports of embarkation adequate for the Army's oversea traffic. He was responsible also for the training of troops and the procurement of equipment and supplies required for marine and rail operations in the oversea commands. The Chief of Transportation did not have control of traffic by air, which was regulated by the Army Air Forces (AAF); he found it necessary to accord to the AAF a large degree of independence in controlling its domestic freight traffic by surface carriers. The design and procurement of motor vehicles for oversea highway services remained with the Chief of Ordnance, and the organization of troop units for the operation of motor vehicles as well as the establishment of training programs and doctrine for such troops remained with The Quartermaster General.

The second objective—unbroken control of troop and supply movements from domestic origins to the oversea ports of discharge—was attained with but one exception, that is, movements by air, which were regulated by the Army Air Forces. Troop and freight movements by rail, motor, or water to the ports of embarkation and thence overseas by water were under the control of the Chief of Transportation at all points. Several proposals were made that would have disrupted this control, but the Chief of Transportation was able to block them. He held consistently to the position that continuity of control was necessary to enable his organization to co-ordinate movements to the ports of embarkation with ship schedules, and thus assure the effective loading and prompt dispatch of the vessels as well as the observance of theater priorities.

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[2] Although from April to July 1942 this official was known as the Chief of Transportation Service, the title Chief of Transportation is used uniformly in this history.

The Chief of Transportation held a unique position in the Army Service Forces (ASF) organization because of the breadth of the staff responsibilities that he had in addition to technical and operating responsibilities. The extent of his staff functions was the natural result of the position that the Transportation Corps had in the military structure—all other arms and services depended on it for mass movements of men and materiel within the zone of interior and to the oversea commands, and to a considerable extent for movements within the oversea areas. This meant that from the beginning of strategic planning the Chief of Transportation, having knowledge of the means of transportation likely to be available and their capabilities under various circumstances, held the key to many important military decisions. It meant also that his concurrence was a prerequisite to any adjustments that might have to be made in strategic plans because of unforeseen developments. The Chief of Transportation built up a strong Planning Division to aid him in performing his staff functions, and he firmly and successfully opposed a proposal put forward in the fall of 1943 to transfer that division to ASF headquarters.

The staff functions that the Chief of Transportation performed and his insistence on maintaining direct contact with the Operations Division (OPD) of the General Staff in regard to the oversea troop movements that OPD had ordered or was planning to order brought him into conflict with the ASF Director of Operations, Maj. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, on numerous occasions. This is understandable since the latter was charged with co-ordinating all ASF activities pertaining to troop and supply movements. But the Chief of Transportation was unwilling to be confined to the technical and operating aspects of transportation; or rather, he believed that his organization would not be fully and properly performing its mission if it did not bring its practical knowledge of transportation to bear on the staff work pertaining to movements. Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, commanding the Army Service Forces, recognized the merits of the positions taken by both parties to the argument, and he sought to strike a practical balance between the two rather than to rule arbitrarily against one or the other. This was fairly well accomplished, both sides yielding on some points.

The fact that the office of the Chief of Transportation was not established until March 1942 affected not only the Chief of Transportation's relations with other elements of the War Department but also his relations with the theater commanders. He had no direct responsibility for transportation operations within the theaters, but he was responsible for furnishing the oversea commanders with capable transportation officers, troop units adequately trained for transportation tasks, and marine, port, and rail equipment correctly designed for theater needs. Starting out with small resources and very limited advance planning, the Chief of Transportation found the early problems in fulfilling these responsibilities formidable. Beyond the difficulties encountered in supplying personnel and materiel, the new Chief of Transportation was handicapped by an early lack of standing with the theater commanders. It took time to acquaint them with his place in the scheme of things, the ways in which he could be of help to them, and the ways in which they could co-operate with him. General Gross devoted much time and energy to building up a satisfactory entente with the commanders of the forces overseas, and in the end he felt that his efforts had paid good dividends. A more difficult problem was that of persuading some theater commanders to accord their chief transportation officers sufficient authority to enable them to function effectively. On this point there was still room for improvement in the European theater in late 1944, and a satisfactory situation was not obtained in the Southwest Pacific until the summer of 1945.

For the fulfillment of his responsibilities in the zone of interior the Chief of Transportation built up, in addition to a headquarters organization of about 3,100 military and civilian personnel, an extensive field establishment, which in the winter of 1945 embraced personnel (not counting personnel assigned by service commands and attached troop units) totaling over 180,000. The headquarters staff dealt chiefly with the establishment of policies and procedures and the supervision of activities in the field. The field installations were the agencies through which policies and procedures approved in Washington were carried into effect either through direct operations, as at the ports of embarkation and the holding and reconsignment points, or through close relationships with the common carriers and industry, as in the case of the zone transportation offices. The procedures approved at headquarters were in large measure based on the operating experiences of the field agencies.

The port installations constituted by far the largest segment of this field establishment. The eight ports of embarkation (Boston, New York, Hampton Roads, Charleston, New Orleans, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle), the three cargo ports (Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Searsport, Maine), and the three subports (Portland, Oregon; Prince Rupert, British Columbia; and Juneau, Alaska), which were active at the end of 1944, employed more than 171,000 military and civilian personnel. The New York installation alone employed more than 55,000. The activities of the ports of embarkation were multifarious; they included the operation of shipping terminals, the operation and maintenance of Army-owned and chartered transports and harbor boats, the repair and conversion of vessels, the operation of staging areas for the housing and processing of intransit troops, the operation of storage and processing facilities for equipment and supplies, the regulation of the flow of troops and supplies to the ports in accordance with the ports' ability to transship them and with due regard to movement orders and theaters requisitions, and certain training activities. The cargo ports and subports had more limited functions.[3]

Nine zone transportation officers, as representatives of the Chief of Transportation, supervised a variety of field activities. These included holding and reconsignment points to provide intransit storage for equipment and supplies destined for oversea areas, freight consolidating stations and distributing agencies to handle less-than-carload shipments, reservation bureaus to obtain accommodations on regular trains for military personnel, railroad repair shops for the repair of Army-owned locomotives and rolling stock, and, until 1945, such procurement and depot activities as were not carried on directly by the Office of the Chief of Transportation. The zone transportation offices, the district transportation offices, which were subordinate to the zones, and the port agencies (which toward the end of the war became district transportation offices) also represented the Chief of Transportation in keeping movements of troops and supplies under observation and in expediting the flow of traffic when circumstances required it.[4]

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[3] See Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-110, for an explanation of the different types of port installations and more detailed personnel data.

The training of officers and enlisted men constituted a third group of field activities. In the early months of the war all such training was given at the ports of embarkation, but the greatly increased requirements soon necessitated the establishment of special schools and training centers. Although the Chief of Transportation believed that he should command all such training installations, under a policy adopted by ASF headquarters in 1943 some of the centers where Transportation Corps troops were trained were operated by the service commands.

A number of field procurement offices were set up in the fall of 1942 with direct responsibility to the Chief of Transportation. Before the end of the year, however, field procurement activities, as well as depot activities, were placed under the supervision of the zone transportation officers. This arrangement continued until near the end of the war; then, with the procurement program largely accomplished, these activities were detached from the zones and were placed under the direct supervision of the Chief of Transportation.

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[4] For a fuller discussion of transportation zones, see Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–23.

CHAPTER I

Army Passenger Traffic in the United States

The tremendous upsurge in military passenger traffic that took place during the war was apparent to everyone who traveled. The difficulty of obtaining seats in railway coaches and buses, the scarcity of sleeping car accommodations, and the throngs of uniformed men and women encountered in transportation terminals were unmistakable evidences. Yet the ordinary traveler had no contact with the most significant part of the military traffic—that which moved directly from installation to installation in special trains. Nor could he have any conception of the extent and complexity of the problems involved in moving large numbers of military personnel in a prompt, orderly, and economical manner by common carriers and in making the available railway and motor equipment perform maximum service.

In approaching the discussion of the Army's passenger traffic, two facts must be borne in mind. The first is that civilian as well as military travel increased as a result of the war. The booming industries called for increased business travel, and the greater income of wage earners gave rise to more travel for personal reasons. The rationing of gasoline and tires caused many owners to lay up their automobiles and use public transportation instead. Although some of the less essential passenger services were eliminated or curtailed and efforts were made to obtain a voluntary abstinence from pleasure travel, no positive restriction was placed on the citizen's right to use the services that were offered. As a result, the 1944 railway passenger traffic, measured in passenger-miles, was 334 percent greater than the annual average for the years 1935–39, and intercity motorbus traffic was 192 percent greater.

The second basic fact is that the carriers were able to make only a limited increase in services after the war began. The building of new equipment and structures was severely limited by the scarcity of materials and the higher priority given to military items. Maintaining adequate transportation operating personnel was made difficult by the manpower requirements of the armed forces and the inducements offered by other industries. Because of these limitations on the ability of the carriers to increase their services, the increased demand for passenger accommodations had to be met chiefly by a more intensive use of existing facilities.[1]

Nature and Volume of the Traffic

Army passenger traffic fell into several categories, each involving special problems and requiring special procedures. There were the larger organized troop movements, usually involving units and their organic equipment, which for the most part moved in special trains. There were the smaller organized groups that traveled chiefly on the regular rail and bus services. Military patients being transferred between hospitals or from ports of embarkation to hospitals were moved on both regular and special trains. Prisoner-of-war groups for obvious reasons were transported chiefly in special trains or special cars. The military and civilian personnel of the Army traveling as individuals on War Department transportation requests naturally used the regular services of the common carriers.[2] The same was true of most military personnel traveling while on leave or furlough, although some of this traffic was handled by special trains. The Army also arranged for the travel of military personnel of Allied nations passing through the United States and for the initial movements of persons of Japanese descent from the Pacific coast for relocation.

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[1] Wardlow, *The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations*, pp. 309–49.

The number of military passengers moved by the carriers in World War II far exceeded the number moved during any earlier period. This was necessarily true because the number of men in uniform was far greater and the plan of training required more travel.[3] Specific data are available for only certain categories of passengers. During the first eighteen months of World War II—that is, through May 1943—statistics were prepared on all passengers moved by rail, motor, air, and water on War Department requests. The total for that period was 24,490,707, and the peak month was October 1942 with 2,068,533 passengers.[4] Thereafter, as an economy measure, transportation officers in the field were no longer required to report the number of passengers moved on requests that they had issued; hence the only data covering the entire war period pertain to passengers moved in the organized groups routed by the central routing authority in Washington. During the forty-nine-month period from December 1941 through December 1945, such traffic totaled 35,848,700 passengers; the peak month was August 1945, when 1,207,100 passengers were moved.[5] Neither set of figures includes the travel of Army personnel while on furlough or leave, which was at the individual's own expense and by his own arrangement.

Since complete data for troop travel were not compiled, the exact percentage of the whole that military traffic constituted is not known, but some indicative estimates are available. For the year 1943, the Office of Price Administration estimated that the uniformed personnel of the armed services—Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—constituted 25.3 percent of the total number of passengers moved (excluding commuter travel) and that this military traffic accounted for 39.5 percent of the total passenger-miles accomplished.[6] In September 1943 the Office of Defense Transportation and the Office of War Information jointly released data indicating that, of the total number of passengers traveling on regularly scheduled trains and buses (that is, excluding special troop trains and buses), 20 percent consisted of servicemen and servicewomen in uniform traveling under orders or on leave. Of the remaining 80 percent, it was estimated that 55 percent represented essential civilian travel and 25 percent nonessential travel.[7]

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[2] The transportation request is an order on a carrier to furnish transportation to persons for official travel at government expense.

[3] During the nineteen-month period May 1917–November 1918, the railroads moved 8,875,000 passengers on WD requests on special and regular trains; during a corresponding period, December 1941–June 1943, such passengers numbered 21,754,000. See Rpt, Transportation, Comparative Data, World War I–World War II, p. 24, prepared by Contl Div OCT, Jul 43, OCT HB MPR.

[4] OCT HB Monograph 20, p. 2 and App. I. Roughly 83.8 percent of this traffic moved by rail, 16 percent by highway, and 0.2 percent by air and water.

[5] See Table 1 and Chart 1, pp. 30, 31, below. Routing procedures are explained below, pp. 25-30. Groups routed by the central routing authority in Washington were estimated to constitute between 50 and 60 percent of the total traffic moved on WD transportation requests.

Carefully worked out techniques and procedures were required to get the greatest possible use out of the rail and motor equipment available to the Army. Although considerable progress had been made with such techniques and procedures before the United States entered the war, much remained to be done to adapt them to the large and closely timed movements that then became frequent. The field maneuvers held in 1940 and 1941 gave the Army an opportunity to try out its own procedures and its working arrangements with the railroads, and also to determine how far commercial motor vehicles could be used for this purpose. The precipitate entry of the United States into a war involving action in both Atlantic and Pacific areas put these arrangements and procedures to the acid test. The results were gratifying, as General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, later testified.[8] There remained, nevertheless, many features to be developed and refined in order for the Army to execute the heavy troop movements of 1943 and 1944 with smoothness and efficiency. As an indication of the size of this undertaking, the Chief of Transportation stated that during the period of heavy traffic in the spring of 1943 a special troop train was started for every six minutes in the twenty-four-hour day.[9]

The system under which troops were inducted and trained was expensive in terms of transportation. In World War I the typical draftee made three basic moves—from home to cantonment, from cantonment to specialized training camp, and thence to port of embarkation. In World War II he made at least five moves—from home to induction station, and thence to reception center, replacement training center, unit training center, and port of embarkation—and, in addition, most soldiers were moved to specialized training centers and to training maneuver areas. Induction stations, reception centers, and replacement training centers were numerous and scattered. Specialized training centers were widely dispersed, and some training was phased, with each phase taking place at a different station. Troops and their equipment frequently were transported all the way across the continent in order to meet theater requests for certain types of units promptly. The Passenger Branch in the Office of the Chief of Transportation estimated that men shipped overseas made on the average between six and seven moves at Army expense before sailing.[10]

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[6] Exhibit A-68, before ICC, *Ex parte 148,* October 23, 1944, reproduced as App. II in OCT HB Monograph 20. As the percentages indicate, the average haul for military passengers was longer than that for the traffic as a whole.

[7] ODT Press Release 349, 3 Sep 43, OCT HB Topic ODT. These figures were released in connection with the campaign for a voluntary reduction of nonessential travel.

[8] In the *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943 . . . ,* the Chief of Staff stated that the movement of almost 600,000 troops and their impedimenta by rail during the first five weeks of the war had been accomplished "in an extremely efficient manner." See also, Memo, Marshall for the President, 3 Mar 42, sub: Troop and Cargo Mvmts, WDCSA 370.5.

[9] Statement in NBC radio broadcast, based on data from Military Transportation Section AAR, reported in *Railway Age,* May 15, 1943.

Many criticisms were leveled at the Army because of what appeared to be excessive troop movements. These criticisms originated with other government agencies, railroad officials and shippers, and soldiers who wanted fewer moves and better travel accommodations. The Army defended its troop movements and system of training and, in the beginning, denied that unnecessary moves were made. Later, the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, and his Chief of Transportation became convinced that the number of moves could be reduced without military disadvantage and requested the commanders of the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces to give the subject their attention.[11] The War Department also endeavored to eliminate unnecessary official travel by individuals and to reduce group meetings, in line with requests made to all government agencies by J. Monroe Johnson, the Director of Defense Transportation, and James F. Byrnes, the Director of War Mobilization.[12]

Several officials and divisions in the Office of the Chief of Transportation were concerned with passenger traffic. The Assistant Chief of Transportation for Operations, Brig. Gen. Robert H. Wylie, had an over-all co-ordinating responsibility. The Movements Division, headed first by Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Andrew F. McIntyre and then by Col. Donald E. Farr, was concerned especially with the movement of troops and troop equipment destined for oversea areas, and the co-ordination of inland transportation with staging arrangements at the ports of embarkation and with troop transport schedules. The Rail Division, headed for a time by Mr. Gustav Metzman, then by Col. (later Brig. Gen.) John A. Appleton, and finally by General McIntyre, represented the Chief of Transportation in his endeavor to help the railways meet their equipment and manpower problems so that adequate services could be maintained. The Highway Division, under the leadership first of Col. Frederick C. Horner and then Col. Lacey V. Murrow, performed a similar service for the bus operators. The Traffic Control Division was responsible for arrangements with the carriers regarding group and individual travel, for instructing transportation officers in the field concerning their responsibilities and assisting them when necessary, for the routing of organized movements of more than one carload, and for controlling special troop movements.

Under the Chief of Transportation the day-to-day task of arranging transportation for and supervising the movement of the Army's passenger traffic was charged to the Traffic Control Division, which was headed by Mr. (later Brig. Gen.) William J. Williamson. Under The Quartermaster

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[10] Memo, CofT for C of Adm Svs SOS, 22 Jan 43, OCT 357 New Orleans; Memo, Sp Sv Div for CofT, 11 May 43, OCT 511; Memo, Col Edmund C. R. Lasher for Gross, 1 Sep 43; Interv with Col I. Sewell Morris, 15 Aug 50 (unless otherwise indicated, all interviews were conducted by the author); last two in OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.

[11] See Wardlow, *op. cit.*, p. 348. Memo, CG SOS for CofT, 20 Jan 43, sub: Use of Rail Trans, OCT 511 Co-ordination of Troop Mvmts; Memo, CG ASF for DCofS USA, 10 Aug 43; Memo, ACofS G-3 for DCofS, 10 Aug 43; last two in WDCSA 370.5.

[12] Memo, ODT to All Government Agencies, 20 May 44; WD Memo W 55-44, 27 May 44, sub: Reduction of Unnecessary Travel; Ltr, SW to Johnson, 19 Jul 44; Ltr, Actg SW to Byrnes, 1 Feb 45; Memo, TAG for CG ASF, 5 Feb 45, sub: Curtailment of Pass Traf; all in G-4 510.

General, who managed Army traffic during peacetime, this function had been performed by the Commercial Traffic Branch, headed by Capt. (later Col.) Edmund C. R. Lasher. When responsibility for transportation and traffic was transferred from The Quartermaster General to the Chief of Transportation in March 1942, the personnel of the Commercial Traffic Branch was also transferred and it became the foundation on which the Traffic Control Division was built. Lasher then became Williamson's deputy.[13]

Working Arrangements With the Carriers

The collaboration of the common carriers and the Army was an outstanding example of team work between private industry and government in a national emergency. It was especially noteworthy because, unlike many other industries that were wholly or partially withdrawn from the civilian field in order that their capacity might be devoted to war work, the carriers continued to meet an expanding civilian demand while also filling the military need. The carriers and the Army did not always see eye to eye in regard to operating and traffic matters, but in the major endeavor—moving troops and military supplies swiftly and safely to their destinations—they achieved a high degree of understanding and co-operation.

In his negotiations with the carriers on operating and traffic matters the Chief of Transportation dealt, so far as possible, with agencies representing the respective branches of the industry, rather than with the individual lines. This not only was advantageous from the standpoint of conducting negotiations and arriving at uniform agreements, but it also facilitated the pooling of the equipment of many carriers to meet the large military requirements.

Fortunately the railroads, which carried the bulk of the Army's passenger traffic, were well organized for this purpose. The Association of American Railroads, with headquarters in Washington, represented lines controlling 97.5 percent of the total railroad mileage. Its Car Service Division, with Warren C. Kendall as manager, exercised a broad influence over the distribution and employment of the passenger cars owned by those lines. The Military Transportation Section of the Car Service Division, managed during the greater part of the war by Arthur H. Gass and later by John J. Kelly, was designed to deal exclusively with the requirements of the armed forces, and during the war it was conveniently located adjacent to the Traffic Control Division in the Pentagon. In passenger traffic matters the railroads were represented by seven territorial passenger associations — New England, Trunk Line, Central, Southern, Southwestern, Western, and Transcontinental—and by the Interterritorial Military Committee on which each territorial association was represented. This committee, with Hugh W. Siddall as chairman, maintained headquarters in Chicago and was the channel through which most rate and traffic matters were handled between the Army and the railroads.[14]

The common carriers by bus were not as fully or effectively organized as the railroads since they constituted a much newer branch of the transportation industry and many small operators were concerned only with local business. The National

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[13] Williamson had been general traffic manager of a large mail-order house and was one of a number of civilian experts who were brought into the TC organization to give it the benefit of their experience with transportation and traffic.

[14] Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 312-14.

Association of Motor Bus Operators, with headquarters in Washington, and the National Bus Traffic Association and National Bus Military Bureau, located in Chicago, were convenient channels through which the Army could negotiate with the operators, but their memberships were limited and they were much less influential than the corresponding organizations in the rail field. The use of the commercial airlines for military passenger traffic was small enough that no special organizations to deal with such traffic were needed.[15]

The working arrangements regarding traffic by rail were incorporated in two basic agreements that were negotiated annually between the territorial passenger associations and the armed forces. The Joint Military Passenger Agreement was the more comprehensive. In addition to fare reductions (called allowances in the agreement), it covered arrangements relating to special cars and special trains, the transportation of military baggage and impedimenta, the transportation of the bodies of deceased military personnel, the use of baggage cars as kitchen cars for troop trains, and the routing of traffic. The Joint Military Passenger Equalization Agreement, which was effective concurrently with the Joint Military Passenger Agreement and considered a part of it, committed carriers that were not required by law to allow 50 percent land-grant deductions from commercial fares in favor of military passengers to allow equal deductions on corresponding routes, with specified exceptions.[16] The so-called land-grant rates, a much controverted subject, had their origin in the Land Grant Acts by which federal lands were ceded to the railroads during their developmental period. The allowances other than land-grant deductions, applicable to both land-grant and non-land-grant routes, were made by the carriers under Section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act. A few coastwise steamship lines with which the railroads had through-booking arrangements were parties to both agreements.

The Joint Military Passenger Agreement included separate fare provisions for military traffic and nonmilitary traffic. Military traffic embraced chiefly commissioned officers, warrant officers, nurses, and enlisted personnel of the U.S. armed forces on active duty, and the allowance on such traffic was 5 percent from the commercial one-way fares for all classes of travel between points between which no land-grant deductions were applicable, and 3 percent from the one-way net fares on routes that were subject to land-grant deductions. Nonmilitary traffic included several categories of persons who were not on active military duty but whose transportation was paid entirely by the U.S. armed forces, and the allowance on such traffic was 5 percent from one-way commercial fares in all classes.

The several classes of transportation affected by the fare reductions accorded by the Joint Military Passenger Agreement were designated first class (standard sleeper and parlor car), intermediate class (tourist sleeper), coach class, and mixed class (combination of coach and sleeper). Since the Army's policy was to accomplish overnight troop movements in tourist sleepers rather than in standard sleepers, it benefited from the railroads' agreement to accept intermediate-class fares on many routes west of the Mississippi on which such fares were not ordinarily available. The railroads did not accept the intermediate-class fares east of the Mississippi, but collected the first-class fare for all troops moved in sleepers, standard or tourist, subject of course to the agreed allowances.[17]

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[15] OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 102, 197, 203, 265.

[16] The last agreements during the war were JMPA 22 and JMPEA 22, both effective 1 July 1945. For the historical background of these agreements, see Comments Prepared by Representatives of the War Department, Navy Department, and Marine Corps, October 15, 1930, on Senate Bill 4447, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., OCT HB Topic Mil Pass Agreements.

One of the advantages that the railroads gained under the Joint Military Passenger Agreement was the privilege of suggesting the routes on which the traffic of the armed forces should move. This enabled them to distribute the traffic on a basis that the carriers accepted as equitable. The Joint Military Passenger Equalization Agreement enabled the territorial passenger associations, which were responsible for the satisfactory distribution of such traffic, to perform that function without the complications that would have arisen if it had been necessary to take land-grant and non-land-grant fares into consideration in working out each routing. The equalization agreement also eliminated the necessity of routing traffic on circuitous land-grant routes in order to meet the government's insistence on the lowest net fare, and in that respect was advantageous to both the carriers and the armed forces. To the carriers the routing privilege was an essential feature of the agreement, and they sometimes referred to it as the justification for the fare allowances that they made. The armed forces, however, had the right under the agreements to reject a suggested routing when it appeared to be unduly circuitous or otherwise disadvantageous from a military standpoint.[18]

Another important feature of the Joint Military Passenger Agreement from the standpoint of the railroads was the clause that defined the conditions under which the armed forces might use carriers other than those parties to the agreement. In peacetime and for a period after the United States began to rearm, this clause committed the armed forces to using the services of the railway and coastwise steamship lines for all movements except when those services were "inadequate to meet the military necessity of the Government." As long as this clause was in effect, the possibility of moving troops by commercial bus or air lines was exceedingly limited. Effective 1 July 1941, the clause was modified to permit the armed forces to use motor and air carriers whenever they were able, in the judgment of the officers arranging the transportation, to provide "more satisfactory service to meet the military requirements of the Government." But even under the modified clause the railroads were in a preferred position with respect to military traffic.[19]

Fare concessions were the key feature of the Joint Military Passenger Agreement from the Army's standpoint. The Army started negotiations for greater concessions from the railroads soon after the emergency began. Whereas the railroads always had contended that the routing privilege was the feature that justified fare concessions beyond the land-grant deductions, the Army traditionally had stressed the volume and character of its traffic as the justification for such concessions.

At a conference in December 1940, when the renewal of the agreement for the next fiscal year was being discussed, the Army representative requested an increase in the allowance on fares affected by land-grant deductions from 3 to 12 percent, and on other fares from 5 to 15 percent. The Army's arguments were that military traffic had increased many times since the beginning of the emergency, that this traffic came to the railroads without the usual expense of solicitation, and that troop movements permitted the use of railway cars with an intensity that was not possible in regular traffic. The carriers did not accede to this request. They contended that, while troop traffic permitted them some economies, it also entailed special arrangements and extraordinary expenses.[20]

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[17] OCT HB Monograph 21, p. 27; WD CTB 6, 27 Jun 44, pars. 3, 4, 5, 6; JMPA 22, Sec. 7(4).

[18] JMPA 22, Sec. 27.

[19] JMPA 17, effective 1 Jul 40, Sec. 6, par. 3; JMPA 18, 1 Jul 41, corresponding par. See OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 183–93, for circumstances leading to this change.

The Chief of Transportation continued the effort to obtain greater fare allowances from the railroads to the end of the war, but without success. The last move in that direction—made in September 1945—was aimed at the situation east of the Mississippi, where the railroads collected first-class fares for troops moving in either tourist or standard sleepers and where land-grant deductions were applicable to only a limited number of lines. General Gross argued that the railroads should not get a greater revenue from a sleeper carrying soldiers than from one carrying civilians. He pointed out that, although the Army placed 40 to 50 percent more passengers in a car than was possible with civilian traffic, the reduction allowed to the Army under the Joint Military Passenger Agreement was only 5 percent. He accordingly instructed General Williamson to undertake a renegotiation of fares on the basis of that principle.[21] Williamson left the Army during the following month, and Gross retired at the end of November 1945, up to which time the fare allowances under the Joint Military Passenger Agreement remained unchanged. Before the end of 1945 Congress took action to abolish land-grant deductions, and an entirely new military rate agreement then had to be negotiated.

The abolition of land-grant rates came as the culmination of a struggle in which the War Department and the railroads were on opposite sides. The carriers long had contended that the government's grants of land to western and southern lines in the third quarter of the nineteenth century to encourage the extension of rail facilities and the settlement of new territories no longer justified the deduction of 50 percent from normal charges when government passengers and freight were hauled.[22] The War Department was reluctant to assume the added transportation expense that the discontinuance of the deductions would entail.[23] This attitude was reflected in the Transportation Act of 1940, which abolished land-grant deductions for other types of government traffic but retained them for "military or naval property of the United States moving for military or naval and not for civil use," and for "members of the military or naval forces . . . traveling on official duty."[24]

The question of total abolition of land-grant rates again came before Congress during the war, and again the War Department opposed such action. It cited the favorable financial position of the carriers resulting from the heavy wartime traffic, as well as the huge additional cost to the Army, which the Chief of Transportation estimated would be about $200,000,000 on passenger and freight traffic during a war year. The War Department, however, indicated that "at another time and under other conditions" a different situation might obtain, and when the question came to a decision soon after the end of hostilities the department acquiesced.[25] The abolition of land-grant rates, effective 1 October 1946, considerably simplified the arrangements between the armed forces and the railroads regarding transportation charges, and in the Joint Military Passenger Agreement that became effective concurrently with the new law, the fare reduction allowed to the armed forces was 10 percent from commercial fares in all classes.[26]

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[20] OCT HB Monographs 6, pp. 204-07; and 21, pp. 28-31.

[21] Memo, CofT for Williamson, 5 Sep 45, sub: Passenger Rates for Mil Travel, OCT HB Gross Day File.

[22] For the railroads' position, see Robert S. Henry, "The Railroad Land Grant Legend in American History Texts," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXII, September 1945, pp. 177-94.

[23] Ltr, Actg SW to Chm House Com on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 11 Jun 38, G-4/24801-2.

[24] PL 785, 76th Cong., Title III, Pt. II, Sec. 321(a).

Although the armed forces did not obtain greater percentage allowances on railroad passenger fares during the war, they were successful in adding to the categories of passengers eligible for the allowances.[27] The scope of the term "military traffic" was broadened to include enlisted reservists recalled to active duty, certain female personnel of the Medical Department of the Army, and members of the Women's Army Corps. The coverage of the term "nonmilitary traffic" was extended to include (when traveling on transportation requests of the armed forces) retired and discharged military personnel returning to their homes, personnel of the American Red Cross, officers of the Army Specialist Corps, student nurses (civilians), military personnel of nations receiving aid under the Lend-Lease Act, and alien enemies, prisoners of war, and other interned persons.[28]

The allowances granted under the Joint Military Passenger Agreement applied only to railroad fares, not to space rates in Pullman cars. The Pullman Company was not a party to this agreement but separately made certain concessions to the armed forces. It agreed to provide standard sleepers for group movements of enlisted men when no tourist sleepers were available and to accept tourist sleeper berth rates in such cases. It permitted tourist sleepers to operate and tourist berth rates to apply in the eastern and southeastern territories, even though there were no regular tourist sleeper services in those territories. The Pullman Company permitted the drawing rooms of tourist sleepers to be occupied at the regular berth rates when the cars were being used for military movements. It also accepted the berth rate for the shortest route between two points when troops were routed over a longer route under the Joint Military Passenger Equalization Agreement.[29]

Since the Army aimed to move troops by special trains whenever practicable, the conditions under which such arrangements would be made by the railroads were of considerable importance. At the beginning of the war the carriers' tariffs required a minimum of 100 first-class fares, or equivalent revenue, for the operation of a special train. This meant more than 100 fares when the troops were moving in coaches or tourist sleepers, and the Chief of Transportation sought a reduction. The result was that during the greater part of the war the minimum for a special train was 75 first-class fares where no land-grant deductions were involved, and 90 first-class fares on land-grant routes.[30]

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[25] Ltrs, SW to Chm House Com on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and Chm Senate Com on Interstate Commerce, 6 Apr 44, AG 500 (6-2-37)(1) Trans by Rail; Memo, CofT for USW, 2 Aug 44, OCT HB Gross Day File; Senate Com on Interstate Commerce and House Com on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, *Hearings on HR 4184*, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., March 16–23, 1944; Ltr, SW to Chm Senate Com on Interstate Commerce, 3 Jul 45; Ltr, SW to Dir Bur of Budget, 6 Dec 45; last two in AG 500 (26 Mar 45)(1); PL 256, 79th Cong., approved 12 Dec 45.

[26] JMPA 23, 1 Oct 46, Sec. 6(1).

[27] OCT HB Monographs 6, p. 206; and 21, pp. 3–5. The voluminous correspondence regarding changes in JMPA is filed in OCT 551.1 JMPA.

[28] JMPA 22, Secs. 3, 4.

[29] OCT HB Monograph 21, p. 27; Ltr, DC of Traf Contl Div OCT to Pullman Co., 26 Jul 45, and reply, 2 Aug 45, both in OCT 510 Trans of Parties; WD CTB 6, revised 9 Jun 45, Sec. V.

Conditions relating to the furnishing of special cars on regular trains were not incorporated in the Joint Military Passenger Agreement but were covered by informal arrangements. The minimum requirement for special sleepers for military movements was fifteen passengers. The Army requested the railroads to make the same arrangement for special coaches and also sought to have this feature covered in the JMPA, but was only partially successful. The railroads declined to commit themselves without qualification to furnish special coaches; however, they agreed to do so for the handling of prisoners of war and internees for whom special coaches obviously were necessary and stated that they would furnish special coaches for troops to the extent of their ability. The minimum requirement for special coaches was fixed at twenty-two and a half fares.[31]

The arrangements concerning the movement of troop impedimenta were evolved in practice rather than fixed by agreement. The railroads agreed to equalize the land-grant freight rates so that impedimenta could move with troops at the lowest net freight charge, but no agreement was reached with regard to special trains for this purpose.[32] The Army found it advantageous when large units were moving to ship the personal baggage and the organizational equipment in advance by special freight trains and the troops in special troop trains, rather than to move both in mixed trains. But the Army did not accept the railroads' contention that the payment for a special impedimenta train should be on the same basis as for a mixed train—that is, a minimum number of passenger fares in addition to the appropriate freight charges. When negotiations became deadlocked, the Army announced that it no longer would request special trains for troop impedimenta but would allow the carriers to determine whether they could best handle the impedimenta in mixed trains with troops, or in regular freight trains for which only freight charges would be assessed.[33] As it worked out, most separate impedimenta trains moved as regular freight trains, and in emergency cases where the Army requested special freight train service, it paid the usual additional charge for such service.

The Army and the railroads also were at odds concerning liability for the personal effects of troops—principally barracks bags, bedrolls, and foot lockers—which were carried as baggage. When troops used regular trains, such baggage up to 150 pounds per person was checked in the usual manner and the railroads assumed the usual liability. When larger movements took place, the baggage was transported in bulk (unchecked) in unattended baggage cars, and in such instances the carriers objected to assuming full liability. They proposed that a clause be inserted in the Joint Military Passenger Agreement limiting their liability to $25.00 per person on unchecked baggage, with a total liability of $2,500 per baggage car, unless additional liability was assumed under an insurance arrangement. The Army refused to accept this tender, and no such limitation on the carriers' liability was included in the wartime agreements.[34]

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[30] OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 47–51; JMPA 22, Sec. 18(3).

[31] OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 61–62; WD CTB 22, 29 June 44, Sec. 1.

[32] OQMG Cir Ltr 157, 16 Jul 41, sub: Equalization of Rates on Trans of Imped; Memo, IMC for CofT, *et al.*, 22 Jun 42, OCT 551.2 Mil Imped.

[33] Ltr, IMC to CofT, *et al.*, 29 Jun 43; Ltrs, OCT to IMC, 2 Sep 43 and 12 Oct 43; all in OCT 551.1 JMPA 20.

Providing meals for troops traveling by rail gave rise to a number of problems after heavy movements began. The first problem involved the question whether troops using regular trains should be provided with cash or with tickets to cover their meals when rations in kind (food boxes) were not furnished. Both the carriers and the Traffic Control Division in Washington favored the use of tickets, since troops often spent the subsistence allowance in other ways and the railroads found that they had provided food for customers that did not appear. The War Department, while directing that tickets "ordinarily" would be used, nevertheless left it to the officer ordering each movement to determine whether tickets or cash should be provided, on the ground that there were occasions when it was inadvisable or impracticable to use meal tickets.[35] This meant that there was lack of uniformity in regard to movements originating with field installations, and the impractical method of giving troops a cash allowance to cover meals en route continued in use.

A more serious problem involved the decision whether troops would use the regular dining car service or would be fed from troop kitchen cars attached to regular trains. Although the subsistence of troops was a Quartermaster function and the subject was covered in the Quartermaster series of War Department regulations, the Chief of Transportation took an active interest because of the bearing that the question had on troop morale and discipline. In the early part of the war when the decision whether or not to attach troop kitchen cars to trains was left to the commanding officers of the installations originating the movements, it often happened that provision was not made for kitchen cars when large numbers of troops were moving and that the regular dining cars were unable to accommodate both civilians and soldiers. Under such circumstances there was likely to be a disorderly scramble for food at each stop along the route. The regulation accordingly was changed so that kitchen cars were required for all movements of 100 or more military personnel involving a journey of twenty-four hours or more duration. They might be used for movements of smaller size or shorter duration if the railroads could provide them.[36]

At the outset the Army had no special kitchen cars. The railroads therefore agreed to furnish without charge, for each 250 troops or fraction thereof (but not for less than 100), an empty baggage car in which the Army could install kitchen equipment. The early practice was to remove the kitchen equipment at the end of each trip and ship it back to the station of origin and to return the car to the railroad. When troop movements became a constant operation, the installation and removal of kitchen equipment was found to be both time-consuming and costly, and the wear and tear on the cars was considerable. The establishment of a permanent pool of converted baggage cars was then proposed, but the need for cars in regular baggage service placed limits on the execution of the plan. The situation was relieved when the government began to acquire special troop kitchen cars. Nevertheless, baggage cars were needed for kitchen purposes to the end of the war, and the somewhat complicated arrangements concerning their employment were detailed in the Joint Military Passenger Agreement.[37]

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[34] OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 92–93; JMPA 22, Sec. 23.

[35] WD Cir 209, 6 Oct 41; AR 30-2215, 1 Feb 44, par. 2; OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 256–68.

[36] AR 30-2215, 14 Jun 43, par. 2; AR 30-2215, 1 Feb 44, par. 2, and Changes 2, 27 Jul 45; OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 81–83.

Special arrangements were necessary in connection with the operation of the government-owned troop sleepers and troop kitchen cars that began to enter service late in 1943. The first order for 1,200 troop sleepers and 400 troop kitchen cars was placed by the Defense Plant Corporation in March 1943, and a duplicate order was placed in May 1945.[38] The troop sleepers provided berths for thirty persons, in ten tiers of three berths each, arranged crosswise. Although the cars were of simplified design and the facilities were utilitarian, the troop sleepers were adequate and they were far preferable to coaches for overnight travel. The troop kitchen cars also were of simplified design, but they were well equipped and were a great improvement over converted baggage cars. The underlying purpose in the construction of both types of cars was to provide additional troop train equipment with a minimum expenditure of scarce materials and production time.[39]

The operating arrangements pertaining to these government-owned cars were covered by interlocking contracts between the Defense Plant Corporation and the Pullman Company, and between the Association of American Railroads and the Pullman Company.[40] Briefly stated, the arrangements were as follows: The railroads paid a mileage rate and the Pullman Company paid a rental fee to the Defense Plant Corporation for the use of the cars. The Pullman Company operated and maintained the troop sleepers in much the same manner as it operated and maintained its owned equipment. The Pullman Company assigned the troop kitchen cars to service in accordance with the needs of the armed forces, and was responsible for their maintenance as railroad equipment at the expense of the Defense Plant Corporation; the armed forces provided and maintained the kitchen equipment, provided the kitchen supplies and mess crews, and were responsible for interior cleaning.

The principal traffic arrangements between the armed forces and the carriers regarding the use of troop sleepers and troop kitchen cars were included in a spe-

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[37] WD Cir 181, 27 Aug 41, Sec. III; AR 55-135, 31 Aug 42, par. 2; JMPA 22, 1 Jul 45, Sec. 24; OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 51-58.

[38] Circumstances leading to the placement of these orders are discussed in Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 333-34.

[39] These special sleepers and kitchen cars were of all-steel construction, 54 feet-2 inches long over the bumpers, and had no vestibules. They had two 4-wheel high-speed trucks and were equipped for operation in regular passenger train service. For further technical details, see file OCT HB Rail Div Troop Sleepers and Kitchen Cars.

[40] Both contracts were published in a pamphlet, Special Troop Car Contracts, OCT HB Rail Div Troop Sleepers and Kitchen Cars.

SPECIALLY DESIGNED GOVERNMENT-OWNED TROOP SLEEPERS *and troop kitchen cars en route to a port.*

cial agreement published each year in connection with the Joint Military Passenger Agreement but not as a part of it.[41] For transportation in troop sleepers the armed forces paid the railroads fares equal to two thirds of the normal one-way first-class fares, except that when such fares were greater than the net military fares under JMPA the lesser fares were applicable.[42] For Pullman service the armed forces paid the Pullman Company a troop sleeper berth rate equal to one third of the sum of the lower and upper berth rates applicable to tourist sleeping cars. The agreement provided that the Pullman Company would assign troop sleepers only when tourist sleepers were not available, but because of the urgent need both types were continuously in use.

To cover the movement of kitchen cars, the armed forces paid the carriers (railroads and Pullman Company) a rate of six cents a mile regardless of whether the cars were moving in service or out of service. In addition, members of the military mess crews of kitchen cars paid fares according to the class of the cars in which they had passenger accommodations. Requests for the assignment of kitchen cars were made to the Pullman Company by the several armed services when they arranged for coaches or sleepers to move their troops. An Army officer was detailed to the Pullman Company headquarters in Chicago to co-ordinate these requests and eliminate unnecessary deadhead mileage. By agreement among the armed services a deadhead movement of a kitchen car was charged to the service for which the last in-service movement of the car was made.[43]

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[41] Joint Agreement T 3, 14 Apr 45, published with JMPA 22, embraced changes to date in original agreement of 11 March 1943.

[42] Troop sleeper railroad fares were applicable throughout the country, although tourist (intermediate) fares applied only west of the Mississippi.

During the war the Army built up a fleet of 320 hospital cars and 60 medical kitchen cars, and separate arrangements were made covering the operation of this equipment over the carriers' lines and the fares to be paid for the transportation of patients and attendants.[44] The terms that the Chief of Transportation accepted after long negotiation and after some of the hospital cars were already in service were not satisfactory to him, and he made repeated efforts to have them modified. He argued that the railroads should not get a greater revenue from the government-owned hospital cars than for moving patients in Pullman cars. The railroads were unwilling to meet his proposal that they either pay a mileage rate to the government or reduce the fares, but they finally agreed to assume certain routine servicing charges retroactively.[45] After the war special arrangements were made between the Army and the railroads concerning the use of 118 government-owned mortuary cars, which were employed for transporting the remains of World War II dead after repatriation from overseas.[46]

Early in the emergency the railroads, acting on their own initiative, granted reduced rates to members of the armed forces traveling at their own expense while on furlough, leave, or pass. Initially the reductions varied in the different territories and they were offered only for limited periods. The War Department urged the railroads to adopt uniform rates and to make the reductions effective for the entire war period. Eventually this was done.[47] A round-trip coach fare of one and a quarter cents a mile, good for thirty days from date of sale, was allowed to members of the armed forces traveling in uniform and holding furlough fare identification certificates. This fare was less than the average that the government paid for troops making official moves.[48] Several bills were introduced in Congress proposing greater reductions on furlough tickets, but they were not passed. The War Department considered the fares adopted voluntarily by the railroads to be equitable and did not favor forcing the carriers to furnish this service at a loss. The department also opposed a plan to have furloughees pay one cent a mile and the government pay the remainder of the tariff fares.[49]

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[43] OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 32-36, 74-80. Concerning requests for assignment of kitchen cars, see Memo, CofT for 6th ZTO, 30 Jun 43, OCT 531.2 Troop Sleepers and Kitchen Cars.

[44] Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 381-91; OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 36-38; WD Memo W 55-33-43, 10 Aug 43, sub: Trans of Hosp Cars and Trains.

[45] Ltr, DC of Traf Contl Div to W. C. Kendall, Chm Car Service Div AAR, 31 Jul 43, OCT 080 AAR; Ltr, CofT to John J. Pelley, Pres AAR, 10 May 45, OCT 531.4 Hosp Train; Ltrs, C of Rail Div OCT for Charles H. Buford, Vice Pres AAR, 16 and 30 May 45, OCT 080 AAR; Ltr, AAR to C of Rail Div OCT, 30 Jun 45, OCT HB Rail Div Hosp Cars.

[46] Ltr, IMC to CofT, 3 Sep 47, OCT HB Rail Div Mortuary Cars.

[47] OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 210-13.

[48] Ltr, SW to Sen H. Styles Bridges, 30 Jun 41; Ltr, Adm Asst to SW to Sen W. Lee O'Daniel, 1 Apr 42; both in OSW Trans 501-800; WD Cir 350, 28 Aug 44, Sec. VIII; WD Cir 103, 3 Apr 45, Sec. V.

[49] Ltr, SW to Rep Andrew J. May, 14 Jul 41; Ltr, SW to Sen Burton K. Wheeler, 10 Mar 42; both in OSW Trans 501-800.

The question was raised whether under Section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act the railroads had authority to allow fare reductions to members of the armed forces when they were traveling at their own expense. This question was removed by an act of Congress, passed in September 1944, which authorized special furlough fares.[50]

The general policy of the bus lines was to allow special furlough fares, but there was no uniformity in the fares available in different sections of the country because of the varying rate structures. The War Department accordingly instructed servicemen and servicewomen to apply to local representatives of the motor carriers regarding the availability and the amount of furlough fares.[51]

The railroads transported most of the troops and the working arrangements between them and the armed forces were complicated; only the basic features have been mentioned. No simple set of rules could cover the many departures from regular tariffs and regular operating practices that were involved in the handling of military traffic. The arrangements also fluctuated because the underlying circumstances changed radically when the United States undertook a large rearmament program in 1940, and again when the nation became engaged in a global war. Although there were many disagreements between the carriers and the Army regarding terms and conditions, these disagreements did not affect the actual movement of military personnel. From that standpoint the Chief of Transportation, representing the Army, and the Military Transportation Section, representing the railroads, literally worked side by side and were in constant contact on all matters affecting movements, so that these matters were dealt with promptly, and in the great majority of cases satisfactorily for the Army.[52]

Army Policies and Procedures

The Army's policy regarding the management of its passenger traffic was essentially one of centralization. The regulations and instructions covering all aspects of this traffic were issued by the War Department, and they reflected chiefly the experience and doctrine of the Chief of Transportation. He was responsible for all negotiations with the carriers relating to services, charges, and other traffic arrangements. All agencies of the War Department in Washington were directed to apply to him for information on such matters and to avoid maintaining duplicate staffs.[53] All of the larger organized groups of Army personnel were routed under the supervision of the Chief of Transportation, and he arranged with the carriers for the necessary equipment and controlled the timing of the movements within limits allowed by the movement orders. This policy of centralization was maintained throughout the war despite objections in some quarters and proposals to modify it.

The efforts to alter the policy came from two sources. During the summer of 1942 a survey of the service commands, conducted by the Control Division of the Services of Supply headquarters, disclosed a sentiment in favor of delegating certain authorities from Washington to the field, including the authority to route group movements. The Chief of Transportation successfully opposed the decentralization of routing; he argued that central control was necessary to insure the economical use of the carriers' equipment, to obtain an equitable and practical distribution of traffic among the carriers, to facilitate the control and diversion of movements en route, and to permit a national program to be formulated and timely notice to be given to the carriers concerning prospective requirements for their services.[54] The Army Air Forces, which late in 1942 had obtained a delegation of authority from the Chief of Transportation to control its own domestic freight movements, suggested that a similar arrangement be made with regard to passenger traffic. This suggestion was made informally on a number of occasions to the Traffic Control Division, but it received no encouragement from that quarter and probably for that reason it was not put forward on a higher level.[55]

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[50] PL 436, 78th Cong., 27 Sep 44. Ltr, Armed Forces to IMC, 8 Nov 46, OCT 551.1 Furlough Fares, reviewed development of furlough fares and requested continuance.

[51] WD Cir 350, 28 Aug 44, Sec. VIII, par. 2.

[52] The methods of this collaboration and the major difficulties will be discussed in later sections of this chapter.

[53] AR 55-105, 29 Dec 42, par. 2. Essentially the same policy was followed concerning freight traffic, as will be seen in Ch. IV, below.

The regulation relating to the size of groups to be routed in Washington was changed several times during the emergency. Initially all groups of fifteen or more were routed by The Quartermaster General. When the Selective Service Act was passed in September 1940, it was foreseen that group travel would increase greatly. The regulation was therefore changed so that only groups numbering fifty or more would be routed in Washington. The primary purpose of this change was to remove the possibility of delay in the movement of the smaller groups while routings were being obtained from Washington, and to lighten the burden on The Quartermaster General. In January 1943 the regulation was changed again, and routings for groups of forty or more were thereafter provided by the Chief of Transportation, who in the meantime had taken over this responsibility from The Quartermaster General. Under the Army plan of berthing, up to thirty-nine passengers could be accommodated in a sleeping car, and the last change was prompted by the desire to have centralized routing for all movements involving more than one carload. When a group was not sufficiently large to require routing in Washington, the Army transportation officers at the originating stations made arrangements for the shipments with local representatives of the carriers.[56]

Routings provided by the Chief of Transportation were established by his Traffic Control Division on the basis of proposals made by the territorial passenger associations of the railroads. These associations had representatives in Washington attached to the Military Transportation Section of the Association of American Railroads. As has been indicated, the main purpose of the associations in proposing routings was to insure proper distribution of the traffic among the rail lines. When the Army regulation was changed in September 1940 to permit the local routing of groups comprising up to forty-nine men, rather than up to fourteen, the railroads protested on the ground that permitting this considerable traffic to be routed by local Army transportation officers would result in an inequitable distribution of business. As a result of this protest, arrangements were made that, when moving groups of from fifteen to forty-nine, the local transportation officers would obtain suggested routings from designated representatives of the carriers located at or near their installations, who in turn would be governed by instructions from the responsible associations.[57] Frequently this representative was the nearest agent of a railroad serving the installation, but full-time agents of the territorial passenger associations were assigned to stations where traffic was especially heavy.

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[54] Memo, CG SOS for CofT, 24 Jul 42, sub: Decentralization of Actions; Memo, C of Traf Contl Div OCT for CofT, 30 Jul 42; both in OCT 323.3 SvCs.

[55] Interv with Morris, 26 Jun 50, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.

[56] AR 30-930, 6 Nov 30, par. 8; WD Cir 101, 12 Sep 40, Sec. II; AR 55-130, 28 Dec 42, par. 8; WD Cir 28, 22 Jan 43, Sec. IV. The commonest type of sleeper had twelve sections and one drawing room, and the total of thirty-nine resulted from placing three enlisted men in each section and three in the drawing room.

The arrangements under which the territorial passenger associations proposed routings for the larger group movements relieved the Chief of Transportation of a heavy responsibility, but they also created a problem. The Chief of Transportation could reject a proposed routing if he considered it unsatisfactory from the military standpoint, in which case the association concerned endeavored to meet his objection.[58] More often the objection originated with the Military Transportation Section because it anticipated difficulty in providing equipment. If the association resisted changing the route, the Traffic Control Division was placed in the cross fire of an argument between the two agencies of the railroads representing the operating and the traffic points of view. Col. I. Sewell Morris, who was in charge of the Passenger Branch of the Traffic Control Division during the greater part of the war, expressed the opinion that when such a situation arose the manager of the MTS should have had authority to decide the issue for the railroads, since the prompt execution of the movement was the primary consideration.[59]

Differences between the operating and traffic interests of the railroads came out in another connection. The Army stated as a general principle that passengers would be forwarded by the "most economical usually traveled routes." [60] The primary purpose was to insure that advantage would be taken of land-grant rates wherever they were applicable. In peacetime there was no occasion for deviation from the principle, but during the war there were times when the most economical routes were congested and other routes were more favorable to expeditious movement. The Military Transportation Section urged the avoidance of congested routes and the Chief of Transportation supported that view. The territorial passenger associations, on the other hand, favored the "usually traveled routes," partly because their plans for the distribution of traffic among the lines were worked out on the basis of such routings, and partly because the railroads could not collect higher fares from the government when they proposed other routes. Here again the Traffic Control Division contended that, when the operating and traffic interests of the carriers were in conflict, the operating point of view should govern.[61]

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[57] Ltr, OQMG to IMC, 28 Sep 40; Ltr, IMC to TQMG, 19 Oct 40; both in OCT 511 (AR 30-930).

[58] The associations did not always take such rejections without an argument. See Memo, Morris for Siddall, Chm IMC, 2 May 44, OCT 511; OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 17, 18.

[59] See Colonel Morris' monograph, Adequacy of Transportation Facilities in the United States to Handle Troop Movements of the Military Establishment During a War Emergency, submitted to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 25 Feb 49, p. 52; hereafter cited as Morris monograph.

[60] AR 55-105, 29 Dec 42, par. 4*a*.

Decision as to the type of carrier to be used in moving military personnel was made by the routing authority—the Traffic Control Division for the larger groups, and post transportation officers for smaller groups and individuals. Guiding principles for such decisions were set forth in instructions issued by the War Department and the Chief of Transportation. In the summer of 1941 the railroads had reluctantly consented to the change in the agreement between the armed forces and the railroads that permitted greater use of the bus lines and airlines than had been possible previously. Afterwards they complained repeatedly when they had reason to believe that the new clause in the agreement was being misapplied to the advantage of the motor carriers. These complaints involved chiefly routings by local transportation officers, and late in 1941 railway representatives suggested that these officers be instructed to confer with the rail agents near their stations before using any other type of transportation. The Army transportation officials in Washington refused to go along with this suggestion, but they investigated each specific complaint made by the railroads and in general endeavored to see that the spirit of the agreement was carried out.[62]

The question of bus versus rail routing was particularly acute in connection with the transportation of selectees. Soon after the passage of the Selective Service Act in September 1940, the Army and the Selective Service System agreed that the latter agency would be responsible for the transportation of men from their homes or draft boards to the induction stations, while the Army through its regular transportation machinery would control subsequent movements.[63] The traffic into the induction stations consequently did not come under the Joint Military Passenger Agreement between the armed forces and the railroads. Buses were well adapted to handle it since the groups were small and the distances usually were short. Selective Service therefore entered into an agreement concerning such movements with the motor carriers through the National Bus Traffic Association. Meanwhile, to facilitate rail movements from induction stations to reception centers, the Interterritorial Military Committee of the railroads established blanket routings, which dispensed with the necessity of obtaining a routing for each group. Close collaboration between Army transportation officers and the Selective Service System was necessary in order to keep the selectees moving promptly through the induction stations. As a result of this collaboration, groups that the railroads believed should have been routed by rail were routed out of the stations by bus. In this case, as in others, the Chief of Transportation issued instructions designed to promote strict observance of the agreement with the rail carriers.[64]

The Army's use of commercial buses increased steadily after the United States entered the war. There were many points that were not served directly by rail. Moreover, routing by highway was encouraged by the Traffic Control Division when short hauls were involved because of the quicker delivery given by the motor carriers, their flexibility due to freedom from fixed terminals, and the limited supply of railroad passenger equipment. The use of buses for long trips and for large groups was not favored because of the lack of sleeping facilities, problems of messing en route when troop units were being moved, and the limited space available for baggage that accompanied the troops. It was the general policy that, except under emergency conditions, routings by highway would be limited to trips that started after 6:00 A.M. and ended before the following midnight.[65]

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[61] Interv with Morris, 28 Jun 50, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.

[62] OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 13, 14, 16. See also Ltr, Western Mil Bur to CofT, 16 Feb 44, sub: Use of Buses versus RRs, and subsequent correspondence, OCT 511.

[63] See AR 615-500, 1 Sep 42, par. 12.

[64] OCT HB Monographs 6, pp. 264-69; 20, pp. 58-63; 21, pp. 20-25.

Use of commercial airlines for military travel was limited by the scarcity of space and by the requirement that the most economical route be used. More than half of the commercial aircraft in operation in the zone of interior when the United States entered the war were requisitioned by the Army, and the airlines discontinued a 5 percent reduction that they had been allowing to military personnel. The Army then made provision for the use of commercial aircraft, despite the higher fare, when time or other exigencies of the service did not permit travel by other means and military aircraft were not available or could not be used economically.[66] When the Army began returning requisitioned aircraft late in the war, some of the airlines reinstated fare reductions. Since air rates were fluctuating at that time and the reductions were not uniformly applicable, local transportation officers found it difficult, in cases not covered by the emergency provision, to determine when the air route was the most economical. To overcome this difficulty, the requirement that the most economical route be always used was temporarily lifted. Late in March 1945, with a view to the needs of the redeployment period, transportation officers were instructed that commercial air passage could be furnished if the cost to the government did not exceed the lowest airline tariff in effect on 1 March 1945 between the points involved.[67]

Of the total traffic moved on War Department transportation requests, for which data are available only for the period December 1941 through May 1943, 83.8 percent moved by rail, 16.0 percent by motor, and the remainder by air and water.[68] Of the traffic that moved in organized groups under routings provided by the central routing authority in Washington, data for which are available throughout the period December 1941–December 1945, 97.25 percent moved by rail and 2.75 percent by bus. *(Tables 1 and 2 and Chart 1)* The fact that travel by bus constituted a considerably larger percentage of the total traffic than of the organized group traffic routed in Washington reflects the policy of using buses only for travel by individuals and small parties and for the shorter trips.

The Army-owned motor vehicles included in the organic equipment of troop units were used in executing troop movements so far as practicable, but the relief that they afforded the commercial carriers was not great. Organic vehicles were trucks and hence not well adapted to

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[65] OCT Cir 18, 12 Jun 42, par. 9*a*; WD Cir 358, 4 Sep 44, Sec. IV, par. 2*c*.

[66] AR 55-120, 26 Apr 43, sub: Trans of Indiv, par. 3*b*.

[67] Ltr, Fiscal Dir ASF to Comptroller Gen of the U.S., 22 Mar 43, AG 584.1 (24 Mar 45); WD Cir 95, 27 Mar 45, Sec. I; OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 18–20.

[68] See n. 4, above.

TABLE 1—ARMY PASSENGERS MOVED BY COMMERCIAL RAIL AND BUS IN ORGANIZED GROUPS ON ROUTINGS PROVIDED BY THE CENTRAL ROUTING AUTHORITY IN WASHINGTON: DECEMBER 1941–DECEMBER 1945 [a]

Year	Total	Rail	Bus [b]
Total	35,848,700	34,862,600	986,100
1941 (December only)	255,300	250,100	5,200
1942	7,237,200	7,056,600	180,600
1943	10,121,900	9,912,500	209,400
1944	8,527,800	8,301,000	226,800
1945	9,706,500	9,342,400	364,100

[a] Up to January 1943 all groups of fifty or more were routed in Washington, thereafter groups of forty or more.

[b] Figures for bus traffic are number of passengers routed; the number actually moved was slightly less, but data are not available.

Source: Data originally compiled by Transport Economics Section, Traffic Control Division, OCT, and reworked for a statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

TABLE 2—ANALYSIS OF ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC MOVED BY RAIL IN ORGANIZED GROUPS ON ROUTINGS PROVIDED BY CENTRAL ROUTING AUTHORITY IN WASHINGTON: DECEMBER 1941–DECEMBER 1945 [a]

Year	Number of Passengers	Number of Groups	Number of Cars Used [b]	Average Men Per Group	Average Men Per Car	Average Miles Per Man-Trip
Total	34,862,600	205,675	824,734	169	42	1,104
1941 (December only)	250,100	1,125	5,953	222	42	1,241
1942	7,056,600	37,561	175,543	188	40	1,129
1943	9,912,500	60,511	238,133	164	42	1,127
1944	8,301,000	45,606	197,372	182	42	1,096
1945	9,342,400	60,872	207,733	153	45	1,065

[a] Up to January 1943 all groups of fifty or more were routed in Washington, thereafter groups of forty or more.

[b] Includes only sleepers and coaches through June 1945; hospital cars are also included beginning in July 1945.

Source: Data originally compiled by Transport Economics Section, Traffic Control Division, OCT, and reworked for a statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

long, continuous troop hauls. Problems of bivouac and messing were involved in making long trips by motor, and delays en route for these purposes made such movements slow compared with those accomplished by rail. When troops were being transferred without their equipment, the round trip of the vehicles, with empty backhaul, was an expensive mode of transportation. During the early part of the war Army regulations sanctioned the use of organic vehicles for movements up to 500 miles at the discretion of the agency initiating the movement order; in April 1943 the distance was reduced to 350 miles, but within a few months it was extended again to 500 miles for administrative movements and 600 miles for training movements in or out of maneuver areas. The latter action was taken in order to

Chart 1—Army Passengers Moved Monthly by Rail and Bus in Organized Groups on Routings Provided by the Central Routing Authority in Washington: December 1941–December 1945*



* Up to January 1943 all groups of fifty or more were routed in Washington; thereafter groups of forty or more. Rail figures are passengers actually moved; bus figures are passengers routed, some of whom did not actually move.

Source: Data originally compiled by Traffic Control Division, OCT, and reworked for a statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

afford as much relief as possible to the railroads.[69]

The many types of passengers moved under Army auspices necessitated rather elaborate regulations regarding the types of railway accommodations to be furnished. In brief, the following arrangements were in effect: standard sleeping car accommodations or parlor car seats (designated in the transportation requests as first class) were furnished to commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers of the first three grades, nurses, and dependents of military personnel making a permanent change of station; noncommissioned officers below the third grade and enlisted men were furnished tourist sleeping car accommodations (intermediate class) if the journey exceeded twelve hours and ended after midnight, otherwise they were furnished seats in day coaches (coach class).[70] Tourist cars were the older types of standard sleeping cars for which the same fare was charged as for coaches, plus a berth rate smaller than that for standard sleeping cars. The carriers did not make enough sleepers available to accommodate all the troops entitled to them under the regulations. When a shortage of sleepers occurred at a particular point, those available were assigned to the troops making the longer journeys.

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[69] WD Cir 193, 16 Jun 42, par. 2; WD Cir 102, 15 Apr 43, par. 2; WD Cir 189, 21 Aug 43, Sec. IV, par. 2. These regulations ostensibly applied also to movements by commercial buses, but in that respect the Traffic Control Division considered them in conflict with the Joint Military Passenger Agreement and did not give them effect. See Memo, Traf Contl Div for Adm Div OCT, 17 Feb 43, par. 6, OCT 511; WD Cir 233, 10 Jun 44, Sec. IV, par. 2; Interv with Morris, 20 Jul 50, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.

[70] AR 55-125, 9 Jan 43, sub: Sleeping Car and Similar Accommodations, par. 2; WD TM 55-525, June 1945, Sleeping Car and Similar Accommodations.

Except under circumstances specified in the regulation, transportation requests were to call for through transportation for the entire journey directed in the travel orders. The purpose of this requirement was to prevent the "splitting" of transportation requests—issuing one request for coaches for the day portion and another for sleeping car accommodations for the night portion of the same trip—a practice that would have wasted transportation equipment. The railroads objected to the splitting of transportation requests also on the ground that it deprived them of revenue—that is, sleeping car rates for the entire journey.[71]

When groups of enlisted men traveled in tourist or standard sleeping cars, two men were assigned to each lower berth and one to each upper.[72] This in effect increased the capacity of a car by 50 percent as compared with regular traffic. The Navy assigned only one enlisted man to a lower berth during the greater part of the war, although an effort was made in the fall of 1942 to have it adopt the Army practice. After redeployment began and the need for sleeping accommodations for long hauls became exceptionally heavy, the Director of Defense Transportation proposed that four servicemen be assigned to each section. The Army declined to go along with this proposal on the ground that it was not "practical" to place two in every berth since double berthing was not satisfactory for large men. It objected also to the application of such a rule to the armed services while civilians were permitted to engage a berth for one person. The Army again appealed to the Navy to place two enlisted men in each lower berth, but the Navy again declined on grounds of "health, morals, and comfort." The issue between the Army and the Navy was resolved in July 1945, when the Office of Defense Transportation ordered that three men be assigned to each sleeping car section in all organized military movements.[73]

When groups of enlisted men were moved in day coaches, the Army used as many of the seats as was considered feasible. On day trips 90 percent of the seating capacity was used for passengers, the remainder being reserved for their personal equipment. In the beginning, when overnight trips were made in coaches, only one soldier was assigned to each double seat in order that the men might obtain as much rest as possible. Later, when the shortage of passenger cars became acute, the practice was changed and three men were assigned to two double seats. When coaches with reclining seats were made available for overnight trips, the 90-percent rule was applied. While as a general practice Army transportation officers and railroad officials were governed by these standards, heavier or lighter loading sometimes occurred when conditions required it.[74]

Individuals traveling first class at government expense were entitled, under an act of Congress, to transportation "not to exceed the lowest first-class rate." The Comptroller General had interpreted this to limit accommodations to lower berths or parlor car seats on trains to which the standard first-class fare applied. During the war these requirements worked a hardship on officers who were traveling under closely planned schedules, since they either had to forego the use of extra-fare trains with consequent delays or had to pay the difference from their per diem allowance. To remedy this situation, the Army obtained from the Comptroller General a revised ruling that permitted the use of extra-fare trains when it was determined by the authority directing the travel that the mission could not be accomplished by the use of regular-fare trains. Officers using extra-fare trains were limited to lower berths when the trains offered such accommodations, or to the lowest cost accommodation on trains that offered only superior accommodations. Provision was made for couriers carrying secret documents as hand baggage to occupy superior accommodations when this was considered desirable from the standpoint of security.[75]

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[71] AR 55-110, 22 Jan 43, sub: Trans Requests, par. 10*a*; OCT HB Monograph 22, p. 44.

[72] AR 55-125, 9 Jan 43, par. 2*c*(1).

[73] OCT HB Monographs 20, p. 54; 22, p. 86; Ltr, ODT to USW, 30 Jun 45, and reply, 4 Jul 45, OCT HB Gross ODT; Ltr, SW to SN, 5 Jul 45, and reply, 13 Jul 45; both in G-4 510, Vol. III; Memo, Col Luke W. Finlay for Gross, 17 Jul 45, pp. 2, 3, OCT HB Gross Day File; ODT GO 56, 20 Jul 45.

[74] AR 55-130, 28 Dec 42, par 6*b*; Changes 1, 26 Apr 43; Ltr, Lasher to Buford, Vice Pres AAR, 18 Dec 43, OCT 511.

The problems connected with the transportation of Negro troops constitute a very broad subject, and no attempt will be made here to discuss them in detail.[76] It was an Army policy that there should be no discrimination between whites and Negroes, and the Chief of Transportation endeavored to enforce that policy to the extent of his ability. On special trains and buses operated under Army control enforcement was not difficult, but a different situation prevailed when the regularly scheduled services of the carriers were involved. In certain states the laws required segregation, and the Army took the attitude that such laws should be obeyed when military personnel used public conveyances for official or personal travel. Efforts by carriers' employees to enforce the laws, sometimes tempered by personal prejudices, created many unpleasant situations for Negro servicemen. Complaints received by the War Department, sometimes directly and sometimes through members of Congress or civic groups, were investigated carefully to ascertain the facts and to correct abuses. The railroads were requested to use special care to supply Negro troops with equal accommodations. Service commanders were requested to see that equal treatment was provided by bus operators serving Army installations and were informed that vehicles would be made available from the Transportation Corps' bus pool to assist them. These and other measures only partially met the situation since the Army had no means of offsetting the segregation laws or of counteracting sectional attitudes.[77]

The railroads were committed to providing special sleepers whenever a group of fifteen or more soldiers was to be moved. As a measure of economy in the use of transportation the Army endeavored to ask for special cars only when all berths could be filled. The Chief of Transportation preferred movements in special cars to movements in cars that were available to the public and encouraged post transportation officers to combine small groups whenever possible so that special cars would be justified. Similarly, movements by special trains were preferred to movements by special cars attached to regular trains. When special troop cars were added to regular trains the public facilities were likely to be overcrowded, especially the dining cars, and this situation was a source of dissatisfaction and disorder. Also, the assignment of administrative and medical staffs to special troop trains and the use of troop kitchen cars simplified the problems of control and discipline. Special trains, moreover, could be routed from Army post to Army post, whereas when troops were moved by regular trains the Army was obliged either to furnish motor transportation to and from the railway terminals or to pay switching charges for the transfer of special cars between Army posts and railway terminals.[78]

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[75] AR 55-105, 29 Dec 42, par. 8*a*; Changes 12, 2 May 44; Changes 14, 15 Dec 44. Documents relating to Army efforts before and during the war to change the "lowest first-class rate" rule are in AG 500 (6-2-37)(1) and AG 510 (1 Dec 42). See also OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 46–48.

[76] Problems connected with transportation of Negro troops are dealt with in Maj. Ulysses G. Lee, Jr., The Employment of Negro Troops in World War II, a volume in preparation for this series.

[77] An indication of the relation of the Transportation Corps to this subject is given in the following: Ltr, Gross to Joseph B. Eastman, ODT, 23 Nov 42, OCT HB Gross Day File; Memo, Finlay for Gross, 13 Aug 42, sub: "Jim Crow" Laws; Memo, Gross for ASW, 19 Jul 43, sub: Trans Facilities for Negroes; Ltr, Gross to Pelley, Pres AAR, 19 Jul 43, and reply, 21 Jul 43; last four in OCT 531.7 Discrimination; Memo, Maj Gen George Grunert for Somervell, 19 Jul 43; Ltr, CofT for CG 4th SvC, 30 Jul 43 (and similar ltrs to other SvCs); last two in OCT 510 Negro; Memo, Maj Gen Wilhelm D. Styer for CofT, 13 Apr 44, sub: Trans Facilities for Negro Troops, and related correspondence, OCT 511.

Procedures within the War Department for the accomplishment of troop movements involved a number of agencies. The authority to initiate movement orders was different for different types of moves. Domestic movements necessitated by permanent changes of station might be ordered by the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff or by the commanding generals of the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, or the Army Service Forces for troops of their respective commands. Domestic movements called for by temporary changes of station might be ordered by OPD, by the commanding generals of the AGF, the AAF, the ASF, and the defense commands, or by subordinate elements of those commands acting within policies established by the respective commanders. Orders for movements to ports of embarkation for shipment overseas always originated in OPD, which acted in accordance with strategic decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in collaboration with the AGF, the AAF, and the ASF. The Mobilization Division of ASF headquarters, in addition to preparing movement orders for ASF troops, prepared the supply and transportation sections of movement orders relating to AGF and AAF troops. The Mobilization Division also acted as a co-ordinating agency between OPD, the commanders of the forces, and the Chief of Transportation with regard to the actual movement of troops and their equipment.[79] The Chief of Transportation, however, maintained direct contact with all these agencies from the earliest stages of their planning in order to advise them on transportation matters and to obtain information on impending movements as far in advance as possible.

The transportation officers at Army posts where troop movements originated had an exacting role, and the Chief of Transportation saw to it that they were fully instructed.[80] They obtained routings and ordered transportation equipment for individuals and small groups traveling from their posts, and they administered the arrangements made by the Chief of Transportation for the movement of larger groups, thus working closely with local railway officials and bus operators. They collaborated with the transportation officers of the units to be moved to insure that both personnel and impedimenta were ready for shipment and loaded according to plan. They were responsible for providing adequate tracks, ramps, and other transportation facilities at their stations. In addition to the War Department regulations and circulars pertaining to passenger traffic, the Chief of Transportation prepared a "commercial traffic bulletin," which was issued from time to time "by order of the Secretary of War," to provide detailed instructions for local transportation officers.[81] He also endeavored through field conferences conducted by his Traffic Control Division and frequent visits by representatives of his zone transportation offices to keep the post transportation officers fully informed regarding the detailed instructions emanating from Washington and the reasons for the procedures prescribed.

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[78] AR 55-125, 9 Jan 43, sub: Sleeping Car and Similar Accommodations, par. 2*a*(2); Interv with Morris, 4 Aug 50, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.

[79] WD Cir 102, 15 Apr 43, par. 1; WD Cir 358, 4 Sep 44, Sec. IV; ASF Manual M 301, 31 Jan 44, Sec. 201.04 Mob Div.

[80] For appointments and duties of local transportation officers, see AR 55-105, 29 Dec 42, par. 3, and Changes 13, 22 May 44, and 14, 15 Dec 44; AR 55-5, 5 Oct 42, par. 5; WD Cir 229, 24 Sep 43, par. 6.

The policies and procedures pertaining to Army passenger traffic were necessarily complex. Throughout the war the Chief of Transportation despite some opposition was able to maintain the key policy—that of centralized control over the routing and movements of groups of more than one carload. The Chief of Transportation also had a good measure of success in the basic task of obtaining a high level of performance from the many local transportation officers, although lack of experience on the part of some of those officers and the fact that he had no command authority over them imposed handicaps.

Mobilization and Conservation of Railroad Equipment

Obtaining rail equipment promptly and using it in the most effective manner were basic problems that confronted the Transportation Corps throughout the war. Obviously these were matters in which thorough co-operation between the military authorities and the carriers was necessary.

When troops were moved in small groups in regular train service or in special cars attached to regular trains, the railroads' task of providing the necessary equipment was relatively simple, but when large movements were to be accomplished a different situation obtained. Large movements were made in special trains and the troops' organic equipment was usually transferred at the same time, so that in addition to sleeping cars and coaches, baggage cars, kitchen cars, and freight cars were required. In divisional movements hundreds of cars of all types had to be assembled at the station of origin, and this sometimes meant drawing on numerous railroads and deadheading the cars for considerable distances. When heavy troop movements suddenly became necessary following the attack on Pearl Harbor, one of the railroads' biggest problems was that of gathering the required equipment at the training camps promptly. Many of the camps were far removed from railway centers where cars

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[81] The bulletin was discontinued for a period for economy reasons but was reinstated by WD Cir 305, 22 Nov 43, Sec. II. WD TM 55-205, 25 Aug 44, sub: Trans in ZI, was primarily for the guidance of local transportation officers.



80TH DIVISION TROOPS ARRIVING AT CAMP FORREST, *Tennessee, June 1942.*

usually were accumulated for commercial purposes. As the war progressed ways had to be found of solving this problem.

The number of cars required for divisional movements varied according to the type of the division and the circumstances under which the move was made. In the summer of 1942 the following equipment was used in moving a triangular infantry division: 442 tourist sleepers, 48 standard sleepers, 89 baggage cars, 90 kitchen cars, 1,124 flatcars, and 89 boxcars. The total of 1,882 cars moved in 63 trains. At about the same time, the equipment needed for moving an armored division embraced 382 tourist sleepers, 23 standard sleepers, 1 baggage car, 67 kitchen cars, and 1,748 flatcars. These 2,221 cars moved in 69 trains.[82] It is obvious even to the layman that the assembling of so many cars and the required number of locomotives, as well as the prompt loading and orderly movement of so many trains to a single destination, was a feat that required careful planning and meticulous execution.

Divisional movements, although many of them were made during the war, were not an everyday occurrence. Most movements by special train involved smaller troop units or groups of replacements, and many such movements were started each day of the war. As already stated, during the spring of 1943, when organized troop movements were especially heavy, the Chief of Transportation reported that special troop trains were departing from their loading points at intervals of about six minutes throughout the twenty-four-hour day. More significant, perhaps, are the

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[82] See author's Memo, 6 Aug 42, sub: Rail Equip for Moving a Division, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.

TABLE 3—RAILROAD CARS USED BY THE ARMY IN MOVING ORGANIZED GROUPS AND THEIR IMPEDIMENTA ROUTED BY THE CENTRAL ROUTING AUTHORITY IN WASHINGTON: DECEMBER 1941–DECEMBER 1945 [a]

Period	Total Cars	Sleepers [b]	Coaches	Baggage Cars	Flatcars	Boxcars	Other
Total (49 Months)	1, 173, 098	520, 903	296, 025	132, 996	[c] 128, 650	[c] 20, 966	73, 558
1941							
December Only	27, 452	4, 329	1, 624	600	17, 439	2, 613	847
1942							
Total for Year	268, 900	121, 349	54, 194	31, 271	50, 025	6, 798	5, 263
Monthly Average	22, 408	10, 112	4, 516	2, 606	4, 169	566	439
Peak Monthly Total	34, 114	. . . .	. . . .	. . . .	. . . .	. . . .	. . .
1943							
Total for Year	345, 790	140, 498	97, 635	45, 444	47, 454	7, 464	7, 295
Monthly Average	28, 815	11, 708	8, 136	3, 787	3, 954	622	608
Peak Monthly Total	36, 598	. . . .	. . . .	. . . .	. . . .	. . . .	. . .
1944							
Total for Year	274, 046	141, 385	55, 987	37, 612	13, 732	2, 830	[d] 22, 500
Monthly Average	22, 837	11, 782	4, 666	3, 134	1, 144	236	1, 875
Peak Monthly Total	29, 062	. . . .	. . . .	. . . .	. . . .	. . . .	. . .
1945							
Total for Year	256, 910	113, 342	86, 585	18, 069	([c])	[c] 1, 261	[d] 37, 653
Monthly Average	21, 409	9, 445	7, 215	1, 506	([c])	[c] 105	3, 138
Peak Monthly Total	31, 861	. . . .	. . . .	. . . .	. . . .	. . . .	. . .

[a] Up to January 1943 groups of fifty or more were routed in Washington; thereafter forty or more. Figures are estimated through August 1942.

[b] Includes standard sleepers, tourist sleepers, and government-owned troop sleepers.

[c] Flatcars were lumped with boxcars in 1945.

[d] Indicates increased use of hospital cars and kitchen cars.

Source: Data originally compiled by Traffic Control Division, OCT, from reports of Association of American Railroads, and reworked for a statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

figures given in Table 3, which indicate that in one month (April 1943) a total of 36,598 passenger and freight cars were used by the Army in special troop trains or as special cars attached to regular trains, and that the monthly average during 1943 was 28,815 cars. These figures, it should be noted, do not comprehend troop movements made in regular train service or troops traveling on furlough, leave, or pass and do not include personnel of the other armed services.

The amount of equipment at the disposal of the carriers to meet the military need and the heavy civilian demand was relatively constant throughout the war. Although a special effort was made to keep all cars in serviceable condition, some had to be retired, and the ordering of new equipment was severely limited by

TABLE 4—PASSENGER TRAIN CARS OWNED OR LEASED BY THE CARRIERS AT THE END OF EACH YEAR: 1940–1945

Year	Total Cars	Owned by Class I Railroads				Owned or Leased by Pullman Company
		Total	Passenger [a]	Baggage, Express, and Others	Mail	
1940	44, 727	37, 817	22, 594	13, 394	1, 829	6, 910
1941	44, 956	37, 897	22, 576	13, 524	1, 797	7, 059
1942	45, 185	38, 051	22, 681	13, 631	1, 739	7, 134
1943	[b] 45, 764	37, 940	22, 714	13, 513	1, 713	[b] 7, 824
1944	[b] 46, 588	37, 837	22, 523	13, 582	1, 732	[b] 8, 751
1945	[b] 46, 863	38, 273	22, 681	13, 891	1, 701	[b] 8, 590

[a] Includes coaches, combination coaches, parlor, sleeping, dining, club, lounge, and observation cars.

[b] Includes government-owned special troop sleepers and kitchen cars, as well as standard and tourist sleepers and parlor cars.

Source: Association of American Railroads, *Railroad Transport, A Statistical Record, 1911–1948* (Washington, November 1948), p. 21.

the demand that the military program made on steel and other strategic materials. Under these circumstances the increase in the total number of passenger cars, including those built for the government, was modest indeed. *(Table 4)* Steps were taken to eliminate some of the less essential travel. The carriers themselves combined or "pooled" certain of their services to resort areas in order to release equipment for other purposes. They converted more than 800 lounge and parlor cars into the more necessary sleepers and coaches. The Office of Defense Transportation stopped the operation of special trains for conventions and sporting events and limited the operation of extra trains and extra sections on the heavily traveled routes.[83] A campaign was undertaken to encourage the voluntary curtailment of unnecessary travel. Despite these measures the increase in traffic far outstripped the increase in passenger accommodations, and the wartime demand was met chiefly through a concerted effort for the more efficient and intensive employment of the equipment on hand.

Responsibility for assigning adequate railway equipment to troop movements and for enforcing economy in its use rested primarily with two agencies representing the Army and the railroads respectively. The Army's interests were the responsibility of the Traffic Control Division in the Office of the Chief of Transportation, and more particularly the Passenger Branch of that division. While the chief of the division and his deputy dealt with matters of policy and participated in conferences relating to especially large movements, the Passenger Branch handled the day-to-day arrangements. It maintained contact with the carriers, gave them information regarding contemplated troop movements and the numbers and types of cars required, and checked to insure that the proper equipment was promptly provided. It dealt with local Army transportation officers to insure that arrangements were made for the prompt entrainment and detrainment of troops and that the cars were fully loaded and eventually turned back to the railroads in good condition. In the fall of 1942 the Car Service Section was established in the Passenger Branch to review all prospective troop movements and prepare co-ordinated plans that would avoid deadheading equipment so far as possible. The staff of this section consisted of specialists who had been employed by the Pullman Company or the railroads.[84]

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[83] For a summary of these controls, see Office of Defense Transportation, *Civilian War Transport* (Washington, 1948), pp. 81–86.

The Military Transportation Section, Car Service Division, Association of American Railroads, represented the rail carriers in these matters. All requests for equipment and train schedules, as well as complaints regarding the railroads' handling of movements, were channeled through it. The fact that the MTS office was located adjacent to the Traffic Control Division in the Pentagon facilitated the constant interchange of information and the joint planning in which the two agencies engaged. While the MTS dealt directly with the individual railroads to a large extent, it was aided in the performance of its functions by thirteen district offices of the Car Service Division whose jurisdictions covered the entire United States.

Although the Military Transportation Section had no direct authority over the employment of the carriers' passenger equipment, the railroads followed its instructions because those instructions were based on military requirements. For the same reason the Pullman Company endeavored to provide the cars requested by the MTS. This voluntary co-operation worked satisfactorily until the redeployment of troops began after the surrender of Germany. Then, because it was evident that much heavier demands would have to be made on the carriers in order to satisfy the military need, the Office of Defense Transportation assumed control over the employment of all passenger, baggage, and express cars of the railroads. W. C. Kendall, chairman of the AAR Car Service Division, was appointed agent to administer this control, subject to the general supervision of the Director of the ODT Railway Transport Department.[85]

The co-operation of the Pullman Company in supplying equipment remained on a voluntary basis. Control over the distribution of its equipment was exercised by a superintendent of car service at the company's headquarters in Chicago. He was aided by branch offices scattered throughout the country, which kept him informed of the location of equipment and the prospective demand in their localities. The Military Transportation Section made daily reports to the Pullman Company regarding the future needs of the armed forces for sleeping cars in the various districts. On the basis of these reports, Pullman equipment was assigned to six regional distribution points, which controlled its further assignment. In July 1945, in view of the extraordinarily heavy demand for sleepers on the Atlantic seaboard for troops being redeployed and repatriated from Europe, the car service superintendent of the Pullman Company placed a representative in the office of the MTS to obtain information regarding requirements as early as possible and to co-ordinate the actual assignment of equipment.

The usual procedure by which equipment was obtained for a troop movement was as follows: As soon as the Traffic Control Division had definite advice that a group was to be moved, it obtained full information regarding the composition of the group from the Army transportation officer at the station of origin. This information included the unit designations, the number of officers and enlisted men involved, the weight and measurement of the impedimenta, the anticipated time and place of entrainment, and the types of rolling stock desired.[86] After the route had been established, in the manner already described, the Traffic Control Division requested the Military Transportation Section to arrange for the execution of the movement. The MTS notified the Car Service Division manager in the district in which the movement was to originate and also the originating railroad. The rail line then began assembling the required coaches, baggage cars, and freight cars and notified the appropriate Pullman Company representative of the number of sleepers needed. If the required number of sleepers was not provided, the rail line undertook to provide coaches instead. If the railroad found it difficult to obtain sufficient equipment to meet the need, the district manager of the Car Service Division was called on for help. If he was unable to overcome the difficulty, he asked for aid from the MTS, which could bring heavier pressure to bear on the carriers serving the area.[87]

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[84] OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 33-36, 81-84.

[85] ODT GO 55, effective 17 Jul 45.

A special procedure was adopted by the Traffic Control Division when an exceptionally large port-bound movement—a division or an equivalent number of troops—was to be made. The assembling of so much equipment inevitably posed a difficult problem for the carriers, and strict compliance with schedules was of great importance. In such instances the Traffic Control Division sent a representative to the station of origin, where all arrangements for the movement were worked out in conference. This conference was attended, as circumstances required, by representatives of the post transportation officer, the commander of the port of destination, the G-4 of the division to be moved, the Military Transportation Section, the Car Service Division district office, the territorial passenger association, the Pullman Company, and the railroads involved. The conference took place soon after the movement order was issued, usually several weeks in advance of the departure date. The requirements for passenger and freight equipment were studied, the sources of the equipment were agreed on, the make-up and loading schedules of the several trains were planned, and train schedules from point of origin to destination were established. These arrangements were considered tentative, but changes did not often become necessary.[88]

Despite the close co-operation of all parties and the measures taken by the Army to ease the carriers' problems, there were delays in furnishing equipment. During the greater part of the war about 25 percent of the railroads' 14,000 line-haul coaches were in military service, and after redeployment began the percentage was larger. The railroads understandably endeavored to protect the regular services that the Office of Defense Transportation permitted them to maintain, while at the same time trying to meet the military requirements. The demand for coaches being what it was, this policy called for exceedingly close calculation and careful management, and sometimes the available equipment could not be made to meet all needs promptly. When the departure of movements was advanced by the Army

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[86] AR 55-130, 28 Dec 42, par. 8*b*.

[87] OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 38-46.

[88] *Ibid.*, pp. 48-50.

CHART 2—REVENUE PASSENGER-MILES ACCOMPLISHED IN PULLMAN-OPERATED SLEEPING CARS AND PARLOR CARS: 1939–1945*



* Military traffic includes the personnel of all armed forces moved in organized groups in special cars and special trains; regular traffic includes civilian and military personnel who traveled in regularly scheduled trains. Includes traffic hauled in government-owned, Pullman-operated troop sleepers.

** Distribution between regular and troop traffic not available for 1939 and 1940.

Source: Annual Reports, Pullman, Incorporated.

ahead of the time originally contemplated, the problem was intensified.

The Pullman Company frequently failed to supply the sleepers required by the Army. Beginning early in the war all of its tourist sleepers—about 2,200 in number—were regularly assigned to movements of the armed forces, and a varying number of its 4,000 standard sleepers were so utilized. Late in 1943 the new government-owned troop sleepers began to enter its fleet. At the end of 1944 the Pullman Company indicated that about half of its sleeping car equipment had been steadily engaged in troop transportation. A few days before Germany surrendered, the company stated that since Pearl Harbor it had transported more than 26,000,000 members of the armed forces in organized groups.[89] Yet in each year the passenger-miles accomplished in regular Pullman services (sleeping car and parlor car) exceeded the mileage accomplished in handling organized movements for the armed forces. *(Chart 2)* Like the railroads, the Pullman Company endeavored to protect its regular services while complying with requests from the military authorities.

It was understood that if the Pullman Company could not supply sleepers as requested, the railroads and the Traffic Control Division would be notified not later than 5:00 P. M. on the second day before the contemplated departure. In such a case, the originating railroad undertook, with the aid of the Association of American Railroads when necessary, to provide coaches in substitution for sleepers. If it was found that coaches could not be made available, such information was to be given to the Traffic Control Division not later than noon of the day preceding the movement. In this event, the division in consultation with the military authority that had ordered the movement determined whether that movement should be postponed or the equipment obtained by deferring another movement of lower priority.[90] The Traffic Control Division impressed upon the carriers, however, that it would not be satisfied simply with notification that sleepers or coaches were not available. It took the position that, while postponements might become necessary, there should be relatively few and that the carriers should make extraordinary efforts to avoid this necessity.

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[89] Annual Rpts, Pullman Incorporated, 1944, p. 5; 1945, p. 6; AAR, Interesting Facts About the Railroads, 3 May 45; all in OCT HB Topic Pullman Company.

No purpose would be served by presenting in detail the many complaints registered by the Chief of Transportation because sleepers or coaches were not supplied as requested or by reviewing the explanations offered by the carriers. General Gross and his staff sometimes felt that the carriers had been negligent, either in not providing equipment or in not giving sufficient advance notice that requests for cars could not be met. In most cases the carriers believed that there were justifying circumstances.[91]

While pressing the carriers to meet its requests for equipment fully and promptly, the Army undertook to improve its own procedures and so alleviate the shortage of cars. One of the problems during the early part of the war was the short notice given the Chief of Transportation by the commands ordering troop movements and the consequent short time allowed the carriers to assemble cars. An inquiry covering a period of ninety days showed that in about 56 percent of the cases the notice was less than forty-eight hours ahead of actual starting time.[92] Beginning early in 1943 corrective measures were taken, under which the Chief of Transportation was informed regarding prospective movements as soon as the plans began to take definite shape and was notified of actually ordered movements at least seventy-two hours in advance in all except emergency cases.[93]

Through frequent contacts with the agencies that issued troop movement orders, the Passenger Branch was able to gather information that enabled it to visualize the requirements for railroad equipment far ahead. When sizable movements—regiments or larger—were being planned, the branch was given an opportunity to look over the equipment situation and the progress of movements already scheduled, and then to indicate to the commands concerned on what dates additional movements could be best handled. As soon as such movements were tentatively fixed, they were posted on a control board in the Passenger Branch from which the branch worked in its endeavor to avoid scheduling too much traffic from a particular area during a particular period. This board sometimes showed divisional movements six months in advance of their departure.[94]

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[90] See WD CTB 35, 10 Jul 45, sub: Troop Mvmts—RR Equip.

[91] The following documents illustrate the complaints filed by the Chief of Transportation: Ltr, Morris to Gass, 7 Dec 43, OCT 511 Main 64884; Ltr, Morris to Gass, 19 Feb 44, OCT 511; Ltr, Morris to Gass, 27 Apr 44, OCT 511 Rail and Motor Mvmts; Ltr, Morris to Trunk Line-Central Pass Assn, 30 Aug 44, OCT 511 Fort Meade (Main 20363); Ltr, Morris to Western Mil Bur, 30 Sep 44, OCT 511; Ltr, Lt. Col Bert E. White to Pullman Co., 27 Feb 45, OCT 531.7 Train Service.

[92] Army Service Forces Monthly Progress Report (hereafter cited as ASF MPR), May 43, p. 60. Such short notice was more likely to occur with the smaller than with the larger units.

[93] Memo, CG SOS for CGs All SvCs, COs All Posts, *et al.*, 8 Dec 42, sub: Co-ordination of Troop Mvmts, AG 370.5 (11-24-42); WD Cir 102, 15 Apr 43, par. 2*b*(4); WD Cir 358, 4 Sep 44, Sec. IV, par. 2*b*(1); OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 71-81.

Another important Army measure affecting the employment of rail equipment was the investing of the Chief of Transportation with authority to change the departure time of troop movements when the equipment situation warranted. Such authority was given his office in April 1943 for movements routed in Washington—that is, groups of forty or more—and the same authority was soon given to post transportation officers in regard to the smaller groups that they routed.[95] Emergency movements naturally were excepted from these arrangements. Under this procedure the orders covering nonemergency movements gave approximate dates of departure or dates between which the movements should be made, and the Chief of Transportation or the post transportation officers could advance or retard the time of departure within the limits stated. Thus a movement destined for a particular installation could be put forward or delayed so that the same equipment could be used for a movement leaving the same or a nearby installation. The ability to adjust the time of departure also facilitated the consolidation of small groups to insure the full utilization of car space.

The advance information received by the Chief of Transportation regarding contemplated movements and his authority to advance or retard the actual time of departure brought very substantial results in the conservation of railway equipment. The most spectacular example was the utilization of the same railway equipment to move seven divisions from seven different installations with only a small amount of deadhead mileage. The Car Service Section of the Passenger Branch, on the basis of its day-to-day planning to improve the utilization of passenger cars, calculated that between the time of its establishment in November 1942 and the end of hostilities it enabled 41,000 sleeping cars to make trips that otherwise could not have been made. This meant additional berths for at least 1,400,000 soldiers.[96]

The Army also undertook to eliminate practices at camps and other installations that were wasteful of car time. Before the United States entered the war, post transportation officers frequently called in railroad equipment as soon as a unit received warning of an impending move. This gave the carriers opportunity to draw equipment from sources where it could be most readily spared and also enabled the post transportation officer and the commander of troops to inspect the cars thoroughly and to entrain at their convenience. During the war this leisurely method of using equipment could not be permitted. Soon after Pearl Harbor all agencies issuing warning orders were directed to include in such orders a stipulation that delivery of railroad cars would not be requested until the actual time for departure had been fixed.[97] Cancellations of movement orders or deferments of movements shortly before departure time also were wasteful of equipment, since the assigned cars were kept idle until they could be reassigned. The Chief of Transportation undertook to impress upon military authorities the necessity of avoiding last-minute changes in movement orders so far as possible.[98]

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[94] Interv with Morris, 16 Aug 50, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.

[95] Memo, CofT for ACofS for Opns ASF, 19 Mar 43, sub: Change in WD Cir 193; Memo, C of Traf Contl Div for C of Adm Div OCT, 29 Jul 43; both in OCT 511; WD Cir 102, 15 Apr 43, par. 2*b*; WD Cir 229, 24 Sep 43, pars. 1 and 2.

[96] Morris monograph, cited above, p. 40; Interv with Morris, 16 Aug 50, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.

In its efforts to improve the utilization of railway equipment and bring about closer co-ordination in handling military movements, the Traffic Control Division supplemented the written instructions to the field with regional conferences. Following the inauguration of new procedures for troop movements in the spring of 1943, Colonel Morris, as chief of the Passenger Branch, held a series of conferences throughout the country, which were attended by the transportation officers of Army installations and representatives of the Association of American Railroads, the territorial passenger associations, and the individual rail lines. Regional conferences held in the headquarters cities of the nine service commands and at San Francisco in February and March 1944 were attended by Colonels Williamson and Lasher, chief and deputy chief of the Traffic Control Division, and by the heads of their traffic branches. Army transportation officers and railroad representatives were informed explicitly concerning the performance that was expected in the accomplishment of troops movements. They were given full opportunity to ask questions, make complaints, or otherwise present their problems. Similar "field forums" were held at later dates. The consensus was that excellent results were achieved in this way—results affecting not only troop movements but other aspects of the Traffic Control Division's work as well.[99]

Although the efficient employment of passenger cars was the chief problem, attention also had to be given to the economical use of freight cars in moving troop impedimenta. This was true particularly of flatcars, which were required for many large items, such as trucks, tanks, and artillery. Early in the war the Chief of Transportation put forward the idea that a considerable saving of freight cars could be accomplished by permanently assigning heavy organic equipment to training centers instead of moving this equipment each time a unit was moved. The system was tried first with motor vehicles and later with other equipment. It not only saved railway cars but also spared the government heavy freight costs. In April 1943, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, commanding the Army Ground Forces, reported that, in moving four armored divisions, two motorized divisions, and one infantry division, the new system had reduced the requirement for rail equipment by 8,743 cars and had saved the government more than $2,500,000 in transportation charges. He also reported substantial savings in the movement of smaller units.[100]

At some Army training camps the inadequacy of rail facilities on the reservations and the limited capacity of the connecting rail lines hindered dispatch of

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[97] Memo, ACofS G-4 for ACofS G-3, 9 Jan 42, sub: Ordering RR Equip, G-4/33739-5.

[98] Memo, CofT for TAG, 23 May 44, sub: Mvmt of Units, OCT 511 Rail and Motor Mvmts.

[99] Memo, CofT for CG AAF, 15 Jun 43; Memo, Williamson for CofT, 16 Jun 43, sub: Confs at SvC Hq; both in OCT 511; ASF Cir 167, 29 Dec 43, sub: Conf, Mvmt of Troops, Etc; Rpt, Traf Contl Conf, 3 Feb–6 Mar 44, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Misc; Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1944, pp. 4–5, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Rpts.

[100] Ltr, Gen McNair to CG ASF, 6 Apr 43, sub: Saving Rail Trans, OCT 511 Co-ordination Mvmts.

PLANNING ROUTINGS AND ASSIGNMENTS OF RAIL EQUIPMENT. *(From left) Col. Edmund C. R. Lasher, Col. William J. Williamson, and Col. I. Sewell Morris of the Traffic Control Division, with Arthur H. Gass of the Association of American Railroads.*

passenger and freight cars and caused a loss of car time. This was often true of new installations that were built early in the emergency without due regard to transportation requirements.[101] The situation at the California-Arizona Maneuver Area, located in a remote region on branch rail lines, was an outstanding example of the difficulty, and at one time the accumulation of cars became so heavy that a four-day stop order was placed on further shipments into the area. Soon after the United States entered the war a general survey of Army installations was made to determine whether additional trackage, loading ramps, or other facilities were necessary to insure prompt dispatch of railway cars, and later similar action was taken whenever the movement of traffic at an installation was found to be sluggish.[102]

The combined efforts of the Transportation Corps and the carriers to utilize railway passenger equipment with utmost effectiveness met with a large measure of success. Yet there were occasions when the numbers of cars or the desired types were not provided as requested by the Army. While late requests sometimes were responsible, failures were attributable chiefly to the endeavor of the carriers—the railroads and the Pullman Company—to maintain their regular services as fully as possible while also meeting the demands of the armed forces. No urgent troop movements were postponed for lack of equipment, but the Chief of Transportation protested any delay that in his judgment could have been avoided. He also protested the failure to provide sleeping cars and the consequent transportation of troops in day coaches on long trips, and he felt that both the Pullman Company and the Office of Defense Transportation were at fault in not withdrawing more sleepers from regular services. The situation became especially acute after redeployment began, even though much larger numbers of both sleepers and coaches were placed in military service.[103]

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[101] Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-17; Morris monograph, p. 49.

[102] Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofE and OQMG, 17 Jan 42, sub: Rail Facilities, G-4/33821; Memo, CG SOS for CofT, 31 Aug 42, sub: Rail Facilities for Emergency Mvmts; Memo, C of Rail Div OCT for CofT, 8 Oct 42; last two in OCT 531.7 Gen.

Special Troop Trains

The troop train was not merely a mode of transportation, it was an institution. Extensive planning preceded its departure, and thorough organization and careful control were necessary throughout. Its punctual departure and arrival were matters on which the Chief of Transportation placed great stress. Each train was given a "main" number, or symbol, and until it had delivered its load at the destination it was as much a military entity as the installation from which it started. This was true whether the train carried troops only or was a mixed train of troops and impedimenta. Special troop cars attached to regular passenger trains also received main numbers and were closely controlled, but for obvious reasons the control could not be as broad as in the case of the special troop train moving on its own schedule.

The war brought changes in the size and make-up of troop trains. While maximum length was desirable from the standpoint of conserving locomotives and train crews, it was necessary to avoid making trains so long that they created operating problems and delays. Early in the emergency the Army rescinded a regulation limiting mixed trains to twenty-five cars, and took the position that when it became necessary from a military standpoint to disregard certain state laws limiting the length of trains this should be done.[104] The Army authorized the railroads to consolidate trains en route provided no delay or compromise of military security was involved. It also authorized the railroads to operate long trains from points of origin and to split them en route, on the condition that the military authorities were informed in advance so that when the trains were cut each section would be self-sustaining.[105] The arrangement of cars in a train was determined finally by railroad officials, but the desires of the military authorities were complied with as far as possible.[106]

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[103] See below, Ch. III.

[104] WD Cir 130, 5 Nov 40, Sec. II; Wardlow, *op. cit.*, p. 349. A typical troop train consisted of 12 to 15 coaches or sleepers, 2 baggage cars, and 2 kitchen cars. A typical mixed train consisted of 6 to 8 coaches or sleepers, 1 or 2 baggage cars, 1 kitchen car, and 25 to 30 freight cars.

[105] Memo, Morris for MTS, 16 Sep 42, sub: Consolidations; Ltr, Morris to IMC, 15 Jan 44; both in OCT 511.

[106] OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 90–94.

The Army imposed various safety requirements with respect to troop trains. In view of the shortage of equipment it was not feasible to insist on all-steel cars, so that cars with wooden bodies on steel frames were accepted, but all cars were required to be in good operating condition, with secure platforms and steps. Passageways between cars were to be guarded by diaphragms or safety chains. The Chief of Transportation accepted chains only as a temporary expedient and urged the installation of diaphragms as promptly as possible. Troop train commanders were directed to issue orders before departure forbidding troops to ride on platforms or on the tops of cars, to move from car to car unnecessarily, or to leave the train without specific authority. The commanders were also instructed to take whatever additional steps might be essential to safety.

A peacetime prohibition against the shipment of explosives in the same train with troops had to be lifted during the war, but any such shipments were subject to strict regulation. Explosives, excluding small arms ammunition, in addition to being handled in accordance with the safety regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, were placed in cars at the rear of the trains and were separated from troops by at least one "buffer" car.[107] Cars bearing explosives were sealed and were under guard at all train stops.

As soon as rail equipment was delivered to an installation from which troops were to be moved, it was inspected by the post transportation officer, the troop train commander, and a representative of the originating railroad.[108] The inspections dealt with the structural condition of the cars and with their cleanliness. The intensity with which the cars were used and the shortage of labor in railroad shops and yards made careful inspection necessary. No record has been found of the number of cars rejected after inspection, but it is obvious that with equipment scarce and with every effort being made to avoid delays a considerable tolerance had to be exercised. Thus it was that during the demobilization period, when the shortage of equipment was being most severely felt, the commander of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation authorized certain officers of his organization to reject cars that they considered unfit, but at the same time he cautioned them that in so doing they should consider not only the types and condition of the cars and the length of the journey but also the backlog of troops waiting to be moved out of the port and the scheduled arrival of additional troops from overseas.[109]

At the end of a trip troop train equipment was again inspected by the troop train commander and by representatives of the railroad and the Pullman Company. This inspection had the dual purpose of determining how satisfactory the service rendered by the carriers had been and whether the carriers had a claim against the government because of damage inflicted on their property by the troops.[110]

The Chief of Transportation was especially concerned about the condition of railway cars used in moving troops to the ports for oversea shipment since this had a bearing on morale. In the spring of 1944 he directed the commanders of the New York and San Francisco Ports of Embarkation to appoint inspectors to examine all trains arriving at the staging areas under their control during June and to report on both the condition of the rail equipment and the service rendered en route. Such reports were to be entirely independent of those rendered by the troop train commanders. Out of the 250 trains inspected, unsanitary conditions were found in twenty cases and in a few instances the supply of drinking water had been insufficient. On the basis of this information, the continuance of these inspections was ordered. The inspectors were instructed not to concern themselves too much with the absence of up-to-date facilities, although this might cause some inconvenience to the troops, but to deal chiefly with conditions that were likely to affect soldier morale.[111]

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[107] 2d Ind, TQMG for 8th Corps Area, 3 Feb 41, OCT 435 Steel Pass Equip; AR 55-145, 30 Sep 42, par. 14*e*, and Changes 1, 19 Dec 42; Memo, Pass Br OCT for MTS, 28 Oct 45, sub: Kitchen-Baggage Cars, OCT 080 AAR.

[108] AR 55-145, 30 Sep 42, par. 4.

[109] Memo, CG SFPE for COs Camp Stoneman, Camp Knight, *et al.*, 16 Nov 45, sub: Rail Equip for Main Trains, OCT 511.

[110] AR 55-145, 30 Sep 42, par. 14*l*; Ltrs, Lasher to Buford, 22 Jan 44 and 29 Apr 44, OCT 511 (AR 55-145).

Since all requests for rail equipment for troops routed in Washington were made to the Military Transportation Section, all complaints by the Army regarding such equipment were channeled through that office, with copies to the respective territorial passenger associations, and to the Pullman Company when its equipment was involved.[112] Such complaints were usually based on reports by the train commander or the staging area inspector, but they sometimes originated with the troops themselves. Each complaint was investigated by the carriers concerned, who reported the circumstances through the MTS to the Chief of Transportation. As has been indicated, there was not much that could be done to avoid the employment of old or badly used cars. In his response to one complaint the manager of the MTS stated: "I am convinced that the best available equipment was furnished for this main, but it is obvious that the best was none too good."[113] The Chief of Transportation understood the situation, but he filed his protests nevertheless to insure that the carriers did not let down in their efforts to provide the best cars available. Complaints regarding poor service—lack of cleanliness, water, or heat, for example—were in a different category. The Chief of Transportation felt that these were conditions that could and should be avoided.[114]

While pressing the carriers to fulfill their responsibilities, the Chief of Transportation recognized that the military authorities on trains often were lax in enforcing sanitation regulations. As late as the summer of 1944 following a discussion of the situation with his field representatives, General Gross reported to General Somervell: "This condition is not only a discredit to the Army, but also reflects on the railroad companies."[115] He recommended that renewed and emphatic instructions be issued to all branches of the service, and this was done promptly. Train commanders were directed to give special attention to the matter and to enlist the co-operation of all personnel under their control. Despite these efforts, however, maintaining sanitary conditions on troop trains remained a constant and annoying problem. The psychology of the troops, manpower shortages on the railroads, and the intensity with which the cars were used were the principal contributing factors.

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[111] OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 99–100; ASF MPR, Jun 44, Sec. 3, p. 56.

[112] Memo, DC of Traf Contl Div for C of Pass Br, 28 Nov 44, sub: Complaints, OCT 531.7.

[113] Ltr, Gass to C of Traf Contl Div, 6 Jan 44, sub: Main 56123, OCT 080 AAR.

[114] The following documents illustrate complaints: Ltr, Lasher to Western Mil Bur, 24 Mar 44, and reply, 29 Mar 44; Ltr, Morris to IMC, 13 Jul 44, and reply, 22 Sep 44; Ltr, AAR to Lasher, 25 Sep 44, and reply, 6 Oct 44; all in OCT 531.7 Unsanitary Conditions on Trains.

[115] Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6–9 Jul 44, Mtg of Port and Zone Trans Offs, 7 Jul 44, pp. 4, 5, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf; Memo, Gross for Somervell, 13 Jul 44, sub: Unsanitary RR Equip, OCT 531.7 Unsanitary Conditions on Trains; WD Cir 334, 16 Aug 44, Sec. III.

The loading of a troop train was an operation for which the post transportation officer and the commander of troops shared responsibility. The post transportation officer, having established the rail equipment required for the move, checked to see that the equipment actually provided conformed to the requirements, prepared transportation requests upon the carriers covering the troops and bills of lading for the freight, and endeavored to adjust any differences that arose between the commander of troops and the representatives of the railroads. The commander of troops appointed an entrainment officer, who planned the loading and supervised the operation to insure that it was accomplished promptly and correctly. The entrainments at training camps during the weeks immediately following Pearl Harbor revealed a lack of familiarity on the part of transportation and entrainment officers with the problems involved, and this led to mistakes and delays. Units of the field forces in the zone of interior were therefore directed to prepare loading plans and have them ready at all times and to hold practice entrainments for both personnel and impedimenta.[116]

A train commander, who was usually assigned by the commander of the unit being moved, was in charge of each troop train.[117] His command began with the departure of the train and ended with the delivery of the troops and their impedimenta to the commander of the new station. Broadly stated, the train commander's mission was to insure that the personnel and property placed in his charge were moved safely and in an orderly manner. As commander of the troops on the train he was responsible for their discipline and for the maintenance of sanitary conditions en route. He controlled the relationship between the military personnel and the representatives of the railroad and the Pullman Company on board. Sometimes he was outranked by other officers on the train, in which case tact was necessary in asserting his authority. The troop train commander had under his supervision a train transportation officer, who handled the passenger requests and bills of lading and prepared such other papers and reports as were necessary; a train medical officer, who looked after the health of the troops and the sanitary condition of the train; a train quartermaster, who was responsible for the kitchen cars and the adequacy of their equipment and supplies; a train mess officer, who supervised the preparation and serving of meals; and a baggage officer when needed. In addition, there was a car commander in each sleeper or coach to maintain order and discipline.

Within this broad field the duties of the troop train commander were varied and exacting. In most instances an officer served in this capacity only once and hence took up his responsibilities without previous experience. Usually the time available for studying the regulations and preparing for the task was short. The regulations were scattered and were inadequate in some respects. Under these circumstances and because of the pressure under which the carriers were working, conditions aboard troop trains often fell short of the standards that the Chief of Transportation desired. Some improvement was achieved by assembling the regulations and instructions in two pamphlets, making them more accessible and understandable.[118] During redeployment and repatriation it was possible to appoint commanders to serve regularly on troop trains operating between the ports of debarkation and the reception stations, and these officers gained competence through experience.

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[116] Memo, Lasher for C of Trans Div OQMG, 14 Dec 41, sub: Troop Mvmts from Fort Bliss, G-4/33700; Memo, TAG for CGs All Armies, *et al.*, 19 Dec 41, sub: Troop Mvmts (Rail); Memo, TAG for CG Field Forces, 24 Dec 41, sub: Troop Mvmts by Rail; last two in AG 370.5 (9-10-41), Sec. 1.

[117] AR 55-145, 30 Sep 42, par. 14.

The feeding of troops from converted baggage cars and from the new government-owned kitchen cars presented numerous problems. The baggage-kitchen cars were makeshifts, and aside from the fact that the railroads could not spare enough of them to meet the Army's need, they were difficult to keep in sanitary condition and lacked adequate refrigeration. Consequently, when it was decided to build government-owned troop sleepers in the spring of 1943, the advisability of constructing specially designed troop kitchen cars at the same time was apparent. Four hundred such cars were ordered by the Defense Plant Corporation at that time and four hundred were ordered two years later. These kitchen cars, although simply designed and faulty in some respects, were a great improvement over the baggage-kitchen cars because the kitchen equipment was more nearly complete and more suitable as well as permanently installed.[119] Even with better equipment, the problem of keeping kitchen cars clean remained. The crews, which were newly assigned for each trip, were often careless in using the facilities and disposing of waste, and, unless very closely supervised, tended to shirk the work of putting the cars in order before releasing them to other movements. Sometimes the cars had to be released so quickly that there was not time for proper cleaning.[120]

In the early part of the war troops fed from kitchen cars were given the regular garrison ration, but later they were provided with a special troop train ration better adapted to their inactive life while traveling. Since the supplies placed in kitchen cars at the beginning of trips often proved inadequate and the railroads were able to provide only limited quantities, a chain of emergency supply points was established at Army installations along the principal routes.[121] Thereafter the railroads were called upon only for ice. Although the subsistence of troops was a function of the Quartermaster Corps, the Chief of Transportation took an active interest in it and in all other arrangements affecting the welfare of troops en route.

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[118] WD Pamphlet 20-7, 14 Mar 44, and second edition, 20 Oct 44; WD Pamphlet 20-14, 16 Apr 45.

[119] WD Memo W 30-7-42, 21 Oct 42, sub: Supplies for Kitchen Cars; OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 108-19; Morris monograph, pp. 54-55; Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6-9 Jul 44, afternoon session, 7 Jul 44, pp. 4, 5, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf.

[120] E.g., see: Memo, 3d SvC for CofT, 21 Feb 44; Ltr, Morris to Gass, 25 Mar 44, and reply, 29 Mar 44; Ltr, Pullman Co. to Morris, 29 Mar 44; Ltr, IMC to AAR, 2 May 44, and incl; Memo, CofT for BuPers, 6 Jul 44; Ltr, Defense Plant Corporation to Morris, 24 Aug 44; all in OCT 531.3 Kitchen Cars.

[121] WD Cir 31, 2 Feb 42, Sec. IV; WD Cir 219, 20 Sep 43; WD Cir 341, 29 Dec 43; WD Cir 400, 11 Oct 44; WD SB 10-63, 4 May 44; TC Pamphlet 22, 27 Sep 44.

Discipline on troop trains was essentially a problem of command, just as it was at an Army post. The responsibility rested with the train commander and the car commanders serving under him, and railroad personnel called upon them when lack of discipline threatened damage to railroad property or interference with train operation. Since the entrainment usually took place at an Army installation, there was slight opportunity for the troops to carry liquor on the trains; every effort was made to prevent them from obtaining it en route, for it frequently was the cause of unruliness and insubordination. Disciplinary problems were intensified when troop trains were sidetracked for long periods while other trains passed through, and when troops making long trips in day coaches came alongside other passengers ensconced in the comforts of Pullman cars.[122] Yet the enforcement of discipline was simpler on special troop trains, where there was adequate military authority, than on regular trains when individual servicemen were traveling in large numbers.[123]

A railroad escort was assigned to each troop train by the originating carrier in addition to the conductor and other members of the train crew and the Pullman conductor and porters. The escort had no operating duties. He was a seasoned railroader who had usually had experience with troop traffic and was therefore able to be of considerable assistance to the train commander. When friction arose between troops and railroad officials, as it did on numerous occasions, the escort might provide the word or the act to calm the situation. Troops were sometimes boisterous, dissatisfied with their accommodations, careless of railroad property, and disrespectful of railroad authority. Conductors, with a regard for the interests of their employers and sometimes with impatience bred of long hours of continuous service, might be short-tempered. There frequently was need for a diplomatic but firm intermediary, and the escort played that role. The Chief of Transportation described the escorts as "indispensable," yet toward the end of the war when the manpower shortage made it difficult for the railroads to place such officials on all trains, he had no alternative but to agree to their omission on the shorter daylight trips.[124]

The railroads were responsible for the maintenance of train schedules, but the Chief of Transportation kept this matter under close observation. Train commanders were required to telegraph the Traffic Control Division the time of departure, the time of arrival at destination, and any unusual delays or incidents en route. The railroads telegraphed similar information to the Military Transportation Section and also reported each time a troop train passed an interchange point—that is, passed from the tracks of one railroad to those of another. If a train fell seriously behind schedule, these agencies were in a position to act, but the initial action frequently came from the train commander. When a delay occurred his first step was to approach the train escort or the train conductor in an effort to correct the situation. In the early part of the war if this course failed to get the desired results, the

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[122] See SFPE, Summary of Problems Handled by Troop Train Comdrs, 8 Oct 45; NYPE, Summary of Troop Train Comdrs Rpts—Camp Kilmer, 12 Oct 45; both in OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.

[123] See below, pp. 67-70.

[124] Ltr, to Richard C. Morse, Vice Pres Penn RR, 31 May 44, OCT 531.7 PRR Sp Train Sv; OCT HB Monograph 22, p. 104.



PREPARING FOOD IN A CONVERTED BAGGAGE-KITCHEN CAR



NEW TROOP KITCHEN CAR EQUIPPED WITH MODERN FACILITIES train commander communicated with the division superintendent of the railroad. This procedure did not work out satisfactorily for the Army, and the train commanders were directed to telegraph a report to the Traffic Control Division, which then sought the aid of the Military Transportation Section in overcoming the delay.[125]

During the early part of the emergency the railroads complained that their efforts to maintain train schedules were sometimes thwarted by requests of the train commanders for unscheduled stops to enable troops to get rest or exercise. The carriers pointed out that most of the schedules requested by the Army made no provision for such stops, although they were recognized as necessary on long trips. An attempt to correct this situation by warning the officers concerned to be realistic in arranging schedules failed to overcome the difficulty. Soon after the United States entered the war, therefore, train commanders and other officers in the field were forbidden to approach the railroads regarding unscheduled stops and were required to direct their requests to The Quartermaster General, who at that time had general responsibility for the routing and delivery of troops, or to the Western Defense Command when trains were destined for points in that area.[126] After the techniques of arranging and executing troop movements had been perfected through practice, the demand for unscheduled stops ceased to be a problem.

Departures from schedule attributable to the railroads required the attention of the Chief of Transportation throughout the war. When trains arrived at Army installations ahead of or behind schedule, arrangements for the reception and accommodation of the troops were upset, and sometimes seriously so. Delays might also disturb plans for using the cars in other troop movements. Early arrivals were not common, but they occurred; late arrivals were more frequent. Operating conditions became more difficult for the carriers as the traffic increased without commensurate increases in facilities and personnel. Recognizing this the Chief of Transportation allowed the railroads some latitude, but he maintained a firm attitude toward what appeared to be excessive or unnecessary delays. This was particularly true of trains destined for staging areas at the ports of embarkation, and such trains were placed under special controls.[127]

When objectionable delays occurred, the facts as reported to the Traffic Control Division were placed before the Military Transportation Section, which in turn obtained the railroads' side of the story. In some cases it was apparent that the carriers concerned had not exercised sufficient care or foresight, and in such cases the MTS took further steps to emphasize the necessity of maintaining schedules. In other cases, the MTS believed that the criticisms of the Traffic Control Division were unduly harsh, since in the handling of long movements under difficult operating conditions situations were likely to arise that could not be foreseen or prevented. Nevertheless, the division was unrelenting. It recognized that on the whole the railroads were giving the Army excellent service, but it also knew that the railroads were under heavy pressure with regular trains frequently running behind schedule, and the division's tactics were designed to keep the carriers constantly alert to the Army's requirements and their responsibility for putting military traffic through promptly.[128]

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[125] AR 55-145, 30 Sep 42, par. 14*d*, and Changes 5, 14 Mar 44; OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 57–59.

[126] Ltr, IMC to TQMG, 4 Apr 41, AG 511 (11-3-34) AR 30-945; WD Cir 149, 24 Jul 41, Sec. I; WD Cir 273, 31 Dec 41, Sec. II.

[127] See below, Ch. II.

Maintaining secrecy regarding troop train movements was a constant and difficult problem. Secrecy was important because of the danger of sabotage on the railroads and because the movement of large troop units into a port was indication of an impending movement by ship from the port—information of value to enemy U-boats. Yet the possibilities for "leaks" were numerous. The troops themselves found a prospective move interesting news to pass on to their relatives and friends. Certain information had to pass between home stations, the Traffic Control Division, the stations of destination, and the carriers in order that the movements might be properly executed, and there was always danger that the messages would get into unauthorized hands or that some one who had received the information properly would use it carelessly. Three months after Pearl Harbor G-2 reported that leaks had been traced to institutions that provided free rest rooms to servicemen, civic organizations and telegraph companies that sent representatives to meet troop trains, police radios reporting the movement of military motor convoys, and crowds assembled in railroad yards when troop trains were passing through.[129]

The problem of secrecy was encountered during the prewar emergency and a tightening of the regulations was begun. Military personnel were warned against making public any information relating to troop movements. Instructions were issued requiring that all identification markings placed on passenger and freight cars, such as those indicating the unit moving or the destination, be removed before the departure of the cars from the military reservation. Movements were classified as secret, confidential, or restricted, and all communications and information pertaining to such movements had to be classified in the same way. Commanding officers were reminded of their responsibility for making all personnel under their control familiar with security regulations.[130] Despite these steps, violations of security continued even after the United States became an active belligerent. Fortunately there were no untoward events traceable to this lack of secrecy, and, with the added measures taken by the Army, the situation gradually improved.

After Pearl Harbor steps were taken to increase troop train security. Explicit instructions were issued to transportation officers in the field and to the personnel of the Traffic Control Division regarding the handling of messages relating to routings. In the case of secret and confidential movements, coded messages by teletype, telegraph, or radio were to be used when time permitted; when there was not sufficient time for such communications and telephone or uncoded telegraph communications were necessary, the movements were to be identified only by reference to the movement orders, and information as to the date, size, origin, and destination was to be omitted.[131] The railroads were required to make sure that information regarding troop movements became available only to employees requiring it, that only the information necessary to the performance of their duties was given, and that the employees were carefully instructed in safeguarding such information.[132] The Traffic Control Division, while pressing the railroads to use utmost care, opposed suggestions that the carriers be required to put all communications regarding secret movements in code or to send them by registered mail, since such restrictions would have interfered with their operating efficiency.[133]

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[128] AR 55-155, 27 Nov 42, par. 1. For typical complaints, see Memo, C of Traf Contl Div for CofT, 7 Aug 42, sub: Late Arrivals at Camp Shelby, OCT 511; Ltr, Morris to Gass, 5 Apr 44, and reply, 20 Apr 44, OCT 511 Rail and Motor Mvmts; Ltr, Maj Samuel N. Farley to Mr. Kelly, 24 Oct 45, and reply, 15 Nov 45, OCT 531.7 Train Av.

[129] Memo, G-2 for CofS, 3 Mar 42, sub: Compromise of Mil Info; Memo, TAG for CG AAF, *et al.*, 13 Mar 42; both in AG 350.05 (3-3-42)(3).

[130] AR 380-5, 18 Jun 41, Sec. VIII; WD Cir 198, 22 Sep 41, Sec. I; WD Cir 242, 22 Nov 41, Sec. V.

In the effort to limit the opportunity for improper dissemination of information, a broad prohibition was set up against giving information regarding troop movements to representatives of nonmilitary agencies and against permitting visitors to go aboard troop trains. The Army declined to authorize the Association of American Railroads to give regular information to the Office of Defense Transportation regarding troop movements, contending that this should be done only when a military purpose could be shown.[134] Representatives of foreign governments were denied such information, except certain officers who were working with the Combined Staff Planners.[135] News agents, vendors of merchandise, and representatives of charitable organizations were not to be given advance information regarding the arrival of special troop trains or to be permitted to board such trains, and this prohibition was interpreted as applying to the American Red Cross despite the good work it was doing on behalf of troop comfort and morale.[136] Railroads were not permitted to use secret or confidential trains for deadheading railroad personnel who were not performing duties on those trains.[137]

Military security as well as rapidity of transmission would have been improved if all communications regarding troop movements could have been sent over Army-controlled cryptographic teletype equipment. Late in 1942 the Chief of Transportation recommended the installation of such connections between his office and all Army installations concerned with troop movements. The proposal was approved by Services of Supply headquarters, but not enough equipment could be obtained to carry it out. Private teletype communications were established only between the Traffic Control Division, the ports of embarkation, and the Army regulating stations on the transcontinental rail lines. Consequently, commercial teletypes and telephones were used extensively, necessitating the restriction on the content of messages.[138]

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[131] Memo, Morris for All Routing Personnel, 7 Jun 42, sub: Telephone Conv—Classified Troop Mvmts, OCT 000.72 Gen; AR 55-130, 4 Jun 43, Changes 2, par. 8*b*(1).

[132] Memo, Lasher for Gass, 13 Dec 41, OCT 080 AAR; Memos, Gass to All RRs, 14 Dec 41, and 12 Jan 42; Memo, Gass for Lasher, 22 Jan 42; last three in OCT 370.5 Secrecy; WD Cir 193, 16 Jun 42, par. 4; Ltr, Williamson to Western Mil Bur, 20 Jul 42, OCT 511.

[133] 1st Ind, CofT for Army Regulating Off, El Paso, Tex., 15 Apr 42, OCT 000.72 Gen; Memo, Traf Contl Div for Mvmts Div OCT, 15 Feb 43, sub: Safeguarding Mil Info, OCT 370.5 Secrecy.

[134] Ltr, Gross to Eastman, ODT, 26 Apr 42, OCT 511.

[135] The Combined Staff Planners was the committee primarily responsible for assisting the Combined Chiefs of Staff in planning the strategic conduct of the war. It consisted of three British officers, Army, Navy, and Air, and four U.S. officers, Army, Navy, Army Air, and Navy Air.

[136] WD Cir 191, 15 Jun 42, Sec. V; Ltr, Lasher to MTS, 11 Jul 42, OCT 080 AAR; Ltr, Morris to Western Mil Bur, 11 Mar 44, OCT 531.7 Gen; WD Cir 314, 26 Jul 44, Sec. VI.

[137] 1st Ind, CofT for PMG, 1 Nov 43, OCT 511 Rail and Motor Mvmts.

Although an Army regulation of September 1942 appeared to favor the use of mixed trains, the Chief of Transportation did not. The inclusion of both passenger and freight cars in the same trains subjected the passenger equipment to hard treatment and necessitated more frequent lay-ups for repairs. Mixed trains moved more slowly than passenger trains, a fact that meant a loss of service from the passenger cars. The decision on using mixed trains, however, was left largely to the commanders of troops, and in many instances they adhered to the old doctrine that troops and their organic equipment should not be separated. The procedures that were developed during World War II for separate movements of troops and their impedimenta and the fact that the country was in no danger of invasion after the early weeks of the war invalidated this doctrine, yet the use of mixed trains continued.[139]

When impedimenta were moved separately from the troops to which they pertained, either in solid trains or in cars attached to through freight trains, the shipments were given MI (military impedimenta) numbers, were moved from origin to destination with the least possible delay, and were controlled en route in the same manner as troop trains. Such shipments were exempt from the diversion orders of an agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission who had authority to reroute transcontinental freight traffic when he found this necessary to keep the principal railroad gateways free from congestion. Markings on troop equipment destined for oversea areas that might reveal the identity of the unit, its destination, or the ship on which it was to be transported were forbidden. Guards were provided for equipment in transit whenever the unit commanders considered them necessary.[140]

The close attention that the Chief of Transportation gave to the operation of troop trains and the importance that he attached to the observance of schedules and the maintenance of order and cleanliness were based on sound military principles. The carriers sometimes felt that his insistence on the observance of schedules went beyond the point of military necessity, but unquestionably delays en route magnified the problems of troop train administration, and late arrivals were disturbing to the installations of destination. There were some, including military men, who believed that the Army's requirements of secrecy in connection with train movements were stricter than the circumstances warranted, but the rules were dictated by consideration of the heavy cost that might result from less strict security measures. Within the limits of practicality, the Chief of Transportation acted on the theory that a troop train was a military installation pro tem, and should be operated with corresponding regard for schedules, discipline, sanitation, and security. Although the results often fell below his expectations, for reasons that have been stated, these standards were achieved in large measure.

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[138] OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 64-65.

[139] AR 55-145, 30 Sep 42, par. 1*b*(2)(d); Interv with Morris, 24 May 43, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass; Morris monograph, pp. 53-54.

[140] OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 51-57, 63; Memo, TAG for CG Field Forces, *et al.*, 20 Jan 42, AG 370.5 (12-20-41), and Memo TAG for CG Field Forces, *et al.*, 28 Jan 42, AG 370.5 (1-25-42).

Official and Furlough Travel on Regular Trains

While troops moving in special trains constituted the most important element from a military standpoint, the other types of Army passenger traffic added up to a considerable volume and involved certain unique problems. Chief among these types were military personnel and civilian employees traveling on War Department transportation requests, either as small groups or as individuals, and military personnel traveling at their own expense while on furlough, leave, or pass. This traffic was handled by regular train and bus services, which also handled the heavy traffic of civilians traveling on private business missions or for pleasure. The mingling of military and civilian passengers and the crowded conditions of the trains, buses, and terminals gave rise to many of the passenger traffic problems with which General Gross and his Traffic Control Division had to deal.

As has been indicated, persons traveling on War Department transportation requests (official travel) were routed by the Traffic Control Division when they numbered forty or more, regardless of the point of origin, while local Army transportation officers routed smaller groups and individuals traveling from their respective stations. The problems involved in the issuance of transportation requests for such traffic and the fulfillment of financial arrangements between the carriers and the government were numerous and sometimes vexatious. These administrative details are not dealt with in this discussion, which is confined to the strictly transportation aspects.[141]

The necessity of utilizing railroad equipment with utmost economy gave rise to two arrangements, mentioned earlier, affecting the official travel of individuals and small groups. At the request of the railroads, the Army had agreed that local Army transportation officers would consult local railroad representatives before routing parties of from fifteen to thirty-nine, inclusive. This procedure enabled the railroads not only to work out the routing of this considerable traffic so as to use their equipment to best advantage but also to make an equitable division of the business among the several rail lines. Upon the recommendation of the Chief of Transportation, local transportation officers, in order to utilize railway cars as they became available and thus reduce deadheading, were authorized to advance or delay the departure of troops that they had routed. These arrangements complemented each other and aided the Army transportation officers and the railroads in their joint effort to avoid idle car time and wasted car space.

Army personnel engaging accommodations in Pullman cars were not subject to the usual rules regarding the reservation and surrender of space. For many years Army regulations had provided that transportation requests for Pullman space would be surrendered after boarding the train, rather than exchanged for tickets before boarding as in the case of requests for rail transportation. This arrangement was convenient for officers and enlisted men whose time of departure was subject to sudden change, but it also meant that reservations could be held until train time and then not be used, and it permitted the holding of reservations on a number of trains simultaneously. In an effort to check the waste of Pullman space, the Office of Defense Transportation early in the war requested the Army and other federal agencies to change their procedures to conform to the rules applicable to the public at large.[142]

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[141] The administrative rules are covered in AR 55-110, 22 Jan 43, sub: Trans Requests; AR 55-120, 26 Apr 43, sub: Trans of Indiv; AR 55-125, 9 Jan 43, sub: Sleeping Car and Similar Accommodations; ARs of the 35 series, 4810 through 4895. For a discussion of administrative problems, see OCT HB Monographs 6, pp. 232, 259-61; 20, pp. 6, 7, 30-57.

The Chief of Transportation did not agree to the proposal since it would have hampered officers in performing duties involving travel, but in September 1942 he entered into an agreement with the Pullman Company that brought considerable improvement to the situation. Under this agreement Pullman space that had been reserved forty-eight hours or more in advance was held for military passengers until twenty-four hours before train time, or it was held until train time if the reservations had been made within forty-eight hours of departure. To meet the problem encountered by officers whose travel orders were changed just before departure, the Pullman Company permitted those who had already exchanged their transportation requests for Pullman tickets to use those tickets on other trains, and when the tickets could not be used at all, refund was made.[143]

When a party of troops required only part of a sleeping car, the Army practice was to use as many lower berths as were required, placing two men in each lower berth and using upper berths only if there was an odd man in the party or after all lowers had been filled. The railroads complained that this practice was inconsiderate of other passengers who might travel in the same car and proposed that the Army assign its personnel section by section as the Navy did, thus leaving more lower berths available for civilians or members of the other armed services. The Chief of Transportation rejected this proposal and the Army practice remained unchanged. He pointed out that the Navy placed only one man in a lower berth (up to July 1945), and that the Army's method of using Pullman space actually was the more economical.[144]

Furlough travel—a term covering the travel of soldiers on furlough, leave, or pass—created special problems because soldiers used the same facilities as civilians and because the peaks of furlough and civilian travel—week ends and major holiday periods—tended to coincide. No actual count of furlough tickets was made, but the railroads estimated that from 1 January 1942 through 31 December 1945 approximately 200,000,000 reduced-rate furlough tickets were sold to men and women of the armed services.[145]

Early efforts were made to hold furlough travel within limits because of the strain under which the carriers were working. Furlough travel was in competition with official military movements for transportation equipment, and overcrowded trains were conducive to disorder. Against these practical reasons for limiting furlough travel, the Army had to weigh both the popular argument that men in training for oversea duty should be afforded an opportunity to visit their homes as often as the training schedule would permit and the morale value of such visits.

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[142] Concerning loss of space due to commercial and governmental practices, see Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Third Annual Report* (Washington, March 4, 1944), pp. 116–17.

[143] Ltr, Pullman Co. to CofT, *et al.*, 17 Jun 42; Ltr, ODT to Gross, 4 Jul 42; Ltr, Lasher to Pullman Co., 13 Jul 42; Ltr, Brig Gen Theodore H. Dillon, OCT, to ODT, 17 Jul 42; Ltr, Pullman Co. to OCT, 29 Sep 42; all in OCT 531.2; AR 55-110, 22 Jan 43, sub: Trans Reqmts, par. 4*b*; OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 32–35.

[144] AR 55-125, 9 Jan 43, par. 2*c*; Ltr, Lasher to IMC, 8 Apr 43, OCT 531.2 (AR 55-125).

[145] Ltr, Earl B. Padrick, Chm IMC, to author, 8 Dec 50, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.

In the fall of 1941 the prospect of heavy furlough travel during the Christmas holiday season caused anxiety to the railroads, The Quartermaster General, and G-4. Not only had the size of the Army greatly increased since the preceding holiday season, but permission had been given to commanding officers to authorize furloughs up to 50 percent of their enlisted personnel at any one time during this period, rather than the usual 15 percent.[146] The railroads proposed among other things that holiday furloughs begin not later than 12 December; that the War Department establish schedules so as to spread the traffic more evenly over the entire period; that the railroads be given advance notice of the numbers scheduled to move each day; and that official troop movements be suspended between 12 December and 14 January, except in case of extreme emergency.[147] The War Department accepted these proposals in principle, but the Japanese attack on our Pacific bases and the ensuing declarations of war against Japan and Germany necessitated a complete change of arrangements. Limitations on official troop movements could not be observed. Furloughs were first limited to 25 percent of unit strength and then restricted to cases of emergency and cases where the railroads could give assurance to camp commanders that official troop movements would not be affected.[148]

In April 1942, in order to lighten the pressure on the carriers over week ends, commanders of Army installations were directed to arrange so far as practicable for furloughs to start and end on Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday. Commanders were also directed to schedule furloughs throughout the year and to avoid concentrating them in certain months.[149] The Christmas–New Year holiday period at the end of 1942 threatened to produce unusually heavy travel, and explicit instructions covering furloughs granted between 12 December and 12 January were issued limiting the number to 10 percent of the strength of the post, camp, or station; passes issued for shorter periods were also restricted. Post commanders were instructed to co-operate with local railroad officials in deciding how much furlough travel could be moved from their commands and when it could be most readily handled.[150] When information reached the Chief of Transportation that some commanders were not observing these instructions, he sent messages to all service commands requesting that measures be taken to enforce them. The Office of Defense Transportation, which had been deeply concerned over the prospective congestion at this period, reported that the measures taken by the Army with regard to furlough travel had enabled the carriers to handle the seasonal traffic smoothly.[151]

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[146] WD Cir 200, 25 Sep 41.

[147] Memo, TQMG for ACofS G-4, 16 Oct 41, sub: Christmas Furloughs; and subsequent correspondence leading up to issuance of Memo, TAG for CGs All Armies, *et al.*, 7 Nov 41; all in AG 220.71 (12-28-39) AR 615-275; Memo, TAG for CGs All Armies, *et al.*, 4 Nov 41, sub: Curtailment of Troop Mvmts, AG 370.5 (10-27-41); Memo, TAG for CofS GHQ, *et al.*, 5 Nov 41, sub: Induction of Men During Holidays, AG 324.71 (9-23-41); Memo, TAG for CGs Corps Areas, *et al.*, 10 Nov 41, sub: Curtailment of Repl Tng, AG 324.71 (11-4-41).

[148] Memo, TAG for CofS GHQ, *et al.*, 8 Dec 41, sub: Furlough Travel; Memo, TAG for CGs All Armies, *et al.*, 24 Dec 41, sub: Curtailment of Leaves and Furloughs; both in AG 220.71 (12-28-39) AR 615-275.

[149] Memo, TAG for CG AGF, *et al.*, 30 Apr 42, sub: Annual Leaves, Furloughs, and Vacations, AG 230.54 (4-24-42).

[150] Memo, Gross for Somervell, 6 Oct 42, OCT HB Gross Day File; WD Cir 348, 19 Oct 42, Sec. II.

While the holiday seasons presented the greatest difficulty, the Chief of Transportation emphasized that excessive furlough travel was a year-round problem. In July 1943, speaking before a service commanders' conference, General Gross argued against the tendency of post commanders to grant furloughs every time enlisted men changed stations and expressed the view that a visit home about once every six months would meet morale needs. He also urged greater restraint in issuing passes to visit nearby places since local rail and bus services were overwhelmed.[152]

Simultaneously the Traffic Control Division proposed a revision of the basic Army regulations on furloughs, making the number of furloughs and passes issued at any post dependent at all times on the availability of commercial transportation equipment, and requiring post commanders to reduce their quotas of furloughs and passes whenever transportation considerations dictated. Army Service Forces headquarters approved the revision as it related to passes but not with respect to furloughs, contending that furloughed Army personnel should not be penalized while there was no restriction on travel by personnel of other governmental agencies or by the public at large. G-1 opposed even the limitation on passes, because it affected Army personnel only and because of the difficulty of equitable enforcement. The entire proposal accordingly was dropped.[153] Special instructions regarding travel during the Christmas–New Year holiday season were issued in the fall of 1943, as in earlier years.[154]

Complaints regarding the inadequacy of transportation available to men on furlough and the crowded condition of trains and buses led to the introduction of a bill in the U.S. House of Representatives in June 1944 to direct the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to give priority to furlough traffic. The War Department opposed the bill on the ground that furlough travel would be given precedence over organized troop movements regardless of the urgency of the latter. In placing itself on record against this measure the War Department expressed the belief that arrangements recently made with the railroads for handling furloughees in special trains, together with the reduction in furlough travel resulting from the reduction in the number of soldiers remaining in the zone of interior, would bring about an appreciable improvement in the transportation situation. The proposed bill was not enacted into law.[155]

The arrangement to move furloughees on special trains was an extension of a plan that had been in effect earlier. Under Army regulations a large percentage of the troops shipped to oversea replacement depots and ports of embarkation were entitled to furloughs before sailing overseas, and the transportation lines serving the training centers frequently were unable to accommodate this traffic. To relieve the situation, commanders of training centers were instructed to provide the men with official transportation on special troop trains to their new stations, and to allow those who would benefit by such an arrangement to leave the trains at convenient gateways and proceed to their homes at their own expense. When their furloughs were over, they returned to the gateways and boarded special troop trains for the completion of their journeys. Under this arrangement the furlough trip was shorter than it would have been if the soldiers had purchased furlough tickets from their stations to their homes and back again. Thus a considerable saving of transportation was effected and, in addition, the men were relieved of the necessity of making long journeys on crowded regular trains. In the summer of 1944 this plan was extended so that whenever a carload of men traveling on furlough tickets from a training center or other installation could be routed through the same gateway, they were moved in a special car to the gateway, from which point they dispersed to their homes. The operation was repeated in reverse when the men returned to their stations.[156] During the last half of 1944 about 216,000 troops on furlough were moved as organized groups in special cars, and during 1945 about 329,000 were so transported.[157]

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[151] Rads, 15 Dec 42, OCT 551.1 Furlough Fares; Ltr, Eastman to Gross, 1 Jan 43, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.

[152] Remarks by Gen Gross at SvC Conf, Chicago, 22–24 Jul 43, p. 113, JAGO Library.

[153] Memo, OCT for CG ASF, 17 Jul 43, sub: Regulating Furloughs, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass; Memo, Mil Pers Div ASF for CG ASF, 19 Aug 43; Memo, ACofS G-1 for CofS USA, 29 Sep 43, sub: Travel on Pass; last two in AG 220.71 (12-28-39) AR 615-275; OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 117–18.

[154] WD Cir 215, 16 Sep 43, Sec. VI.

[155] HR 5116, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 23 Jun 44; Ltr, SW to Rep Andrew J. May, Chm House Com on Mil Affairs, 24 Aug 44, OCT 511 Priorities for Servicemen.

This method of handling furlough traffic, while it had definite advantages, required very careful administration at the stations from which the troops were moving, and gave rise to numerous complaints from the railroads. The difficulties arose from the fact that the number of furloughees leaving their stations by rail often was less than the number for which cars had been ordered and from the failure of all men to return to the gateways in time to take the special cars that were to carry them back to their stations.[158]

The armed forces proposed in the summer of 1944 that servicemen and servicewomen in uniform be allowed to pass through the gates at railway terminals or board trains in advance of civilian travelers. The primary purpose was to facilitate the travel of furloughees who held coach tickets; they had limited time for their journeys and often were delayed in getting aboard trains because of the volume of nonessential civilian traffic. In response to this proposal, the railroads stated that many of them already were following the practice at stations where there were facilities for controlling traffic and where the granting of preference was considered expedient, and they did not favor the adoption of the plan as a general rule.[159]

It often happened that enlisted men who were entitled to a furlough before going overseas were without funds with which to purchase transportation. The Army Emergency Relief and the Red Cross had found it necessary to limit loans to servicemen to cases of sickness or death at home. The Army accordingly arranged with the railroads and the bus lines for the issuance of official transportation requests for round-trip furlough tickets in such instances, with the understanding that the cost of this transportation would be charged against the account of the enlisted man and would in no case be borne by the government.[160]

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[156] AR 615-275, Changes 3, 20 May 43, and Changes 5, 30 Sep 43; Memo, CofT for CG AGF, 3 Jul 44, OCT 511 Furlough Travel; WD CTB 25, 10 Aug 44; OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 139-41.

[157] Data originally compiled by Transport Economics Section, Traffic Control Division, OCT, to be published in a statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

[158] Ltr, Siddall to CofT, 11 Aug 44; Ltr, Morris to Siddall, 19 Aug 44; both in OCT 511 Furlough Travel; Memo, CofT for CG AGF, 29 Sep 44; Ltr, White to Siddall, 5 Jan 45; Memo, Gass for White, 10 Feb 45; last three in OCT 511 Furlough or Delay En Route.

[159] Ltr, Armed Forces to AAR and IMC, 11 Aug 44, and reply, 24 Aug 44, OCT 510 Trans of 15 or Less.

In addition to the other measures he took to improve travel conditions for military personnel using regular trains, the Chief of Transportation assisted in obtaining reservations for sleepers, parlor cars, and reserved-seat coaches. The difficulty that members of the armed forces experienced in obtaining reserved space led first to the establishment of government reservation bureaus (GRB's) operated by the railroads, and later to the establishment of Army reservation bureaus (ARB's) to complement these special railroad offices.

Government reservation bureaus were the outgrowth of an arrangement between the Passenger Branch in the Office of the Chief of Transportation and certain of the railroads that operated trains out of Washington, under which a limited amount of space was held at the disposal of the branch to meet its emergency needs. The arrangement proved so helpful that the Passenger Branch proposed that it be extended to other cities. The railroads were agreeable, and the approval of the Office of Defense Transportation was given with the provision that the space held by the railroads should be available to all of the armed services and also to the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration. Organized on this basis, the first GRB began functioning in Washington late in June 1942. Space was sold to the several government agencies in the order of application, and any space not taken up by these agencies within the time set by the railroads was made available to the public.

Plans for the extension of this arrangement to other cities were worked out at meetings between representatives of the government agencies and the railroads in the fall of 1942. Recommendations for the establishment of additional GRB's usually originated with the Passenger Branch, but the decision as to their actual establishment rested with a committee representing the major rail lines. The operation of each bureau was the responsibility of a committee of local railroad representatives. The government agencies authorized to use the GRB's were required to designate a single office in each city through which all requests for reservations would be made.[161] The offices that the Army designated for this purpose became known as Army reservations bureaus.[162]

The scope of this activity was steadily increased. Although it was part of the original plan that reservations would be requested only for individuals on official travel and not for groups, the rule was modified, against considerable railroad opposition, to permit the ARB's to make reservations for groups up to fourteen.[163] The railroads and the Office of Defense Transportation also objected to the extension of the arrangement so that the reservation bureaus could serve personnel traveling on furlough and leave, but eventually both accepted the Army's recommendation. The carriers also agreed to set aside space in their larger terminals so that the Army reservation bureaus located at Army installations in those cities could operate branches in locations more readily accessible to transient service personnel. At the end of hostilities the Army had forty-four reservation bureaus and they, in turn, maintained a total of forty-eight branches. General supervision of these offices was a responsibility of the Traffic Control Division. More detailed supervision was given by the zone transportation officers, who also negotiated with the railroads regarding increased allotments of reserved space to the government reservation bureaus in their respective territories.[164]

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[160] OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 145-46; WD Cir 22, 18 Jan 45, Sec. II.

[161] OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 83-85; Memo, Lasher to Wylie, 10 Nov 42, OCT 531.8 GRBs; WD Cir 40, 4 Feb 43, Sec. I; Standard Operating Procedure for GRBs issued by CofT, undated, OCT HB TZ Gen ARB.

[162] Memo, Lasher for CofT, 2 Aug 43, sub: GRB Status Rpt, OCT 531.2 GRBs.

[163] Ltr, Armed Forces to AAR and IMC, 11 Aug 44, and replies, 24 Aug 44 and 11 Sep 44, OCT 510 Trans of 15 or Less.

The chief problem in the operation of Army reservation bureaus was to get the carriers to allocate sufficient space on trains to the government reservation bureaus to meet the military need. The Chief of Transportation kept pressing for larger allocations and some lines responded, but others evidently were reluctant to hold back large blocks of space from the general public.[165] Although the Army emphasized that the reservation bureaus were operated solely as a convenience to military personnel and did not imply any priority in favor of military over civilian travelers, the fact remained that while space was under allocation to the GRB's it was not available to the public. On the Army's side it could be pointed out that civilians could and did make reservations far in advance, whereas this frequently was not possible with military personnel, and that some large business concerns bought up blocks of space on important trains and never relinquished it even though some of the accommodations might not be used.

Despite the competition for reserved space, the results obtained by the Army reservation bureaus were substantial. During the early months of operation the percentage of requests that could not be filled was high, reaching a peak of 13.3 percent in August 1943, but rapid improvement followed. In several later months the percentage of failures was as low as 2.1. Activities of the ARB's from their inception in April 1943 through 1945 are summarized in Table 5.

The Chief of Transportation considered this traffic so important that in order to supplement the regular sleeper services he assigned to it a considerable number of the cars that had been allotted to handle organized troop movements. These cars were placed on routes where the travel of military personnel on official business and on furlough was especially heavy, and they were designated military sleeping car lines. When the need became apparent to the Traffic Control Division, the division requested the railroad concerned and the Pullman Company to study the situation and to arrange for the operation of such a line. When on days of peak travel the traffic exceeded the capacity of regular sleeper services and the military sleeping car line, the officer in charge of

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[164] OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 77-82, 85-98; WD Memo W 55-40-43, 24 Aug 43; WD Cir 396, 7 Oct 44, Sec. I; WD CTB 23, 8 May 45, includes a list of ARB's and their branches and the rules governing their operation.

[165] Ltr, Gross to Maj Gen Sanderford Jarman, 23 Jul 43, OCT 531.8 GRBs; Ltr, Morris to IMC, 17 Aug 44, OCT 531.2 SF; 1st Ind, 8th ZTO for CofT, 1 Jan 45, and related correspondence, OCT 531.2 New Orleans.

TABLE 5—ARMY RESERVATION BUREAU ACTIVITY: APRIL 1943–DECEMBER 1945

Year	Reservations Requested	Reservations Obtained	Reservations Not Obtained	Percentage of Failures
1943 (April–December)	823, 388	753, 521	69, 867	8.5
1944	1, 754, 048	1, 687, 369	66, 679	3.8
1945	4, 312, 524	4, 184, 282	128, 242	3.0

Source: Data based on Army Reservation Bureau Activity Report, received by Traffic Control Division, OCT, compiled for publication in a statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

an Army reservation bureau was authorized to arrange with the carriers for the assignment of overflow sleeping cars. These also were to be taken from the military allotment. Since the establishment of military sleeping car lines meant that so much less equipment was available for organized troop movements, the Traffic Control Division weighed very carefully the circumstances affecting each case. While these lines were intended primarily for military personnel for whom reservations had been made by the ARB's, any space not sold by the release time was made available to the public. In May 1945 there were seventy-six such lines in operation.[166]

Although the Army reservation bureaus initially served only Army personnel, their services eventually were made available to personnel of the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard. The Navy also set up a number of reservation bureaus that could be used by personnel of all of the armed services. Toward the close of the war both the Army and the Navy reservation bureaus were advertised as military reservation bureaus, but in most places the management continued to be by the Army or by the Navy. Early in 1945 the ARB's at San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle became joint bureaus and were operated under the control of committees representing all of the armed services.[167]

As soon as hostilities were over the carriers undertook to terminate the operation of both government reservation bureaus and military sleeping car lines promptly. In this they had the support of Mr. Johnson, Director of Defense Transportation, who on 4 September 1945 informed the armed forces that overflow sleeping cars would be discontinued at once, and that the GRB's would be canceled on 15 October "in order that sleeping cars may be made available for commercial use on a parity with government travel." General Gross and his colleagues in the other branches of the military establishment immediately entered a protest against this action, pointing out that the military population of the country would be large for many months to come and that military personnel returning from overseas would be in special need of these services. The protest was successful. The government reservation bureaus were continued, on a diminishing scale, until August 1946. While some military sleeping car lines were discontinued, others were inaugu-

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[166] OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 97–100; WD CTB 23, 8 May 45, p. 12.

[167] Memo, CofT for 9th ZTO, 28 Oct 44, OCT 531.8 GRBs; Interv with Col Morris, 11 Oct 50, OCT HB TZ Gen ARB.

MILITARY TRAIN RESERVATIONS
and INFORMATION FOR PERSONNEL OF THE
ARMY. NAVY. MARINE CORPS & COAST GUARD
3

SPECIAL RESERVATION BUREAU FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL *in the station concourse, New Orleans, Louisiana.*

rated during the period of heavy demobilization.[168]

The number of officers passing through Washington to domestic and oversea assignments was large, and the Chief of Transportation provided a complete travel service for their benefit. This service, established in November 1942, replaced similar services set up by The Adjutant General and by other agencies of the War Department. Operated as a section of the Passenger Branch, Traffic Control Division, the travel bureau had its main office in the Pentagon and a branch in the Munitions Building. Complementing the activities of the Army reservation bureau (formally set up in April 1943), the travel bureau rendered assistance in preparing mileage and expense vouchers, aided in filing applications for pay allotments and insurance, gave advice on obtaining financial assistance and making wills, issued transportation requests upon presentation of travel orders, prepared itineraries, provided information regarding conditions in foreign countries, processed applications for passports and visas, made reservations for air and rail travel, and obtained hotel accommodations in other cities. Consolidated ticket offices maintained by the rail, bus, and airlines were domiciled with the travel bureau. The bureau's services were available to both the civilian and the military personnel of the Army, and for group as well as individual travel. After the war its activities were transferred to the Military District of Washington.[169]

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[168] Ltr, Gross to Johnson, 21 Aug 45; Ltr, Johnson to Gross, 4 Sep 45; Ltr, Armed Forces to Johnson, 5 Sep 45; Ltr, Johnson to Armed Forces, 10 Sep 45; Memo, McIntyre for Gross, 12 Sep 45; Ltr, Johnson to Gross, 20 Sep 45; all in OCT HB Gross ODT; Ltr, IMC to Johnson, 8 Jan 46, OCT 531.7 Sleeping Car Lines.

Although the commanders of Army installations in the zone of interior were also instructed to establish travel information booths to enable officers and enlisted men to complete arrangements without having to visit the crowded ticket offices of the carriers, the travel bureau established in Washington was unique both in size and in scope. The nature and extent of its principal activities are indicated in the following summary of services performed during the fiscal year ending 30 June 1945:[170]

Services	*Number*
Military travel orders issued	19,262
Civilian travel orders issued	4,967
Transportation requests issued	116,640
Mileage vouchers prepared	23,608
Pullman reservations made	164,251
Air reservations made	44,654
Hotel reservations made	10,533
Passports obtained	6,680
Visas obtained	8,363

The value of ticket sales for the fiscal year 1945 were as follows:[171]

Railway	$3,370,774
Airline	853,884
Bus	12,750

The hotel reservation service performed by the Chief of Transportation's travel bureau was based on an arrangement made with the American Hotel Association early in 1943 under which members of the Association agreed to reserve rooms, against letters of recommendation written by the travel bureau, either in their own hotels or in others of similar class. Travelers presented copies of these letters when claiming their accommodations. The success of the plan led to its extension to some of the Army reservation bureaus in the field. The travel bureau in Washington and the ARB's made only out-of-town reservations. Late in the war the service commands set up bureaus in the principal cities that made hotel reservations only in their respective localities. Then it was arranged that when any of the Chief of Transportation's bureaus wanted to make reservations in cities in which there were service command bureaus, they would do so through the latter bureaus rather than directly with the hotels.[172]

Discipline of military personnel traveling on regular trains became a problem as soon as the build-up of the armed forces began in 1940. Train officials were reluctant to exercise the same authority over soldiers that they did over civilians, military authority was frequently lacking, and young men temporarily relieved from the restraints of the military reservation were often guilty of rowdyism and irresponsible acts. Complaints made by passengers and train officials indicated that the excessive use of liquor was a contributing factor in many cases. The railroads therefore inquired whether it was the desire of the Army that they refuse to sell liquor to service personnel. The Adjutant General replied in the negative, stating that discrimination against service personnel on public trains was undesirable and that enlisted men who were drunken or disorderly were subject to trial and punishment by court-martial under the Articles of War.[173]

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[169] OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 102–14; SOS Adm Memo 65, 9 Nov 42, sub: Discontinuance of Travel Assistance Functions; SOS Memo, 13 Nov 42, sub: New Location of Travel Offices; WD Memo 55-45, 22 Oct 45, sub: Estab of Oversea Travel Office, MDW; ASF Cir 128, 24 May 46, Sec. VI.

[170] WD Cir 77, 17 Mar 43, Sec. IV; Annual Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1945, p. 31, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Rpts.

[171] *Ibid.*

[172] OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 114-114*b*; ASF Cir 77, 2 Mar 45, Sec. II; ASF Cir 174, 17 May 45, Sec. I.

Although the commanding officers of camps and other installations were directed to enforce the regulations strictly and to co-operate with railroad officials in dealing with disciplinary problems, the complaints against misconduct continued. The carriers then proposed that the Army place its representatives on trains carrying large numbers of furloughees to enforce discipline. The Army at first rejected this proposal, in part because of the lack of appropriations, but later accepted it when the railroads offered free transportation for such representatives. In September 1941 station commanders were authorized to designate military police to ride such trains when the railroads requested them to do so.[174]

After the United States entered the war and travel by servicemen on regular trains increased, further measures were required. As a first step, post commanders were again directed to deal vigorously with cases of misbehavior on trains, but the need for more effective control was soon evident.[175] The next step was to assign to the commanders of corps areas (later redesignated service commands) full responsibility for placing military police on regular passenger trains whenever large numbers of military personnel were being carried.[176] In the beginning this arrangement was not wholly successful because many of the men assigned as military police were inadequately trained and were not always assigned to the trains where they were most needed. In November 1942 General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, complained that the control of discipline on trains was not effective, and the Provost Marshal General then appointed thirty inspectors to make investigations throughout the country and to coach military police in the proper performance of their duties.[177]

The effectiveness of the military police increased steadily after these measures were taken. As the reports of difficulty became less frequent some of the service commands, in view of the growing scarcity of military police, began withdrawing them from certain trains. In the summer of 1943 the railroads protested vigorously against this action and the Chief of Transportation supported their position. As a result, ASF headquarters reminded the service commands of their responsibilities and directed them not to withdraw military police from trains unless a careful survey showed their services were not needed.[178]

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[173] Ltrs, IMC to TQMG and Other Armed Forces, 4 Mar 40, and 29 Jun 40; Ltr, IMC for TQMG, 31 Jul 40; Ltr, TAG to IMC, 5 Aug 40; all in OCT 250.1 Misconduct of Mil Pers, Vol. I.

[174] Memo, IMC for TQMG, *et al.*, 26 Feb 41; Memo, TAG to CGs Corps Areas, *et al.*, 1 May 41, sub: Conduct of Mil Pers on Trains; Ltr, IMC to TAG, 12 May 41; Ltr, TAG to IMC, 10 Jun 41; Ltr, IMC to TAG, 15 Jul 41; Memo, TAG to CGs Corps Areas, *et al.*, 26 Sep 41, sub: MP on Furlough Trains; Ltr, TAG to IMC, 4 Nov 41; all in AG 250.1 (2-26-41)(1).

[175] Memo, TAG for CG AGF, *et al.*, 12 Apr 42, sub: Conduct of Mil Pers on Pub Carriers, AG 250.1 (3-25-42).

[176] Memo, TAG for CG AGF, etc., 21 Jul 42, sub: Misconduct on Pub Carriers, AG 250.1 (7-14-42); SOS Memo S 190-1-42, 24 Sep 42, sub: MPs Assigned to Pub Carriers. Concerning general responsibility of service commands for conduct of military personnel, see WD Cir 77, 17 Mar 43, Secs. I and III.

[177] Memos, CofS for PMG, 4 and 17 Nov 42; Memo PMG for CofS, 23 Nov 42; Memo, PMG for CGs of SvCs, 1 Dec 42; all in PMG 250.1; WD Memo W 190-1-43, 5 Jan 43, sub: Size and Composition of MP Details on Carriers; WD Memo, W 190-2-43, 13 Sep 43, sub: Assignment of MPs to Extra Sections; ASF Cir 224, 18 Jul 44, Sec. III.

In addition to quelling disturbances and performing other duties of a disciplinary nature, military police checked the papers of each soldier to make sure that he was traveling with proper authority and that he was on the right train. At the end of July 1945, out of a total of 10,640 military police engaged in the enforcement of discipline in the United States, 3,401 were policing railroad stations and trains.[179]

In the early months of the war the Army's military policemen and the Navy's shore patrolmen devoted their attention entirely to men of their respective services. Later, under an agreement made in 1942, they were authorized to take corrective measures against servicemen of any of the armed services when their actions were reprehensible. Military police and members of the shore patrol frequently served on joint missions.[180] One disadvantage of the joint patrols, as the Provost Marshal General pointed out, was that shore patrolmen were all petty officers while only a small proportion of the military police held comparable grades.[181]

The matter of serving liquor to Army personnel on regular trains came up recurrently. The railroads desired a definite statement of policy from the Army, and the Army apparently hesitated to take a positive stand. Eventually, in September 1943, the railroads were informed that responsibility for this matter had been assigned to the Chief of Transportation and that certain steps had been decided on. Railroad employees were requested to refuse to sell liquor to soldiers whose actions indicated that an additional drink might result in disorderly conduct. The serving of liquor in dining cars was to be stopped whenever such sale interfered with the expeditious serving of meals. At the same time the extensive conversion of lounge and club cars into coaches already had greatly reduced the opportunity for soldiers to obtain liquor on the trains.[182] The policy was therefore one of regulation rather than of prohibition.

Transportation of members of the Women's Army Corps (WAC) and enlisted men in separate cars was favored by WAC headquarters. The Chief of Transportation agreed that this should be done when practicable but pointed out that complete segregation could not be assured in view of the shortage of railway equipment. Segregation was easily accomplished when enough servicewomen to fill a car were traveling, but when smaller groups were involved they were often placed in the same cars with servicemen to avoid wasting space. This procedure was in keeping with the commercial practice, and no unusual difficulties were experienced. Each group of Wacs had a leader with disciplinary responsibilities, as did the enlisted men.[183]

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[178] Memo, ASF Hq for CGs of SvCs, 2 Sep 43, OCT 531.7 MP on Trains.

[179] PMGO monograph, Military Policy Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, 1 Sep 45, p. 44, OCMH; WD press release, 7 Nov 46.

[180] WD Cir 380, 24 Nov 42.

[181] PMGO monograph, cited n. 179.

[182] Ltr, Wylie to Siddall, Western Mil Bur, 15 Sep 43, and preceding correspondence in OCT 531.7 Sale of Liquor on Trains.

[183] Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 17 Dec 43; WD Cir 154, 18 Apr 44, Sec. III; Memo, CofT for CG 7th SvC, 19 Jun 45; all in OCT 511 Mixed Groups of Enlisted Men and Women; Interv with Morris, 26 Jun 50, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.

The problems that arose when military personnel used regular transportation services were different from those encountered when they moved by special troop train, and in some respects they were more difficult to handle. The sources of difficulty were the mingling of civilians and soldiers, the overcrowding of trains and buses, and the lack of military control over the facilities and of command authority over the men. The Chief of Transportation did much to relieve the uncertainties and inconveniences of travel by providing the reservation bureaus, the military sleeping car lines, and through other measures. As to discipline, such measures were taken as were considered feasible and the situation improved, but it never became wholly satisfactory. The need for military police on all trains carrying substantial numbers of servicemen was clearly demonstrated.

Movement of Patients

In moving patients, as in moving troops, all suitable means of transportation were used—the railways, air transport, and motor ambulances.[184] The employment of aircraft developed gradually and ambulances were used chiefly for short hauls, so that the railways were the major factor. It was with the rail movements that the Transportation Corps was primarily concerned.

In peacetime the small numbers of patients that had to be moved by rail were transported by regular train service using sleepers, parlor cars, or coaches according to the condition of the patients and the length of the journeys. During the war the Army found it advisable to build up a fleet of specially constructed hospital cars to handle the rapidly growing traffic, particularly the more serious cases, but the railroads' regular services and equipment still were required.

Movements of patients fell into two general categories. In the first category were movements of patients being transferred to or between medical facilities in the zone of interior. Such movements were regulated by The Surgeon General, who took into account the medical needs of the patients and bed vacancies in the respective hospitals. In the second category were movements from the water ports and aerial ports where patients were landed after evacuation from the oversea theaters. These movements followed a prearranged pattern. In general, they were governed by bed credits that the ports held at so-called debarkation hospitals located near the seaboard. Usually the patients remained at the debarkation hospitals only a few days pending determination of the institutions to which they would be sent for further treatment or for convalescence. While there was a certain amount of traffic involving patients stationed in the zone of interior, the heavier movements resulted from oversea evacuations, and the volume was therefore on an ascending scale throughout the war, reaching its peak soon after the German surrender when evacuation from the European theater was being pressed.

Close collaboration obviously was necessary between The Surgeon General, who controlled the direction of the traffic and supervised the medical services rendered en route, and the Chief of Transportation, who had over-all responsibility for providing the means of transportation. General

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[184] See Clarence McKittrick Smith, *The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior,* UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1956), Chs. XIX-XXIV, for a detailed discussion of the handling of patients, including their transportation.

TABLE 6—OPERATIONS OF ARMY HOSPITAL CARS AND MEDICAL KITCHEN CARS: 1944–1946

Type	1944	1945	1946
Hospital Cars			
Smallest Number in Service	111	134	100
Largest Number in Operation	129	320	241
Car-Miles in Service	4,089,666	13,116,094	2,775,330
Deadhead Car-Miles	3,162,388	8,391,457	1,959,931
Medical Kitchen Cars			
Smallest Number in Service	1	38	18
Largest Number in Service	40	60	45
Car-Miles in Service	1,434,124	3,514,057	518,906

Source: Records of Passenger Branch, Traffic Control Division, OCT; monthly data from these records will be published in a statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

co-ordination was provided by the Hospitalization and Evacuation Branch of ASF headquarters, but that was not enough; direct collaboration was necessary on the many details relating to the proper movement and adequate care of patients. This was undertaken in the beginning through the assignment of a medical liaison officer to the Chief of Transportation, and later by the attachment of a medical regulating unit to the Chief of Transportation's Movements Division. This unit dealt with the movement of patients from the theaters and their handling at the ports, as well as with their subsequent transportation inland.[185]

Although the war found the Army without any definite plans for the development of a fleet of hospital cars, 320 such cars were acquired gradually for operation in the zone of interior.[186] Of these, 120 were former Pullman sleepers and lounge cars that had been converted to hospital cars with thirty-two berths arranged in two tiers. The remaining 200 had been designed and built as hospital cars with accommodations for thirty-six persons in three-tier berths. All cars had large side doors to facilitate the handling of litter patients. Some cars that were acquired early in the war did not at first have kitchen facilities, but later all were equipped with buffet kitchens. Air conditioning was not installed in some of the earlier acquisitions, but eventually it was provided for the entire fleet. The Army also built sixty medical kitchen cars, which were of simplified design similar to the troop kitchen cars but especially equipped for feeding patients. The medical kitchen cars were needed principally for use in connection with moving patients in regular sleeping cars and coaches, because such cars had no kitchen equipment. Summary data regarding the operation of the hospital cars and medical kitchen cars during 1944, 1945, and 1946 are given in Table 6.

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[185] The medical regulating unit will be discussed in connection with evacuation by water. See below, p. 213.

[186] On the build-up of this fleet, see Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 385–89.



NEW SELF-CONTAINED ARMY HOSPITAL CAR. *Three-tier berths accommodating thirty-six patients (above); the kitchen (below).*



Since hospital cars served as both medical facilities and transportation facilities and were staffed and supplied by the Army, responsibility for their construction, maintenance, and operation was divided among several Army agencies. These responsibilities were worked out after the United States entered the war, and for a time the division of authority was not entirely clear. But by the time the movement of patients became heavy, responsibilities had been clarified.[187] The Surgeon General and the Chief of Transportation collaborated in establishing car designs that would meet both medical and transportation requirements. The Chief of Transportation supervised the maintenance of the cars as railroad equipment—such maintenance was provided by the railroads—assigned them to the service commands in accordance with the requirements of the respective areas, made general arrangements with the carriers for the movement of the cars over their lines, and in certain cases provided routings. The Surgeon General supervised the maintenance of the medical equipment and the staffing of the cars with medical personnel. The service commands were directly responsible for staffing, supplying, and cleaning the cars and for their assignment to load at ports of embarkation and hospitals in accordance with the number of patients to be moved from the respective installations.

The Army policy was to move as many patients as possible in hospital cars, since they were more satisfactory from the standpoint of facilities than regular passenger equipment and the latter was sorely needed for civilian and troop traffic. It was necessary, nevertheless, to call on the carriers for many sleepers for litter patients and their attendants as well as for parlor cars and coaches to accommodate ambulant patients. Because The Surgeon General desired that litter patients be moved in air-conditioned cars, the sleepers assigned to this traffic were mostly of the standard type rather than tourist-class cars. The special Army troop sleepers were not used for patients because of the lack of air conditioning and other refinements.[188]

In the early part of the war the Chief of Transportation had less control over the routing of movements of patients and the ordering of equipment from the railroads than he had over troop movements, but his control increased as the war progressed. Under instructions issued by SOS headquarters in the summer of 1942, the service commands were authorized to deal directly with the railroads regarding sleepers, coaches, and dining cars for the transfer of patients, as well as routings, when the movements were wholly within their territorial jurisdictions.[189] This procedure continued until June 1943, when it was changed to conform to the policy already in effect for other traffic—groups of forty or more would be moved under arrangements made by the Chief of Transportation.[190] In the spring of 1945 in anticipation of heavy patient traffic at the end of the war in Europe and the consequent desirability of consolidating movements as much as possible in order to conserve rail equipment, the Chief of Transportation requested authority to control all movements involving fifteen or more patients and attendants. This authority was granted in June 1945. Smaller movements were arranged for by local transportation officers through representatives of the railroads attached to their installations.[191]

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[187] SOS Pamphlet, Military Hospitalization and Evacuation of Patients, 15 Sep 42, in OCT HB Rail Div Hosp Cars; WD Cir 316, 6 Dec 43.

[188] Morris monograph, p. 56; Memo, SG for CofT, 6 Dec 43; Memo, CofT for GAO, 1 Oct 45, par. 6; last two in OCT 531.4 Hosp Train.

[189] Memo, CG SOS for CGs SvCs, 26 Aug 42, sub: Control of Hosp Trains, par. 4, OCT 531.4 Hosp Trains; SOS Pamphlet, Military Hospitalization and Evacuation of Patients, cited n. 187.

[190] AR 55-130, 28 Dec 42, par. 8*b*, and Changes 2, 4 Jun 43.

The Chief of Transportation also increased his control over the utilization of Army hospital cars as the patient traffic became heavier. Because of his close contacts with The Surgeon General and the railroads, as well as his control over routings, he was able to avoid deadheading and other uneconomical practices much more effectively than the service commands. Consequently, early in 1944 the Chief of Transportation's Traffic Control Division began to assign hospital cars to specific movements, request railroad equipment for integration into hospital trains, establish schedules, and determine what stopovers and diversions could be made en route. Similar supervision was exercised over the employment of the medical kitchen cars. In December 1943, with this increased control in prospect, the Passenger Branch had established an evacuation unit to deal exclusively with the movement of patients. This unit was responsible for advance planning as well as day-to-day operations.[192]

The evacuation unit kept each movement of patients under observation and complained to the railroads whenever their services did not appear satisfactory. It emphasized the importance of the smooth handling of hospital trains and cars and requested that buffer cars always be placed between locomotives and cars occupied by patients.[193] The apparent inclination of some lines to handle hospital movements "at their leisure," with resulting poor connections at junction points and long delays for the patients, was strongly criticized.[194] As in the case of complaints regarding troop trains, the Military Transportation Section transmitted the reported failures to the individual rail lines and eventually relayed the lines' explanations to the Chief of Transportation.

Despite the effort to move patients in groups of a carload or greater, it frequently was not possible to do so, and arrangements for the transportation of individuals and small groups on regular trains were necessary. Although such arrangements were made by the local transportation officers, the Chief of Transportation used his close relations with the railroads to insure prompt handling. The principal problem was to obtain accommodations without delay. Patients traveling on regular trains usually required room space, and such space generally was sold or reserved far in advance. Sometimes travelers who held space could be persuaded to relinquish it in favor of patients whose cases were urgent, but this was not always true. The railroads were requested, and they agreed, to have such situations referred to their general passenger offices, which usually held some accommodations in reserve. Unfortunately, this procedure did not fully meet the need. The next step was a more formal arrangement between the Army and the railroads under which Class I patients—those requiring immediate transportation—were certified in writing by the responsible medical officers and the carriers designated special officers to deal with these cases.[195]

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[191] WD Cir 234, 12 Jun 44; Ltr, Morris to IMC, 2 Aug 44, and reply, 31 Aug 44, OCT 511; WD Cir 405, 14 Oct 44; Ltr, IMC to CofT, 9 Feb 45; Memo, CofT for SG, 14 Feb 45, sub: Routing Hosp Train Travel, par. 3; last two in OCT 531.4 Hosp Cars; Memo, CofT for ACofS G-4, 16 May 45, OCT 511 (AR 55-130); WD Cir 177, 15 Jun 45, Sec. II.

[192] Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1944, pp. 23-24, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Rpts; ASF Cir 328, 30 Sep 44, Sec. VIII.

[193] Ltr, Morris to MTS, 13 Nov 44; Ltr, AAR to Morris, 20 Nov 44, and atchd instruction to RRs; both in OCT 510 Patients.

[194] See Memos, White to MTS, 21 Apr 45, OCT 531.4 Hospital, and 9 Aug 45, OCT 511 Starke Gen Hosp.

In June 1944 the Office of Defense Transportation, recognizing the difficulties of the situation, requested the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to direct the carriers to cancel reservations and, if necessary, to require regular passengers to vacate accommodations that were needed for patients of the armed forces and the merchant marine.[196] The ICC service order that was issued in response to this request specifically named the railroad passenger agents and the train conductors concerned with each case as its agents for enforcing the priority arrangement. The Chief of Transportation refused to recognize a narrow interpretation of this order and maintained that, when the necessity of evicting regular passengers was certified by an authorized Army officer, all agents of the carriers, including the Military Transportation Section, were obligated to take any action within their competence to obtain the desired accommodations.[197] Both the Chief of Transportation and the railroads agreed, however, that eviction should be resorted to only when other means of accommodating patients had failed, and in practice such evictions were rarely necessary.

Providing meals for patients traveling on regular trains was a problem for the railroads from the beginning of heavy movements. One of the reasons was that there were not sufficient dining cars for all such trains. When large movements were started from ports and general hospitals in hospital trains, dining cars—or medical kitchen cars after they became available—were assigned, but frequently these trains were broken up en route and the cars bearing patients were attached to a number of regular trains for the onward journey. If the regular trains did not customarily carry diners, the railroads were confronted with two alternatives: they could attach special diners, which was difficult because of their scarcity, or they could serve box meals, which The Surgeon General did not consider satisfactory for patients.[198]

In trying to solve the problem, the railroads requested the Chief of Transportation to notify them at the time hospital movements were routed of the specific trains for which they would be expected to provide dining cars. The Chief of Transportation did not feel that this was necessary and took the position that, when a route had been established showing the initial, intermediate, and terminal carriers, he had done all that he reasonably could to forewarn the railroads, and that the responsibility for meeting dining car requirements then rested with the carriers. It was the consideration of this problem, as well as the preference for meals prepared under medical supervision over those served from regular dining cars, that led to the inclusion of buffet kitchens in the 200 new hospital cars built by the Army and the eventual installation of buffet kitchens in the converted cars.[199]

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[195] WD Cir 234, 12 Jun 44; WD Cir 405, 14 Oct 44; OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 63-67.

[196] ODT, *Civilian War Transport,* p. 84; Ltr, ODT to CofT, 19 Jun 44, and reply, 20 Jun 44, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass; ICC Sv Order 213, effective 27 Jun 44; WD Cir 405, 14 Oct 44, par. 5.

[197] Memo, Gass for Morris, 7 Oct 44, and reply, 10 Oct 44, OCT 510 Patients.

[198] Memo, MTS for McIntyre, OCT, 7 Apr 44, OCT 453.9 Hosp Cars; Memo, IMC for CofT, 18 Sep 44, and reply, 27 Sep 44, OCT 531.7 Train Service.

Hospital cars and hospital trains were staffed by the service commands to which they were assigned, and the instructions regarding the composition and responsibilities of the medical staffs were issued by those commands, subject to the approval of The Surgeon General.[200] A senior medical officer, who had over-all responsibility for administration, messing, discipline, sanitation, and care of patients, was in charge of each hospital train. The grades and numbers of medical personnel on hospital cars moving in regular train service depended on the type of patients and the length of the journey. Close co-ordination obviously was necessary between the service command personnel and the Medical Corps and Transportation Corps officers in Washington and at the ports who were concerned with the movement of patients. In anticipation of heavy evacuation from overseas, meetings of such officers were held on the east and west coasts in 1945 to discuss problems and to review and refine the procedures.[201]

Data are available only for patients routed by the Office of the Chief of Transportation. Throughout the war individuals and small groups were routed locally, and during the early part of the war some larger groups were so routed. The first recorded routings by the OCT were for the month of December 1942, when the groups totaled 375 patients and attendants. During the next four years the totals were as follows:[202]

Year	*Patients and Attendants*
1943	85,705
1944	165,121
1945	440,864
1946	50,767

The peak month was May 1945, when concentrated efforts were being made to evacuate the sick and wounded from the European theater, and in that month more than 58,000 patients and attendants were routed by rail.

The demand for cars to transport patients was heavy not only because of the number of patients to be moved but also because of the length of the journeys. The long trips resulted from the necessity of sending patients to distant hospitals for specialized treatment and the policy of placing patients in hospitals as near their homes as possible. Patients landed at west coast ports were likely to make especially long trips because the majority of the hospitals were in the east. In planning patient movements and the utilization of hospital cars, The Surgeon General and the Chief of Transportation naturally gave attention to shortening the trips whenever possible and reducing deadhead mileage. Incident to the study of the transportation of patients from the ports to hospitals of definitive treatment during the latter part of the war, the following data were compiled on the utilization of rail equipment in such movements:[203]

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[199] WD Cir 480, 22 Dec 44, Sec. I, gave comprehensive instructions regarding subsistence on Army hospital cars and trains.

[200] See Ltr, Col Edgar S. Linthicum, 1st SvC, to Col Harry D. Offutt, SGO, 22 Jul 43, and atchd SOP, OCT 531.4 Hospital.

[201] Hospital Train Conf, Miller Field, New York, 15-18 Feb 45; Hospital Train Unit Commanders Conf, San Francisco, Calif., 10-13 July 45; both in Hist Div SGO. During repatriation Navy patients were transported in Army hospital cars in emergencies, and railroad cars with Navy patients were attached to Army hospital trains. For procedures, see ASF Cir 441, 11 Dec 45, Sec. V.

[202] Data from reports prepared by Transport Economics Section, Traffic Control Division, OCT, compiled for publication in a statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

Debarkation Port	*Average Miles Per Trip*	*Number of Round Trips Per Car Per Month*
Boston	1,175	3.4
New York	1,058	4.0
Hampton Roads	1,105	3.6
Charleston	1,145	3.5
Los Angeles	2,320	1.7
San Francisco	2,409	1.7
Seattle	2,630	1.5

In reviewing the Army's experience with the movement of patients by rail during the war, two facts are noteworthy from the standpoint of the Chief of Transportation. First, although such movements were accomplished without serious delay or inconvenience, the situation would have been improved by earlier decision as to the number of hospital cars to be procured. The Pullman cars used when hospital cars were not available were not as satisfactory as the hospital cars from the medical standpoint, and they had to be taken out of other services where they were constantly needed. The last 100 hospital cars were not ordered until January 1945, and some of them had not yet entered service when the war ended. The delay was occasioned chiefly by the difficulty of estimating the extent of battle casualties and the incidence of disease in a war being waged in many widely scattered areas and under a great variety of conditions. Uncertainty concerning the evacuation policy on removal of patients from the theaters to the zone of interior was another factor in the delay. Second, the original plan of delegating a large measure of authority to the service commands for routing groups of patients and for utilizing hospital cars and regular railroad equipment proved unsatisfactory. The Chief of Transportation's authority in these matters was therefore considerably broadened as the traffic became heavier. Thus the experience with the movement of patients confirmed the position that the Chief of Transportation had consistently taken with respect to troop movements—that centralized control was necessary in order to obtain the most efficient utilization of equipment and a proper distribution of traffic.

Prisoners of War and Enemy Aliens

The transportation of more than 400,000 prisoners of war (POW's), evacuated from the theaters to the zone of interior, was an unwelcome responsibility added to those already resting on the Chief of Transportation and the railroads. This traffic was difficult to handle not only because of the over-all shortage of passenger equipment, but because security requirements dictated that prisoners of war be removed from the seaboard areas as promptly as possible; ship arrivals could not be predicted precisely; advance information regarding the size and composition of POW shipments was sometimes inadequate or inaccurate; the railway cars used for handling this traffic had to be specially prepared for the purpose; and the internment camps were scattered throughout the country. When large groups of prisoners of war arrived at U.S. ports, the railroads were hard put to meet the requirements for equipment in addition to the other demands regularly made on them, and it was sometimes necessary to delay other military movements of low priority in order to move prisoners of war to internment camps without delay.[204]

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[203] History, Medical Liaison Office to OCT and Medical Regulating Service SGO, section on hospital trains, in OCT HB Mvmts Div Med Reg Sv, cited hereafter as Hist Med Liaison Off. The period to which the data apply is not stated, but the context indicates the latter part of the war.

Prisoners of war received in the United States were mostly Germans and Italians captured in North Africa and in Europe. At the end of May 1945 there were 371,000 Germans and 50,000 Italians in our internment camps, while at the end of the hostilities in the Pacific there were only 5,400 Japanese prisoners of war in the United States.[205] The burden, therefore, fell largely upon the eastern ports and the eastern rail lines. In 1943, when the handling of POW's from the Mediterranean was adversely affecting military movements along the Atlantic seaboard, the War Department considered the advisability of setting up staging areas near the ports for the temporary detention of new arrivals, in order that the flow from the ports to the internment camps might be leveled off and the carriers relieved of the necessity of assigning so much equipment to this traffic at one time. The inadvisability of holding prisoners in heavily populated seaboard areas argued against the proposal, and sufficient success was achieved in co-ordinating the water and the land movements to cause the project to be dropped.[206]

The railroads still found this a difficult and undesirable traffic. In the fall of 1944, after wrestling with the problem for more than a year and with heavy additional shipments from Europe in prospect, the Association of American Railroads recommended that no further prisoners of war be brought to the United States. In response, General Gross was able to inform the AAR that the Army already had instructed the European theater to that effect.[207]

The restraint was only temporary, however, for in the spring of 1945 further large shipments of German prisoners were received. In the beginning the purpose of removing prisoners of war from the theaters was to relieve the theater commanders of the burden of housing, feeding, and guarding them, and this argument remained a strong one from the theater standpoint. As the war progressed, the growing labor shortage in the United States and the success with which POW's were being employed in industry and agriculture created another persuasive argument for bringing captured Germans to the zone of interior.

From the time prisoners of war were placed aboard trains at the ports where they landed they were in the custody of the Provost Marshal General. His office and that of the Chief of Transportation kept in close touch regarding prospective arrivals at the ports and subsequent transfers. In matters affecting the inland transportation, internment, and employment of POW's, the Provost Marshal General's authority was largely delegated to the service commands. When groups of forty or more were to be transferred from ports or internment camps, the service commands passed this information to the Chief of Transportation, who arranged for the railroads to execute the movements. When smaller groups were transferred, the transportation arrangements were made by the commanders of the ports or the internment camps from which the movements started. The service command in which a movement originated was responsible for providing escorts, mess personnel, and medical attendants, as well as for furnishing the supplies required by the prisoners en route.[208]

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[204] Memo, Gass for Morris, 2 Sep 43, OCT 511 Rail and Motor Mvmts.

[205] PMGO monograph, Prisoner of War Operations, Feb 46, pp. 31-35, copy in OCMH. This monograph covers many aspects of the subject that cannot be treated here.

[206] Ltr, SW to SN, 27 Sep 43, OSW 453 (9-8-43)(1).

[207] Ltr, Buford to Gross, 30 Oct 44, and reply, 1 Nov 44, OCT HB Gross Rail.

The utmost effort was made to move prisoners of war in special trains and special cars, rather than in regular train service where they might be brought in contact with the public. It frequently happened that this was not possible because of the wide distribution of the internment camps. At the end of August 1945 there were about 155 base camps and over 500 branch camps for prisoners of war located in forty-five states. The dispersion of camps was necessary to serve the many areas in which POW labor was used. Transfers between camps were numerous because of fluctuations in the demand for this type of labor, particularly the seasonal demand for agricultural workers. Under an agreement between the War Department and the War Manpower Commission, all requests for the assignment of POW's to industrial or agricultural employment were channeled through the War Manpower Commission, which had a broad view of the labor situation throughout the nation.[209]

As with other types of passenger traffic, data are not available for prisoner-of-war movements routed in the field but only for groups for which transportation arrangements were made by the Traffic Control Division in the Office of the Chief of Transportation. From the time when prisoners began arriving in the United States from North Africa until the bulk of the repatriation movement was accomplished, the annual totals of POW's and guards routed by the division were as follows:[210]

Year	*POW's and Guards*
1942 (December only)	1,975
1943	216,651
1944	487,270
1945	546,052
1946 (Seven months)	378,298

Prisoners of war were transported in the lowest-class transportation available—that is, coaches—except in certain cases. Generals were furnished accommodations in sleepers or parlor cars upon request of the Provost Marshal General to the service command making the transfer. Prisoners who were physically or mentally disabled were moved in sleepers or hospital cars. When it was more economical, because of the smallness of the group, to move prisoners of war in regular train service than to engage a special coach, they were accommodated in enclosed space (compartment, drawing room, and so forth) so that they could be more readily guarded.[211] When sleepers were required in special POW trains, tourist-class cars or troop sleepers were used; in regular trains they might be standard, tourist, or troop sleepers. When a special car for prisoners of war was included in a regular train, it was placed ahead of other cars so that there would be no contact between prisoners and other passengers.

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[208] For summary of responsibilities, see ASF Memo S 580-1-43, 13 Jul 43, sub: SOP for Transfer of POW; see also instructions from the Provost Marshal General to the service commands regarding numerous transfers in OCT 383.6 (1943).

[209] PMGO monograph, cited n. 205, pp. 59, 102.

[210] Data from reports prepared by Transport Economics Section, Traffic Control Division, OCT, compiled for a statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

[211] WD Cir 471, 15 Dec 44; WD Cir 222, 23 Jul 45.

The coaches in which prisoners of war were transported were specially prepared for this service by the railroads in accordance with instructions issued by the War Department.[212] Such cars were to contain no partitions that would obstruct the view of the guard in one vestibule to the guard in the vestibule at the other end. The doors of washrooms and other enclosures were to be removed, and windows were to be blocked to prevent their being open more than eight inches.[213] Cabinets containing fire-fighting equipment were to be covered. As further safeguards the officers arranging transfers were directed to notify the railroads that the movements should be expedited in every way possible, and the railroads were requested to notify the train commanders in advance of any known or probable stops. The Chief of Transportation consummated agreements with the carriers covering charges for the preparation and restoration of cars for the transfer of POW's and charges for transportation and sleeping car accommodations.[214] Specially prepared cars were not required for the transfer of captured Italians who had volunteered to join Italian Service Units and hence had acquired a special status.[215]

Despite the effort made to consolidate small movements of prisoners of war into carloads so as to avoid the use of enclosed spaces in regular cars, there was public criticism of any use of superior accommodations for such passengers. In July 1945, following a much publicized incident in which U.S. soldiers making a long trip in coaches were reported to have passed a sleeper in which prisoners of war were accommodated, Army Service Forces headquarters issued instructions that thereafter the transportation of prisoners of war would be confined to day coaches, except in the case of litter patients, and that motor transportation should be used to transport prisoners within service commands to permit consolidation of small movements into carload shipments.[216]

The Army arranged for some movements of enemy aliens—that is, citizens of enemy countries residing in the United States when the war began—but they were not extensive. The largest movement of that nature was the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from strategic areas on the Pacific coast, pursuant to Executive Order 9066, 19 February 1942. Approximately 110,000 Japanese and Japanese-Americans were moved in trains and bus convoys from exclusion areas to nearby assembly centers, and thence to relocation centers farther inland. The Chief of Transportation arranged with the carriers for the initial movements, but this function was soon taken over by the Western Defense Command, which had general charge of the relocation project.

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[212] WD Cir 420, 26 Oct 44.

[213] Windows of Pullman cars and Army hospital cars transporting POW patients were not blocked unless the service commander specifically requested it; see Ltr, Maj Darrell T. Lane, OCT, to Gass, 5 Feb 45, OCT 383.6 Special Preparation of Cars.

[214] WD Memo 55-38-43, 21 Aug 43, sub: Trans of POW; WD CTB 6, 27 Jun 44, par. 10.

[215] WD Cir 195, 18 May 44, Sec. VI.

[216] Memo, DCofS for SvCs ASF for PMG, CofT, *et al.*, 9 Jul 45, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass. Further details regarding this incident are given in Ch. III, below.

Throughout the operation Lt. Col. Victor E. Maston of the Traffic Control Division was detailed by the Chief of Transportation to the Western Defense Command to advise Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt on transportation matters.[217]

The Chief of Transportation and the railroads would have welcomed relief from the necessity of moving prisoners of war. The policy of evacuating such prisoners from the North African, Mediterranean, and European theaters was dictated by other considerations, however, and transportation had to be provided even though this increased the general stringency in railroad equipment. After procedures had been established and tested, POW movements were accomplished without difficulty beyond that incident to the provision of the necessary railroad equipment. There were only a few threats of disturbance by prisoners being transported, and they were quickly quieted by the guards.

A Job Well Done

Although Army traffic on the common carriers included several other types of passengers, the movement of troops was the basic responsibility. This responsibility was carried out far better in World War II than in World War I, despite the fact that the military traffic was much greater and the railroads had fewer units of passenger equipment. Heavy troop movements between training stations and to the seaboard were for the most part handled in a prompt and orderly manner. There was no serious congestion at the inland gateways or the ports of embarkation to tie up cars and waste their work potential. There were few instances of light loading with wasted car space. The results, in brief, gave evidence of careful planning and a close control over operations.

Credit for this achievement belongs to both the carriers and the Army. The Association of American Railroads, established in 1934, had a much broader influence over the distribution and utilization of railway equipment than the corresponding organization in World War I. The industry was therefore better integrated and more readily responsive to military needs. Although the railroads had fewer units of equipment than in the previous war, those units were larger and capable of more work. The Army also had centralized control from the beginning over the routing and movement of all but the smaller groups and so was in a position to plan its traffic carefully on a nationwide basis and to spread the load. The hand-in-glove manner in which the Army Transportation Corps and the Association of American Railroads collaborated in both the planning and execution of troop movements indicated that they regarded these movements as joint undertakings.

This does not imply that the Chief of Transportation and his staff were always satisfied with what the carriers did or the way in which they did it. These officers believed that the railroads sometimes held equipment in regular service when it should have been made available for military movements. They protested because the Pullman Company failed to withdraw more sleepers from overnight commercial runs, with the result that many soldiers made long trips in coaches. They complained because at times the carriers appeared negligent in allowing troop trains to fall behind schedule. They also believed that the railroads should have given the Army greater fare reductions and other concessions, in view of the volume of the military traffic. But despite these criticisms, the Chief of Transportation and his associates recognized that in their over-all performance the railroads gave the Army excellent service, and they said so on numerous occasions.

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[217] For full account of this evacuation, see General DeWitt's final report to the Secretary of War, *Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942* (Washington, 1943), pp. vii–x, 77–79, 356–62.

The reasons for the divergent views of the Chief of Transportation and the railroads were obvious and understandable. The Chief of Transportation had a single objective—to move troops according to War Department plans. The railroads' situation was not so simple. They recognized their obligation to meet the requirements of the armed forces, but they also wanted to maintain their regular services as fully as possible. Because of this fact, and also because of the limitation on the construction of new railroad equipment and other operating difficulties that the carriers encountered during the war, it was inevitable that the service given the Army should have fallen short of the Chief of Transportation's expectations on some occasions. As to fares, the lean years through which the railroads had passed just before World War II undoubtedly strengthened their resistance to requests for larger concessions on wartime military traffic, and that was especially true of those lines whose revenues were already reduced by the land-grant deductions.

With increases in railroad equipment and operating personnel severely limited by other wartime demands, the only way to relieve the pressure under which the railroads were working and to assure the armed forces that all troop movements would be executed as they desired was to further curtail the regular services. The Chief of Transportation believed that such curtailment should have been carried further than it was, and he made his opinion known to the Director of Defense Transportation, who had the requisite authority. A considerable percentage of the civilian travel was admittedly unnecessary. But the Director of Defense Transportation evidently believed that the military needs were being adequately met, and it was not until the repatriation of troops from Europe was well under way that he yielded to requests for further cuts in the regular services. The additional problems that arose, after Japan had surrendered and the repatriation of troops from the Pacific had begun, involved the line-haul capacity of the western railroads, as well as the amount of equipment assigned to military service.

It is noteworthy that in addition to his efforts to make effective arrangements for the movement of troops, patients, prisoners of war, and other passengers who moved on War Department transportation requests, the Chief of Transportation did much to ease the problems of military personnel who traveled as regular passengers while off duty. Such traffic was heavy, and the difficulties encountered in getting reservations and utilizing overcrowded trains had a direct bearing on soldier morale. The fact that the Chief of Transportation was willing to have railroad equipment assigned to the so-called military sleeping car lines, which were used by men on furlough or leave as well as individuals traveling on official business, indicates the importance that the Army attached to this traffic, for there never was a time when the equipment could not have been used advantageously to accomplish organized troop movements.

The motor carriers moved a relatively small percentage of the total military passenger traffic, but they performed an essential service. Their capacity was limited when compared with that of the railroads, and they could not offer some of the features—notably sleeping and messing facilities—that were considered essential in moving large numbers of troops over long distances. But for the transportation of individuals and small groups over the shorter distances, the motor carriers had distinct advantages, and the Chief of Transportation saw to it that their services were used whenever they met the Army requirements. The movement of troops by motorbus had the added virtue of relieving the hard-pressed railroads.

CHAPTER II

Troop Movements to the Oversea Commands

Since all combat areas were overseas, efficiency in the execution of transoceanic troop movements was of primary importance to the military authorities. From that fact sprang the significance of the problems involved in such movements, and these problems were magnified by the proportions that the war assumed from the outset, far exceeding anything contemplated in prewar planning.

Lack of preparation for heavy troop movements was evident from the day the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and plunged the United States into a two-ocean war. The Army ports of embarkation on the west coast had neither the facilities nor the personnel required for the prompt and orderly transshipment of the troops and supplies that had to be rushed to our Pacific outposts. There were not enough ships to meet all requirements and a satisfactory procedure had not yet been worked out for allocating the nation's vessels to the uses for which the need was most urgent. Adequate arrangements had not yet been adopted by the Army and the Navy for the joint use of troopships and joint troop-priority lists. Within the Army itself the procedures governing the shipment of troops and their organizational equipment from home stations to the ports of embarkation had not yet been fully adapted to wartime requirements. The procedures for handling troops at the port staging areas still needed refinement. Progress toward the solution of these and related problems had only begun when the Army installed a Chief of Transportation as the head of the new transportation service in March 1942.

Ocean transportation entered vitally into military planning from the inception of each undertaking since it was a persistent limiting factor. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill were projecting the broad lines of Allied strategy, they necessarily took into account the shipping resources that would likely be available. When the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British-American military co-ordinating agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the corresponding agency for the United States, undertook to implement the strategic plans with arrangements for the deployment of Allied military forces, the availability of sufficient troop and cargo vessels was a basic consideration. The Army's Chief of Transportation maintained an active Planning Division, headed during the greater part of the war by Col. Marcus B. Stokes, Jr., and contributed heavily to the long-range estimates of shipping capability upon which such decisions turned.[1]

A number of transportation agencies were involved in the actual movement of troops to the theaters, and co-ordination was therefore one of the Chief of Transportation's major functions. The Army operated few vessels of its own and most troopships were obtained from the U.S. War Shipping Administration, the U.S. Navy, and the British Ministry of War Transport (BMWT). Troops were moved from their home stations to the seaboard by commercial carriers. The transshipment of the men and their impedimenta from the inland to the ocean carriers took place at Army ports of embarkation, which were military stations under the direct supervision of the Chief of Transportation. Each phase of a movement had to be co-ordinated with every other phase, and each movement had to be kept in conformity with the general plan incorporated in the movement order. The coordinating responsibility rested ultimately with the Assistant Chief of Transportation for Operations, General Wylie, and his deputy, Col. Richard D. Meyer. A large share of this responsibility was delegated to the Movements Division, which worked closely with the Operations Division of the General Staff, the appropriate elements of ASF headquarters, the Traffic Control and Water Divisions in the Office of the Chief of Transportation, and the ports of embarkation.[2]

The ports of embarkation had a key role, as the ensuing discussion will show. Linking the inland and ocean carriers, they had to function with speed and precision in order to avoid congestion, confusion, and delay. The port commanders specified the time when each movement should reach the seaboard. They provided accommodations for troops during periods ranging from a few days to a few weeks, and during this interval gave both the men and their personal equipment a thorough processing to prepare them for service overseas. They stored, processed, and repaired organizational equipment before dispatching it to the theaters. They were responsible for the prompt and orderly embarkation of troops and for the proper equipping, staffing, and administration of troopships. The Chief of Transportation recognized that the success of the entire troop movement program could be disrupted by failure at the ports of embarkation, and he therefore selected the port commanders with care and kept their operations under close observation.

While the Chief of Transportation was concerned principally with the movement of Army combat and service troops, other types of passengers were accommodated on the troopships. Naval personnel were moved on vessels sailing under Army control, just as Army troops were moved on the Navy's vessels. Numerous special missions, which were nonmilitary in nature but usually embraced both military and civilian personnel, were transported to oversea areas. Employees of contractors engaged in the construction of military facilities overseas sailed on Army transports. Some military personnel of Allied nations were moved on these vessels, and representatives of various American and Allied civilian agencies, including members of the diplomatic corps, were transported under Army auspices. In 1944 the Army began to send prisoners of war back to their native lands, and soon after the fighting was over the Army transported dependents overseas to join military personnel stationed there.

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[1] Wardlow, *The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations*, pp. 18–22, discusses long-range planning.

[2] For more detailed description of the functions of the Movements Division and its relations with other offices, see OCT Pamphlet 1, Organizational Manual; Memo, Farr for Ocean Traffic Br, Water Div, 1 Aug 44, sub: Projected Troop Moves; Min of Junior Officers' Meetings, 27 Sep 44, 4 and 11 Oct 44; and Memo, C of Mvmts Div for C of Hist Unit OCT, 20 Jun 45, sub: History of Mvmts Div; last five in OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

Of a total of 7,639,491 persons embarked by the Army from December 1941 through December 1945, 7,157,966 (93.7 percent) were troops of the Army, 261,525 were personnel of the U.S. Navy, and 220,000 were in other categories. Of the last figure, 93,301 were prisoners of war shipped from the United States in 1944 and 1945.[3] While the great bulk of this traffic moved from U.S. ports, some passengers were embarked at Canadian ports.

Categories of Troops Moved

The troops transported to the theaters fell into several categories, each of which involved peculiar transportation problems. First, there were troops moving as units (prescribed military organizations) or detachments therefrom. Second, there were replacements, or individual soldiers, needed by the theater commanders to replace men lost from units because of battle casualties, sickness, accidents, or transfers. Third, there were fillers required by the theater commanders to complete the personnel of units that had been understrength when they were dispatched from the zone of interior. Fourth, there was rotational personnel, or soldiers traveling pursuant to the Army's policy that men who had seen lengthy service abroad—especially those who had served in isolated or unhealthy areas—should be returned to the zone of interior and other personnel sent overseas to take their places. Finally, there were so-called temporary-duty groups that were returned to the United States for short periods and eventually sent back to their stations overseas. The last category included men traveling on leave or furlough obtained for personal reasons and men sent back by their commanders for rest and recuperation.

The troop units moved overseas ranged in size from divisions downward, and the problems encountered varied according to the size, type, and maturity of the organization, as well as to the completeness of its training and equipment. The movement of a division, involving up to 14,000 men and great quantities of matériel, required meticulous planning and detailed supervision throughout. The most spectacular achievement in moving large units was the transfer of thirty-six divisions to Europe between August 1944 and February 1945. Twenty-five were infantry divisions, nine were armored divisions, and two were airborne divisions. These organizations, aggregating 458,416 officers and men, were embarked at the New York and Boston Ports of Embarkation in 126 troopships, using most but not all of the space. Their organic equipment and initial supplies totaled more than 1,500,000 measurement tons and required the major part of the capacity of 260 large cargo vessels.[4] The last two divisions, dispatched in February 1945, had been earmarked for the Pacific, but when plans were changed they were rushed across the United States by rail and embarked at New York on fast ships to bolster General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower's forces in the final drive against Germany.[5]

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[3] Figures for the period December 1941 through December 1944 are from ASF *Statistical Review, World War II* (Washington, 1946), pp. 121-22; figures for 1945 are from reports by the ports of embarkation to Movements Division, OCT, all reworked for statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

[4] Summary, Divisions—ETO, prepared by Maj Welman H. Ouderkirk, Mvmts Div OCT, 30 Jun 45, in binder, European Divisions, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen. See also Rad, SHAEF London to WD, 9 Aug 44, S 57189, and Rad, Marshall to Eisenhower, 11 Aug 44, WAR 79344.

During the early part of 1943, replacements and fillers constituted about 20 percent of the total outbound troop movement, but beginning in the fall of that year the percentage showed a marked increase.[6] The number of replacements sent to Europe during the heavy fighting that followed the invasion of the Continent raised this traffic to a new high level in July 1944. That level was exceeded, however, during the following winter. December 1944 found General Eisenhower's combat divisions badly depleted, and the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes brought the situation to a crisis. Expedited movements were arranged from replacement training centers and replacement depots to the ports; the troops were embarked without delay and upon arrival at French ports were entrained immediately for the advanced areas. In January 1945, replacements and fillers constituted more than 40 percent of the total troop movement to the theaters. In March, when the movement of units to the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA), had been virtually stopped, replacements and fillers made up over 60 percent of the total. The effect of the impending German collapse on the proportion of troops shipped as units, fillers, and replacements, as well as the effect of the realignment of forces after the German surrender, is reflected in Table 7.[7]

Although rotational personnel and temporary-duty groups never constituted a large percentage of the total outbound movement—usually well under 10 percent—they were nevertheless a matter of concern to the Chief of Transportation. The more such passengers he had to accommodate on transports, the less space he had for units, replacements, and fillers. Early in the war General Gross urged that the rotational policy be kept within limits because of the tight shipping situation, and he continued to urge this point of view.[8] Late in 1943 the War Department presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a proposal for the conversion of twenty-four cargo vessels, in addition to those already being converted to troopships, to provide space for rotational traffic. This proposal was predicated on a policy of returning 1 percent of the total troop strength each month from the South Pacific, the Southwest Pacific, and the China-Burma-India theaters. The JCS requested the Maritime Commission to convert sufficient vessels to provide 34,000 additional troop spaces.[9] These vessels after conversion were absorbed in the Army troopship pool; they were not operated exclusively for rotational troop traffic since that would have involved a waste of ship space. The rotational policy was also applied to other

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[5] *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945* (Washington, 1 September 1945), p. 106.

[6] ASF MPR, Jul 44, Sec. 3, p. 30.

[7] For a discussion of the replacement crisis in the ETO, see Report of Activities, Army Ground Forces, 10 Jan 46, pp. 10, 11. Concerning the AGF's problem in providing replacements, see Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops,* UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1947) pp. 246–51, and Maj William R. Keast, Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Study 7, Historical Section AGF, 1946, pp. 16–19, 28–36.

[8] Memo, Gross for C of Pers Div SOS, 22 Mar 42, sub: Regular Relief of Pers at Oversea Sta, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks; Memo, Gross for Somervell, 22 Jun 44, ASF Hq Shipping 1944.

[9] JCS 595, 2 Dec 43, and subsequent reports and correspondence; Ltr, JCS to Mar Com, 22 Mar 44; all in OPD ABC 322 (2 Dec 42).

TABLE 7—CLASSIFICATION OF TROOPS EMBARKED AT U.S. PORTS OF EMBARKATION FOR OVERSEA COMMANDS: MAY 1944–DECEMBER 1945

Month and Year	Total Troops	Units	Replacements	Fillers	Rotation	Temporary Duty
1944						
May	211,715	104,998	72,369	17,228	14,972	2,148
June	174,095	86,502	66,924	11,364	7,029	2,276
July	269,384	155,774	90,648	16,339	4,442	2,181
August	238,160	156,148	51,251	16,039	12,550	2,172
September	235,115	164,830	46,021	9,813	12,317	2,134
October	268,858	210,419	31,713	12,811	11,860	2,055
November	234,568	147,915	46,649	20,212	16,200	3,592
December	225,020	139,686	54,406	12,151	14,043	4,734
1945						
January	278,852	144,967	104,528	8,055	14,417	6,885
February	225,562	119,047	74,880	8,626	11,723	11,286
March	199,660	54,118	116,318	10,496	11,106	7,622
April	134,803	35,921	70,698	9,420	9,632	9,132
May	88,519	22,385	50,493	8,567	6,310	764
June	115,981	47,589	29,423	31,313	7,428	228
July	79,619	22,721	24,090	27,099	5,367	342
August	158,843	47,510	68,565	41,329	1,159	280
September	60,891	4,017	36,546	19,674	563	91
October	79,209	1,589	61,458	15,848	266	48
November	67,780	379	36,324	29,639	1,385	53
December	47,423	1,152	20,543	22,948	2,745	35

Source: Data based on reports from ports of embarkation to Movements Division, OCT, compiled for publication in statistical volume of this series, now in preparation. A breakdown for earlier months is not available.

theaters. Initially the number of men returned to the zone of interior had depended on the requests of theater commanders and the availability of transportation to move replacements, but later the War Department established monthly quotas.[10]

The problem of moving personnel to oversea areas was always accompanied by the problem of moving equipment and supplies. Troop units had to have their organizational equipment and initial supplies when they arrived in the theater or they were virtually useless. Thereafter a steady flow of maintenance supplies was necessary so that the men would be properly fed and clothed and adequately provided with ammunition and other expendable military items. Early in the war it was recognized that the maximum force that could be sent to a particular theater was the force the War Department could confidently expect to maintain there.[11] This doctrine, which was the

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[10] Unnumbered WD Cir, 28 Jun 43, sub: Rotation and Return of Mil Pers as Individuals; Rad, OPD to SWPA and SOPAC, 12 Nov 43, CM-OUT 5527, paraphrase in OCT 000-370.5 POA; WD Cir 58, 9 Feb 44; WD Cir 8, 6 Jan 45.

[11] Memo, Gross for Somervell, 21 Dec 41, sub: Estimate of Shipping Available, p. 4, OCT HB Gross Day File.

TABLE 8—PERCENTAGE OF TROOPS EMBARKED FROM U.S. PORTS IN VESSELS UNDER BRITISH AND U.S. CONTROL: MAY 1944–DECEMBER 1945

Operating Arrangement	May–December 1944	1945
Total	100.0	100.0
Vessels Under U.S. Control	71.8	88.9
Army transports owned or chartered by the Army	11.9	9.7
Naval transports and combatant vessels	20.6	34.5
WSA vessels operated by WSA agents on Army schedules	29.8	24.0
WSA vessels operated by the Navy on Army schedules	9.4	19.1
WSA vessels operated by WSA agents in commercial services	0.1	1.6
Vessels Under British Control	28.2	11.1

Source: Movements Division, OCT, Outbound Classification Summary, Pt. A, reworked for publication in a statistical volume for this series, now in preparation. Data for earlier period not available.

opposite of that followed in sending the American Expeditionary Forces to France in 1917–18, developed logically from the fact that troops in most oversea areas would have to be equipped and supplied entirely or almost entirely from the zone of interior and that shipping would be a limiting factor. A corollary of this doctrine was the necessity of maintaining a balance between troopship capacity and cargo-ship capacity—a matter that required the constant attention of the Chief of Transportation.[12]

The larger units naturally presented a greater challenge from the standpoint of providing adequate facilities for their movement, of maintaining the integrity of the organizations en route, and of delivering the troops and their equipment overseas at the times and places that would permit them to be brought together without great delay. From the standpoint of administration and control, however, the smaller units and detachments and the replacements and other individuals traveling in temporary groups posed a greater variety of problems for the Transportation Corps because of their less adequate organization and leadership.[13]

Troopships and Sailing Schedules

The ships used in transporting Army personnel to the theaters were obtained from various sources and were operated by various agencies. Broadly speaking, they were under either American or British control. The British group, which included many vessels under the registry of other friendly nations, was integrated into one fleet under the operational control of the British Ministry of War Transport. The operating arrangements relating to the vessels of the American group, which also included some of foreign registry, cannot be so simply stated. Table 8 shows the several types of operating arrangements and the percentage of troops embarked at U.S. ports on vessels of each category during the latter part of the war.

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[12] Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 161–62.

[13] These problems will be discussed later in this chapter in the sections, Troop Staging at the Ports, Embarkation Procedures, and Troop Ship Administration.

The vessels on which American troops were moved to the theaters were of many types, for the extreme need of troop lift necessitated the use of all available passenger ships and many freighters. An important element of the troopship fleet consisted of the prewar passenger liners that had been requisitioned and converted to increase their capacities. Notable among these vessels were the British liners *Aquitania, Britannic, Empress of Scotland, Mauretania, Queen Elizabeth,* and *Queen Mary;* the French liners *Ile de France* and *Pasteur;* the Dutch liner *Nieuw Amsterdam;* and the American ships *Argentina, Brazil, Edmund B. Alexander, George Washington, Hermitage, Matsonia, Monterey, Monticello, Mount Vernon, President Coolidge, Uruguay, Wakefield,* and *West Point.* Two of the American vessels, the Army transports *Edmund B. Alexander* and *George Washington,* were built before World War I and carried many U.S. troops to Europe in 1917–18, but they also served well in World War II after extensive reconditioning. All of the above foreign-flag vessels and some of those of American registry had sufficient speed to enable them to proceed independently of convoys. The troop capacities ranged from about 2,000 to 15,000—the latter number being the capacity of the "Queens" in favorable weather.[14]

Only a limited number of ships designed expressly as passenger carriers was built during the war because of the length of time required for construction; instead, a policy of converting the more quickly constructed cargo types to troopships was followed. Nineteen vessels of the U.S. Maritime Commission's wartime passenger design (P-2) were completed, named after generals and admirals, and operated by the Navy on Army schedules. These were vessels of about 17,800 gross tons and 19 knots speed, with accommodations for well over 5,000 troops. Thirty of the Maritime Commission's largest standard cargo type (C-4) were converted to troop carriers and operated by the Navy on Army schedules. These vessels, also named after generals, were of about 13,000 gross tons and 17 knots speed and had troop capacities ranging from about 3,000 to 4,000. Cargo vessels of the other standard types (C-1, C-2, and C-3) were converted to troopships and operated by agents of the War Shipping Administration, mostly on Army schedules. Notable among such troopships were the "Marine" series (C-4's), the "Sea" series (C-3's), and the "Cape" series (C-1's). The principal wartime cargo design, the Liberty ship, also was used as a troop carrier to meet emergency requirements.[15]

While all luxuries and many comforts had to be omitted from vessels in wartime service in order to obtain the maximum troop capacity, the only type that gave rise to serious criticism was the converted Liberty. This was an emergency cargo type of 11 knots speed. It was designed for quick construction and the shipyards made deliveries rapidly. Accordingly, when it became necessary to move large numbers of prisoners of war from North Africa to the United States in the spring of 1943, the Army decided to install temporary facilities in about 250 Liberty ships and to use them for this purpose. Some were equipped to accommodate 300 prisoners of war, and others 500. Late in the summer the need for additional troop lift to the Mediterranean became acute, and OPD authorized the use of these vessels to meet the situation with the understanding that the accommodations would be improved.[16] This action was subsequently brought before the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by that agency as an emergency measure.[17]

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[14] For a description of the ships and an account of their service, see Roland W. Charles, *Troopships of World War II* (Washington, 1947). On a few trips the Queens carried more than 15,000 troops.

[15] On cargo ship conversions, see Wardlow, *op. cit.,* pp. 300–301.

Many cargo ships normally had accommodations for a limited number of passengers and these were used whenever possible.[18] In the spring of 1942 British and American military representatives discussed this subject, and the Joint Military Transportation Committee initiated a proposal to install accommodations for fifty or more passengers on a large number of the cargo vessels then being built, including Liberty ships. Execution of the proposal was delayed, however, because of the failure of the War Shipping Administration, the Army, and the Navy to agree on plans and the WSA's insistence on having Presidential authority before undertaking such installations. The project was dropped in the summer of 1943, for by that time the program of converting standard cargo vessels to troop carriers and of installing temporary passenger accommodations on Liberty ships had deprived the earlier proposal of its importance.[19] Nevertheless, all available passenger space on freighters of both the British and the American pools was used when required, and such space was particularly valuable in moving reinforcements to the European theater during the critical winter of 1944–45.[20]

The transportation of troops on freighters brought up the question of moving personnel and explosives on the same vessel. After a heavy loss of life in the sinking of a Liberty ship carrying both, large quantities of explosives were no longer placed in ships carrying troops, and the loading of small quantities was subject to the approval of the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff.[21]

The vessels converted to combat loaders—attack transports (APA's)—for operation by the Navy had troop occommodations that, when utilized on voyages from U.S. ports to the theaters, added appreciably to the outbound troop lift. In order to utilize these accommodations to best advantage, the Army proposed late in 1942 that combat loaders thereafter be assigned to particular operations by the JCS, rather than by the Navy, so that the Army would be informed regarding their movements.[22] In accepting this proposal, the Navy stated that it had always obtained the concurrence of the Army before deciding upon the operation of combat loaders and pointed out that such vessels

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[16] The problems that resulted from this makeshift arrangement are discussed below, pp. 145–48.

[17] CCS 121st Mtg, 1 Oct 43. For further documentation, see notes 179 and 180 below.

[18] Memo, CofT for CGs of PEs, 10 Jun 42, sub: Maximum Utilization of Pass Space; Memo, CofT for CofS USA, 4 Sep 42, sub: Transport of Troops on Cargo Vessels; both in OCT 541.1 Small Groups.

[19] Ltr, Wylie to WSA, 30 Mar 42, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks; JMTC 8th Mtg, 23 Apr 42, and occasional mtgs through 34th Mtg, 25 Mar 43; Memo, Wylie for CofT, 18 May 42; Memo, Gross for Somervell, 2 Sep 42; Memo, CofT for CofS USA, 4 Sep 42, sub: Conversion of WSA Cargo Ships to Carry 50 Troops or More; last three in OCT HB Gross Troops on Cargo Ships.

[20] Memo, CofT for ACofS OPD, 30 Jan 45, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Memo, Maj Ouderkirk for Capt Robert L. Zellman, 11 Apr 45, par. 6, bound in Mvmts Div Hist, Mar 1945, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

[21] Memo, Farr for Gross, 27 Apr 44, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Memo, Gross for Somervell, 15 May 44, ASF Hq Trans 1944; Memo, CofT for OPD, 31 May 44, sub: Pass Shipts on Cargo Vessels, OCT 370.5.

[22] Memo, CG SOS for CofS USA, 26 Nov 42, OPD 370 (3-6-42) Army Transports; JCS 158/2, 14 Dec 42; JCS 46th Mtg, 15 Dec 42, Item 2.



THREE TYPES OF TROOP TRANSPORTS. *The* James Parker, *a converted prewar passenger liner (top); the Maritime Commission's P-2 type, designed and built as a troopship (middle); a naval transport, combat loaded for the assault on Sicily (bottom).*

were required by the Navy for amphibious training as well as for actual assault operations. In September 1943 the Chief of Transportation, acting on a report that a combat loader had sailed from San Diego with naval personnel of low priority, instructed the Army port commanders to make sure that the agreed arrangement was fully carried out at the ports under their respective jurisdictions.[23] The Army also sought to have any passenger space that might be available on aircraft carriers, LST's (landing ships, tank), or other combatant vessels sailing from the United States utilized for personnel on the joint troop-priority list.

With the variety of types of ships used in moving troops it would be interesting to know what percentage of the total movement traveled on vessels of various capacities. Unfortunately such an analysis is available only for the month of December 1943, but that was a period of heavy outbound traffic and the data are therefore significant. The total of over 273,000 passengers (mostly troops) embarked on 312 vessels was distributed as follows:[24]

Size of Shipment	*Number of Ships Used*	*Percentage of Total Passengers*
Total	312	100.0
Up to 199	178	2.1
200–999	64	10.3
1,000–1,999	23	13.2
2,000–4,999	33	37.9
5,000 and over	14	36.5

The allocation of troopships to serve particular oversea areas depended on strategic decisions arrived at by the President and the Prime Minister at their occasional conferences, by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when inter-Allied relations were involved, and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff when only the U.S. armed forces were concerned. The deployment of shipping to implement these strategic decisions was planned and supervised by the Combined Military Transportation Committee on the international level and by the Joint Military Transportation Committee on the American level. The allocation and reallocation of specific ships, however, were normally matters for direct dealing between the Office of the Chief of Transportation on the one hand and the Naval Transportation Service, or the War Shipping Administration, or the British Ministry of War Transport on the other. Negotiations with the British usually resulted in quick understanding regarding the employment of troopships, and the rate attained in moving American soldiers to the European theater was possible only because of the use of the large British liners.[25] The troopships operated by agents of the War Shipping Administration were committed to military service and hence were deployed in accordance with decisions of the military authorities. The task of allocating and reallocating American troopships therefore rested largely with the Army and the Navy, and they sometimes found it difficult to agree.

The basic cause of disagreement stemmed from the fact that the Navy's chief interest was in the Pacific, whereas the Army's principal effort was in the Mediterranean and European theaters. Under the Allies' plan of strategy the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO) and the European Theater of Operations (ETO) were to have priority over the Pacific areas until Germany had been defeated. The disagreements, which were particularly acute with respect to the employment of the large, fast troopships operated under charter by the Navy, came to a head in the late summer of 1943, when the Army protested vigorously against the unilateral action of the Navy in transferring certain of these vessels to the Pacific.[26] About this time it became necessary to decide upon the allocation of the new troop carriers then being constructed by the Maritime Commission. As a result, the Joint Military Transportation Committee appointed a troopship subcommittee consisting of representatives of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, the Naval Transportation Service, and the War Shipping Administration to assign transports by name to the various theaters and to major areas within the theaters.[27] The OCT representatives were General Wylie and Colonel Farr. Following the appointment of this subcommittee, allocations were made in a more orderly manner after careful study, and the problem itself was lessened somewhat by the delivery of new troopships and the temporary conversion of Liberty ships to carry troops. Nevertheless, the differences between Army and Navy interests remained, and the difficulty of reaching agreement regarding the employment of troopships was never entirely removed.[28]

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[23] Min of Port Comdrs Conf, Boston, 30 Aug–1 Sep 43, pp. 113–14, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf.

[24] Memo, Finlay for Gross, 21 Feb 44, OCT HB Gross Troops on Cargo Ships.

[25] Agreement concerning the use of British ships became more difficult after V-E Day. On the general subject, see Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 220–27.

The procedures for scheduling troopships—that is, fixing loading berths and sailing dates for specific voyages—were not the same in the Atlantic as in the Pacific. Since the Army's interest predominated in areas served from U.S. Atlantic ports, sailings from those ports were scheduled by the Movements Division in the Office of the Chief of Transportation, subject to arrangements with the Convoy and Routing Section of the Navy Department and the policies of the British Ministry of War Transport regarding vessels under its control. A different method was used in scheduling sailings from Pacific coast ports. There were a number of reasons for this—the large requirements of the Navy for troop lift, the length of the transpacific voyages, the frequent detention of vessels overseas for intratheater operation, the unusual delays at home ports on account of repairs, the fact that most vessels sailed independently rather than in convoy, and the distance of Pacific coast ports from headquarters in Washington. Because of these circumstances the troopships in the Pacific were considered a pool for the joint use of the Army and the Navy, and their utilization was governed by joint committees with headquarters at San Francisco. This decentralization of control over troopships and troop movements was an expedient that the Chief of Transportation accepted reluctantly.[29]

Close collaboration between the Office of the Chief of Transportation and the

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[26] Memo, Styer for Marshall, 9 Aug 43, sub: Employment of Troop Lift in Atlantic and Pacific, OCS 570; Memo, Meyer for CofT, 13 Sep 43, sub: Use of Navy-Controlled Unescortees in Atlantic, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.

[27] Memo, Dir NTS for CofT, 18 Sep 43, sub: Transport Assignment to Ocean Areas, and reply, 28 Sep 43; both in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; JMTC-51st Mtg, 14 Oct 43, Item 2.

[28] Memo, Vice Adm Frederick J. Horne for Lt Gen Joseph T. McNarney, 19 Nov 43, sub: Trans of Army Engineers to India, and related documents in OPD 560 (24 Jan 44); Ltrs, Farr to Stokes, 19 and 21 Nov 43 (Stokes was then attending the inter-Allied conference in Cairo); Memo, CofT for Brig Gen Carl A. Russell, OPD, 24 Aug 44; last three in OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[29] See below, pp. 161–62.

Operations Division of the War Department General Staff was essential to the co-ordination of ship movement and troop movement plans. On the basis of estimates of theater troop requirements obtained from OPD, corresponding data obtained from the Navy, and forecasts of troopships likely to be available, the Movements Division prepared a statement of the potential troop lift to each theater for each six-month period. A revised statement was prepared at the beginning of every month.[30] The OCT frequently indicated to OPD how adjustments could be made in the plans for troop movements to the respective theaters to make better use of the available vessels.[31] When emergency troop shipments were necessary, the OCT calculated how they could be accomplished with the least disturbance to movement plans and ship schedules already set up.[32]

Changes in troop movement plans necessitating adjustments in shipping schedules created serious problems for the Chief of Transportation. Cargo-ship schedules as well as troopship programs often had to be adjusted. When such changes were occasioned by strategic developments or were ordered by the President as the result of top-level decisions or international agreements, there was no cure for the difficulty. But the Chief of Transportation believed that the shuffling of movements by "higher echelons" of the War and Navy Departments went beyond that which was necessary and indicated a lack of foresight and a failure to appreciate the shipping problem involved. He also objected to efforts by superior headquarters to have specific vessels assigned to specific movements or particular areas. This was a matter, he felt, that should be left entirely to the transportation organization if waste of troop lift was to be avoided.[33] As the strategic situation became more stabilized and planning procedures were improved, changes in movement programs were less frequent, but in view of the scope and nature of the war some such adjustments were inevitable.

The Chief of Transportation believed that the obvious advantages of thorough co-ordination between troop movement plans, as developed by OPD, and troopship movements, as planned by his office, could best be accomplished by direct collaboration between these offices. He therefore protested against any intervention by the Mobilization Division, ASF, and refused to allow that division to influence his plans for the employment of vessels, which he believed to be based on the best available information and expert technical knowledge. The primary function of the Mobilization Division was to co-ordinate supply and troop movements, and it was expected to follow developments to insure that such movements were effectively executed. Close collaboration between the Chief of Transportation's staff and the Mobilization Division obviously was necessary, but General Gross considered inadmissible any intrusion of the

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[30] See Memo, CofT for OPD, 4 Apr 43, sub: Forecast of Shipping; Memo, CofT for OPD, 26 Nov 43, sub: Six-Month Requirements; both in OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Memo, CofT for Dir Plans and Opns ASF, 8 Dec 44, and other dates, OCT 370.5. Copies of these statements were furnished to ASF headquarters as well as to OPD.

[31] Memo, CofT for OPD, 8 Jun 43, sub: Troop Lift to India, OCT 370.5 India; Memo, CofT for OPD, 13 Nov 43, sub: Effect on Shipping of Proposed Movement to Pacific, OCT 000-370.5 POA.

[32] Memo, Wylie for Gross, 13 May 42, sub: Paratroopers, OCT 000-900 *Queen Elizabeth*.

[33] Memo, CofT for CofS for Opns SOS, 23 Jan 43, sub: Issuance of Mvmt Orders; Memo, CofT for Dir NTS, 10 Aug 43, sub: Troop Deployment Program; both in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.

Mobilization Division into transportation operations or into the relationship between the OCT and OPD. During 1943 there was sharp disagreement on the subject between General Gross and General Lutes, Director of Operations, ASF, under whose direction the Mobilization Division functioned. General Gross did not relax his position, and General Lutes' proposal to establish a transportation co-ordination section in the Mobilization Division was not carried out. While opposing the extension of the division's activities to transportation, the Chief of Transportation gave it warm praise as a movements co-ordinating agency.[34]

Since Colonel Farr as chief of the Movements Division had a central role in the effort to fit troop movement plans and ship movements neatly together, his views on the mission of the Chief of Transportation in this matter are of interest. Farr found that the several Army staff agencies concerned with programming oversea movements did not always agree, nor did the Army and the Navy. When these authorities were at odds on what troops *should* be moved, the Chief of Transportation felt that it was his duty to tell them what *could* be moved—that is, what deployment of troops would accomplish the most effective use of the available troop lift. This procedure gave rise to the accusation that the Chief of Transportation was endeavoring to determine strategy. On the contrary, Farr maintained, the Chief of Transportation's purpose was to serve the higher authorities of the War Department and the theater commanders, and the Chief of Transportation believed that he was performing such a service when he indicated how the limited shipping resources could be used to obtain maximum results.[35]

The need for getting the maximum service from troopships dictated a policy of turning them around at the ports as rapidly as possible. This policy was a major consideration with the Movements Division in preparing schedules for the Atlantic. It frequently met with opposition from the operators of the vessels, who desired more time for repairing, storing, and fueling the ships, even though the pressure for delivery of troops to the theaters was a compelling argument. The Army ports of embarkation and the War Shipping Administration usually could be persuaded to accept the Movements Division's schedules with respect to the vessels under their control, but the Navy held more rigidly to its operating standards. The Movements Division, as has been stated, did not have the same control over the dispatch of vessels from west coast ports, and it often complained about the time taken to complete repairs on troopships employed in the Pacific. There were several explanations for the extensive lay-ups—the long periods that the ships spent away from their home ports, the lack of repair facilities at most ports in the Pacific areas, and the fact that west coast repair yards were heavily engaged with naval work of top priority—but their effect on the execution of planned troop movements is obvious.[36]

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[34] Memo, Lutes for CofT, 26 Mar 43, OPD 381 (120-140); Memo, CofT for Lutes, 3 Apr 43, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; ASF Cir 23, 28 Apr 43, sub: Troop Mvmt Co-ordinating Center; Memo, Lutes for CG ASF, 22 Oct 43; Memo, Finlay for Wylie, 26 Oct 43; last two in OCT HB Ex Co-ordination with Staff Agencies ASF; ASF Adm Memo S-96, 20 Nov 43, sub: Mvmt Co-ordinating Center; Memo, Gross for Lutes, 16 Mar 44, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

[35] Ltr, Farr to author, 15 Nov 49, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

[36] Memo, Farr for Wylie, 16 Mar 45, sub: Utilization of Troopships, OCT HB Water Div Ship Repair and Conversion; Memo, CofT for Mil Pers Div ASF, 13 May 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Ouderkirk Staybacks; Interv with Farr, 28 Apr 51, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen; Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-84.

The Movements Division kept account of the status of all vessels carrying or committed to carry U.S. troops or their equipment. During the latter part of the war these records embraced upwards of a thousand troopships and freighters. A type of record was needed that would disclose at all times the locations of the vessels, their speeds and capacities, and their prospective sailing dates, destinations, and arrival dates. The first such record, known informally as "slipstick," was a set of flex-line sheets on which the vessels were posted according to routes or convoys. These sheets could be changed readily as new information was received and photographed for distribution to all concerned as often as circumstances required. The effectiveness of this device as a basis for planning troop movements was dependent on the adequacy and the accuracy of the information received from the oversea commands. Time was required to bring theater commanders to an appreciation of the need for this information, and advices concerning ship movements in the Pacific were inadequate during the greater part of the war. By early 1945, however, the receipt of ship movement reports had improved to a point that justified the erection of an electrically controlled position board, which by the operation of switches could be made to show the location of a particular ship or the ships in a particular port. This visual aid was supplemented by a set of vessel cards giving full information on the ships themselves, their capacities, and their movements. The system, though not used until late in the war, proved of value in controlling the huge fleet on which troops were transported during the redeployment and repatriation periods.[37]

Although advance planning was necessarily tentative because of the constantly changing troop requirements and the uncertainty of ship movements, the Chief of Transportation considered it essential to his task of making the best possible use of the ships. One phase of this planning was the six-month estimate of troop lift on the several routes that was furnished by the Chief of Transportation to OPD and ASF headquarters. Beginning early in 1944 these estimates, prepared under the supervision of General Wylie, Assistant Chief of Transportation for Operations, were elaborated in charts called transportation operational projections. The primary purpose of these projections was "to provide the key planning and operating personnel of the Transportation Corps with graphic data reflecting the future movement of troops and cargo between U.S. ports and oversea theaters, and with the measure of achievement in meeting forecasts." The basic charts showed for each theater, for each month of the past six months, the number of troops made ready to move during the month in accordance with theater priorities and the number carried forward as a backlog from the preceding month. The sum of these constituted the "effective target" for the month, against which were set the actual embarkations. A continuation of these charts reflected the estimated embarkations for each of the ensuing six months. Supplementary diagrams were prepared to show the fluctuations in the advance estimates of troop requirements prepared by OPD, and how

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[37] Memo, Opns Div OCT for Water Div OCT, 4 May 42, sub: Slipstick Plan, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Ltr, Farr to CofT ETOUSA, 5 Oct 43; Memo, Lt Col Carl E. Berzelius, Mvmts Div OCT, for Wylie, 16 Mar 45, sub: Problems in POA and SWPA; Memo, Farr for C of Contl Div OCT, 14 Jan 46; last three in OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Ltr, Farr to author, 14 Feb 50, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen. Copies of slipstick in OCT HB Ex File.

CHART 3—PASSENGERS EMBARKED MONTHLY BY THE ARMY AT U.S. PORTS FOR OVERSEA DESTINATIONS: DECEMBER 1941–DECEMBER 1945*



* Atlantic areas include North and Latin America, Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom, continental Europe, Mediterranean, Africa, and the Middle East. Pacific areas include western Canada, Alaska, Central Pacific, South Pacific, Southwest Pacific, western Pacific, India, Burma, Japan, and Korea.

Source: Monthly reports by ports of embarkation to Movements Division, OCT, reworked for statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

actual embarkations compared with these estimated requirements and with the number of troops on the theater priority list that were ready to move. The charts gave the Office of the Chief of Transportation a basis for studying the results of planning and operations during preceding months and for drawing conclusions for guidance in the future. There were similar charts for the shipment of Army cargo to the theaters.[38]

The growth of the Army's troop lift is illustrated by the fact that G-4, a few days after Pearl Harbor, estimated the capacity of the ships then available for Army troop service to be about 65,000 troops, whereas at the end of hostilities the troop capacity of the vessels serving the Army was ten times that figure.[39] The Army embarkations in December 1941 totaled 29,800 passengers, while in January 1945, when the outbound movement reached a peak, 295,100 were embarked. *(Chart 3)* The increase was brought about through the exploitation of all practicable means—increasing the capacity of existing passenger vessels, building new troopships, converting cargo ships, using the limited passenger accommodations on unconverted cargo ships, and employing British and other foreign troopships. Yet from the standpoint of the military authorities concerned with planning strategy, the troop lift never was large enough. The Chief of Transportation, moreover, repeatedly found that embarkations fell somewhat short of the target he had helped to set. The latter fact is explained chiefly by delay in the work of converting cargo ships on which the Chief of Transportation counted heavily in his planning.[40] The unforeseen retention of vessels in the theaters and the extensive repairs required by vessels returning to U.S. ports, particularly those returning from long voyages in the Pacific, also upset the forecasts.

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[38] Copies of the transportation operational projections for August and September 1944 are in OCT HB Dir of Opns.

[39] Study, Trans Br G-4 WDGS, 10 Dec 41, sub: Analysis of Passenger Shipping, OCT HB Gross Day File; ASF MPR, Aug 45, p. 50.

The statement that the troop lift was never large enough requires some qualification with respect to the period from June 1944 onward. The build-up of forces in the United Kingdom for the invasion of the Continent, the pressure of the campaign in the Mediterranean, and the effort to increase troop strength in the Pacific and Asiatic theaters as rapidly as possible kept the demand for troop lift strong on both Atlantic and Pacific coasts until after the invasion of France had been launched. Then, because battle casualties and the demand for replacements were not as high as had been expected, the troop shipping situation in the North Atlantic became perceptibly easier. This made it possible to release some of the temporarily converted Liberty ships from troop service, to release part of the space on British ships, and to relax somewhat the practice of "overloading" transports—that is, loading them beyond the normal troop capacity. The troop lift deficit continued in the Pacific, but the Chief of Transportation decided against transferring vessels from the Atlantic because an early end of the war against Germany was anticipated and maximum capacity would then be required for redeploying troops from Europe. The decision was fortunate, because with the launching of the German counteroffensive in December 1944 the movement of troops to Europe again became heavy and all available space was required. This stringency was soon over, however, and from February 1945 until redeployment began there was a surplus of troop lift in the Atlantic. The commitment of so many additional troops in Europe in the winter of 1944–45 reduced the number available for the Pacific and relieved somewhat the demand for troop lift at west coast ports.[41]

The Ports of Embarkation

The long-range planning and the day-to-day adjustments in projected oversea troop movements and ship movements, which were accomplished in Washington, were carried into effect by the ports of embarkation. The port commanders controlled the movement of troops and their equipment from home stations to the seaboard, inspected and processed both troops and equipment to insure that they were ready for oversea service, prepared

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[40] Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 207–08, 305–07; Memo, CofT for PEs, 26 Aug 43, sub: Vessels Repair Info, and atchd rad to oversea commanders; Memo, Farr for Wylie, 4 Oct 43; last two inOCT HB Farr Staybacks; Memo, Farr for Maj Gen John M. Franklin, 14 Mar 44, OCT 564 Troop Transports.

[41] Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 22 Jun 44, sub: Ship Capabilities, ASF Hq Shipping 1944; Min of OCT Opns Mtg, 13 Jul 44, p. 3, OCT HB Dir of Opns; Memo, Farr for Wylie, 1 Aug 44, sub: Troop Mvmt Trends, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Memo, Wylie for Somervell, 20 Dec 44, sub: Troop Transport Position, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Memo, Farr for Gross, 17 Jan 45, sub: Briefing; Memo, CofT for Traf Div AAF, 27 Feb 45; last two in OCT 370.5.

TABLE 9—PASSENGERS EMBARKED BY THE PRINCIPAL ARMY PORTS: DECEMBER 1941–DECEMBER 1945 [a]

Port	Total	1941 (December Only)	1942	1943	1944	1945
All Ports	7,639,491	29,839	955,302	1,871,120	3,072,127	1,711,103
Boston [b]	768,898	0	26,747	116,476	456,651	169,024
New York [c]	3,273,009	3,399	421,756	910,658	1,400,486	536,710
Hampton Roads [d]	764,839	1,135	55,489	234,872	372,368	100,975
Charleston [e]	36,654	1,981	25,556	2,069	447	6,601
New Orleans [f]	174,651	6,172	58,139	41,069	42,470	26,801
Los Angeles [g]	217,886	0	1,940	46,418	74,782	94,746
San Francisco [h]	1,745,989	15,084	289,637	456,998	534,018	450,252
Seattle [i]	579,209	2,068	75,491	49,777	178,760	273,113
Portland [j]	47,194	0	0	0	0	47,194
Prince Rupert [k]	31,162	0	547	12,783	12,145	5,687

[a] Figures include military personnel of the Army, Navy, and Allied nations, civilians, and prisoners of war. Embarkations by cargo ports and subports on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts are combined with embarkations at the ports of embarkation to which they were subordinate. When embarkations at these subordinate ports were reported separately, they are stated in footnotes, but such figures may not be complete.

[b] Number of passengers embarked at Halifax, a subport of Boston, is not available. Boston was a subport of New York until July 1942.

[c] Includes 225 passengers embarked at the Philadelphia cargo port in 1943, and 250 in 1944.

[d] Includes 295 passengers embarked at the Baltimore cargo port in 1942, 1,044 in 1943, 84 in 1944, and 11 in 1945. Hampton Roads was a subport of New York until June 1942.

[e] Charleston was a subport of New York until January 1942.

[f] Includes 751 passengers embarked during 1942 at Miami, Key West, and Galveston.

[g] Los Angeles was a subport of San Francisco until October 1943.

[h] Includes 17,048 passengers embarked at Portland, as a subport of San Francisco, through August 1944.

[i] Includes 4,838 passengers embarked at Portland, as a subport of Seattle, September–December 1944. Seattle was a subport of San Francisco until January 1942.

[j] See notes *h* and *i* concerning embarkations prior to 1945. Portland continued as a subport of Seattle during 1945, although its embarkations are shown separately.

[k] Prince Rupert was a subport of Seattle.

Source: Monthly reports of ports of embarkations to Movements Division, OCT, reworked for statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

billeting plans for the transports, moved the troops from staging areas to shipside and embarked them, and provided for their comfort, control, and entertainment on board.[42]

Each port of embarkation was assigned primary responsibility for one or a few oversea areas, but also made shipments to other areas, so that the over-all pattern of movements was complex. Moreover, the port responsibilities were subject to adjustment as conditions changed. In the latter part of the war the port of embarkation at Boston served the North Atlantic bases and northern Europe; New York was concerned principally with movements to northern Europe and the Mediterranean; Hampton Roads shipped chiefly to Africa and the Mediterranean; Charleston embarked troops to various destinations but served principally as the

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[42] AR 55-390, 16 Dec 42, par. 10, gives a broad outline of port commanders' duties. See also Memo, CG SOS for Dirs and Cs of Staff Divs, *et al.*, 1 Jul 42, sub: Procedures for Booking Individuals and Small Groups, OCT 541.1 Small Groups.

TABLE 10—PASSENGERS EMBARKED BY THE ARMY FOR THE SEVERAL OVERSEA AREAS: DECEMBER 1941–DECEMBER 1945 [a]

Destination Areas	Total	1941 (December Only)	1942	1943	1944	1945
All Areas	7,639,491	29,839	955,302	1,871,120	3,072,127	1,711,103
Atlantic Areas	4,791,237	12,687	522,667	1,250,275	2,179,319	826,289
North America [b]	214,026	1,243	14,601	15,326	7,512	30,564
Latin America [c]		9,071	74,267	32,475	28,967	
Mediterranean [d]	1,116,047	0	102,860	491,399	342,615	104,918
Central Africa and Middle East [e]		327	41,794	32,134		
European [f]	3,461,164	2,046	289,145	678,941	1,800,225	690,807
Pacific Areas	2,848,254	17,152	432,635	620,845	892,308	884,814
North America [g]	250,501	2,068	82,054	100,335	46,831	19,213
Central Pacific [h]	1,213,684	15,084	109,300	115,494	398,375	380,407
South Pacific [h]		0	77,936	117,088		
Southwest Pacific [i]	1,124,868	0	149,494	194,286	341,566	439,522
Asiatic [j]	259,201	0	13,851	93,642	106,036	45,672

[a] The grouping into Atlantic and Pacific areas indicates that the passengers were embarked mainly but not exclusively at Atlantic and Gulf ports or at Pacific ports.

[b] Includes bases in Canada, Newfoundland, Greenland, and Bermuda.

[c] Includes Panama Canal Zone, Caribbean, South America, and South Atlantic.

[d] Includes North Africa, Sicily, and Italy.

[e] Middle East includes Egypt, Red Sea, and Iran.

[f] Includes Iceland, United Kingdom, and continental Europe.

[g] Includes Alaska and western Canada.

[h] Central and South Pacific were combined into Pacific Ocean Areas in 1944.

[i] Includes embarkations for western Pacific, Japan, and Korea after those areas were occupied by U.S. forces.

[j] Includes India, Burma, and China.

Source: Monthly reports by ports of embarkation to Movements Division, OCT, reworked for statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

home port for Army hospital ships assigned to the Atlantic; New Orleans handled troop traffic to the Panama Canal, Latin America, and the Pacific bases; San Francisco was a transshipment point for troops proceeding to all of the Pacific areas; Los Angeles served the Asiatic and Pacific theaters; and the Seattle Port of Embarkation was responsible for shipments to Alaska and western Canada and also served the Central Pacific.[43] The numbers of troops shipped from the subports and the cargo ports, each of which functioned under the control of a port of embarkation, were relatively small. More than 45 percent of the passengers embarked by the Army during the war period were destined for the European theater, and more than 42 percent were embarked under the jurisdiction of the New York Port of Embarkation. *(Tables 9 and 10, and Chart 4)*

The ports of embarkation were advised by the Chief of Transportation as far in advance as possible concerning the troops

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[43] ASF MPR, Jan 44, Sec. 3, p. 46, graphically shows "troop relationships" of U.S. ports and theaters, October–December 1943.

CHART 4—PASSENGERS EMBARKED BY THE ARMY AT U.S. PORTS FOR THE SEVERAL OVERSEA AREAS: DECEMBER 1941–DECEMBER 1945 [a]



[a] Includes a small number of passengers embarked in Canada.
[b] Includes Alaska and Canadian Pacific ports.
[c] Includes North, Central, and South America, Greenland, Bermuda, and South Atlantic islands.
[d] Includes South and Central Pacific.
[e] Includes North and Central Africa, Sicily, Italy, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf.
[f] Includes western Pacific.
[g] Includes troops for China, Burma, India.
[h] Includes Iceland, United Kingdom, northern Continent, southern France.

Source: Reports from ports of embarkation to Movements Division, OCT, reworked for a statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

and organizational equipment that they would be expected to embark during succeeding months. In the beginning such information was irregular, but later a definite procedure was followed. The first advices, usually given six months in advance, included an estimate of the troop spaces to be available during each month and the types of troops to be moved. These estimates enabled the port commanders to enlarge or reduce their staffs and their facilities according to the prospective load. Frequent changes in the forecasts were necessary as theater priority lists were revised and as firmer estimates of the shipping situation became possible. When movement orders for specific units, replacements, or fillers were issued indicating the ports through which they were to move and the dates on which they were to be ready to leave their home stations, copies were sent to the port commanders. As rapidly as specific ships could be named to sail on specific dates, the ports were notified. The troops and their equipment were then called forward by the port commanders in accordance with the priority lists, the ability of the port facilities to accommodate them, and the availability of ships to move them.[44]

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[44] Memo, CofT for HRPE and SFPE, 16 Apr 43, sub: Priorities for Late April, OCT 370.5 South Pacific; Msg, CofT to NYPE and HRPE, 11 Jul 43; Memo, CofT for BPE and NYPE, 26 Jan 44, sub: Vessel Allocations; Ltr, Gross to CG NYPE, 1 Jul 44, summarizing procedures; last three in OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

The port commanders were responsible for notifying the theater commanders when troops were shipped overseas. The Operations Division of the General Staff kept the theaters informed regarding War Department actions on their priority lists, but such advices dealt only with types of units and tentative departure dates. The first advice from a port of embarkation to a theater of destination was the "loading cable," which was dispatched about a week or ten days before the sailing. The loading cable identified the troops that were expected to be embarked on a particular ship for sailing on a particular day. From such messages the theaters were able to make preparations for the handling of the ships and the disposition of the troops and their equipment. As soon as possible after a ship or convoy had sailed, the port sent a "sailing cable," which gave the actual time of departure. Passenger lists and cargo manifests were forwarded to the theaters by air mail in order to arrive in advance of the vessels. Because of the unusually heavy movements to the European theater and the careful planning that was necessary in advance of the troops' arrival, that theater was notified in the sailing cable of any changes that had been made in the troop list after the loading cable had been dispatched. In the early part of the war the theaters complained of the failure of the ports of embarkation to give them full and prompt advices, but the system was steadily improved. This improvement was facilitated by frequent exchanges, between ports of embarkation and the theaters they served, of liaison officers for short tours of duty.[45]

The preparation of the loading plan, showing the troops that were to be embarked on a particular ship, was usually left to the port commander, who was governed by the approved priority list for the theater concerned. But sometimes when the sailings to an oversea area were infrequent, or when the theater's requirements were especially urgent, the Chief of Transportation indicated that certain units were to sail on certain vessels.[46] Loading plans were often upset by late changes in priorities. In some instances units for which movement orders had been issued were not able to pass inspection by the scheduled readiness dates because of shortages of personnel or equipment or deficiencies in training. In this situation OPD designated other units of the same type if they were available, or, as was often the case, the port commander substituted troops that were already at the port staging area, following the theater priority list as nearly as possible. Every effort was made to avoid letting a ship sail with empty spaces when the theater was in need of troops.

The organizations at the port for handling troop movements were not uniform. Early in 1944 the Chief of Transportation issued a "typical organization chart" for the ports and requested them to follow it so far as practicable, but because of different conditions in the several localities and personal preferences on the part of the port commanders organizational differences persisted.[47] There were, however, several groups of related functions to be performed at all ports. The ships had to be made ready for the embarkation of troops and their impedimenta. Arrangements had to be made for the transportation of troops and impedimenta into and within the port area. The enforcement of theater priorities and War Department movement orders, the calling of troops to the ports, and the planning of embarkations constituted another group of related activities. Control of the movement, processing, and loading of the equipment and supplies that accompanied troops, or were marked for particular units though moving separately, made up another functional field. In addition, the port commanders were responsible for regulating the flow of maintenance supplies for the support of troops after their arrival overseas. In the typical plan issued by the Chief of Transportation, these five groups of functions were assigned to five divisions, designated Water Division, Port Transportation Division, Troop Movement Division, Initial Troop Equipment Division, and Oversea Supply Division. This five-division organization was actually employed only at New York; at other ports movements of troops and equipment were supervised by the same division, and there were other departures from the typical plan.

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[45] Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for CGs of PEs, 12 Jan 42, sub: Sailing Info to Oversea Comdrs, G-4/29717-114; Ltr, Col Frank S. Ross, CofT ETOUSA, to Wylie, 15 Aug 42, OCT 319.1 England; Memo, CG SFPE for CofT, 18 Sep 45, sub: Accomplishments and Handicaps, OCT HB SFPE Gen.

[46] Memo, CofT for CG SFPE, 2 Jan 43, sub: Sailing of *West Point* for Middle East, OCT 353.01-400.93 Middle East; Memo, CofT for CG CPE, NYPE, etc., 15 Aug 43, sub: Priorities for Asiatic Theater, etc., OCT 370.5.

[47] Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-102.

Because of the close co-operation that was necessary between the Office of the Chief of Transportation, the ports of embarkation in the zone of interior, and the oversea theaters, the communication systems by which these agencies were linked were of utmost importance. Exchanges of information and adjustments in programs had to be made quickly as sailing dates approached, and the transmission of messages had to be secret as well as fast. Both teletype and telephone connections were used. Maj. Gen. Homer M. Groninger, who commanded the New York Port of Embarkation until V-E Day and then became commander of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, remarked that the daily teletype conferences that the ports held with the chiefs of transportation in the theaters were of "inestimable value." Colonel Farr, expressing the view of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, corroborated that opinion. To emphasize the point, he stated that during the redeployment period the information received from the European theater was unsatisfactory because the theater did not permit its port commanders to communicate directly with the zone of interior, and that there were usually omissions and delays when messages regarding troops sailing from European ports had to be relayed through the theater headquarters.[48]

Maintaining secrecy in communications between the Office of the Chief of Transportation and the ports was a constant problem. Messages transmitted over the Transportation Corps teletypewriter network were coded and hence were considered safe, but urgent business could be transacted much more satisfactorily by telephone. Although telephone conversations were "scrambled," the Intelligence Division (G-2) of the General Staff did not regard this as providing adequate security. Accordingly, the transmission by telephone of certain information such as sailing dates, names of vessels, identification of units, and destinations was forbidden.[49] Breaches of these security rules were sometimes risked in order to get business of great urgency transacted. Such breaches when detected by G-2 caused embarrassment to the officers involved, but there is no evidence that the enemy was ever benefited.

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[48] Memo, CofT for All PEs, *et al.*, 9 Aug 42, sub: Secret Communications, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen; Memo, CG SFPE for CofT, 18 Sep 45, sub: Accomplishments and Handicaps, par. 6, OCT HB SFPE Gen; Memo, Farr for Finlay, 19 Sep 45, sub: Lessons Learned, p. 2, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

Movement to the Ports

Preparations for the movement of troops to the ports began with instructions issued by OPD to the AGF, the AAF, or the ASF, directing that necessary steps be taken to prepare specific types of troops for shipment to stated oversea theaters, and setting approximate dates on which the troops were to be ready to leave their home stations. These instructions normally were issued about six weeks before actual movement. Specific units, or groups of replacements, were designated and alerted as soon as possible. As the date approached for the departure of a unit from its home station, a movement order was issued by The Adjutant General at the request of the AGF, the AAF, or the ASF, giving complete instructions regarding the strength of the unit, authorized equipment and supplies, the port for which the movement was destined, and the latest date for arrival at the port. The movement order included a shipment number that was used thereafter in identifying the troops and their impedimenta in order to obviate reference to their military designations. The movement order also included any special instructions required by the unit commander or the commander of the port at which the troops were to be staged and embarked. These instructions were issued only after a careful study had been made of theater requirements, shipping capabilities, the training status of troops, and the readiness of equipment. Such study represented the combined efforts of the Operations Division of the General Staff, the Operations Division of Army Service Forces headquarters, The Inspector General, and the Chief of Transportation.[50]

The process of making troops ready for shipment to the theaters and moving the men and their impedimenta to the ports in an orderly and timely manner involved a number of Army agencies—the major commands (AGF, AAF, and ASF) to which the troops belonged, the corps areas (later service commands), the commanders of home stations, the unit commanders, the chiefs of technical services who provided equipment and supplies, and the ports of embarkation. During 1940 and 1941 it became increasingly apparent that co-ordination between these agencies lacked effectiveness and that more adequate definition of the duties of each was necessary. Late in 1941, at the request of the Chief of Staff, The Inspector General made a study of the problem in connection with troops moving through the ports of embarkation at New York, San Francisco, and Seattle, and his report provided a basis for corrective action.[51] This action was spurred by the outbreak of war with Germany and Japan and the prospect of vastly increased troop shipments. It took the form of more explicit instructions in the movement orders and the issuance of separate instructions covering standard procedures that could be referred to in movement orders.

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[49] OCT Adm Memo 116, 7 Oct 42, Sec. 1; Memo, CofT for Agencies Listed, 30 Jan 43, sub: TC Priority Teletype, OCT 676.2; TC Cir 45-6, 24 Jul 44, sub: Communications Security; Memo, CofT for PEs, 5 Aug 44, sub: Communications Security Course, OCT 000.72/TC Misc; TC Cir 50-14, revised 31 Jan 45, sub: Ships' Port Serial Numbers.

[50] Procedures and responsibilities for priority lists and movement orders are dealt with in the following: Memo, TAG for CG AGF, *et al.*, 5 Jan 43, sub: Org, Tng, and Equip of Units, AG 320.2 (1-2-43); Memo, DCofS USA for ACofS G-1, G-3, G-4, OPD, 5 Aug 43, sub; Mvmts to Theaters; Memo, ACofS OPD for Theater Group, *et al.*, 12 Aug 43, sub: OPD Co-ordination of Pers, Troop and Matériel Matters; Memo, OPD for DCofS, 10 Nov 43, sub: Troop Mvmt Projection; last three in WDCSA 370.5 (Secret); WD Pamphlet 29-3, 24 Oct 44, Oversea Travel Orders for Casuals, Replacements, and Individuals (short title, OTO).

The separate instructions, eventually published in pamphlet form, became the "bible" of officers concerned with troop movements. The basic document, entitled Preparation for Overseas Movement (short title, POM), was issued first in February 1943 and was later greatly expanded and reissued as experience accumulated. It was supplemented by pamphlets entitled Additional Preparation for Overseas Movement for AAF Units (short title, AIR-POM), Identification of Organizational Impedimenta (short title, IOI), and Preparation for Overseas Movement of Individual Replacements (short title, POR).[52] The publication of standard procedures was a great boon to the Chief of Transportation, whose headquarters was responsible for all transportation arrangements, and whose port organizations had ultimate responsibility for the condition of troops and impedimenta when they were dispatched overseas. His staff naturally had played an important role in formulating these procedures.

Detailed instructions regarding the preparation of troops at home stations before their movement to the ports were included in POM. In general, the objective was to have units at full strength, completely trained and equipped, before entrainment, and to establish a complete understanding between the unit commander and the port commander regarding the personnel and the matériel being shipped. The periods normally allowed between the dates when units were alerted and the dates when they were to be ready to move were theoretically adequate to allow shortages of personnel and equipment and deficiencies in training to be overcome, but frequently this proved not to be the case. Especially during the early part of the war, when the production of equipment and supplies was slow and training programs were lagging, the port commanders were obliged to assume exceedingly heavy burdens in correcting such deficiencies at the staging areas. The Chief of Transportation, while encouraging his port commanders to take all possible measures to meet the responsibility, kept up a constant campaign for more complete compliance with the provisions of POM on preparations at home stations, but his effort was only partly successful.[53]

It was logical that the movement of both troops and impedimenta from home stations to ports of embarkation should be controlled by the port commanders. They were in possession of approved priority lists and of movement orders indicating the dates when specific units were to be ready to go forward; they also knew more accurately than anyone else when the staging areas would be able to receive additional troops and when the ships would be ready for loading.[54] The control authority vested in the port commanders applied to replacements as well as to troop units. As a general practice the port commander's summons, which became known as a call, was issued at least five days before the troops were expected to entrain. It stated the staging area to which the troops were to be delivered and the date of their arrival.[55] The Chief of Transportation received a copy of each call, and his Traffic Control Division took immediate steps to establish a rail routing for the shipment and to arrange for rail equipment to be available at the home station on the departure date.[56]

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[51] Memo, TIG for CofS, 19 Nov 41, sub: Supply and Mvmt of Units, G-4/33098.

[52] Author's Memo, 22 Feb 44, sub: Instructions Regarding Preparation of Troops and Impedimenta for Movement Overseas, summarizing actions taken, with documents attached, OCT HB PE Gen Troop Mvmts to Port.

[53] See below, pp. 117–19.

The actual date of departure from the home station frequently differed from the date contemplated when the movement was initiated. Changes in the priority lists approved by OPD and adverse reports by The Inspector General on the condition of units often caused movements to be delayed. Usually such delays were counterbalanced by the advancement of other movements. The port commanders sometimes called troops to the staging areas slightly ahead of their readiness dates. Such advancements might be the consequence of other units being deferred or of adjustments in the sailing schedules for troop transports. In either case the units advanced were needed to fill available ship space. Because such advancements sometimes drew protests from the major commands concerned, the Chief of Transportation arranged that, in cases where a major command decided that a unit was not in condition to comply with the port call and there were no other units on the priority list suitable for substitution, the facts would be presented to OPD for a decision that would, if possible, avoid a waste of ship space.[57]

When port commanders were not able to call troops by the readiness dates given in the movement orders, they were expected to propose new readiness dates as promptly as possible. But the port commanders were instructed to keep departures from readiness dates, whether advancements or deferments, to a minimum.[58] To assist port commanders in determining when calls should be issued, the Chief of Transportation supplied them with data regarding the time in transit to be allowed from the respective service commands to the respective ports for troop trains, freight trains, and mixed trains.[59]

The movement of troop impedimenta to the ports gave rise to special problems because the shipments flowed from many sources. A considerable part of the equipment and supplies was not shipped from home stations but from technical service depots and from manufacturing plants. Matching these numerous shipments with the troops for which they were intended was an intricate problem at the ports. Although the instructions on the subject were explicit, information furnished the port commanders concerning such shipments was often inadequate or arrived too late to be of service.[60] Shipments of impedimenta were usually called to move from home stations ahead of the troops because of the longer period required en route. Both the AGF and the ASF complained that not enough time was allowed to prepare equipment for shipment, and the port commanders were instructed to issue calls as early as possible. However, the port commanders were limited in this respect by conditions at the ports and by the fact that many units were not cleared by The Inspector General until near their readiness dates. To meet the latter situation, the Chief of Transportation arranged with OPD that when the readiness date for a unit drew near and the port commander had not yet received clearance on the training status of the troops, he might nevertheless call the unit's equipment forward, since there was reasonable assurance that the troops would be cleared soon.[61]

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[54] Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 1 Jan 42, sub: Entrainment of Troops, G-4/33700; Memo, TAG for CofAAF, *et al.*, 2 Jan 42, AG 370.5 (1-1-42); Memo, TQMG for Trans Br G-4, 12 Jan 42, sub: Overseas Troop Mvmts, G-4/33700.

[55] In the beginning some ports referred to these calls as movement orders, but this was stopped because of confusion with movement orders issued by TAG; see Memo, Dir of Plng ASF for CofT, 28 Oct 43, sub: Call Issued by PEs, OCT 523.06 Follow-up of Shipments.

[56] TC Cir 100-6, 5 Oct 44, sub: POM, and changes, concerning distribution of copies of calls.

[57] Memo, CofT for CG AGF, 25 Jan 43, OCT 370.5 Readiness Dates.

[58] Msg, CofT to Port Comdrs, 10 Aug 43, OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[59] TC Cir 100-4, 20 Jun 44, sub: Troop and/or Impedimenta Mvmt by Rail to Ports.

Troops usually were unacquainted with the ports through which they were to move and the procedures they were likely to encounter there. Several measures were adopted to offset this unfamiliarity. Each port commander issued a pamphlet containing information for the guidance of incoming troops, which described the facilities of the port and its staging areas, the organization of the port commander's staff, and the practices relating to the staging and embarkation of troops, the processing of equipment, and port security. These pamphlets were intended to be of service to unit commanders both before and after arrival at the staging areas.[62]

Whenever a large unit was scheduled for movement overseas, an advance detail was sent to the port of embarkation to coordinate matters relating to the handling of troops and equipment. The larger the unit the more time was required for this advance work. The port commanders encouraged the early arrival of such details and the assignment of adequate personnel, but unit commanders did not always make satisfactory arrangements. When especially large units were to be moved, the port commanders sent their representatives to home stations to assist the units with their planning. As a further aid to unit commanders, the New York Port of Embarkation prepared a motion picture portraying the execution of important procedures prescribed in POM.

The bulk of the troops arriving at the staging areas traveled by rail because the railways afforded the most satisfactory service for large groups making long journeys and simplified the problem of enforcing discipline and security regulations.[63] The railway terminals at the larger staging areas were capable of accommodating eight to twelve troop trains at the same time. Some troops were transported to the ports from nearby stations by motor, but the number was small compared with the total delivered by rail. Individuals and small groups sometimes were dispatched to the ports by air in order not to miss the ships on which they were scheduled to sail, but here again the percentage of the total was slight.

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[60] Memo, TAG for Supply Arms and Services, 17 Jan 42, sub: Shipments to PEs, AG 523.01 (1-17-42); Memo, CofT for PEs, 28 Nov 42, sub: Task Force Shortages; Memo, CofT for ACofS for Opns SOS, 14 Dec 42; last two in OCT 400.61 Shortages 1943.

[61] Memo, CofT for Col Calvin DeWitt, Jr., NYPE, 18 Apr 43, sub: Release of Org Equip; Memo of Record by Col Farr, 26 Apr 43; both in OCT HB Farr Staybacks. The problem of getting impedimenta shipped so as to be available to the troops soon after their arrival overseas had many facets. See below, pp. 148-61.

[62] Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 17 May 43, sub: Info Concerning PEs, OCT 370.5 POM 1942-43; Procedures for Overseas Movement Through the New York Port of Embarkation (short title, NYPE POM), 1 Jan 44, OCT HB NYPE Troop Mvmts to Port.

[63] Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 357-58.

During the early months of the war there was some speculation as to the feasibility of moving troops from their home stations directly to shipside rather than sending them to port staging areas for periods of from one to several weeks before embarkation. To develop information on this subject, the Chief of Transportation requested The Inspector General to send representatives to observe the movement of several units through the Charleston Port of Embarkation. The reports of the observers indicated that the proposed procedure was feasible under certain conditions but also disclosed that there were formidable problems in getting troops and their equipment fully ready for shipment overseas before they left their home stations.[64] By the time the investigation was finished and the reports studied—summer of 1942—experience had established that the port staging areas had an intricate and indispensable mission to perform, and the question of eliminating them from the standard troop movement procedure was never again given serious consideration.

During a period of heavy troop movement through a particular port it was advantageous to have some of the larger and better organized units staged at their home stations and moved from there either to shipside or to a staging area for an overnight stop before embarkation. In such cases the port commanders sent processing teams to the home stations. Also, some groups of replacements were staged at replacement depots. But the bulk of the troops received their final processing at port staging areas. In all cases the essential point of doctrine—that movements to the ports should be made only on call of the port commanders—was observed.

Troop Staging at the Ports

The staging areas at the ports of embarkation served a dual purpose. The basic conception was that they should serve as temporary stations where troops destined for shipment overseas could be assembled and organized so that they could be embarked as soon as the transports were ready to receive them. Since there was a critical shortage of ships and many troop transports moved in convoys with closely calculated departure dates, it was important that vessels not be held in port waiting for troops to arrive from inland stations. The second conception of the staging area was that of a station where troops could be processed—that is, given the final attention necessary to make them ready for oversea service. The processing included bringing units to authorized strength and correcting deficiencies relating to the physical condition, the personal equipment, and the training status of the individual soldiers.[65] The latter role proved to be highly significant and more time consuming than had been foreseen. It was intended, of course, that troops returning from overseas would pass through the staging areas for some of the processing that was necessary in connection with their repatriation. In addition to processing U.S. Army personnel, including nurses and Wacs, the staging areas carried out whatever processing was necessary for personnel of the U.S. Navy, troops of

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[64] Memo, TIG for Trans Div SOS, 3 Jun 42, sub: Mvmt of Task Forces, OCT 370.5 POM 1942-43; Interv with Col Farr, 18 Feb 44, sub: Troop Mvmts Overseas, OCT HB PE Gen St Area Procedures.

[65] TC Pamphlet 7, Guide for Org and Opn of Staging Areas, 7 Feb 44, and revision, 16 Dec 46, deal with mission, functions, and organization. See also appropriate sections of PE Org Manuals, in OCT HB files for respective ports.

Allied nations, and civilians who were sailing on troopships.

In peacetime somewhat similar functions had been performed by the oversea discharge and replacement depots located at the ports, but in wartime much more extensive and complete facilities were required. This need was felt during 1941, and the ports of embarkation then in operation arranged for the assignment of space for troop staging at nearby Army installations. It was recognized, however, that the space procurable in this way was limited and that entirely new staging areas would have to be constructed if the United States should enter the war. Another consideration was that some of the established installations available for staging purposes were located at considerable distances from the ports, whereas the port commanders found it advantageous to have such facilities near to, though not within, the port areas. Plans for the construction of staging areas were initiated late in 1941, and during the month following the Pearl Harbor attack new facilities in the vicinity of New York, New Orleans, and San Francisco were authorized. Later in 1942 approval was given to the construction of staging facilities near Boston, Charleston, Hampton Roads, Los Angeles, and Seattle, as well as a second large staging area near New York. Eventually staging facilities were constructed at Portland, Oregon, and Prince Rupert, British Columbia.[66]

The Chief of Transportation and his port commanders kept the staging capability under constant review in the light of projected troop movements to insure that it would be adequate for the needs as they arose. The specially designed staging areas were more satisfactory for staging troops than other Army installations, and the policy was to make them adequate to handle the bulk of the movement. However, several of the older stations were used for staging purposes throughout the war. The fluctuation in theater requirements, the convoy system in the Atlantic, and delayed ship movements made the flow of troops through the ports uneven, and the staging facilities had to be capable of handling the peak load.[67]

Higher headquarters did not always agree with the Chief of Transportation's estimate of staging area requirements, and he found it necessary to resist efforts to radically reduce the physical capacity of the staging areas as well as the station complements. He succeeded in maintaining what he considered an adequate staging capability by emphasizing that the determining factor was the possible peak load and by pointing out the role that these installations would have in repatriation and demobilization. Nevertheless, the staging capacity was considerably reduced as the war progressed and the prospective need could be more clearly foreseen.[68]

The ability of the staging areas to handle peak movements naturally depended on the intensity with which the facilities were used. For a time the usual allowance of sixty square feet of floor space per enlisted man was cut to forty square feet, but this was found undesirable as a permanent arrangement.[69] Various means were used to avoid holding troops for excessive periods in the staging areas, not only because a slow turnover reduced the number that could be handled over a given period but also because it adversely affected morale and increased the security problem. The port commanders closely co-ordinated the movement of troops to the staging areas with troopship schedules. Home stations were admonished to do a more complete job of processing and training troops so as to lighten the task of the ports. For a time the port commanders were required to report any units which, because of changed priorities or other circumstances beyond their control, remained at the staging areas more than forty-five days so that steps could be taken to have them removed.[70]

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[66] OCT HB Monograph 8, pp. 35–44.

[67] Memo, CofT for Dir of Opns ASF, 11 Sep 43, sub: St Area Reqmts; reply, 23 Sep 43; Memo, ACofT for Mob Div ASF, 10 Oct 43; Chart, St Area Loading Forecast NYPE and BPE, Sep 43–Apr 44; all in OCT 680–900 NY 1943.

[68] Memo, Farr for McIntyre, 4 Nov 43, sub: St Area Work Load Analysis, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 29 Jan 44, sub: Utilization of Posts, Camps, and Stations, AG 323.3 Trans Gen; Memo, ACofT for PEs, 24 Jun 44; Memo, CofT for Dir Mob Div ASF, 28 Jun 44; last two in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Memo, Dir Plans and Opns ASF for CofT, 18 Aug 44, sub: Closing Certain St Areas; 1st Ind, CofT for CG ASF, 23 Aug 44; last two in OCT 323.3 Utilization of Comd Facilities.

Early in the war when theater requirements were uncertain and priorities subject to frequent change, units were sometimes held at the staging areas for many weeks. This situation improved during 1942, and early in 1943 the War Department instructed the port commanders to avoid so far as possible holding units at the staging areas more than two weeks.[71] While that objective could not be attained in all instances, a good measure of success was achieved. Data are not available to show the over-all result, but the figures given in Table 11 for troops staged by the New York Port of Embarkation during 1944 indicate that, during the six months for which the data are available, well over 75 percent of the troops that sailed had spent less than fourteen days at the staging areas, and that in each month of the year the average was well below that figure. The exceptionally low average for the month of May 1944 must be viewed in the light of the extraordinary effort made at that time to get troops to Europe before the invasion of the Continent began.

The rated capacity for staging intransit troops fluctuated greatly. These fluctuations were due to the acquisition or release by the port commanders of staging space at training camps or other stations not normally under the control of the port commanders, the construction of new barracks or the diversion of housing to other uses, and changes in the amount of floor space allotted to an individual. The largest recorded capacity for staging intransit troops was 248,653 in May 1943. At that time several installations that would soon be released because of the completion of new facilities were still listed as staging areas, and the allotment of space per enlisted man had been reduced to forty square feet. During the first seven months of 1944, when the invasion of Normandy was the primary military consideration, the staging capacity averaged 224,000 and the peak number of troops on hand was 187,000. In August 1944 the allotment of space per enlisted man was again placed at sixty square feet, and this together with other adjustments reduced the rated capacity considerably. During the last year of the war the capacity figure fluctuated between 131,000 and 141,000. Dur-

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[69] Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 7 Jan 44, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks; Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 29 Jan 44, par. 2*a*, AG 323.3 Trans Gen; WD Cir 321, 3 Aug 44, Sec. V.

[70] Memo, AGF Comd Gp, Fort Dix, for CG ASF, 20 Feb 43; 3d Ind by CG NYPE, 3 Mar 43; 8th Ind by CofT, 1 Apr 43; all in OCT 322 Ord Cos; TC Cir 50-55, 9 Oct 44, sub: Units in St Areas Over 45 Days.

[71] Memo, TAG for CGs AGF, AAF, SOS, *et al.*, 5 Jan 43, sub: Org, Tng, and Equip of Units for Oversea Sv, AG 320.2 (1-3-43).

TABLE 11—TIME SPENT AT THE STAGING AREAS BY TROOPS EMBARKED AT NEW YORK DURING 1944 [a]

Month	Total Troops Departing From Staging Areas	Troops Departing Within 14 Days of Arrival	Percentage Departing Within 14 Days of Arrival	Average Days Spent at Staging Areas
January	104,759	72,492	69.2	11.7
February	145,711	118,241	81.1	9.8
March	99,157	69,175	69.8	10.5
April	94,224	84,791	90.0	8.2
May	95,579	87,411	91.5	5.9
June	89,478	62,316	69.6	8.8
July	103,624	(b)	(b)	8.7
August	139,391	(b)	(b)	7.1
September	128,888	(b)	(b)	9.2
October	174,225	(b)	(b)	7.2
November	127,913	(b)	(b)	9.0
December	96,644	(b)	(b)	7.7

[a] Includes units and casuals staged at Camp Kilmer, Camp Shanks, Fort Slocum, and Fort Hamilton.

[b] Data not available.

Source: January–June figures are from Rpt, NYPE Progress and Activities, for respective months; July–December figures submitted with Ltr, NYPE to Mil Plng & Int Div OCT, 31 Oct 52, OCT HB NYPE St Areas Gen.

ing December 1944 and January 1945, when the outbound troop movement was especially heavy because of the military situation in Europe, the peak number of troops on hand at some staging areas exceeded the rated capacity, but the excess was readily absorbed. In view of these fluctuations, no month can be considered typical. Table 12 gives a spot picture of the staging situation in January 1945, which witnessed the heaviest outbound movement of any month of the war.[72]

The staging areas were under the command of the port commanders throughout the war, but vigorous action on the part of the Chief of Transportation was necessary to keep them in that status. When the service commands were established in July 1942 as successors to the corps areas, there was a strong sentiment in SOS headquarters for the transfer of staging areas to the service commands, and an organizational manual was drafted on that basis. This sentiment was predicated on the fact that the equipping and training of troops, which were important aspects of the staging process, as well as housekeeping at the staging facilities were normal functions of the service commands, whereas the ports of embarkation were essentially transportation agencies.

General Gross attacked the proposal from many angles and won General Somervell's decision to leave the staging areas as they were.[73] The basic argument against the proposed change was the advantage of continuity in the control of troops from

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[72] ASF MPR, Sec. 3, gives an analysis of staging each month, based on weekly reports from port commanders.

[73] Memo, Opns Off OCT for Gross, 26 Jul 42, and atchd papers, OCT HB PE Gen St Area Facilities; Min of Conf of CGs SOS, 30 Jul 42, App. to record of afternoon session, Question 40, OCT HB Ex Files.

TABLE 12—CAPACITIES OF TROOP STAGING AREAS AND INTRANSIT TROOPS STAGED: 1–28 JANUARY 1945 [a]

Staging Areas	Rated Gross Capacity [b]	Rated Staging Capacity [c]	Intransit Troops Staged		
			Troops Arrived [d]	Troops Departed [e]	Peak Number on Hand [f]
All Areas	194,636	139,405	258,042	273,211	147,598
Boston:					
Camp Myles Standish [g]	23,464	17,917	46,141	57,729	28,523
New York:					
Camp Shanks [g]	34,686	25,501	64,295	63,240	29,745
Camp Kilmer [g]	37,550	28,006	61,957	54,237	30,786
Fort Hamilton [h]	5,729	1,017	1,560	1,338	512
Hampton Roads:					
Camp Patrick Henry [g]	24,137	17,815	10,577	24,426	17,464
New Orleans:					
Jackson Barracks [h]	5,940	2,622	4,589	4,943	2,085
Los Angeles:					
Camp Anza [g]	7,636	6,020	10,966	11,569	8,923
San Francisco:					
Camp Stoneman [g]	30,677	23,424	20,527	24,470	13,934
Fort McDowell [h]	3,661	2,507	7,368	7,986	2,878
Seattle:					
Fort Lawton [h]	12,524	9,476	28,078	21,277	10,738
Portland:					
Vancouver Barracks [h]	5,964	3,345	1,978	1,983	1,999
Prince Rupert:					
Prince Rupert Staging Area [g]	2,668	1,755	6	13	11

[a] Table does not include a number of facilities used for staging earlier in the war.

[b] Rated gross capacity based on allowance of 60 square feet per enlisted man and 120 square feet per commissioned officer in housing in active status at end of month.

[c] Rated staging capacity was gross capacity less space required for station complement, troops in training at the port, and other non-staging purposes.

[d] Total troops arrived includes 225,446 destined overseas and 32,596 returned from overseas.

[e] Total troops departed includes 238,872 embarked for overseas and 34,339 shipped to stations in the zone of interior.

[f] When peak number exceeded rated staging capacity, the excess was accommodated by reducing the space allowance or by using tents.

[g] These were entirely new facilities. The new staging area built at New Orleans (Camp Plauché) was being used entirely for training. The new staging area at Charleston was no longer required because that port was being used almost entirely for receiving patients from overseas.

[h] These were Regular Army installations improved or enlarged to provide staging facilities.

Source: ASF Monthly Progress Report, January 1945, Sec. 3, p. 16.

their arrival at the seaboard until they had been embarked. Throughout this period the closest possible co-ordination was necessary to insure that the troops were fully processed by the scheduled embarkation dates, that last-minute changes in priorities were accomplished without delay to the vessels or waste of ship space, and that organic equipment was processed and shipped at the proper time. As long as the port commander had direct control of all of these operations he was in a position to deal with problems as they arose through command decisions. If he should have to negotiate with the service commanders in such matters, the directness and speed of command decisions would be lost. Mutual understanding between the officers in charge of the staging areas, the ships, and the embarkation operation was necessary, and the Chief of Transportation was convinced that this could be best achieved if they were all under one command.

Although the port commanders' control of the operation of the staging areas was thus established, uncertainty still existed regarding the command of troops while they were being staged. The AGF and the AAF wanted to retain command of troops while they were at the staging areas, particularly because of the training that might have to be carried on there and the disciplinary problems that arose, and G-3 concurred in this view. The Operations Division and SOS headquarters supported the view of the Chief of Transportation that such an arrangement would create confusion and hamper the port commanders in their task of processing the troops. The latter view prevailed and in September 1942 the Chief of Staff issued appropriate instructions. Under these instructions all units upon arrival in the staging areas were to pass to the command of the port commanders and of their representatives, the commanders of the staging areas. The Chief of Transportation was to establish at each staging area separate "small permanent command groups" for the AGF, the AAF, and the SOS to assist in controlling units smaller than divisions with respect to discipline, security, and training. These command groups were to provide liaison between the major command headquarters and the troops being staged; it was clearly stated in the instructions, however, that they were not independent of the port commanders but were included among the command echelons through which the port commanders exercised control.[74]

The issues at stake were not entirely resolved by the establishment of command groups. The AGF continued to express dissatisfaction with the command setup, although the complaints abated as the number of units held at the staging areas for abnormally long periods decreased and the training facilities and methods were improved.[75] The AAF alleged that the command groups were being restrained by the port commanders from communicating with their headquarters and so were not fulfilling their purpose. As late as July 1943 some staging areas had not been provided with command groups. The Director of Military Training, ASF, accordingly instructed the Chief of Transportation to take immediate measures to insure that such groups were established in all staging areas requiring them and that liaison between the groups and the major command headquarters was not obstructed.[76]

The Chief of Transportation endeavored to enforce this policy, although it was not popular with either his Movements Division or his port commanders. They believed, on the one hand, that the staging area complements were able to provide adequately for the training and other needs of troops during their short stay at the ports before embarkation and that the command groups were therefore unnecessary. They found, on the other hand, that there was a tendency among the command groups to communicate with their headquarters regarding matters that were strictly the responsibility of the port commanders, and that these activities resulted in "a great deal of minor aggravation" and some interference with the processing of troops.[77]

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[74] Memo, ACofS OPD for CofS, 4 Sep 42, sub: Comd of Units Ordered Overseas; Memo, CofS for AGF, AAF, and SOS, 12 Sep 42, sub: Control of Units in St Areas; both in WDCSA 370.5 (Secret); Memo, CG SOS for CofT, 21 Sep 42; Memo, CG AGF for Subordinate Comds, 5 Oct 42; Memo, CofT for Port Comdrs, 20 Oct 42; last three in OCT 370.5 Control of Units of St Areas.

[75] Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1948), pp. 573-77.

[76] Memo, Dir Mil Tng ASF for CofT, 21 Jul 43, OCT HB Mvmts Div St Area Policies and Procedures.

The problems obviously stemmed from an overlapping of interests. The major commands had a natural interest in what happened to their units up to the time they left the zone of interior. The port commanders were anxious to avoid any developments that would cause confusion or delay in the final processing of troops for oversea service since this processing was usually done under great pressure and with deadlines established by convoy or ship sailing dates. The basic difficulty was one of establishing a clear understanding with the command groups regarding the matters that they should take up directly with the port commanders and those on which they should maintain liaison with their command headquarters. In September 1945, the War Department made a final effort to clarify the situation by defining in detail the functions of the groups—then redesignated liaison sections—and re-emphasizing that although these sections were under the command of the port commanders the liaison with their respective headquarters should not be impaired.[78]

When troops detrained at a staging area they were immediately taken in charge by the billeting officer. He was prepared with a billeting plan, based on advance information from the unit commander regarding the composition of the unit and a study of the housing available. In most cases enlisted men were accommodated in mobilization type or theater of operations type barracks, but in the early part of the war when staging was done at permanent Army installations, the use of tents sometimes was necessary. The larger staging areas were divided for administrative purposes into regimental areas, each of which accommodated about 3,000 men and was served by a billeting team. So far as possible units were billeted in adjacent barracks, since that arrangement facilitated processing and aided morale and discipline. White and Negro troops were separated. Enlisted men with their personal equipment were conducted from the train to their quarters by members of the billeting team. Under ordinary circumstances processing was started almost immediately.[79]

The processing of troops at staging areas required attention to many details, and it was an especially onerous task because of the frequent failure of home stations to fully prepare the men for oversea service. There were many reasons for such failures during the early part of the war including shortages of equipment, shortages of training personnel, confusion as to command and supply responsibilities, insufficient time between the receipt of alert notices and the movement dates, and failure of commanding officers of units to follow the prescribed procedures.[80] Efforts to improve the situation included issuing POM and related procedural instructions during 1943, and emphasizing the preparation of complete and accurate unit status reports showing the condition of personnel, training, and equipment before units left home stations.[81]

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[77] Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14 Jan 44, p. 62, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf; Memo, Farr for Finlay, 19 Sep 45, sub: Lessons Learned, par. 10, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

[78] WD Cir 193, 16 May 44, Sec. I; WD Cir 270, 8 Sep 45, Sec. V; Memo, CG AGF for AGF Liaison Off SPE, 14 Sep 45, sub: WD Cir on Port Liaison Secs, OCT HB Ex PE—AGF Liaison.

[79] On staging area operations, see lecture by Col Cecil L. Rutledge, comdr of Camp Kilmer, NYPE, at Atlantic Coast TC Off Tng Sch, undated but probably 1943, in OCT HB Fort Slocum Lectures.

The responsibility of the staging area for the medical processing of troops was threefold. First, it was required to weed out those individuals who were unfit for oversea service when unfitness was disclosed by the physical inspection made to detect infectious or contagious diseases, by the report of the individual on sick call, or by reports of commanding officers. Second, it was expected to provide treatment to qualify individuals for oversea shipment with their units, if possible, including medical and surgical attention, the correction of dental defects, and the provision of eyeglasses. In addition, the staging area completed the inoculations required for oversea service.[82]

In September 1943 the Chief of Transportation reported that over a period of sixteen months the average number of individuals withheld from oversea shipments by the port commanders because of physical defects had been one half of one percent.[83] The survey on which this report was based disclosed that 10 percent of the troops required dental treatment on arrival at the staging areas, and that 1 percent had defects that would have caused their detention in the zone of interior unless corrected. While he desired that the staging areas deal with such defects as fully as their personnel and facilities would permit, the Chief of Transportation emphasized that the responsibility for the physical condition of troops rested primarily with the home stations. When he learned that some ports in their zeal to correct defects were giving thorough physical examinations to troops upon their arrival at the staging areas and again shortly before embarkation, he directed them to discontinue the first examination, which was not required by War Department instructions and was not necessary when home stations fulfilled their responsibilities.[84]

The port commanders were responsible for bringing units to full strength before they left the staging areas for oversea service. Movement orders usually stated that all vacancies were to be filled before the units left their home stations, but that frequently was not accomplished.[85] In addition, there were the vacancies caused by the withdrawal of men from units at the staging areas for medical reasons. Not infrequently enlisted men went AWOL during the staging period and hence were lost to their units. In order to fill such vacancies the port commanders maintained replacement pools at the staging areas, to which they assigned soldiers who had not been permitted to sail with their units because they needed medical attention, returned AWOL's, and fillers who had failed to arrive in time to sail with their units. When these replacement pools did not provide the classes of personnel required, the port commanders called on the AGF, the AAF, and the ASF for fillers. In the early part of the war it was necessary to permit some units to sail understrength and to dispatch fillers on subsequent sailings, but as the replacement pools at the ports were built up and the replacement systems of the major commands were improved, this became unnecessary except on rare occasions when certain types of specialists were in short supply.[86]

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[80] Memo, TIG for CofS, 7 Dec 42, WDCSA 370.5 (Secret).

[81] Memo, ACof S OPD for AGF, AAF, and SOS, 4 Feb 43, WDCSA 370.5 (Secret).

[82] Memo, CofT for PEs, 29 Dec 43, sub: Medical Processing, OCT 370.5 POM 1944; TC Cir 120-3, Changes 1, 1 Feb 44.

[83] Memo, CofT for Contl Div ASF, 25 Sep 43, OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[84] Memo, CofT for PEs, 21 Mar 44, sub: Physical Exam and Insp at Ports, OCT 370.5 POM 1944.

[85] See POM, pars. 9 and 30*a*.

It was War Department policy that troops not be sent to the staging areas until they had completed training and had fired the course of marksmanship prescribed for the weapon with which they were armed.[87] These requirements were not always met, however, and the deficiencies had to be made up at the ports. Also, it was considered desirable to continue active training while troops were at the staging areas as a means of preventing deterioration of physical condition and morale. Training personnel and training aids were provided by the port commanders, and when suitable arrangements could not be made for the use of firing ranges at nearby installations such facilities were constructed at the staging areas.[88]

In March 1945, with the demand for troops for the European theater abated, the War Department increased the minimum period of training required before embarkation from thirteen to eighteen weeks. At that time the port commanders were relieved of responsibility for enforcing this requirement except in cases where troops had received their basic training at the ports.[89] Training activities to keep the troops in good physical and mental condition were continued, however, as was instruction in fields that fell peculiarly within the province of the staging areas, such as conduct on transports and abandon-ship procedures. Troops also were instructed in tactics for evasion, escape, and resisting enemy interrogation. The Chief of Transportation objected to the inclusion of the latter type of training in the port commanders' responsibility because he believed that the staging process should be lightened as much as practicable, but his objection was overruled.[90]

Probably the most troublesome part of processing was the completion of the individual equipment of the troops. The staging areas normally supplied certain items, such as gas masks and impregnated clothing, but by far the greater task was providing equipment that the troops should have had when they arrived. Each of the technical services maintained a staff and a considerable stock of supplies at

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[86] Memo, CofT for TAG, 2 Apr 42, sub: Repl Pools at PEs, OCT 320.2 Gen Trans; Memo, CofT for Mil Pers Div ASF, 10 Apr 43, sub: PE Repl Pools, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; WD Memo W 600-72-43, 23 Aug 43, sub: Overseas Repl System; unsigned article, "Classification and Assignment at a Staging Area," *A.G. School Bulletin*, April 1943, p. 24.

[87] Memo, TAG for CGs AGF, AAF, SOS, *et al.*, 5 Jan 43, sub: Org, Tng, and Equip of Units for Oversea Sv, par. 9, OCT 370.5 POM 1942-43; Memo, CG SOS for CGs SvCs and Tech Svs, 4 Mar 43, sub: Basic Tng for SOS Units, SPX 353 (2-26-43); Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14 Jan 44, p. 60, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf.

[88] Memo, CofT for PEs, 26 Jan 43, sub: Training Aids; Memo, CofT for Dir Tng Div SOS, 26 Feb 43, sub: Rifle Range; both in OCT HB PE Gen St Areas Facilities; Memo, ACofS G-3 for CG ASF, 9 Apr 43, OCT 370.5 Contl of Units in St Areas. For the types and extent of training at staging areas of the NYPE, see monthly rpt, Progress and Activities, OCT HB NYPE Gen.

[89] Memo by Overseas Troop Br of Mvmts Div, 9 Mar 45, in Mvmts Div Histories for Feb 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

[90] Memo, G-2 for CofT, 4 May 44; 1st Ind, CofT for CG ASF, 7 Jun 44; 3d Ind, CofT for G-2, 23 Jun 44; all in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Memo, CG ASF for Dir Int ASF and CofT, 12 Jul 44, OCT 370.5 POM 1944.



TRAINING FACILITIES AT CAMP STONEMAN, *staging area of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation. Rifle range (above) and mock village for practice in street fighting (below).*



each staging area; also, facilities were maintained for repairing equipment that arrived in bad condition.

Some of the reasons for the failure of home stations to provide troops with full equipment and to have it in good repair have already been noted. Many items were in short supply, especially during the early part of the war, and the depots could not make shipments promptly upon receipt of requisitions. Often the interval between the alerting of a unit and its departure from the home station was brief. Unit commanders, home station commanders, corps area commanders, and the chiefs of the technical services all had responsibilities in connection with the supply of troops destined for oversea areas, and co-ordination was sometimes faulty. Unit commanders were expected to report shortages to the technical services as soon as possible, and the technical services were expected to report to the port commanders which items would be shipped to the ports and when they would arrive. Frequently this information was not received at the ports, but they nevertheless had to make up all deficiencies before the troops embarked. Sometimes this was accomplished only by drawing heavily on the port reserves that were maintained to meet emergency requests from oversea commanders.[91]

As a result of the efforts of the responsible agencies and the Mobilization Division in ASF headquarters, there was gradual improvement in the equipping of troops at home stations. The Chief of Transportation employed various measures to secure this improvement. Early in the war he directed his port commanders to set up co-ordinating agencies at the staging areas for the specific purpose of maintaining close liaison with the unit commanders and the chiefs of technical services on supply matters.[92] He also urged that the commanders of home stations be held responsible for positive action to insure that unit commanders gave proper attention to the equipment of their troops, since the former had an opportunity to learn from experience whereas the latter prepared for oversea movement only once.[93] A provision to that effect was included in the second edition of POM, which was issued in August 1943.

When the situation did not improve as rapidly as he had hoped, the Chief of Transportation in conjunction with The Inspector General established a procedure for reporting and tabulating the items of clothing and other equipment issued to soldiers at the staging areas in order to determine how far the respective home stations were falling short of their responsibility. A summary, based on data for the period 15 May–31 August 1944 and listing the home stations individually, was published by ASF in October and circulated to all concerned with the advice that although some improvement had been achieved the situation was still far from satisfactory.[94] Similar data for the period 16 September–13 December 1944 again showed improvement, but not enough to indicate a satisfactory supply performance at home stations. During that period 729,060 troops arrived at the staging areas whose authorized supplies and personal equipment included 42,304,956 items, excluding those that were normally supplied at the ports. The summary showed that 2,325,056 (5.5 percent) of these items were missing and that 1,248,068 (2.9 percent) were not in order for combat service. The total deficiency therefore was 8.4 percent.[95]

At one time during the period when

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[91] Memo, Somervell for Lutes, 17 May 42, ASF Hq Opns Div 1942–43; Memo, Wylie for Gross, 9 Oct 42, sub: Supply of Troops Going Overseas; 1st Ind, Lutes for CofT, 4 Dec 42; Memo, CofT for PEs, 11 Dec 42, sub: List of Items Shipped to Ports; Interv with Col Farr, 4 Sep 46, sub: Troop Mvmts, p. 5; last four in OCT HB PE Gen St Area Procedures; Memo, CofT for ACofS for Opns SOS, 14 Dec 42, sub: Task Force Shortages, OCT 400.61 Shortages 1943.

[92] Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 12 Aug 42, sub: Rpts on Status of Equip; Memo, CG ASF for Cs of Tech Svs, 3 Oct 42, sub: Supply of Troops at PE; both in OCT HB PE Gen St Area Procedures.

[93] 5th Ind, CofT for CG SOS, 4 Nov 42; Memo, CofT for DCofS for SvCs ASF, 31 Jul 43; both in OCT HB Mvmts Div St Area Policies.

[94] Memo, Lutes for Dir Plans and Opns ASF, 19 Jul 44, ASF Hq Dir of Plans and Opns; Memo, CG ASF for Home Sta Comdrs and Agencies Issuing Mvmt Orders, 31 Oct 44, sub: Processing Deficiencies of Troops at St Areas, OCT 370.5 POM 1944.

[95] Extract from Memo, TIG for DCofS, 8 Jan 45, sub: Readiness of Units for Mvmt Overseas, OCT 370.5 Processing Deficiencies 1945.

constant pressure was being exerted to have troops provided with full equipment before they started for the staging areas, a strong sentiment developed for eliminating the showdown inspection at home stations and placing the responsibility for this inspection, as well as for making up the shortages that it disclosed, solely on the ports of embarkation. Representatives of the service commands attending a meeting held in November 1943 made a definite recommendation to that effect, pointing out the difficulties that home stations and technical services were experiencing in carrying out the existing regulation and the advantages that would accrue from concentrating the responsibility at the ports. The Chief of Transportation was willing to assume the added burden, but he indicated that it would involve a substantial increase in personnel and warehouse space at the staging areas. The proposal was therefore dropped.[96]

Despite the showdown inspections at home stations, the port commanders held similar inspections as soon as possible after the troops arrived at the staging areas in order to establish definitely what items were missing and what were in bad condition. The soldiers spread out their personal equipment before an inspection team, usually in their barracks, and the members of the team immediately took steps to correct the deficiencies. Late in the war, with supplies more readily procurable by home stations and with larger stocks on hand at oversea bases, a revision of the procedure for noncontrolled items became possible. The change was made late in 1944 and was incorporated in the third edition of POM, issued in February 1945. The port commanders no longer were responsible for conducting showdown inspections, and the technical services ceased shipping noncontrolled supplies to the ports earmarked for particular units. The unit commanders conducted the final showdown inspections at the staging areas and informed the port commanders what items were needed to fill shortages and replace unserviceable equipment. The port commanders provided these items so far as possible by withdrawals from their own stocks or by calling on nearby depots. Requisitions for items not supplied before the sailing date were canceled, and the unit commanders submitted new requisitions for these items after arrival in the theaters.[97] Controlled items—those supplied in accordance with the priorities assigned to the respective troop units—continued to be shipped to home stations or ports according to the circumstances.

In addition to the larger tasks of overcoming deficiencies in personnel, training, and equipment, the staging areas had many other responsibilities in connection with the final preparation of troops for departure overseas. Assistance was given in handling such personal matters as insurance, pay allotments, purchase of savings bonds, taxes, wills, powers of attorney, and various aspects of domestic relations. Service records were checked and brought up to date. Payrolls were prepared and wages were paid in full unless already paid as of the last payday.[98] Considerable attention was given to "special service" activities, which included athletics, theatricals, motion pictures, concerts, libraries, and clubs for the entertainment of the soldier, and lectures and discussions for his orientation to the life that lay ahead. Each of the larger staging areas published a newspaper devoted chiefly to news of the camp. The division of responsibility between the port commanders and the service commanders led to misunderstanding and delay in providing facilities for special service activities at certain ports, but a vigorous directive from General Somervell and a close follow-up by the Chief of Transportation corrected this situation.[99]

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[96] Memo, Dir of Supply ASF for Dir of Plans and Opns ASF, 13 Nov 43, sub: Suggested Revision of POM; Memo, CofT for Brig Gen Frank A. Heileman, Dir of Supply ASF, 30 Jan 44, sub: T/E 21 Showdown Inspection; both in OCT 370.5 POM 1944.

[97] See Memos, CofT for PEs, 22 Nov 44 and 23 Feb 45, sub: Proposed Supply Procedure, OCT 370.5 POM.

[98] Uncertainty as to the necessity of and the port's responsibility for seeing that troops received their pay before sailing was removed by WD Cir 106, 4 Apr 45, Sec. III, and TC Cir 50-57, 10 Apr 45.

Other aspects of the staging operation were given close attention because of their bearing on morale. The staging period was a trying one for many soldiers, particularly those with family responsibilities. Much depended on the condition of the unit when it arrived and the character of its leadership, but in any case the staging area had an important role in keeping the soldiers' spirits up and holding disciplinary problems down.

With this in mind, the Chief of Transportation insisted that the staging installations be kept clean and operated in an orderly and efficient manner. In line with this policy, he directed late in 1943 that the commanding officer at Camp Patrick Henry, staging area of the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, be relieved, although he conceded that that officer had been handicapped by physical conditions at the camp and too close supervision by the port commander. An officer who had proved his qualification at another staging area was assigned to the post.[100]

Constant attention was given to staging-area messes as factors affecting morale. The Chief of Transportation wanted these messes to provide "the best food in the Army," but he found that in some instances they fell far short of that ideal. Early in 1944 he arranged for the assignment of a food service specialist from the Quartermaster Corps to aid him in correcting deficiencies by making regular inspections and recommending improvements. The aim was to have the messes operated entirely by the staging area complements, and port commanders were under instruction to assign transient troops to mess details only in emergencies.[101]

The processing of replacements was similar to the processing of troop units, although it differed in some respects. In 1943 the growth in demand for replacements for the active theaters necessitated a clear definition of the oversea replacement system.[102] Replacement training centers were established by the AGF, the AAF, and the ASF, and these commands also set up replacement depots near the seaboard where replacement troops were received for classification, checking of

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[99] ASF Cir 77, 14 Sep 43, Sec. IV; Memo, Somervell for Gross, 15 Jun 43, with Ind, Gross to NYPE, OCT HB Gross St Areas; Ltr, Farr for Col James K. Herbert, CO LAPE, 20 Feb 45, Oct HB Farr Staybacks; Remarks by Gen Groninger, CG NYPE, in Min of Port Comdrs Conf, Boston, 30 Aug–1 Sep 43, p. 39, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf.

[100] Ltr, Gross to Brig Gen John R. Kilpatrick, CG HRPE, 21 Dec 43, and related documents, in OCT HB Gross St Areas. On the general subject see other documents in this file; also ASF Staff Conf, 25 May 43, p. 2.

[101] Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11–14 Jan 44, pp. 93–94, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf; TC Cir 120-3, 1 Jan 44, Sec. III; Memo, ACofT for CG NOPE, 22 Jan 45, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks.

[102] WD Memo W 600-31-43, 26 Mar 43, sub: Oversea Repl System; WD Memo W 600-72-43, 23 Aug 43, same sub. For a general discussion of the replacement system, see Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *op. cit.*, pp. 169–239.



STAGING AREA RECREATIONAL FACILITIES *for New York Port of Embarkation. An entertainment program is presented at the amphitheater, Camp Kilmer, New Jersey (above); the library at Camp Shanks, New York (below).*



qualifications, and formation into casual detachments or companies for shipment overseas.[103] While the replacement system was being developed, the question arose whether replacement depots could be located at the ports as had been the case during peacetime. The Chief of Transportation opposed any such plan because he foresaw that the movement of replacements would be heavy and that all available facilities at the staging areas would be needed for the regular staging operation.[104] Although the replacement depots were responsible for the full processing of replacement troops, the port commanders nevertheless were required to make up any deficiencies that existed when the troops reached the staging areas.[105]

The casual detachments or companies formed by the commanders of replacement depots were placed under the command and supervision of commissioned and noncommissioned officer replacements who were part of the same shipment. This command arrangement continued while the troops were at the staging areas and until they arrived at their oversea destinations. The staging areas found that casual officers sometimes felt little responsibility for control of the men under them, thus throwing an unusual burden of administration and discipline on the staging area personnel. To rectify this situation, the War Department stipulated that when shipments of replacements numbered more than 200 enlisted men, the commanders of replacement depots would assign officers from their station complements to act as escorts for the shipments and assist with the processing and administration of the troops throughout the journey overseas.[106]

Although they did not always complete the job, the replacement depots relieved the staging areas of much of the processing that would have been necessary if the troops had moved directly from replacement training centers to the ports. In some instances, when requests for replacements received from overseas commanders called for quick dispatch, the port commanders sent processing teams to the replacement depots to aid in the preparation of the troops so that they could be moved to shipside without passing through the staging areas.[107]

The problems of maintaining secrecy in troop movements was intensified while the troops were at the staging areas. The troops knew that they were on their way overseas and speculation was rife regarding sailing dates and destinations. Sometimes details from secret orders were carelessly allowed to get into the hands of persons who were not authorized to receive such information. Many measures were employed to make soldiers realize the importance of not giving out information that might be of value to the enemy, but complete censorship could not be imposed. Because of the effect on morale, it was not considered advisable to hold troops incommunicado between the time of their arrival at the staging area and the date they were alerted for embarkation.[108] Yet their conversation in public places, their local and long-distance telephone calls, their letters to friends and families, and the visits of friends to the staging installations furnished constant opportunity for the leakage of information on the time and direction of prospective movements. Information in the hands of the station complements at the staging areas, which included both military and civilian personnel, also had to be guarded. The many aspects of this problem commanded the constant attention of the intelligence officers at the ports, the Intelligence and Security Division of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, The Inspector General, and G-2 of the General Staff.[109]

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[103] WD Memo W 600-35-43, 12 Apr 43, sub: Opn of ZI Pers Repl Depots; Changes 1, 11 May 43; Changes 2, 7 Sep 43.

[104] Min of Port Comdrs Conf, Boston, 30 Aug–1 Sep 43, pp. 232–33, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf.

[105] Memo, CG ASF for CofT, 9 Aug 43, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; POR, 1 Oct 43; par. 3*b*.

[106] Memo, Cof T for Mil Pers Div ASF, 18 Sep 43, OCT 322 Activation of Units; Memo, TAG for AGF, 27 Sep 43, sub: Org of Casuals Prior to Staging, AG 320.2 (18 Sep 43); Wd Memo W 600-72-43, Changes 2, 12 Nov 43; WD Cir 317, 31 Jul 44, par. 6.

[107] 2d Ind. CofT for CG NYPE, 9 Sep 43, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6–9 Jul 44, Mtg of Port Opn, Troop Mvmt, and Equip Representatives, 8 Jul 44, p. 13, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf.

The emotional state of troops about to move overseas was conducive to irresponsible acts and disorder. Group disturbances were most likely to involve Negro troops since Negroes comprised the largest group subject to racial tensions.[110] Although the Chief of Transportation tried to forestall trouble by insisting that there be no discrimination between races in the assignment of barracks, mess halls, and recreation facilities, the possibility of disorder was always present. Contributing causes were lack of leadership on the part of some unit commanders and the limited number of military police available. Following two disturbances that occurred at staging areas in 1944—one at Fort Lawton, Washington, and the other at Camp Patrick Henry, Virginia—General Gross instituted special measures for preventing and handling such situations.[111] He emphasized that the port commanders and staging area commanders had primary responsibility, and that they could not delegate that responsibility to others. Adequate officer supervision of troops being staged was to be assured at all times. Daily inspections were to be made and any evidences of racial tension promptly reported. The commanding officers of staging areas were to go immediately to the scene of any serious disorder and personally take charge of the effort to quell it. Immediate and thorough investigations were to be made to apprehend the instigators and the participants, and appropriate disciplinary action was to be taken against such persons "without exception." These measures were effective, and no further disturbances of consequence occurred at the staging areas during the war.[112]

The port commanders made regular reports to the Chief of Transportation on staging area operations, and they in turn obtained the reactions of the commanders of units being staged. In the fall of 1944 the Chief of Transportation directed that a report be obtained from each unit commander just before he sailed. For this purpose a single-page form was provided, on which the unit commander was to place a check opposite each of the listed activities to indicate whether he considered the performance excellent, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory.[113] Although it was recognized that this report would give the impressions of an officer who had witnessed only a small part of the staging operation and had little knowledge of the conditions under which that operation was carried out, the Chief of Transportation believed that a comparison of the reports would provide a useful guide in working out further improvements in personnel, facilities, and procedures. The Chief of Transportation sent a chart summarizing the reports pertaining to each staging area to each port commander monthly.[114] Although some unit commanders indicated that they considered certain activities unsatisfactory, the preponderance of checks in the "excellent" and "satisfactory" columns brought a strong commendation from General Somervell for the over-all success of the staging operation.[115]

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[108] Memo, CofT for PEs, 3 Nov 42, sub: Measures for Enforcing Secrecy, OCT HB PE Gen St Area Procedures.

[109] The extent of the problem is indicated in the following: Memo, G-2 WDGS for Int Br OCT, 5 Feb 43, sub: Revealing Mil Info, and incls, OCT 370.5 Secrecy; Memo, CO Camp Myles Standish for CG BPE, 28 Oct 43, sub: Censorship Violations at St Area, OCT 000.900 Camp Myles Standish 1943; Memo, CG ASF for CofT, 6 Mar 44, sub: Censorship Instructions at St Areas, and atchd SOP for Censorship Contl Off at St Areas; Rpt of Base Censorship at PEs, source not shown, for weeks in late 1943 and early 1944; last two in OCT 000.73, 1943–45; Memo, CO Camp Myles Standish for CofT, 14 Oct 44, sub: Violations of Security, OCT 000.72 TC Misc.

[110] On the general question of disturbances involving Negroes, see Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops in World War II, Chs. XIV, XV.

[111] Lack of preparation and alertness at Fort Lawton were indicated in Memo, Asst IG SPE for CG SPE, 28 Aug 44, sub: Prelim Rpt on Negro-Italian Riot, 14 Aug 44, and later rpts; 2d Ind, CofT for CG SPE, 7 Nov 44; all in OCT 291.2 Ft Lawton; for resulting directive see Memo, CofT for Port Comdrs, 16 Nov 44, sub: Handling of Racial Disturbances, OCT HB Ex Staybacks.

[112] The nature of the problems and the measures adopted at Camp Kilmer are illustrated in Rpt, Special Committee to CG ASF, 12 Jan 45, sub: Insp of Facilities for and Problems Relating to Negro Pers, OCT 331.1 Camp Kilmer.

This was the judgment on staging areas late in the war. Earlier there had been frequent and sometimes severe criticism, and the Chief of Transportation had been well aware of the need for improvement not only in the mechanics of staging but also in maintaining morale and discipline.[116] The complexity of the staging operation, the mental state of the troops, and the pressure under which staging usually was done combined to make this phase of the transportation task an especially difficult one. In his efforts toward improvement the Chief of Transportation was aided on the one hand by the emphasis that his superiors placed on the importance of the activity, and on the other hand by the close attention that the port commanders gave the subject.

Embarkation Procedures

Preparation for embarkation began at the staging area twenty-four to seventy-two hours in advance of the troops' departure. This preparation involved co-ordination between the Troop Movement Division of the port, staging area officials, and the commanders of the units or casual groups involved. It included the formulation of a detailed plan covering the movements of the troops from the time they left the staging area until they had been installed in their quarters on the ship. The passenger list, initially prepared at the staging area with names arranged alphabetically, was the key document. From it groups were set up and schedules were established for transporting the troops to the pier and for embarking and billeting them. The usual practice was to chalk on the soldier's helmet the number that appeared opposite his name on the passenger list. This was done as soon as the unit was alerted and the number indicated his place in all movements that took place subsequently. While the bulk of the troops and their TAT (to accompany troops) equipment were being organized for em-

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[113] TC Cir 50-55, 9 Oct 44, sub: Units in St Areas Over 45 Days; OCT Misc Ltr 14, 13 Jan 45, sub: Unit Comdrs Rpt, OCT HB PE Gen St Area Procedures. Completed reports filed under OCT 370.5 grouped by staging areas.

[114] See Memo, CofT for CG SPE, 30 May 45, and incl, OCT 319.1 Ft Lawton.

[115] Ltr, Gross to Kilpatrick, CG HRPE, 5 Sep 45, OCT HB Gross Day File.

[116] See Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 20 Jan 44, sub: Current and Anticipated Problems, problems 16 and 17, OCT 319.1.

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT READY TO BE CARRIED *by soldiers en route to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, May 1942.*

barkation, an advance party was already on the ship preparing for their arrival. This party included a loading detail, a guard detail, a mess detail, and a medical detail.[117]

Although organizational equipment was shipped separately, the soldier was accompanied on his journey overseas by his individual equipment, the greater part of which was placed in two barracks bags. Usually the "A" bag remained in his possession throughout the voyage, while the "B" bag was stowed in the ship's baggage or cargo spaces. In addition to the A bag, the soldier carried his weapon, helmet, gas mask, and pack—all together a heavy load. When barracks bags were inspected at the staging areas an effort was made to eliminate from the A bag any equipment that would not be required during the voyage, but the tendency among enlisted men was to put as much as possible in the A bag, and they often encumbered themselves further with musical instruments and other personal possessions. Many officers complained about the heavy burden the men had to carry whenever they moved and about the congestion that the A bags created in the limited sleeping quarters on the troopships, but no substantial reduction was made in the load. The barracks bag was redesigned during the war with the intention of making it more manageable. There were differences of opinion, however, as to whether the new bag was an improvement over the old one from that standpoint. In some instances, when conditions at the oversea port of debarkation were favorable, both barracks bags were stowed in the ship's hold and the soldier carried something similar to a small laundry bag, but this was not a general practice.[118]

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[117] Considerable information used in this section has been taken from an address, "Troop Movement Embarkation," by Lt. Col. Leo J. Meyer, Troop Movement Officer, NYPE, at the Atlantic Coast TC Officers Training School, Fort Slocum, N.Y., during the spring of 1943, filed in OCT HB Fort Slocum Lectures. Although practices differed somewhat at the different ports, they followed the same general pattern.

The movement from the staging area to the pier was arranged by the port transportation officer. The Traffic Control Division in the Office of the Chief of Transportation did not undertake to route this traffic when it involved only a short haul between two stations under the same port commander. The movement was made by rail, motor, or small boat according to the circumstances, and sometimes by a combination of carriers. At New York, troops leaving Camp Kilmer or Camp Shanks usually were transported by rail to Jersey City, where they were transferred to ferry boats that discharged them at the river end of the pier where the transport was docked. Late in the war the San Francisco Port of Embarkation experimented with docking a Liberty ship at Camp Stoneman and embarking troops there, but this did not become a practice because of navigational difficulties.[119] The location of most staging areas rendered this procedure either impossible or impracticable. Throughout the journey from the staging area to the transport the troops remained in passenger-list order, according to the numbers on their helmets.

The same order was maintained after arrival at the pier. Generally there was a short pause while units that had arrived earlier were being checked at the gangway. During this interval refreshments were served by Red Cross workers. When a unit's turn came, the troops approached the embarkation desk in single file and in passenger-list order. In addition to the personnel team, which was present to check the men against the passenger list and the service records, the unit commander or some other officer was there to identify each individual. When a soldier's name was called, he responded, received his compartment number, and immediately boarded the ship. When no one responded to the name read, that name was scratched from the passenger list and the corresponding service record was withdrawn. Steps then were taken to account for the individual's absence, and the information obtained was entered on the list and the record. Usually absences were due to late withdrawals of men from units on account of physical or mental illness. Although the number of men who went AWOL while at the staging area constituted a considerable problem, there was little opportunity for this to occur after the unit had been alerted for embarkation. Company grade officers usually followed their men into the ship immediately so as to observe their billeting. Field grade officers usually went aboard later.

The entire embarkation program was timed so as to move the troops through one phase to another with as little delay as possible. As experience was gained the ports succeeded in executing embarkations with remarkable precision. This pre-

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[118] Remarks by Col Robert R. Litehiser at Mtg of Port Opn, Troop Mvmt, and Equip Representatives, 8 Jul 44, in Min of Port and Zone Conf, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf.

[119] Ltr, SFPE to author, 9 Feb 51, OCT HB SFPE Camp Stoneman.

ARMY NURSES ENTRAINING AT CAMP KILMER *for the New York Port of Embarkation.*

cision was especially necessary in moving troops along the pier and into the ship, because they all passed over one or two gangways and there was a consequent threat of congestion in the narrow passageways on the vessel. The danger that this last phase of embarkation might become a bottleneck was reduced by careful scheduling and by thorough instruction of the loading and the guard details, which had arrived in advance of the troops. In the case of the British troopships *Queen Mary* and *Queen Elizabeth,* which sometimes embarked as many as 15,000 soldiers on a single voyage, the loading was accomplished in as little as five hours from the time of arrival of the first troops at the pier to the passing of the last man over the gangway. When the U.S. Army began using the Queens for moving troops to England in 1942, the embarkations were slowed by differences in British and American practices, but these differences were soon adjusted through close co-operation between representatives of the British Ministry of War Transport in New York and the New York Port of Embarkation.[120]

As soon as embarking troops crossed the gangway they were taken in charge by members of the loading detail and guided to their quarters.[121] Upon arrival at his compartment the soldier was instructed to

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[120] Interv with Lt Col Leo J. Meyer, 31 Jan 51, OCT HB PE Gen Troop Embarkations.

[121] For instructions to loading officers, see Ship's Regulations, USAT *George Washington,* 25 Jun 43, par. 17, OCT 232-900 *George Washington.*

TROOPS LEAVING CAMP MYLES STANDISH *for the Boston Port of Embarkation.*

arrange his equipment as snugly as possible in the limited space assigned to him and then to get into his bunk and remain there until announcement was made that the embarkation had been completed. Usually the men were glad to avail themselves of the opportunity to rest, and this was particularly true when embarkations were made late at night. Such movements as were necessary were closely controlled by the guard detail. These controls were necessary because, if the troops already on board had been permitted to move about, the billeting of those arriving later in the crowded compartments would have been impeded.

The billeting plan was worked out in advance by the port's embarkation staff and was checked with the actual accommodations after the ship arrived in port.[122] Since this plan was co-ordinated with the transportation plan under which the troops were moved from staging area to shipside, last minute changes in billeting were kept to a minimum. In billeting enlisted men the basic objective was to keep units together, since that arrangement aided the exercise of command and the control of movement. To the same end noncommissioned officers were billeted with the enlisted men, and commissioned officers of company grade were placed in staterooms as near their men as possible.[123] Officers normally were assigned to staterooms by the port commanders in accordance with their military rank. An AAF proposal that length of combat service also be considered in making such assignments was rejected by the Chief of Transportation as "impracticable." [124]

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[122] WD FM 55-105, Water Trans, Ocean-going Vessels, 25 Sep 44, p. 43. The billeting plan for the large British transports was worked out in conjunction with representatives of the BMWT and the master.

The transport commander was authorized to consider complaints regarding billeting and to take corrective action when the objections were valid and changes were possible. Such complaints were inevitable despite the care generally used in preparing the billeting plan, and the plan was not always above criticism.[125] The tactful transport commander usually could appease dissatisfied officers by arranging an exchange of accommodations or explaining why this could not be done. On a heavily booked transport changes in the berthing of enlisted men were virtually impossible.

The number of troops placed on a transport depended on the facilities that the vessel provided, the urgency of oversea requirements, the season, and the length of the voyage. Three capacities were established for each vessel—normal load, overload, and maximum load.[126] The normal load was reckoned from the number of berths normally available. Overloading required that two men use the same bunk alternately, and might involve the installation of additional temporary bunks. Maximum loading was overloading carried to the practicable limit. The assignment of two soldiers to the same bunk—generally referred to as double bunking—did not mean that twice the normal load could be carried, for the maximum load was usually determined by the capacity of the messing facilities or by the extent of the deck spaces and public rooms available for recreation and other activities.[127] In all cases the total number of passengers and crewmen was kept within the capacity of the lifesaving equipment, and the ports complied with other rules pertaining to the safety of passengers established by the Navy and the Coast Guard.[128]

Overloading is necessary when large forces must be moved overseas because the normal shipping capacity does not equal the emergency requirements. It is unavoidable in wartime and when properly controlled does not impose a serious hardship on the soldiers.[129] The Transportation

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[123] Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 18 Jul 42, sub: Rpt of Investigation, *Queen Elizabeth*, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Memo, CofT for PEs, 27 Dec 43, sub: Combat Crews, OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[124] Memo, CofT for CG AAF, 19 Aug 44, sub: Treatment of Crew Pers Returning from ETO, OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[125] To illustrate, see Memo, British Army Staff for WD, 10 Jul 43, and CofT's reply, 20 Jul 43, sub: Asgmt of Off; both in OCT 524-541.1 N.Y.; Memo, Col M. Cordero for TAG, 19 Oct 44, and Memo, CofT for CO LAPE, 10 Apr 45, sub: Shipt 2086; both in OCT 333.7 *General A. F. Anderson*.

[126] Memo, Mvmts Div for Water Div OCT, 17 May 43, sub: Capacity of Troopships, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; TC Cir 80-12, 22 Jan 44, sub: Capacity of Pers Transports, and atchd OCT Form 46, OCT HB PE Gen Transport Capacity.

[127] Ltr, Farr to author, 14 Feb 50, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen. The first double bunking in World War II was on the *Siboney*, the *Thomas H. Barry*, and the *Arthur Murray*, which sailed from the NYPE for the United Kingdom on 31 May 1942; Memo, Opns Off for Water Div OCT, 15 May 42, sub: Increased Troop Capacities; Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 20 May 42; Memo, Col Claude E. Stadtman for CG NYPE, 9 Jun 42, sub: Overloading of *Siboney;* last three in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Rpt, 11 Jun 42, by Lt Col Peter C. Hains, CO of Troops, *Thomas H. Barry*, OCT HB PE Gen Troop Embarkation.

[128] Memo, CofT for PEs, 17 Aug 42, sub: Maximum Allowable Number of Passengers, and atchd Memo, DCofS US Fleet for Dir Convoy and Routing Sec USN, 15 Aug 42, sub: Limitations on Number of Passengers, OCT 541.1 Small Groups.

[129] Memo, TIG for CofS, 9 Sep 42, sub: Overseas Mvmts, WDCSA 370.5 (Secret).

Corps adapted the practice to the various types of vessels, recognizing that some of them were more suitable for overloading than others. It took cognizance of the fact that soldiers could endure conditions on the shorter and cooler North Atlantic voyages that would become intolerable in the tropics or on the long transpacific routes. Cold or stormy weather, which made it impossible to quarter troops on the decks, necessitated limiting the load to the number that could be properly accommodated within the superstructure and below deck, where the capacity of the ventilating system often was a limiting factor.

From a medical standpoint it was preferable to limit troopship loads during the winter months to the normal capacity, but such a policy could not be applied uniformly since it would have seriously retarded the build-up of military strength overseas.[130] When the demand for troops in the European theater eased somewhat during the late winter of 1944–45, the Chief of Transportation authorized the port commanders to avoid overloading so far as possible and to distribute the troops to be moved among the scheduled vessels in such a way as to obtain maximum comfort.[131] During the summer and fall of 1945 overloading was again resorted to as a means of redeploying and repatriating troops as rapidly as possible.

Since troopship capacity usually was less than the military authorities desired, every effort was made to see that ships did not sail with empty passenger spaces, but full loading could not be uniformly accomplished. Late changes in priorities and the failure of some troops to arrive at the ports sufficiently early were among the reasons for allowing ships to sail with empty passenger spaces. The port commanders frequently had troops on hand that could be substituted in such contingencies, but this was not always the case. A ship sailing to several oversea ports with small numbers of troops to be delivered at each might sail with some of its bunks unoccupied. Cargo vessels, with limited passenger capacities, often were destined for ports where no troops were needed. A study of 187 ships that sailed from American ports under Army auspices in May 1944 produced some interesting data. These data must be viewed with some reservations because of the short period covered and the elasticity of the rated capacities—it must be assumed that normal capacities are referred to—but they nevertheless are significant. The troopships with spaces for more than 2,000 men were loaded to 99 percent of capacity. Vessels capable of carrying not over 500 passengers were loaded to only 49 percent of capacity. Taking the group as a whole, the loading was 88 percent of capacity.[132]

Secrecy with regard to troop embarkations obviously was necessary, but there were different opinions as to the measures required to insure it. Some aspects of security pertaining to troops en route to the ports and at the staging areas have already been mentioned.[133] The primary purpose of secrecy was to avoid disclosing sailing dates and unit designations. During the early months of the war instructions were issued to insure that information pertaining to prospective troop movements and ship sailings was restricted to the smallest practical numbers of persons, both in the War Department and at the ports.[134] Some months later the Chief of Transportation announced that it would be standard operating procedure at all ports for embarkation to take place under cover of darkness.[135] But provision was made for exceptions and the exceptions were numerous, since it was recognized that nighttime embarkation had limited security value. Moreover, many ships that were loaded at night sailed in broad daylight.

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[130] Memo, Port Surgeon for CG HRPE, 13 Dec 43, sub: Overloads in Winter; 1st Ind, CG HRPE for CofT, 14 Dec 43; both in OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[131] Msg, CofT for CGs NYPE and BPE, 13 Mar 45, OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[132] ASF MPR, Jul 44, Sec. 3, p. 44.

[133] See above, pp. 123–24.

The Army regulation on security of information effective in 1942 provided for the exclusion of persons not having official business from the piers and forbade the playing of bands at embarkations. In April 1943 the latter prohibition was withdrawn and port commanders were permitted to use bands when they believed security would not be jeopardized.[136] There was sharp difference of opinion in the War Department on the application of security rules to the use of bands and Red Cross personnel. The Chief of Transportation believed that to have a band playing while troops were entraining at the staging areas and while they were embarking at the ports was an excellent means of bolstering morale.[137] He also favored permitting members of the American Red Cross to distribute food to troops while they were on the piers waiting to embark. These views were concurred in by General Somervell, OPD, and G-1, but G-2 took an opposite stand.[138]

The matter came to a head in the summer of 1943, when the British Chiefs of Staff entered a protest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff against bands and Red Cross activities on the piers so far as they affected the larger British vessels, and also against the admission of press representatives to the piers during embarkations.[139] The Inspector General was directed to investigate the matter and his conclusion was that the use of bands and Red Cross activities did not constitute a breach of security.[140] General Marshall then reported to the CCS that the presence of the press at the embarkation that gave rise to the British protest had been a special occasion arranged by the Acting Secretary of War and that newspaper stories had not been published until after the ship had reached its oversea destination. General Marshall further stated that the use of bands and the admission of Red Cross workers to the piers would be continued but that they would be strictly controlled.[141] This was the policy followed for the remainder of the war.

Not all port commanders were agreed on the practical value of dispensing food on the piers, but the majority favored the practice.[142] There was general agreement among them regarding the value of bands, which they believed not only buoyed the

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[134] Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 11 Feb 42, sub: Dissemination of Info; Memos, C of Trans Br G-4 for PEs, 14 and 25 Feb 42; all in G-4/29717-118.

[135] Memo, CofT for PEs, 1 May 42, sub: Security and Secrecy Measures, OCT 000.72.

[136] AR 380-5, 28 Sep 42, par. 65*a* and *b*, and Changes 10, 20 Apr 43.

[137] Memo, CofT for Col Fremont B. Hodson and other officers of OCT, 3 Oct 42, OCT HB Gross Day File.

[138] Memo, ACofS G-1 for CofS, 12 Apr 43, sub: Use of Bands, WDCSA 370.5 (Secret); Memo, G-2 for CG ASF, 16 Jul 43, sub: Activities at PEs, CCS 371.2 (7-8-43).

[139] CCS 273, 8 Jul 43; CCS 273/1, 28 Jul 43.

[140] Memo, TIG for CG ASF, 21 Jul 43, sub: Security Arrangements During Emb, ASF Hq Somervell File 1943.

[141] CCS 105th Mtg, 6 Aug 43, Item 8; Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 11 Aug 43, OCT 370.5 Agencies at Ports; Memo, CofT for PEs, 7 Oct 43, OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[142] Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11–14 Jan 44, pp. 90–91, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf.

NIGHT EMBARKATION. *Troops are checked with the passenger list at the embarkation desk (above), and file over the gangway in numerical order (below).*





RED CROSS WORKERS WAVING TO TROOPS *aboard an Army transport leaving the Boston Port of Embarkation.*

morale of the troops but helped the embarkation officers to keep them in proper order and moving briskly.

Immediately after each troopship departure the port of embarkation made a full report to the War Department. Copies of passenger lists as corrected at the gangway were sent to the Chief of Transportation and The Adjutant General, and copies, of course, were given to the transport commanders. Various summaries were required by the Chief of Transportation showing the passengers according to shipment numbers, types of personnel (units, replacements, fillers, and so forth), and arms and services. The summaries also showed the control status of each ship—that is, whether it was under control of the Army, the Navy, and War Shipping Administration, or a foreign nation.[143]

Because of the submarine menace it was considered desirable to notify relatives as soon as soldiers arrived overseas. This was accomplished in the beginning by having "safe arrival cards" prepared before the ship sailed, and mailing them from the port of embarkation as soon as a message was received that the vessel had arrived at its destination. Early in 1943 the style of card was changed so that reference to safe arrival was omitted and only the Army Post Office (APO) number and the cable address were given. Later in the same year the procedure was again changed and a V-mail form was provided. The V-mail form was filled out at the port of embarkation or on the ship but was not mailed until after the soldier had arrived overseas and his APO number and cable address had been definitely established. This procedure prevented the large amount of misdirected mail that had resulted from the use of tentative APO numbers.[144]

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[143] AR 55-385, 31 Dec 42; TC Cir 50-8, revised, 10 Apr 44, sub: Passenger Lists and Passenger Summaries; TC Cir 50-23, 27 Apr 44, sub: Classification of Outbound Passengers.

In 1942 when many National Guard units were being sent overseas, General Marshall made it a practice to send personal letters of notification to the governors of the respective states as soon as the arrival of the ships at destination had been reported. While he intended that the governors, through means at their disposal, should notify relatives of the members of the units, General Marshall pointed out that the code of wartime practices would not permit the publication of this information in the press.[145]

The great majority of the troops sent overseas were not expected to land against opposition and were therefore embarked according to the regular procedures. When task forces were embarked to assault hostile shores, the embarkation requirements were somewhat different. In that case the entire personnel constituted a combat team and their billeting was governed by that fact. Also, so far as possible the organizational equipment and supplies were loaded in the same ship with the troops and were stowed in such a way that they could be put ashore quickly and in the order in which they would be needed. The vessels in such operations were said to be combat loaded; they were small or medium types and were specially equipped for the purpose. The billeting of troops and the stowing of the impedimenta were determined by the force commander, although he usually made his plans in consultation with the port commander.[146]

Although most amphibious assaults were mounted in the theaters, a few were mounted at home ports. The first large assault force loaded at a U.S. port during the war was the Western Task Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., which participated in the invasion of North Africa. The major elements were loaded at the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation in October 1942. The time for planning had been short and ideas regarding matériel requirements varied greatly. There was considerable confusion at the port because of the lack of established procedures and the difficulty of achieving complete co-ordination between the task force commander, the port commander, and the naval officer who commanded the expedition afloat. Through attention to lessons learned from this experience, the embarkation of Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton's force for the invasion of Sicily, accomplished at Hampton Roads in June 1943, proceeded much more smoothly.[147] The same may be said for the forces sent against Attu and Kiska, which were loaded on the west coast in April and July 1943.

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[144] WD Cir 191, 15 Jun 42, Sec. VII; WD Cir 36, 2 Feb 43, Sec. IV; WD Cir 197, 2 Sep 43, Sec. III; Memo, Dir Army Postal Sv for AGO, 1 Jun 43, AG 311.1 (1-6-43) WD Cir 36.

[145] See file WDCSA 370.5 (Secret) for correspondence with governors.

[146] AR 55-390, 16 Dec 42, par. 10*c*.

[147] Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943,* UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), Ch. XVI; OCT HB Monograph 13, pp. 50-59. See also articles by Brig Gen John R. Kilpatrick, CG HRPE, "Task Force A" and "Task Force B," *Army Transportation Journal,* II, 6-8 (September 1946) and 26-28 (October 1946).

The key to smooth embarkation was thorough planning and procedures that were fully developed and completely understood by all concerned; improvization had to be reduced to a minimum. Such procedures were fairly well worked out during the first year of the war so far as regular embarkations were concerned by close co-ordination of the activities of the staging areas and the several operating divisions of the ports of embarkation, all functioning under the supervision of the port commanders. There were not enough embarkations of assault forces at U.S. ports to enable procedures to be developed to anything approaching the same degree of refinement, and the problem was complicated by the fact that the interests of the task force commanders and the naval commanders, as well as those of the port commanders, had to be taken into account.

Troopship Administration

The administration of a troop transport was complicated by problems that did not exist in other military commands. One reason for this was the crowded and abnormal conditions under which the troops lived while on board. Another was the variety of passengers carried—uniformed men and women of all of the American armed forces, and usually military personnel of our Allies and some civilians. Yet another reason lay in the fact that three independent authorities were exercised side by side—that of the master, who had full responsibility for the ship; that of the transport commander, who was solely responsible for the passengers; and that of the commander of the naval armed guard or gun crew. Administration was further complicated by the fact that the transports were operated under the control and according to the standards of the U.S. Navy, the War Shipping Administration, and the British Ministry of War Transport, in addition to the Army.

The transport commander was in command of all personnel on board except the ship's crew and the naval armed guard. He was the chief of the permanent military complement on the vessel, and in matters affecting the administration of the ship his authority was superior to that of the officers who were traveling as passengers, even though they might outrank him. His relationship with the unit commanders was that of a station commander to the commanders of units bivouacked at his station. During peacetime the chief of the permanent military complement, then known as the commanding officer of troops, had been required to yield his command whenever a line officer of superior rank was on board and to serve as a member of that officer's staff. The arrangement was found to be impracticable after troop movements by water became large, and in 1942 the position of transport commander was created.[148] Most unit commanders had no experience in dealing with the wartime problems of troopship administration, and some of them, upon assuming command of the personnel on board, tried to revise the established procedures according to their own ideas. The confusion that ensued emphasized the need for transport commanders who would serve continuously in that office with unbroken authority.[149]

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[148] AR 30-1130, 23 Jul 32, par. 1; WD Cir 109, 6 Jun 41, Sec. IV; AR 55-320, 7 Dec 42, Sec. I, and Changes 1, 26 Jan 43; AR 55-315, 11 Nov 44.

The transport commander was assigned by, and exercised his authority as a representative of, an Army port commander. In the beginning port commanders were required to select line officers as transport commanders, but because of the difficulty of obtaining qualified men the limitation was lifted and officers of the supply services assigned to duty with the Transportation Corps could be selected.[150] The ports of embarkation maintained offices through which the transport commanders received their instructions and filed their voyage reports and recommendations. The importance of the post and the need for uniform instruction and over-all supervision caused the Movements Division to recommend in January 1944 that it be granted personnel for the establishment of a new branch to deal especially with transport commanders and transport complements. Such a unit was not activated, however, until May 1945, and uniform instructions for transport commanders were not published by the Office of the Chief of Transportation until after the war had ended.[151]

The duties of the transport commander were varied and exacting. Before each voyage he made a thorough inspection of his ship and prepared a plan for utilizing the facilities in a way that would best serve the troops and other passengers who were scheduled to embark. It was necessary to have instructions applicable to the passengers ready for distribution and guard details ready to enforce them when embarkation began, otherwise confusion would ensue. The location of billeting areas, mess halls, recreation areas, latrines, and passageways were charted. Emergency abandon-ship stations were assigned to the troops in each billeting area, and regulations covering fire and boat drills and blackouts were posted. A plan was prepared for feeding the troops, which in the larger ships involved continuous operation of the galleys and mess halls. The location of guard posts to control traffic, protect stores, and insure discipline were determined. Orders were issued relating to dress, general conduct, and sanitation. Plans were laid for the recreation, instruction, and training of the troops. Off limits and smoking areas were defined. Provisions were made for the administration and security of the sales commissary. The requirements for work details to be provided by unit commanders were determined, including details for the operation of the messes, the handling of stores, and the performance of guard and general police duty. Throughout the voyage the transport commander had to be constantly alert to insure that all general and special orders he had issued were enforced.[152]

The military complement, which functioned under the supervision of the transport commander, varied in size according to the troop capacity of the vessel, and eventually the number of members and their ranks were specified by the Chief of Transportation.[153] This complement comprised personnel assigned to the office of the transport commander, the office of the transport surgeon, the office of the chaplain, and the signal section. The total authorized personnel of these offices ranged from four on vessels capable of carrying 50 to 100 troops to thirty-two on transports carrying 6,000 or more. In addition, the transport commander supervised the ship transportation officer (initially called cargo security officer), whose function was to prevent the mishandling or pilferage of Army cargo, and the ship transportation agent (civilian), who administered supplies and funds on vessels operated by the Army.[154] All members of troopship complements were selected and assigned by the Army port commanders under whose jurisdictions the respective vessels were placed by the Chief of Transportation.[155]

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[149] Interv with Col Herbert S. Duncombe, 26 Feb 51, OCT HB PE Gen Transport Complement. Colonel Duncombe served as both commanding officer of troops and transport commander, sailing out of New York.

[150] AR 600-20, 1 Jun 42, par. 3*a*; Memo, CG NYPE for CofT, 2 Dec 42; Memo, CG SOS for ACofS G-1, 22 Mar 43; last two in AG 210.72 (4-1-42) AR 600-20; AR 600-20, Changes 2, 26 Jan 43, and Changes 3, 9 Apr 43.

[151] Memo, Farr for Wylie, 31 Jan 44, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Memo by Lt Col Richard C. Marshall, 20 Jun 45, incorporated in Mvmt Div Hist, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen; TC Pamphlet 44, Transport Comdrs Guide, Mar 46.

[152] AR 55-430, 19 Sep 42, sub: Conduct of Passengers; AR 55-435, 1 Sep 42, sub: Routine of Passengers; TC Pamphlet 44, cited n. 151; NYPE, Instructions for Transport Comdrs, 1 May 43, OCT HB NYPE Transport Comdrs; Maj F. H. Mayne, Duties of a Transport Commander, address at Atlantic Coast TC Offs Tng School, OCT HB Fort Slocum Lectures; SFPE Transport Comdrs Manual, May 45, OCT HB PE Gen Transport Complements.

In order to forestall jurisdictional disputes, the duties and relationships of the masters of Army-operated transports, the transport commanders, and the commanders of units traveling on such vessels were clearly defined in Army regulations.[156] These regulations sufficed also for vessels operated by agents of the War Shipping Administration and allocated to the Army. A more complex problem of jurisdiction developed when large numbers of Army personnel began traveling on transports operated by the Navy and on WSA transports allocated to the Navy. On such vessels the naval commanding officers insisted on paramount authority with respect to all passengers. There were frequent misunderstandings until a set of rules was worked out by the Chief of Transportation and the Naval Transportation Service that removed the principal causes of discord.[157] After these rules were issued in the spring of 1944, no Army transport commanders were placed on troopships that were under Navy control, and the military complements that supervised the Army personnel traveling on such vessels were subordinate to the ranking naval officers on board. A corresponding relationship was established with respect to naval personnel traveling on vessels under the control of the Army.

Under arrangements with the British Army Staff and the British Ministry of War Transport, American military complements, headed by transport commanders, were placed on the larger British vessels that carried U.S. troops regularly.[158] The British Army also placed military complements on these vessels, and the British officers in charge had authority over the American staffs. Although their methods were different, harmonious relationships prevailed between the two groups, and during the period when U.S. troops were utilizing most of the space on these vessels, the British complements were greatly reduced and the American transport commanders were permitted to follow their own procedures. When considerable numbers of Canadian troops were being carried, the Canadian Army also placed transport commanders on board.

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[153] TC Pamphlet 24, Ships' Complements and Cargo Security Officers, 29 May 45, Sec. I and Tables A and B.

[154] AR 55-320, 11 Nov 44; WD Cir 141, 12 May 45, Sec. II.

[155] Memo. CofT for PEs, 7 Mar 44, Ports of Assignment of WSA Vessels, OCT 320.2, 1944 Gen.

[156] AR 30-1130, 23 Jul 32; WD Cir 109, 6 Jun 41, Sec. IV; AR 55-320, 7 Dec 42.

[157] Memo, HRPE for CofT, 23 Feb 44, and 1st Ind by CofT, 10 Mar 44, OCT 560.11 Hampton Roads; Wardlow, *op. cit.*, p. 208; WD Cir 167, 29 Apr 44; WD Memo 55-44, 22 May 45, sub: Principles Governing Jurisdiction and Operating Procedure Aboard Army, Navy, and Allocated Troop Transports.

[158] Memo, Wylie for Styer, 22 Sep 42, ASF Hq CofS Trans; Memo, CofT for CofT ETO, 22 Apr 44; 1st Ind, CofT for CofT ETO, 22 Jun 44; last two in OCT 320.2 ETO.

The principal problems encountered in moving American troops on British vessels stemmed from differences in facilities, services, and food. The capacities of the British vessels had been greatly increased when they entered U.S. troop service, and in some respects the facilities had not been increased and improved correspondingly, because of the scarcity of equipment and the quick dispatch that the vessels were given in British ports. When these deficiencies came to light in the prevoyage inspection to which all troopships, American and foreign, were subjected by the U.S. Army port commanders, immediate steps were taken to correct them. British troops traveling on U.S. vessels also complained about the facilities and the food. It was not practicable to undertake to eliminate all difference in standards, but an agreement was reached regarding the minimum standards to be provided on British and American troopships, respectively.[159]

The crowded condition of the ships, even when only the normal load was being carried, invariably involved inconvenience and discomfort for the passengers, particularly the enlisted men. In severe winter weather and in the tropics additional hardships were encountered. The efforts to offset these conditions by entertainment and exercise were handicapped by limited space. All that the transport commander could do was to make the best possible use of the facilities that were available. To this end he made a daily inspection of the vessel, accompanied by other members of his complement and by one of the ship's officers, to determine that the ventilating and sanitary systems were working, that the galleys and mess halls were being operated properly, that the medical department was fulfilling its responsibilities, and that cleanliness and order were being maintained throughout. During these inspections the transport commander noted repairs and replacements that should be made on the next call at the home port and also the improvements or additions to the facilities that were needed. His recommendations on these points were submitted to the home port commander with his voyage report.[160]

As an aid to morale the Chief of Transportation endeavored to bring the messes on troop transports to as high a standard as could be attained with the limited space available for galleys and mess halls and the large number of passengers to be fed. Notwithstanding this effort, the food service sometimes was unsatisfactory, particularly on ships that were just entering service and those making long voyages through the tropics. During a considerable part of the war troops bound overseas were given two full meals each day, which was considered adequate in view of the relatively inactive life that the men were compelled to lead while at sea. Even then the troop messes on some ships had to be in continuous operation throughout the day in order to take care of the numerous shifts into which the men were divided. Late in the war this policy was modified so that two and one-half meals were served—that is, full meals in

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[159] Concerning this agreement, see Wardlow, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

[160] See NYPE, General Instructions for Transport Comdrs, 1 May 43.



CROWDED ACCOMMODATIONS ABOARD A TROOP TRANSPORT

the morning and in the evening, and a light meal at noon.[161]

During 1943 there was some improvement in troopship messes resulting from an ASF program to better the food service throughout the Army.[162] The special mess adviser assigned by the Chief of Transportation to this task early in 1944 got good results, but he was limited to vessels operated by the Army and by WSA agents and had no jurisdiction over the messes on troopships operated by the U.S. Navy or the British. The Navy provided messes comparable in general to those on Army transports. As a rule, the American soldier did not like the food on British troopships, and when large numbers of U.S. troops were traveling on British vessels, as was the case between New York and the United Kingdom, the Transportation Corps supplied the U.S. Army ration for those troops and also provided American personnel to supplement the British galley crews.

Because of the large number of troops to be fed, it was necessary to serve them, dispose of the remaining food, and clean the utensils as rapidly as possible. The service was cafeteria style and the Army's first plan was to have the soldier use his field mess kit, eat while standing, and clean his own equipment. This plan was adopted early in the war because of the difficulty in obtaining satisfactory compartmented trays and the machinery for cleaning and sterilizing them. The Navy on the other hand favored the use of trays and sit-down service. In 1944, in view of the large number of new troopships being used jointly in the Pacific and the development of a suitable tray, the Army modified its policy.[163] But troopships under Army control were forbidden to utilize trays until proper facilities for cleaning, sterilizing, and drying them had been installed.[164]

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[161] Memo, CofT for PEs, 13 May 44, sub: Orientation Course in Transport Messing, OCT HB PE Gen Transport Complements and Services; TC Cir 80-17, 25 Jan 45, sub: Troop Messing Aboard Vessels.

[162] Wardlow, *op. cit.,* pp. 243-45.

The sales commissary was another aid to morale since it gave the soldier an opportunity to purchase cigarettes, candy, soft drinks, and other items that contributed to his comfort and pleasure. During peacetime a post exchange had been operated on each Army transport and had carried a wide variety of commodities to be sold to military personnel and their families. Under wartime conditions so varied a stock was not necessary and the rapid increase in the number of transports made the administration of post exchanges burdensome. In the summer of 1942, therefore, the post exchange was replaced by the sales commissary, operated on a more limited basis. The officer in charge was a member of the permanent military complement and functioned under the general direction of the transport commander. In the beginning sales commissaries were maintained only on Army transports and on WSA vessels allocated to the Army, but later they were established also on British vessels that were regularly engaged in the movement of U.S. troops.[165] The principal difficulty was that only limited space could be allotted to this activity, and the stocks frequently did not prove adequate. As a result, some transport commanders had to contend with the "black market" problem.

Maintaining morale was the principal aim of the so-called transport services activities. When the soldier was occupied with sports, theatricals, movies, and other forms of entertainment he had less opportunity to think about the discomforts of the voyage and the hazardous adventure that lay ahead of him. Books, magazines, phonograph records, and Army News Service broadcasts served the same purpose. While some soldiers carried their own musical instruments, the ports solicited donations of instruments, which they repaired and placed on the transports to encourage informal as well as organized musicales. The transport services activities also included informational and educational programs to prepare the soldier for experiences in the country for which he was destined and assistance with the personal problems of the individual and his family. Initially these activities were in charge of the ship's chaplain when there was one on board; if no transport chaplain was on board, the transport commander took the responsibility himself or assigned it to the ship's transportation officer. Since all of these officers had other responsibilities that prevented them from giving sufficient time to educational and recreational activities, a specially selected transport services officer

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[163] For a review of these developments, see OCT HB Monograph 12, pp. 56-59.

[164] TC Cir 133, 19 Oct 43; TC Cir 80-16, 4 Apr 44, and Changes 13, 20 Jul 44; Memo, C of Water Div OCT for C of Ship Conversion Unit, 5 Jul 44, OCT HB Water Div Ship Repair and Conv.

[165] WD Cir 281, 22 Aug 42; Memo, CofT for NYPE, 21 Dec 42, OCT 400.34 N. Y.; WD Memo W 55-17-43, 5 May 43, sub: Opn of Sales Commissaries; 1st Ind, CofT for TQMG, 28 Jan 44, sub: Canteen Supplies for British Army Transports, OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

IMPROMPTU ENTERTAINMENT ABOARD SHIP

was added to the permanent military complement late in the war. The organization of each port of embarkation included an officer to supervise these activities and provide the equipment that they required.[166]

The transport chaplain's principal duty was to look after the spiritual and moral welfare of the troops. Sometimes the chaplain was qualified to assume the additional responsibility for recreation and entertainment that he had until late in the war, but often he lacked the temperament as well as the time needed to do it justice. This was true even though the chaplain was authorized to enlist the assistance of the special services officers of units being transported. The appointment of a transport services officer to take over this responsibility was therefore welcomed.

Chaplains served regularly on the troopships operated by the Army and by WSA agents for the Army. When the Navy began operating some of the new troopships that had been built for the Army, it was thought for a time that the Navy chaplain on such vessels would suffice. Experience showed, however, that the Navy chaplain's time was devoted almost entirely to the crew and consequently an Army transport chaplain was provided. The transport chaplains received guidance from the chaplains of the ports to which their vessels were attached.[167]

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[166] TC Cir 167, corrected 17 Dec 43; TC Cir 35-11, 11 Jul 44; WD Cir 360, 5 Sep 44, par. 7; TC Cir 35-2, 22 Feb 45; TC Cir 35-14, 28 Mar 45; TC Cir 35-11, 28 May 45; TC Pamphlet 43, Transport Services Programs, 27 Jun 45; NYPE Pamphlet 1, 1 May 45, sub: Transport Services Manual; all in OCT HB PE Gen Transport Complements and Services.

On the transports, as at the staging areas, it was desirable to conduct some form of training to keep the soldier physically fit, but the possibilities for training were even more limited. Since space reserved for training reduced troop capacity, the Chief of Transportation directed his port commanders not to reserve such space on voyages to North Africa, Europe, Hawaii, and Alaska, which were only slightly in excess of one week. On longer voyages a space allowance was made. In any case the prescribed training required only a minimum of equipment. The aim was to devote from thirty minutes to an hour each day to training that consisted chiefly of physical exercise. What actually was accomplished depended on the weather and other circumstances of the voyage, and to a considerable extent on the ingenuity of the transport commander.[168] Some technical training was also given on board, chiefly for radio technicians, but that, too, was affected by the limitation on equipment as well as by the rules relating to radio silence at sea.[169]

The transport surgeon was a member of the permanent military complement; he was directly responsible to the transport commander but was under the technical supervision of the port surgeon. In addition to having charge of the ship's hospital, he gave attention to all matters affecting the health of troops, including the maintenance of proper sanitation, cleanliness, and ventilation, and investigated the cause of any sickness that might develop during the voyage. It was readily recognized that overcrowding was a contributing cause to many illnesses, but the Chief of Transportation was under such pressure to meet the requirements of the theater commanders for troops that overloading was inevitable.[170] He nevertheless desired that troop movement officers always consult the port surgeons when heavy overloading was contemplated, and that their recommendations be followed when possible.[171]

Since troops received needed dental attention at home stations and at the staging areas, no space on the transports was assigned to dental equipment and dental personnel. Emergency needs were taken care of by the dental personnel of units that were on board. There was a slight modification of this policy after V-E Day. Port commanders were then permitted to install dental equipment on transports provided it could be done without reducing the troop space and with the understanding that no permanent dental personnel would be assigned.[172]

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[167] AR 55-355, 22 Aug 42; Memo, CofT for PEs, 13 Jun 44, sub: Asgmt of Army Chaplains, and atchd documents, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.

[168] Memo, CofT for PEs, 27 Dec 43, sub: Troop Tng Aboard Transports, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Memo, ACofS G-3 for CG ASF, 28 Jan 44, sub: Physical Tng, OCT 353.5 Physical Tng; Digest of Rpt, Maj George Ream, OCT, to ACofS G-3, 16 Mar 44, OCT HB PE Gen Transport Complements.

[169] ASF Cir 108, 28 Oct 43.

[170] Medical service on troop transports will be treated more fully in the discussion of evacuation of patients from the theaters. See below, Ch. III.

[171] AR 55-350, 14 Sep 42; Memo, NYPE for CofT, 2 Oct 43, sub: Outbreak of Diarrhea Aboard Transport, OCT 680-900 New York; Min of Conf of Port Surgeons and Troop Mvmt Offs, Ft Hamilton, N.Y., 12-14 Oct 43, p. 40, OCT HB NYPE Port Surgeon.

[172] Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 28 Jul 45, sub: Installation of Dental Equip Aboard Troopships, OCT 564 Troopships.

Replacements and other casual troops when traveling in large numbers frequently created problems for the transport commanders because they were not as well organized and controlled as the members of units. The designation of convoy or escort officers by the commanders of the replacement depots from which such troops were shipped relieved the situation considerably after that procedure was inaugurated late in 1943, but the problems persisted. Some escort officers, being only temporarily in command of the troops, did not take their responsibilities seriously. On the other hand, some transport commanders assigned these officers staff duties that prevented them from giving proper supervision to the troops in their charge. When the latter situation came to the attention of the Chief of Transportation, he requested the port commanders to instruct all transport commanders regarding the duties of escort officers toward their troops and to warn them against unnecessary interference with the performance of those duties. He nevertheless maintained that casual escort officers must be ready to assist the transport commanders, as was the case with unit commanders.[173]

The transportation of nonmilitary passengers on troopships under Army control was carefully regulated. All applications passed through the Office of the Chief of Transportation, which obtained clearance from OPD before notifying the ports of embarkation that the passengers could be accepted. Nonmilitary passengers included diplomatic personnel and others traveling under the auspices of the State Department, representatives of other civilian agencies of the federal government, officers and employees of territorial governments, employees of contractors doing work for the armed forces in oversea areas, and representatives of such organizations as the American Red Cross and the Young Men's Christian Association.[174] This kind of travel was kept at a minimum not only because the space was needed for troops but also because the facilities and services on the transports were not up to the standards that civilian passengers expected.

The regulations provided that women, other than Army nurses and Red Cross workers, would not be carried on troopships except on specific authorization of the Chief of Transportation. He took the position that the few women who were sent abroad by civilian agencies should be transported by air, since they had to be assigned to separate compartments on troopships, and this usually involved a waste of space. The policy could not be carried out uniformly, however, for OPD sometimes found it necessary to assign troopship priorities for civilian women, and these priorities were binding on the Chief of Transportation.[175]

During the voyages transport commanders issued debarkation schedules and appropriate instructions in order that they might be studied and plans might be made to accomplish debarkations smoothly and quickly. These instructions were drawn up in accordance with the established practices of the ports, and revisions sometimes were necessitated by special orders issued by the port commanders. When calling at unfamiliar ports, the transport commander based his instructions on such information regarding port procedures as he could obtain in advance, and he sometimes prepared alternate instructions in order to be ready for several contingencies. Upon completion of debarkation the transport commander sent a message to the port from which he had sailed, announcing his arrival overseas, indicating any discrepancies that had been discovered between the passenger list and the troops actually on board, and giving the names of any passengers that had been injured or had become seriously ill during the voyage.[176]

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[173] Memo, CofT for PEs, 12 Jan 44, and atchd correspondence; Memo, CG HRPE for Comdr of *General W. A. Mann*, 7 Jun 44; Memo, CG HRPE for CofT, 18 Jun 44; all in OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[174] AR 55-390, 16 Dec 42, Secs. II and IV.

[175] Ltr, SW to Secy State, prepared 15 Mar 43; 2d Ind, CofT for ACofS OPD, 26 Nov 43; both in OCT HB Farr Staybacks; TC Cir 80-13, 1 Jan 44, sub: Mvmt of Pers.

The key to successful troopship administration was the competence of the transport commander. New appointees found themselves confronted with a maze of unfamiliar problems. After an officer had served as transport commander for a number of voyages he could count on experience to guide him in many matters, but no two voyages were alike. At all times the responsibility was a heavy one. It required administrative skill in controlling the activities and conduct of a large number of troops under difficult circumstances, ingenuity in making the best possible use of limited means, and diplomacy in dealing with ship's officers and unit commanders. The latter were usually conservative in their criticisms, but in some cases their reports indicated that they had found little to their satisfaction on the ships.[177]

A frequent handicap to transport commanders was their low rank. Under the table of organization for military complements established by the Chief of Transportation, the transport commander on a ship carrying 4,000 or more passengers might be a colonel. On a ship carrying between 500 and 4,000 passengers he might be a major, and on smaller ships a captain.[178] Often, however, officers of such ranks were not available and officers of lower rank had to be assigned. Regardless of rank, some men had the necessary qualifications and others did not. Careful selection, constant instruction and supervision, and prompt relief of those who did not measure up to the requirements enabled the port commanders to build up a generally competent group of transport commanders.

The Liberty Ship as a Troop Carrier

Special and unusually difficult problems were encountered in connection with the use of about 225 Liberty ships that had been temporarily converted to carry troops. The Liberties, although slow and designed solely as freighters, were used for troop transportation because without them the execution of strategic plans would have been delayed.[179] The original conversions were hastily made by the War Shipping Administration in order that the vessels might join convoys to North Africa without loss of time. The Chief of Transportation recognized that the Liberty ships were far from ideal as troop carriers, but he probably did not realize when they first went into troop service in September 1943 how serious would be the complaints from those who traveled on them. The galley and mess facilities were very unsatisfactory. The sanitary installations were inadequate. The food storage and fresh water capacities were small. Insufficient space was allotted to the medical department and the sales commissary. Ventilation and heating were poor. The deck spaces available for recreation were exceedingly limited.[180]

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[176] AR 55-445, 19 Sep 42; NYPE, General Instructions for Transport Comdrs, 1 May 43, Sec. IV, OCT HB NYPE Transport Comdrs; TC Pamphlet 44, Mar 46, pp. 14, 15.

[177] For example, Rpt on Shipment 2086, to TAG, 19 Oct 44, OCT 333.7 *General A. E. Anderson*.

[178] TC Cir 25-8, revised 13 May 44.

[179] See above, pp. 90–91; Memo, Gross for Styer, 19 Nov 43, OCT HB Wylie Liberty Ship Conversions; Memo, CofT for ACofS OPD, 31 Dec 43, sub: Emergency Use of POW Converted Liberty Ships, OPD 560 (24 Jan 44).

Other conditions contributed to the difficulties encountered on the Liberties during the early period of their employment as troop carriers. The responsibilities assumed by transport commanders on larger ships were assigned to cargo security officers, who in most instances were lieutenants without experience to qualify them for the task. The unsatisfactory quarters, poor and sometimes insufficient food, and lack of space for exercise often created a recalcitrant spirit among the troops resulting in poor discipline, pilferage of galley and commissary stores, and indisposition to maintain order and cleanliness. Some of the ships' masters resented the conversion of their vessels and the added responsibilities the transportation of passengers entailed. The troops embarked on these vessels usually were small units or casuals and most of their officers were young and inexperienced. The Chief of Transportation observed that because of the unusual conditions the more seasoned transport commanders were needed for the Liberty ships, but they obviously could not be taken from the regular troopships.

Reports from early voyages of converted Liberties in slow convoys to the Mediterranean made it clear that immediate steps would have to be taken to improve their facilities and operation. Measures for bettering the facilities were agreed upon between the Chief of Transportation and the War Shipping Administration, and the Maritime Commission was requested to accomplish the work as promptly as possible.[181] In November 1943 an understanding was reached between the Chief of Transportation and the WSA regarding the division of responsibility for the comfort and safety of the troops. The WSA, whose agents operated the vessels, agreed to provide adequate steward personnel and food, and to instruct the masters regarding their duties in connection with the care of passengers and co-operation with the transport commanders. The Chief of Transportation agreed to establish limits for the number of troops to be embarked, to arrange for the inspection of the vessels before each voyage, to assign transport commanders with adequate military staffs, and to provide sufficient medical and commissary supplies.[182]

These measures brought considerable improvement, but the temporarily converted Liberties still lacked many desirable features, and their slowness was an added disadvantage. The first plan was to carry only 350 troops, but the demand for space was so great that the limit was raised to 500.[183] By May 1944 the addition of more desirable types of vessels to the troopship fleet made it possible to discontinue use of the temporarily converted Liberties. Thereafter, only those that had been provided with permanent facilities for troops were used.[184]

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[180] See numerous documents in OCT HB Water Div Converted Liberty Ships, and OCT HB Wylie Liberty Ship Conversions; see also record of discussion in Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14 Jan 44, pp. 95-102.

[181] Ltr, C of Water Div OCT for Dir Opns and Traf, U.S. Mar Com, 18 Oct 43, OCT 564 EC-2 Vessels.

[182] Agreement Between the War Shipping Administration and the Chief of Transportation Regarding EC-2 Hastily Converted Prisoner of War Ships for the Transportation of U.S. Troops Outbound, 20 Nov 43, OCT HB Wylie WSA; Memo, CG ASF for DCofS WDGS, 10 Feb 44, sub: Final Rpt—Converted Liberty Ships, OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[183] Msg, Mvmts Div to NYPE and BPE, 4 Feb 44, OCT HB Mvmts Div Farr Staybacks; Memo, WSA New York for Col Raymond M. Hicks, 2 Mar 44, OCT 565.2 WSA.

The fact that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had approved the use of temporarily converted Liberty ships as emergency troop carriers did not relieve the Army of criticism. Because of the unsatisfactory conditions on board, the Navy Department requested the Chief of Transportation not to place naval personnel on these vessels. However, General Gross took the position that, since the decision to use them had been taken deliberately by the CCS as a matter of military necessity and with a realization of the problems involved, they should be used without discrimination in favor of any branch of the military service. On the other hand, he ordered that if possible the ports avoid embarking civilian passengers on Liberty ships.[185]

When a number of Liberties developed structural cracks, the U.S. Coast Guard recommended that vessels of this type be withdrawn from troop service to the extent that troop commitments would permit. The commitments at that time were so heavy that no troop lift could be spared. The Chief of Transportation agreed that strengthening alterations should be made when the ships were laid up for other repairs, but he was unwilling for them to be taken from service solely for that purpose unless the cracks constituted a safety hazard.[186]

In a report issued in June 1944 the Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program commented on the unsuitability of Liberty ships for troop traffic and expressed the view that greater foresight on the part of the military authorities would have obviated their use. General Gross, nevertheless, maintained that they had served a useful purpose and recommended that they be kept available as potential troop carriers against the possibility that they might be needed in connection with a further expansion of the military effort or for the repatriation of troops after hostilities were over.[187] That plan was followed and in the summer of 1945, in anticipation of the heavy redeployment and repatriation traffic, about 200 converted Liberties were prepared to carry 550 troops each with some improvements over their former passenger facilities.

Justification for the use of the Liberty ship as a troop carrier rested solely on the urgency of the need for additional troop lift. In September 1943, when the decision was made to employ this type of vessel for moving troops overseas, the Allies were still struggling with the problem of constructing enough ships to offset sinkings by the enemy while adequately supporting the armies on the far-flung battle fronts. The Liberty ship was being built in a fraction of the time required to complete other types of vessels, and the installation of temporary troop accommodations could be accomplished between voyages without loss of ship time. Appraisal of the use of these vessels, therefore, must take into account the fact that they represented the quickest way of achieving the additional troop lift desired by the military authorities. The withdrawal of Liberty ships from troop service as more suitable ships became available indicates that the Army regarded their use as an emergency or stopgap measure. Their further employment during redeployment was essential to the plan for bringing the war in the Pacific to an early conclusion, and during the repatriation period their use was a concession to the popular demand that the troops be returned home as quickly as possible.

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[184] Msg, Mvmts Div to Port Comdrs, 21 Apr 44; Memo, CofT for Port Comdrs, 29 Apr 44; both in OCT HB Water Div Converted Liberty Ships.

[185] Memo, VCNO for CofT, 7 Dec 43, sub: Trans of Naval Pers in Liberty Type Vessels; 1st Ind by Gross, 14 Dec 43; both in OCT 569.3 Liberty Ships; 1st Ind, CofT for HRPE, 22 Apr 44, OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[186] Memo, USCG for Lt Col Otey Y. Warren, OCT, 5 Feb 44; Memo, CofT for ACofS OPD, 11 Feb 44; Memo, Farr for Gross, 17 Feb 44; all in OCT HB Farr Staybacks (Nos. 85 and 100).

[187] Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, additional report, *Merchant Shipping*, Rpt 10, Pt. 18, June 23, 1944; Memo, Gross for Somervell, 30 Jun 44, sub: Comments on Truman Committee Rpt, OCT HB Gross Troopships.

Movement of Organizational Equipment

While troop units moving overseas took their personal equipment with them into the staging areas and onto the ships, their organizational equipment and initial supplies moved separately to and through the ports. The term "organizational equipment" covered the vehicles, tanks, artillery, technical paraphernalia, housekeeping tools, and other items that the unit would require in order to be an effective fighting force when it arrived on a foreign shore. Some of this equipment was loaded in the same vessels with the units to which it appertained, but most of it moved in other vessels. Some was force marked—that is, marked with the shipment numbers of the troop units to which it belonged—and some was shipped in bulk and assigned to units after reaching the theaters. The basic requirement was that the troops should have their equipment immediately or soon after their debarkation. Fulfilling this requirement involved many problems for the Chief of Transportation. Numerous devices were tried in the effort to meet these problems, and considerable improvement was achieved during the war, but because of the many considerations involved and changing conditions in the theaters a complete solution was never reached.[188]

The amount of organizational equipment to be shipped varied according to the types of units and the areas for which they were destined. The equipment of an armored force naturally had greater cubic measurement per man than that of an infantry force or a service unit.[189] The quantity of equipment required in an area where a great amount of construction or reconstruction was necessary, or in an area where no paraphernalia or supplies could be procured locally, was greater than elsewhere. The contrast between World War I and World War II was striking in this respect. In World War I approximately 50 percent of the matériel required by the American Expeditionary Forces was obtained in Europe. In World War II the Army not only shipped the preponderance of its requirements from the zone of interior, but also the bulk of those requirements was much greater because of the increased number and size of weapons, vehicles, bulldozers, and other equipment.

In the spring of 1943 the Chief of Transportation calculated that the initial movement of equipment and supplies per man averaged six measurement tons for the Central and Southwest Pacific and the Middle East, seven measurement tons for North Africa and the United Kingdom, and eight measurement tons for the South Pacific and Central Africa. In January 1945, by which date oversea operations had assumed a more stable pattern and better methods of calculating requirements and of packing and stowing matériel had been developed, the average for initial shipments to all theaters was five measurement tons per man.[190]

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[188] The persistence of the problems is indicated in Memo, Gross for Maj Gen Walter A. Wood, Jr., 12 Jan 45, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks; Ltr, CG NYPE to Wylie, 15 Jan 45; Memo, Berzelius for Wylie, 20 Jan 45; last two in OCT HB Wylie Cargo; Memo, Wylie for Franklin, 21 Jan 45, sub: Loading Troop Equip, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks.

[189] For a comparison, see Miscellaneous Shipping Information, data on p. 58, 2 Mar 43, OCT HB Plng Div Gen.

The movement of troops and their equipment in separate vessels was at the root of many of the problems. During the early part of the war there were persistent requests from oversea commands, particularly those in the Pacific, that troops be unit loaded—that is, loaded in the same ships with their equipment. Such a procedure was unquestionably advantageous to the theaters, since it insured arrival of both troops and equipment at the same port at the same time. From the standpoint of the zone of interior, however, unit loading frequently was not practicable. Usually it involved unbalanced cargoes and a waste of ship space. Moreover, the vessels that carried large numbers of troops had relatively small cargo capacities. The extreme examples were the *Queen Mary* and the *Queen Elizabeth,* which could carry up to 15,000 troops but could provide space for only 500 dead-weight tons of matériel.[191] Moving troops and their equipment in different ships therefore was not a matter of choice but of practical wisdom. Convoy loading—that is, forwarding the troops and their equipment in different vessels but in the same convoy—had only limited application. The convoy system was little used for sailings from the Pacific coast, and even in the Atlantic fast troopships ran independently and those of medium speed sailed in fast convoys, while most cargo vessels moved in slow convoys.[192] The slow cargo convoys, moreover, were often broken up overseas and the vessels assigned to different ports for discharge.

A complaint heard often during the early part of the war was that organizational equipment was scattered over too many vessels and hence was difficult to locate and consolidate after arrival in the theater.[193] There were several circumstances that contributed to this kind of loading. Equipment reached the ports on different and sometimes widely scattered dates, and the simplest procedure was to ship it out as it arrived. At a time when shipping space was extremely scarce, the ports desired to get the best possible stowage for each cargo vessel, and this often involved mixing organizational equipment and maintenance supplies. The ports also had to consider, especially through the period of heavy submarine activity in the Atlantic, the consequences of placing all or most of a unit's equipment in a single vessel if that vessel should be sunk.

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[190] Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 9 Apr 43, OCT HB Wylie Shipping Requirements and Allocations 1943; Ltr, SW to Sen Harley M. Kilgore, 10 Jun 43, OCT 500 Mobilization of Shipping Resources; Miscellaneous Shipping Information, 21 Jan 45, data on p. 54, OCT HB Plng Div Gen.

[191] Memo, CofT for BAS, 25 Feb 43; Memo, Col Llewellyn Wansbrough-Jones, BAS, for Farr, OCT, 6 Mar 43; both in OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[192] 4th Ind, CofT for ACofS for Opns ASF, 4 Apr 43, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.

[193] As an extreme case, in September 1942 Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark reported that the organizational equipment of a regiment had arrived in the United Kingdom on 55 different vessels; Memo, CG SOS for CofT, 26 Sep 42; Memo, CofT for PEs, 4 Oct 42; both in OCT HB PE Gen Troop Equip; Memo, CofT for HRPE, 9 Oct 42, sub: Troop Equip, OCT 475 Overseas Equip Left in U.S.

Many other factors entered into the rather complex situation. Movement orders were not always issued sufficiently far in advance of the actual movement, with the result that shipments of impedimenta were late in reaching the loading ports.[194] Particularly during the early part of the war when many items were in short supply, units held the equipment they had at home stations as long as possible in order to complete their training. Sometimes the ports were not notified regarding the equipment that would be dispatched from technical service depots, or when it would arrive. At the outset many shipments of impedimenta to the ports were inadequately marked, so that identification of particular items with particular units was slow and sometimes impossible. The processing of unboxed equipment at home stations was inadequate or entirely lacking, with the result that shipments were damaged en route, particularly when they were transported overseas as deck cargoes. Packaging frequently did not meet the test of transshipment at loading and discharge ports. Advices from ports of embarkation to the theater commanders sometimes failed to give sufficient information regarding the equipment on a particular vessel and the manner of its stowage to enable the port of destination to plan ahead for its discharge and disposition.[195]

The efforts to cope with these problems fall into two distinct categories. In the first were measures taken toward better preparation in the zone of interior for handling movements of impedimenta, including clearer instructions to all concerned. In the second category were adjustments made in procedures to meet conditions peculiar to the several theaters and the changing strategic situation.

A vital factor in the zone of interior was the control that port commanders exercised over the movement of troop impedimenta from home stations and depots to the seaboard. Troops and their equipment were alike in that respect—the port commanders were in the best position to know when their facilities would be able to receive additional shipments, how long it would take to prepare the shipments for embarkation, and when the vessels would be ready to receive them. Port commanders, and they alone, were in a position to state when shipments should be made and to which facilities at the ports they should be delivered. Authority to control these movements had been vested in the port commanders in Janury 1942, as a result of the confusion that followed the uncontrolled shipment of impedimenta to San Francisco during the early weeks of U.S. participation in the war.[196]

Complete understanding between port commanders, unit commanders, and technical service chiefs regarding shipments of equipment to the seaboard was sometimes difficult to achieve. Unit commanders did not always know in advance exactly how much of their old equipment would be taken overseas. The technical services often were not given sufficient time to make shipments from their depots, and sometimes the requisitioned items were not immediately available. In addition to impressing upon unit commanders and technical service chiefs the necessity of providing the ports with prompt and full information regarding all shipments, SOS headquarters directed the Chief of Transportation to have his port commanders maintain close liaison with the sources from which equipment would move.[197] In some cases representatives of the ports were sent to home stations to assist unit personnel in organizing and loading their impedimenta.

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[194] Memo, CofT for ACofS OPD, 23 Jan 43, sub: Issuance of Mvmt Orders; Memo, CG SOS for CofT, 26 Jan 43; both in OCT 370.5 Mvmt Orders (1).

[195] Memo, TAG for Cs of Supply Arms and Svs, 17 Jan 42, sub: Shipts to PEs; Memo, TAG for CG Field Forces, *et al.*, 19 Jan 42, sub: Equip of Troops; Ltr, CofS for CG WDC, 13 Mar 42; all in G-4/33889; Memo, CofT for PEs, 12 Apr 42, Org and Trans of Task Forces, OCT 370.5 (Jan-May 42).

[196] Memo, TAG for CofAAF, *et al.*, 2 Jan 42, AG 370.5 (1-1-42).

Early in 1943, when it was learned that some units had sailed for North Africa with elaborate office furniture, housekeeping supplies, and other nonessential items, the Chief of Transportation recommended that in view of the shortage of ships the major commands examine the tables of basic allowances and designate the items that should be left behind when units moved overseas. Some months later the War Department took steps to regulate the amount of station equipment that might be shipped overseas on requisitions from theater commanders.[198]

Automotive vehicles constituted a major element of the organizational equipment of most troop units. They also were a troublesome element. By the time a unit had completed training many of its vehicles were unfit for service in a theater of operations and had to be repaired or replaced either at the home station or at the port of embarkation. Also, when vehicles accompanied troops they required extensive processing to prevent deterioration during the voyage. After some months of experience explicit instructions were issued to deal with this situation.[199] Units ordered overseas were required, unless otherwise directed in movement orders, to turn in at their home stations all general purpose and special purpose vehicles that did not meet certain specifications as to age and condition, and to notify the appropriate technical services by the fastest means of communication regarding the shortages to be made up. Units might receive vehicles to fill these shortages at their home stations, at the ports of embarkation, or after arrival overseas. The chiefs of the technical services were directed to establish pools of vehicles in the zone of interior and in the principal theaters for this purpose. As it worked out, general purpose vehicles were usually supplied to the units after their arrival in the theaters. This arrangement made possible the shipment of a considerable percentage of such vehicles partially knocked down and boxed, in which condition they required only about one third as much space as when they were fully assembled.[200] Also, when vehicles were shipped boxed the ports were relieved of the task of processing them.

The processing of vehicles at the ports to prevent deterioration during the voyage became a large undertaking. Although their authority was uncertain in the beginning, all ports found themselves doing a certain amount of processing because it had not been done at home stations or depots. The San Francisco Port of Embarkation, which had bitter experience in shipping unprocessed vehicles and tanks to Pacific bases during the early months of the war, took the lead in setting up a well-equipped processing plant at Emeryville, on the eastern shore of San Francisco Bay not far from the Oakland Army base. As soon as the authority of the ports had been definitely established, the Chief of Transportation requested the other port commanders to establish similar facilities.[201] The initial purpose of processing was to seal or insulate the machinery against rust and corrosion and to board up the exposed glass surfaces against breakage. When it was found that tools and spare parts that should have accompanied the equipment did not arrive overseas, either because they were not shipped or because they were removed en route, the ports were instructed to establish the presence of these items before processing and to box them in so securely that pilferage would be difficult.

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[197] Memo, CG SOS for Cs of Tech Svs, 3 Oct 42, sub: Supply of Troops at PEs, OCT HB Gross Ports.

[198] Memo, CofT for ACofS OPD, 3 Feb 43, sub: Imped for Overseas Troops, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; WD Memo W 210-24-43, 7 Sep 43, sub: Shipment of Post, Camp, and Station Equip.

[199] WD Memo W 850-19-42, 27 Nov 42, sub: Supply and Distribution of Automotive Equip.

[200] Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 5 Dec 43, sub: Shipment of Boxed Vehicles, OCT HB Wylie Shipping and Cargo for UK 1943-44.

Most of the equipment was procured by the Ordnance Department, and the port ordnance officers were in charge of the processing plants. In the beginning these officers were left largely to their own devices, and the Chief of Transportation came to the conclusion that there was overprocessing at some ports. In July 1943 he pointed out to the Chief of Ordnance that, although the complaints from overseas regarding vehicles arriving in bad condition had almost ceased, there was still room for refinement in the methods because of the differing conditions affecting equipment in the various theaters and the differing requirements for shipments stowed in the hold and on deck. The Chief of Ordnance was therefore requested to develop standards for processing that would take these differences into account.[202]

Because of the heavy shipments to Europe, the port of embarkation at New York passed the largest number of vehicles through its processing plant, which was located at Port Johnston on the New Jersey side of New York Harbor. The peak was reached in May 1944, when 9,550 vehicles were serviced. From incomplete records it appears that the same month marked the peak at Emeryville, with 3,391 vehicles serviced.[203] The plants operated on an assembly-line basis and, in addition to processing vehicles for shipment, they made repairs within the capability of their facilities. The object was to have the vehicles ready for service with a minimum of attention after arrival in the theaters.

Ports of embarkation kept meticulous records of troop equipment, for they had to know at all times what equipment was being shipped for particular units, where it was located, and when it would be loaded into ships.[204] Maintaining records for these purposes was complicated by the number of units moving simultaneously, the great variety of impedimenta to be handled, amendments to movement orders affecting dates of shipment, lack of

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[201] Memo, CofT for PEs, 7 Oct 42, sub: Shipment of Motor Vehicles, Memo, CofT for PEs, 21 Dec 42, sub: Ordnance Maintenance at Ports; both in OCT HB PE Gen Troop Equip; WD Memo W 850-19-42, 27 Nov 42, par. 12; WD Cir 14, 8 Jan 43, Sec. II; WD Cir 150, 2 Jul 43, Sec. III; WD Cir 175, 30 Jul 43, Sec. V; ASF Cir 76, 15 Mar 44, Sec. V.

[202] Memo, CofT for CofOrd, 22 Jul 43, sub: Standards of Performance; Memo, Meyer for CG NYPE, 31 Jul 43, sub: Preparation of Unboxed Vehicles; both in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.

[203] NYPE monthly report, Progress and Activities, Jun 44, p. 64; (report also gives data for engineer vehicles processed by the port engineer); SFPE Quarterly Progress Rpt, Oct–Dec 44, p. 53; these and similar reports for other periods are in OCT HB files for respective ports.

[204] Memo, CofT for Contl Div ASF, 7 Jun 43, sub: Records of Org Equip, OCT HB PE Gen Troop Equip.

PROCESSING TROOP EQUIPMENT *before shipment overseas. Vehicles awaiting attention at the motor inspection base, Emeryville, California (above); processing ramps at Port Johnston, Bayonne, New Jersey (below).*

information regarding the items actually forwarded from home stations and depots, and the inability of some unit commanders to state exactly what impedimenta would accompany them overseas because of changing tables of equipment.[205] Gradually the Chief of Transportation developed a plan of complete and uniform records for all ports that would show at all times what was to be shipped and what had been shipped.[206] If part of the initial equipment had not been dispatched when the troops sailed, as was often the case, the ports of embarkation were required to advise the theaters when the remainder would be dispatched so that the theater commanders would not submit requisitions for those items. The port commanders were also responsible for advising ASF headquarters when further shipments of equipment from the zone of interior should be stopped and theater commanders requested to supply the outstanding items.[207]

The Chief of Transportation investigated the possibility of relieving the main ports through which the larger troop movements passed of the necessity of handling all of the organizational equipment for those movements. In shipping maintenance supplies, specific ports were responsible for controlling all movements to specific theaters, but they allocated the actual loading of part of the supplies to other ports, known as outports. The movement of troop equipment, however, involved a different set of circumstances. The flow of the impedimenta for a particular unit had so many sources, extended over so long a period, and was subject to so many uncertainties that splitting the movement among several ports and yet maintaining complete and up-to-date records presented formidable obstacles. Split shipments of equipment therefore were avoided whenever possible.[208]

Both in the Office of the Chief of Transportation and at the ports of embarkation special personnel was required to supervise the handling of troop equipment. The Movements Division, OCT, set up a separate unit for this purpose in December 1943 and placed in charge an officer who had had extensive experience with shipments of impedimenta at San Francisco. This unit, which eventually became known as the Troop Equipment Branch, dealt with all aspects of the subject from the time the movement orders were written until the equipment and troops were brought together overseas.[209] At the New York Port of Embarkation, where the traffic was heaviest, movements of impedimenta were supervised by the Initial Troop Equipment Division, which was coordinate with the Troop Movement Division and other operating divisions. At San Francisco and other ports, movements of troops and troop equipment came under the jurisdiction of the same division, but separate groups of personnel were assigned to perform the separate functions.[210]

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[205] Memo, Wylie for Ross, CofT ETOUSA, 26 May 43, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks; Memo, CofT for Dir of Opns ASF, 11 Jun 43, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.

[206] TC Cir 15, 2 Feb 43, sub: Shipt of Task Force Units; TC Cir 56, 27 Apr 43; OCT Cir 95, 26 Jul 43, sub: Records of Shipts; TC Cir 100-2, 4 Apr 44; TC Cir 100-3, 4 Apr 44.

[207] SOS Memo S 700-1-43, 2 Jan 43, sub: Cancellation of Back Orders; Memo, CofT for PEs, 6 Sep 44, sub: Clearance of Shipts from PEs, OCT 400.7.

[208] Memo, CofT for Col William E. Carraway, Plng Div ASF, 4 Apr 43, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Memo, CofT for CGs NYPE and HRPE, 17 Jul 43, sub: Forwarding of Equip; Memo, CG NYPE for Port Trans Div, 26 Jul 43; last two in OCT 045.0 UGF 10; Remarks by Col Berzelius at Mtg of Port Comdrs and Opng Representatives, 8 Jul 44, in Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6-9 Jul 44, p. 17, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf.

[209] Remarks by Col Berzelius, C of Troop Equip Br, at Junior Officers Meeting, Mvmts Div, 16 Oct 44, OCT HB Mvmt Div Gen.

Clear instructions to explain procedures and establish the responsibility of all concerned were necessary to the efficient movement of troop impedimenta just as they were to the movement of the troops themselves. The basic instructions were included in the War Department publication, Preparation for Overseas Movement. Further instructions were included in the supplementary pamphlet, Identification of Organizational Impedimenta, which was issued in August 1943.[211] The detailed directions given in the latter pamphlet emphasize the importance that was attached to the correct marking of such shipments and to maintaining full and accurate records in accomplishing the orderly flow of organizational equipment.

The second aspect of the problem of moving troop equipment to the theaters was to adapt the procedures to differing conditions in the several oversea areas. During the spring and early summer of 1942, when a feverish effort was being made to build up American strength in the United Kingdom against the possibility of an invasion of the Continent in the fall, the movement of troop impedimenta was a major consideration. Many items of equipment were in short supply, and organizational equipment had to be held until troops were about to leave their home stations in order for them to complete their training. Unit loading was impossible because a large percentage of the troops were dispatched in vessels that had limited cargo capacity. The ships of the convoys in which most of the equipment moved were distributed among the British ports according to conditions at the time of their arrival, so that it was impossible to plan in advance where particular vessels would be discharged. At this period some items were not available for shipment until long after the troops had departed. Consequently, a considerable amount of equipment was sent to depots in the United Kingdom, where related items were brought together before they were assigned to troop units. Under these circumstances from one to three months often elapsed between the arrival of the troops and their receipt of complete equipment.

With a view to correcting the situation and at the same time utilizing some cargo shipping that the British were expected to provide, G-4 proposed that at least half of the equipment of eight divisions scheduled to sail during the summer be shipped in bulk about a month in advance of the troops. There were some objections to the plan. The AGF was uncertain of the effect of such an arrangement on the training and morale of the divisions; the troop basis was not considered firm; the theater was fearful that placing so much equipment in its depots without unit marking and issuing it to the troops from stock might involve too much delay. OPD therefore did not concur in the proposal, and strategic developments made it necessary to use the British vessels elsewhere, so that the plan—later known as preshipment—

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[210] Remarks by Col Henry J. Amy, C of Initial Troop Equip Div NYPE, at Mtg of Port Opn, Troop Mvmt and Equip Representatives, 8 Jul 44, in Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6–9 Jul 44, pp. 39–45, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf; Preliminary Rpt, Control and Handling of Force-Marked Equip at NYPE, 16–26 May 44; Rpt of Survey, Control and Handling of Force-Marked Equip at SFPE, 4–15 Jun 44; last two in OCT HB PE Gen Troop Equip.

[211] Copies of POM and IOI are in OCT HB PE Gen Troop Mvmt to Port.

did not go into effect in 1942.[212]

In the winter of 1942–43, when the North African campaign held priority over the build-up in the United Kingdom, much the same condition prevailed with respect to troop equipment. Many shipments were late in reaching the ports of embarkation and consequently were late in being transshipped overseas. The troops and their impedimenta usually were shipped in different vessels, and the problem of getting the two together in the theater persisted. Officers in North Africa felt that they were not being adequately informed regarding the status of shipments of equipment. When General Somervell visited the theater after the Casablanca Conference, he heard strong complaints on these matters and requested an explanation from the Chief of Transportation. In response, the Chief of Transportation stated that every effort was being made to get equipment to the ports and ship it as promptly as possible, and to notify the theater commanders when delayed items would be forwarded; he did not consider it advisable, however, to give such notification until the ship on which the equipment would move had been definitely nominated.[213] No solution to the problem was found during the North African campaign.

Preshipment, or the shipment of organizational equipment and supplies in bulk ahead of troops, became an approved policy in the spring of 1943, when the build-up of forces in the United Kingdom was resumed in volume. Conditions that had prevented its execution in 1942—the scarcity of many items, the acute shortage of cargo shipping, and the uncertainty of the troop basis—had by this time been alleviated. The Chief of Transportation saw in preshipment the best chance of solving this difficult problem. There were still some who feared undesirable consequences from withdrawing equipment from troops four to six weeks ahead of their departure from training stations. But the decision was turned in favor of preshipment by the fact that in April 1943 an adequate supply of cargo space was assured and British ports were then capable of handling increased shipments. It was realized, moreover, that the accumulation of large stocks in the United Kingdom during 1943 would relieve the strain on shipping and on the ports that would inevitably develop as the date for the invasion of the Continent—then set for the spring of 1944—approached. In May 1943, therefore, preshipment on as broad a scale as possible was decreed.[214]

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[212] Memo within OCT, Lt Col Norman H. Vissering for Col Noble M. Coe, 5 Jun 42, sub: Shortage of Equip, OCT HB PE Gen Troop Equip; Msgs, Marshall to USFOR London, 4 Jun 42, CM-OUT 0786, and 17 Jun 42, CM-OUT 4300; Memo, ACofS OPD for ACofS G-4, 10 Jul 42, sub: Shipts in Bulk, OPD 520; Rpt of ETO General Board, Study 128, sub: Logistical Build-up in the British Isles, pp. 21–23; Leighton and Coakley, *op. cit.*, Ch. XIV, pp. 33–48.

[213] Memo, Somervell for Gross, 19 Feb 43, pars. 1(3)–(4); Memo, Gross for Somervell, 23 Feb 43, pars. 1*e–f*; both in OCT HB Ex File Somervell's Insp Trip to Africa.

[214] The documentation is voluminous and the following citations are given chiefly to show the TC position: 4th Ind, CofT for ACofS for Opns ASF, 4 Apr 43, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Memo, Meyer for Wylie, 9 Apr 43, giving review of developments to date, OCT HB Wylie Cargo; Memo, CofT for Somervell, 9 Apr 43, sub: Data on Shipping, with attachment entitled Special Problems in UK Build-up, OCT HB Wylie Shipping Reqmts and Allocations 1943; Memo, Gross for Styer, 12 Apr 43, sub: Visit of Gen Lee, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Memo, Gross for Lutes, 16 Apr 43, sub: Cargo for UK, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks; Memo, ACofS for Opns ASF for Gross, 17 Apr 43, sub: Cargo for UK, OCT HB Wylie Shipping and Cargo for UK 1943–44; Memo, ACofS for Opns ASF for Dir Stock Contl Div ASF, 17 Apr 43, sub: Cargo Shipts to UK, OCT HB Wylie Cargo; Rad, CG ASF for ETO, 20 Apr 43, CM-OUT 8165; Memo, Farr for Gross, 1 May 43; Memo, Gross for

During the ensuing year the preshipment plan was found an effective means of assuring that troops arriving in the United Kingdom got their equipment promptly. Gradually a larger and larger percentage of the matériel was shipped to the ports of embarkation by the procuring services rather than by the units' home stations. The Chief of Transportation maintained an unrelenting pressure on these sources to insure that shipments did not lag, and on the War Shipping Administration to insure that enough shipping to lift the cargoes was allocated. His Water Division reported almost daily on the outlook for both ships and cargo, and this report was the basis for aggressive action to keep the two in balance.[215] During 1943 the more serious problem was to get sufficient cargo delivered to the ports to fill the scheduled ships, but after the priority of the European theater for both organizational equipment and maintenance supplies was raised at the end of that year, the problem was essentially one of keeping the flow of cargo to the seaboard within the capacity of the available shipping.[216]

Although the practice of preshipping organizational equipment and supplies was admirably suited to the build-up of strength in the United Kingdom, which was a well-organized noncombat area, a different system was required when the forces moved to the Continent. In the spring of 1944, with D Day set for early June, the European Theater of Operations requested that all troop units arriving from the United States after D plus 90 be debarked on the Continent and be ready to fight within fifteen days after landing. This meant that the troop equipment would have to be accumulated and consolidated in the zone of interior, then convoy loaded so that the entire equipment of a unit would arrive in the theater at about the same time and almost simultaneously with the troops.

Several possibilities were considered in selecting a place where equipment could be accumulated. The ports of embarkation were ruled out because they did not have the necessary space. Home stations were not considered favorably because they were mostly in the south and southwest and much of the equipment would have to be shipped to them from depots and manufacturers in the northeast and then backhauled to the North Atlantic ports of embarkation. The Chief of Transportation therefore urged that the Elmira Holding and Reconsignment Point in central New York be used for this purpose. In addition to having adequate space, the installation was so situated that shipments could be effected quickly to both New York and Boston, the ports through which the bulk of the equipment was to move. This plan was approved by the War Department in the early summer.[217]

Somervell, 2 May 43; Memo, CG NYPE for CofT, 2 May 43; last three in OCT HB Wylie Cargo; AG Memo 400.22 (5-16-43), 16 May 43, sub: SOP for Shipments of Equip and Supplies to UK; AG Memo 400.22 (1 Jun 44), 2 Jan 44, sub: Change in SOP.

[215] Some of these reports are in OCT HB Wylie Shipping and Cargoes for UK 1943-44.

[216] Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, a volume in preparation for this series, Ch. III; Roland G. Ruppenthal, *Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I: May 1941-September 1944,* UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), Ch. VI.

[217] Memo, Farr for Plng Div ASF, 27 Apr 44, sub: Shipping of Units, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Remarks by Col Farr at Mtg of Port Opn, Troop Mvmt, and Equip Representatives, 8 July 44, in Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6-9 Jul 44, pp. 15-19, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf; Memo, Farr for Wylie, 14 Jul 44, OCT 337 Elmira H&RP; Rpt attached to Memo by Capt James M. Walls, 16 Jun 45, included in Mvmt Div Hist, OCT HB Mvmt Div Gen.

The purpose of the new project at Elmira, which eventually became known as the Northeast Equipment Staging Area, was to "receive, document, assemble, consolidate, prepare for shipment, and ship" to the ports the organizational equipment and supplies forwarded to that installation under War Department movement orders. Shipments to the ports were to be made immediately upon receipt of calls from the port commanders.[218] The matériel sent to Elmira embraced all items procured by the Army Service Forces (other than general purpose vehicles) that could not reach the home stations of the respective units before established deadline dates.

The task imposed upon the equipment staging area proved to be a very considerable one, for among the several hundred units that were dispatched to the European theater between August 1944 and February 1945 were thirty-six divisions. Frequently more than 150 carloads of freight were handled (unloaded or loaded) during a single day, and on several occasions the number exceeded 250 carloads.[219]

September 1944 proved to be the most difficult month, for not only were the staff and the procedures relatively untried at that time but a number of large units, including two divisions, were required to sail earlier than had been planned. During that month a considerable backlog of cars developed, and as a result of the congestion some shipments did not reach port in time for dispatch with the convoys for which they were scheduled. This congestion had been cleared up by mid-October through special efforts of the commander of the Elmira Holding and Reconsignment Point, who had charge of the equipment staging operation, and the Movements Division, OCT, which gave it general supervision.

From the time it was established in the summer of 1944 until February 1945 when it was discontinued, the equipment staging area at Elmira handled matériel for units embracing more than 700,000 troops. The liaison officers of some units who went to Elmira to assist in identifying and segregating the equipment of their respective organizations reported that there was considerable confusion during September and early October resulting in a "serious mixing of property." The opinion was expressed that equipment should be staged nearer the ports and under the control of the port commanders.[220] Nevertheless, the equipment staging area served a useful purpose. It relieved home stations of the heavy task of receiving, consolidating, and shipping this equipment. It enabled technical service depots to avoid congestion by dispatching equipment as soon as it was ready rather than holding it until the port call was received. It absorbed the shock that the ports would otherwise have felt when the sailing dates of units were changed. The accumulation of equipment at a point where shipments could be made equally well to either New York or Boston as circumstances might require proved advantageous. After the difficulty experienced during the early fall, the operation at Elmira proceeded smoothly and shipments to the ports were made promptly.

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[218] TC Cir 5-20, 4 Nov 44, sub: Northeast Equip Staging Area; Min of Mtg at Elmira, 5 Sep 44, sub: Processing Troop Equip Under the Red Lists, OCT HB Zones Gen Elmira H&RP; Memo, CofT for NYPE, BPE, Elmira H&RP, 26 Oct 44, sub: Red List Procedures, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.

[219] A list of cars on hand, loaded, and unloaded will be found in OCT HB Zones Gen Elmira H&RP.

[220] Memo, NYPE for CofT, 14 Oct 44, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.

Indeed, Colonel Farr expressed doubt whether the urgent requests from the theater to advance the departure dates of numerous units could have been fulfilled without this equipment staging area.[221]

In order that troop units might be fully equipped and ready to fight soon after arrival in the European theater, it was necessary to impress into service as many fast cargo ships as could be spared from other urgent tasks. These vessels, sailing eastbound in fast (14-knot) convoys, reduced by several days the time required for the delivery of equipment to British and French ports in slow convoys. The turnaround of the ships was shortened by permitting them to make the homeward voyage unescorted. This fast service to the ETO began soon after the invasion of the Continent and continued until the heavy movement of units to that theater had been completed. In cases of special urgency, equipment was sent directly to the ports of embarkation rather than through the equipment staging area at Elmira. To avoid delay in delivering equipment to troop units after their arrival on the Continent, the impedimenta of a particular unit was loaded in the fewest possible ships even though this resulted in poor stowage and sacrifice of cargo space. In this instance military considerations required a sacrifice of the principle of good stowage, which the Chief of Transportation otherwise endeavored to enforce.[222] During the five-month period August–December 1944, 108 vessels carrying chiefly organizational equipment were dispatched to the ETO; data for later sailings of this type were not found.[223]

The problems in the Pacific relating to the shipment of organizational equipment were similar to those in the Atlantic, but there were certain basic differences. On the one hand, a greater percentage of the troops moved to Pacific destinations in relatively small units and more of the troopships had substantial cargo capacity, making unit loading possible more often. On the other hand, the military situation in the Pacific was more fluid, and the practice of diverting ships from their original destinations to widely scattered bases was more disturbing to planned movements. After Generals Somervell and Gross had visited the Pacific theaters in the fall of 1943 and had listened to complaints about the late arrival of organizational equipment and the spreading of shipments over many vessels, increased efforts were made to improve the procedures.[224]

In 1943 the Transportation Corps and also General Somervell favored the preshipment of troop equipment to the Pacific, but the ASF Supply Division was already hard pressed to find enough matériel to carry out the program of preshipment to the United Kingdom and did not want to assume this further obligation.[225] Accordingly, improvement in the delivery of troop equipment to the Pacific areas depended on the establishment of closer liaison and better understanding between the ports of embarkation and the theater commands, and on the employment of unit loading wherever possible. When an equipment staging area was set up near the east coast of the United States in 1944, it was believed that a similar procedure would be introduced eventually on the west coast. This did not transpire, chiefly because the situation in the Pacific never called for as concentrated a movement of troops and equipment as that which attended the invasion of the European continent. The western holding and reconsignment points, however, served in a limited way as assembly points for troop equipment destined for San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle for transshipment to the Pacific bases.[226]

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[221] Memo, Farr for Historical Unit OCT, 20 Jun 45, sub: History, par. 3, OCT HB Mvmt Div Rpts; ASF Annual *Report for the Fiscal Year 1945* (Washington, 1946), p. 55.

[222] Memo, CofT for COMINCH US Fleet, 23 Aug 44, sub: Unescorted Fast Freighters, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Memo, CofT for Mobilization Div ASF, 8 Sep 44, sub: Red List Procedures, OCT 322 Red List Units; Msg, Lt Gen Thomas T. Handy to Hq COMZONE ETO, CG AFHQ, Italy, CG NYPE, 1 Oct 44, WARX 39841; Memo, CofS ASF for Dir Plans and Opns ASF, 26 Dec 44, ASF Hq CofS—Dir of Plans and Opns.

[223] ASF MPR, Dec 44, p. 56; Memo, CofT for Styer, 5 Feb 45, sub: Org Equip Ships, OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[224] Memos, Gross for Wylie, 26 Sep 43 and 6 Oct 43, OCT HB Wylie Ltrs from Gross.

[225] 1st Ind, ACofT for CG ASF, 11 Oct 43; Memo, Meyer for Wylie, 14 Oct 43; both in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; ASF Staff Conf, 6 Nov 43, p. 3, OCT HB ASF; Memo, Farr for Wylie, 2 Dec 43, OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

The procedure for handling equipment procured by the Air Service Command for AAF units was somewhat different from that for equipment procured by the Army Service Forces. Throughout the war such equipment was sent to AAF intransit depots near the ports, where it was assembled and processed before being forwarded to the water ports of embarkation. These intransit depots were justified by the AAF on the ground that distinctive Air Forces matériel required special handling and technical treatment.

The AAF complained repeatedly that equipment and supplies procured by the ASF technical services failed to reach AAF units overseas promptly. These units were expected to be ready for combat service soon after arrival in the theaters and the ASF endeavored to overcome the delays, but some of the causes were not easy to control. When stocks were short or shipping was inadequate for all needs, AAF units, like all other units, had to be dealt with according to the established priorities. Some delays were traceable to the inability of the AAF to release equipment to the ports sufficiently in advance of the troops. When the theaters diverted ships from the discharge ports for which they were originally destined, there were usually compelling local reasons. In the spring of 1944 the commanding general of the Army Air Forces proposed to the commanding general of the Army Service Forces that matériel procured by the ASF technical services for AAF units be routed through the AAF intransit depots. The ASF did not concur since it did not believe that this change of procedure would overcome the difficulties.[227]

The task of getting organizational equipment to the theaters so that the troops could have it soon after their arrival proved a challenging one. A basic difficulty was the impracticability from a shipping standpoint of moving troops and their impedimenta in the same vessels. The frequent necessity of changing the discharge ports of cargo vessels after they had reached the theaters was a disturbing factor. During the early part of the war the situation was further complicated by the scarcity of some items of equipment and the over-all shortage of shipping. Gradual improvement was achieved through the establishment of standard procedures, careful planning by the Chief of Transportation's Movements Division and the ports of embarkation, and close coordination between the port commanders, the commanders of units, the technical services, and the theaters. The most complete solution was recognized to be the shipment of equipment to the theaters in advance of the troops. This plan presupposed, however, a stable and well-organized base, such as existed in the United Kingdom during the build-up of strength for the invasion of the Continent, as well as adequate equipment and shipping. Unfortunately, those conditions did not sufficiently apply to any other oversea areas to warrant the adoption of a broad program of preshipment.

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[226] Memo, CofT for SFPE, SPE, LAPE, 30 Oct 44, sub: Diversion of Certain Shipments to HRP, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.

[227] Memo, Gross for Somervell, 23 Feb 43, OCT HB Ex File Somervell's Trip to Africa; Memos, Farr for Gross, 1 and 5 May 43; both in OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Memo, CG AAF for CG ASF, 19 Jun 43, and reply, 26 Jun 43; both in OCT 475 Oversea Equip Left Behind; Memo, CG AAF for CG ASF, 1 Apr 44, and replies, 3 and 4 Apr 44; all three in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; 1st Ind, CG ASF for CG AAF, 6 Apr 44; Memo, C of Traf Div AAF for ACofT, 29 May 44, sub: Baylor Committee Findings, and reply, 1 Jun 44; last three in OCT 475 Oversea Equip Left Behind.

Joint Use of Troopships by the Armed Services

Since both the Army and the Navy were constantly moving personnel to the same theaters, economy of shipping dictated that all troop transports should be available to the troops of both services. Some of the problems that arose in connection with the allocation and scheduling of the vessels because of joint utilization have already been discussed.[228] Other problems in the joint use of troopships concern principally the Pacific, for in that area the command setup was more complex, the strategic situation was more fluid, and the forces of the Navy and the Marine Corps were larger than in theaters across the Atlantic.

In the Atlantic, where the Navy used a relatively small amount of troop space, the troopship sailing schedules were determined almost entirely by Army requirements. The Chief of Transportation's Movements Division, in consultation with the Water Division and the ports of embarkation, endeavored to work out a program of sailings that would take care of the Army personnel expected to move and at the same time meet the Navy's needs. When the Navy desired to move personnel to an oversea station, the Naval Transportation Service filed a request with the Army Chief of Transportation, who allotted space on scheduled sailings in accordance with the approved priorities.[229] Although adjustments in the schedules were sometimes necessary because of the Navy's requirements, this was not often the case.

All troopships serving the Pacific areas were regarded as a single pool and their scheduling and utilization were under joint management.[230] This pool included the owned and the chartered transports operated by the Army or the Navy, the transports assigned to the Army by the War Shipping Administration and operated for the Army by naval personnel, and those operated by agents of the WSA and allocated to the Army or the Navy. Acting in accordance with general plans and instructions agreed on by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Military Transportation Committee in Washington, the Joint Army-Navy Surface Personnel Committee, with headquarters at San Francisco, determined the loading ports and sailing dates as well as the assignment of troop space. The Joint Army-Navy-WSA Ship Operations Committee, also located at San Francisco, determined such matters as the utilization of piers, ship repair facilities, and labor. These west coast committees therefore exercised a broad control over the employment of troopships and the movement of troops and troop equipment.[231] The commander of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation represented the Army or designated the representatives of the Army in these joint activities.

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[228] See above, pp. 93-94.

[229] For example, Memo, CofT for NTS, 22 May 43, sub: Trans of Naval Pers, OCT 370.5 Mvmt BLOT; Memo, NTS for OCT, 22 May 43, sub: Oversea Trans for Naval Pers, and reply, 31 May 43; last two in OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[230] Joint use of ships was practiced from the beginning of the war, but it increased after formal agreements were made during the first half of 1943; see Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-72.

Despite the fact that the joint committees functioned smoothly and with considerable effectiveness, the Army Chief of Transportation did not like the arrangement. The basic reason was that it involved a decentralization of control and interfered with the plan of centralized control on which the Transportation Corps operated. General Gross favored the decentralization of technical operating functions and carried the doctrine into effect by a broad delegation of operating responsibilities to his field representatives. On the other hand, he regarded the exercise of central control by his office over the employment of the means of transportation necessary to the economical use of those means, and similar control of troop and freight movements necessary to the close co-ordination of inland and ocean transportation and the avoidance of delays. Naval logistics was characterized by greater decentralization, and the Navy was unwilling to attempt to revamp its system during wartime.[232] The Army refused to accord as much independence to the west coast committees as the Navy desired, but it found no alternative to going along with the plan in general.

A number of specific complaints may be cited as evidence of the general dissatisfaction in the Office of the Chief of Transportation because of the lack of a closely integrated control over the movement of ships and troops in the Pacific. The OCT believed that troopships were being detained on the Pacific coast longer than was necessary, with not enough pressure being put on the completion of repairs and on quick turnaround at the loading port.[233] Sufficient advance notice could not be obtained regarding the prospective sailings of APA's and other naval combatant ships to permit arrangements to be made for the full utilization of their passenger capacities.[234] The estimates of troopship capabilities and requirements prepared by the Army and the Navy were difficult to harmonize because of the different approaches to the subject.[235] The Navy's lack of central control over the flow of personnel to the embarkation ports created a demand for more staging capacity at the ports than otherwise would have been necessary.[236]

Additional difficulties from the point of view of the Chief of Transportation arose from the independent action of the oversea commands, particularly the Pacific

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[231] Memo, Farr for Wylie, 15 Nov 44, sub: Control of Shipping in the Pacific, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen; Min of Mtgs of Joint Army-Navy Surface Personnel Committee are filed in OCT 334 JANSPC.

[232] Duncan S. Ballantine, *U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), pp. 229–33.

[233] Memo, Farr for Wylie, 15 Nov 44, par. 7, cited n. 231; Memo, Farr for Wylie, 16 Mar 45, sub: Utilization of Troopships, OCT 565.2.

[234] See n. 23, above; Memo, Gross for Somervell, 31 Dec 43, sub: Basis of Allocation, OCT HB Wylie Army vs Navy; Memo, Farr for Wylie, 15 Nov 44, par. 8 and summary 5, cited n. 231.

[235] Memo, Meyer for Gross, 10 Jan 43, sub: Troopship Capacities, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.

[236] Memo, Wylie for Wood, 24 May 44, sub: Greenslade Rpt, and atchd comment on Appendix E, Recommendation 3, OCT HB Port Capacity and Utilization.

Ocean Areas, in diverting troopships and retaining them for intratheater use without approval from Washington.[237] Troop lift was needed in the theaters for the assault and support operations that were being mounted there, and the theater commanders retained vessels that had arrived from the zone of interior in order to make those operations successful. Such retentions obviously were disturbing to the planners in Washington, who were endeavoring to work out a balanced and well-timed program of troop movements from U.S. ports. Another disturbing factor from the standpoint of central planning and control was the lack of information from the theaters in regard to the movements of troopships and their return to U.S. ports. Here again the chief difficulty was with Pacific Ocean Areas.

In view of these conditions and their effect on the work of the Movements Division in planning troop movements and supervising their execution, Colonel Farr recommended in November 1944 that an "advance echelon" of the Movements Division be set up at San Francisco to collaborate with the joint committees in achieving the best possible use of troop carriers and in policing the execution of instructions issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Military Transportation Committee. As conceived by Colonel Farr, this office would have been entirely independent of the Army port of embarkation and would not have dealt with operating matters; its principal function would have been "to get information and to be present when certain decisions are made of an over-all nature that require complete and thorough coordination with the Navy." The proposal carried the implication that Army interests on the Pacific coast needed a type of supervision that they had not been receiving. The plan was given careful consideration in the Office of the Chief of Transportation and a tentative organizational chart was drawn up, but in the end the creation of such an office was disapproved because of the possibility of conflict between it and the San Francisco Port of Embarkation.[238]

In the beginning the joint utilization of troopships in the Pacific was beset with frequent misunderstandings because of the lack of joint priority lists for the movement of Army and Navy personnel. Without such lists the assignment of troop space and the distribution of the inevitable deficit in troop lift could not be equitably achieved.[239] In May 1943 the Army and the Navy agreed that "a single joint priority list for personnel for overseas movement to all areas of the Pacific Theater except North Pacific and Southeast Pacific" should be prepared monthly by the two departments. The Operations Division of the War Department General Staff represented the Army in the establishment of joint priorities.[240] To provide the basis for negotiations in Washington, the commanders of the Central, South, and Southwest Pacific Areas were required to submit joint priority lists for their respective commands. These were consolidated into over-all joint priority lists, which guided the Joint Army-Navy Surface Personnel Committee at San Francisco in its utilization of troopships and in the dispatch of troops.[241]

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[237] Memo, Farr for Wylie, 15 Nov 44, par. 9 and summaries 2 and 3, cited n. 231.

[238] Recommendation 1, Memo, Farr for Wylie, 15 Nov 44, cited n. 231; Memo, Farr for Wylie, 29 Jan 45, sub: West Coast Operation; Memo, Farr for Meyer, 6 Feb 45, sub: Proposed West Coast Reorganization; last two in OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Ltr, Farr to author, 20 Jul 50, p. 3, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

[239] Memo, CofT for ACofS OPD, 13 Mar 43, sub: Shipping for South and Southwest Pacific, and reply, 29 Mar 43; both in OCT 000-370.5 POA 1943.

[240] Agreement, Gen Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King, 26 May 43, sub: Joint Priority Lists, OCT 000-370.5 POA 1943.

The joint use of troopships also called for the development of greater uniformity in the shipping procedures used by the Army and the Navy. This development was slow, but in the spring of 1945, with the prospect of an early shifting of emphasis from the Atlantic to the Pacific, a comprehensive joint directive, Ocean Shipping Procedures (short title, OSPRO), was published.[242] The primary object of the publication was to establish uniform procedures for regulating the preparation and dispatch of shipping documents and for reporting information regarding ship movements, passengers embarked, and freight loaded. These procedures applied not only to vessels sailing between the zone of interior and the theaters, but also to those sailing between theaters, since it was anticipated that the redeployment of troops after the defeat of Germany would involve substantial shipments from Europe and the Mediterranean directly to Pacific bases. In matters on which complete uniformity could not be achieved, the differing procedures of the Army and the Navy were explained, so that each service would be informed regarding the other's methods. The agreement provided for joint central record control units in each theater and at the principal U.S. ports to assist in the administration of the plan. The establishment of such units, known as Army-Navy Shipping Information Agencies (short title, ANSIA's), had barely begun when hostilities ceased.

The joint use of troopships was essential as a means of insuring that full advantage would be taken of the capacities of vessels sailing under Army or Navy control and that the priorities established by theater commanders for the shipment of personnel were observed. Differences arose over the administration of the plan, and some of the supporting arrangements, which obviously were desirable, were slow in developing. The misunderstandings and delays were attributable chiefly to the differing systems employed by the Army and the Navy for controlling transportation and movements and the fact that there had been virtually no co-ordination on this level before the war. By the end of the war substantial progress toward such co-ordination had been made.

A Test of Method and Efficiency

Oversea troop movements provided a real test of method and operating efficiency. The number of agencies concerned with both the planning and the execution phases was a complicating factor. The many types of units belonging to the Ground Forces, the Air Forces, and the Service Forces, and the loosely organized groups of individual replacements implied a wide variety of problems. The necessity of shipping units and their organizational equipment on different vessels in most instances, yet in such a manner that the troops could have their equipment soon after arrival overseas, added to the difficulties. Co-ordination was the basic requirement, and in December 1941 the machinery for this purpose was very inadequate. Later, when the system had been improved as the result of experience, large shipments of troops were moved to the seaboard, staged, and embarked with commendable smoothness.

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[241] Memo, CofT for CG SFPE, 27 Jul 43, sub: Priority Lists for Central, South, and Southwest Pacific, OCT 000-370.5 POA 1943.

[242] WD TM 38-412/OPNAV 39-H3, United States Army and Navy Ocean Shipping Procedures (short title, OSPRO); Monthly Vessel Utilization Summary, Jul 45, OCT HB Topic Army-Navy Joint Logistics; Memo, SFPE for CofT, 8 Oct 45, sub: Hist Record, and incl entitled ANSIA, OCT HB Topic Port Co-ordination.

The formulation and publication of detailed procedures was a prerequisite to the satisfactory execution of troop movements. This was true because of the many agencies involved and the multitude of services to be performed in making troops ready for movement to and service in the theaters. The instructions dealing with the preparation of units and individuals for oversea movement covered every step of the operation and fixed the responsibilities of each agency, and they were of inestimable value. Even then it was necessary for the port staging areas, in order to have troops completely ready for embarkation, to perform many services that should have been performed by other agencies.

Assignment of a key role to the port commanders was an important factor in the successful regulation of the flow of troops to the theaters. The control that port commanders exercised over the departure of troops for the seaboard, the processing and training at the staging areas, and the embarkation on the transports enabled them to so co-ordinate all stages of the operation as to avoid the congestion of port facilities, the waste of rail equipment, and the delay of ship sailings. The close contact—by teletype, radio, and cable—maintained by the ports of embarkation with the theaters they served enabled them to administer theater priorities effectively, to meet emergency requirements, and at the same time to keep the theater commanders informed regarding the status of the troops they had requested. Like many other relationships, this co-ordination between the ports of embarkation and the theaters was developed only gradually, and it was more successfully accomplished in the Atlantic than in the Pacific.

Wartime experience demonstrated the value of the port staging area both as a reservoir in which troops could be held pending embarkation and as a place where units that were under strength when they left their home stations could be filled, shortages of individual equipment could be made up, and minor deficiencies in physical condition and training could be corrected. Although home stations gradually improved their performance in preparing units and individuals for oversea service before shipping them to the ports, they frequently fell short of that goal. Their performance never supported the theory, which was given some attention in the early days of the war, that even in periods of heavy troop movement staging areas could be dispensed with and troops could be moved directly from home stations to shipside.

Troop movements were necessarily tailored to fit the troopships that were available. The situation that confronted the Army during the early months of the war was bleak indeed, but soon the increase in troop lift became rapid, permitting troop shipments to be increased accordingly. The American capacity was multiplied through the conversion of existing passenger ships to troop carriers, the construction of additional passenger ships, and especially through the conversion of many new cargo ships to troopships. The virtual pooling of the American and British troopship fleets to serve the Allied cause greatly helped the U.S. Army, especially in the North Atlantic. The pooling of

Army and Navy resources in the Pacific facilitated the movement of troops to the Pacific bases. The intensive operation of the troopships under Army control and the plan of loading them to the maximum practical capacity were additional measures employed to hasten the build-up of strength overseas. In brief, every effort was made to utilize the troop lift—admittedly a limiting factor—to best advantage.

The movement of organizational equipment had to match the movement of troops, but it was affected by different circumstances both in the zone of interior and overseas. Special methods were adopted to meet the exceptional requirements of the European theater in 1943 and 1944, but otherwise the task was essentially one of insuring that equipment was properly marked, getting it delivered to the ports of embarkation at about the same time as the troops, processing and shipping it as promptly as possible, and keeping the theaters of destination informed regarding the shipments en route and those that were delayed. Many difficulties were encountered and the performance was uneven.

The salient fact regarding oversea movements in World War II is that, after the transitional period immediately following Pearl Harbor, there were no serious interruptions in the shipment of troops and their equipment to the theaters in accordance with strategic plans. The inadequacy of the early procedures, failure to execute properly the improved procedures that were in effect later, and other difficulties inherent in so complex an operation resulted in some temporary annoyance and confusion but did not disturb the military program.

CHAPTER III

Redeployment and Repatriation

The most complicated and in some ways the most difficult phase of the war from the standpoint of troop transportation came after the defeat of Germany. Up to that time the movement of troops had been mainly from the zone of interior to the oversea commands; traffic between theaters and return traffic to the United States had been on a limited scale. The end of hostilities in Europe, followed closely by the Japanese surrender, involved more than simply a change in direction for the major troop movement; it involved broad changes in procedures and the handling of a far greater volume of traffic on land and on sea than had been handled at any earlier stage of the war.

During the redeployment and the repatriation periods—that is, between V-E and V-J Days, and after V-J Day—the primary objective was to move the maximum number of troops. After the German surrender heavy shipments were necessary in order to transfer sufficient forces from Europe to the Pacific to maintain an ever-increasing pressure on Japan. The progress of the campaigns under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz had exceeded expectations; the Japanese strength obviously was deteriorating and no time was to be lost in pushing the war to a conclusion. After the Japanese capitulation public opinion in the United States demanded that the troops be brought home and demobilized with utmost dispatch. Providing transportation to meet these requirements proved to be a major task for the Army.

The Army's transportation task included, in addition to returning troops, heavy movements of patients from the theaters to the zone of interior, and after the fighting was over the repatriation of the war dead. Both movements involved peculiar problems and required special procedures. The return of civilians, including the dependents of military personnel, also gave rise to special problems, but this traffic was not allowed to interfere with homeward military movements.

While the bulk of the traffic was moved by ship and by rail, air transportation was used during the redeployment and repatriation periods to an extent that was not possible earlier. However, the aircraft so employed were under the control of the Army Air Forces, and the Chief of Transportation was not responsible for such movements.

Return Traffic Before V-E Day

Although the number of passengers landed at U.S. ports from Army troop-

GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR DEBARKING AT A U.S. PORT

ships before V-E Day was small compared to the number embarked for oversea areas, the volume of return traffic nevertheless became substantial as the war progressed. The experience gained in handling this return traffic was valuable to the Army in dealing with the larger problems that developed during redeployment and repatriation.

The military element of the wartime homeward traffic was made up chiefly of rotational and temporary duty groups, casuals returning on furlough or leave, and patients. Very few units were returned to the United States before V-E Day. The Army transported some personnel of the U.S. Navy and of the Allied forces, and prisoners of war constituted a considerable movement during the campaigns in North Africa and continental Europe. Among the civilians debarked were representatives of the nonmilitary branches of the U.S. and Allied Governments, the employees of contractors who had performed construction and other work for the Army abroad, dependents of military personnel who were overseas when the war began, and the brides and children of soldiers who had married while in foreign countries. Up to the time of the German surrender the largest monthly total of passengers debarked at U.S. ports from ships under Army control was 146,246 in September 1944. Prisoners of war, chiefly from the European theater, accounted for 41 percent of that number.

There was some redeployment of units from the less active to the more active oversea commands before V-E Day. The reduction of strength in Alaska, which began in the late summer of 1943, resulted in a number of units being returned to the United States for reorganization and reassignment. A considerable transfer of units from the South Pacific Area to the Central and Southwest Pacific Areas took place as Allied forces pushed the perimeter of the Japanese forces northward and westward. During the early months of 1945 a number of units with their impedimenta were moved from the Persian Gulf Command to the European Theater of Operations and to China, and from India to the Pacific Ocean Areas. These movements, however, required no extensive redistribution of shipping such as became necessary after the German capitulation.

The increasing number of casual troops returning to the United States during 1943 necessitated a clearer definition of categories and a more explicit statement on procedures. To this end consolidated instructions were issued by the War Department in September in a document entitled, Procedures for the Return of Individuals (short title: PRI), and these instructions were revised and amplified in August 1944.[1] Although it dealt with soldiers traveling as individuals, PRI contemplated that the majority of individuals would be placed in rotational (RO) groups or temporary duty (TD) groups under group commanders. The groups were to be organized in the theater so that each would include troops destined for a single reception station in the zone of interior. Such grouping was expected to have advantages from the standpoint of administration and discipline and also to facilitate transportation arrangements. The instructions stated the basis on which rotational and temporary duty troops were to be selected, the records that were to be kept, the processing that was to be done in the theaters, and the security indoctrination that was to be provided. Of more particular interest to the Transportation Corps, PRI specified the information that was to be radioed to the zone of interior by theater commanders when troops embarked, the issuance and disposition of group or individual movement orders, the procedures to be followed during the homeward voyage, the processing to be given at the ports of debarkation, and the manner of forwarding from the ports to the reception stations. PRI also covered the handling of troops at and beyond the reception stations.

The prompt and orderly handling of troops when they arrived at U.S. ports depended to a considerable extent on the degree to which the theaters fulfilled their responsibilities regarding the movements. In addition to organizing rotational and temporary duty personnel into groups and providing them with escort officers, the theater commanders were required to notify the Chief of Transportation each month how many passengers were awaiting evacuation to the zone of interior. They were also required to send a radio message immediately after each troopship departure giving the numbers and categories of passengers embarked.[2] Army ports in the United States were heavily engaged with outbound troop movements, and advance information regarding inbound movements was needed in order that the ports might arrange for accommodations at the staging areas, the assignment of processing personnel, the reservation of hospital beds for patients, and the provision of railroad equipment for the onward journey. The theater commands did not always provide the desired data. As late as March 1945 the Movements Division complained that the Southwest Pacific Area and the Pacific Ocean Areas were not complying with the instructions, since their advices often were entirely lacking or were not sufficiently explicit.[3] The theaters, although they protested strongly when full and prompt information was not received regarding troops en route to them, were themselves sometimes at fault in not providing such information on homeward-bound troops.

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[1] Memos, TAG for CG AAF, CG AGF, CG ASF, *et al.*, 26 Sep 43, AG 370.5 (22 Sep 43); 16 Aug 44, (10 Aug 44); 23 Dec 44, Supp. 1, (22 Dec 44); 17 Feb 45, Supp. 2, (17 Feb 45); 6 May 45, Supp. 3, (25 Apr 45).

[2] Detailed information was given the theaters regarding the capacities of vessels when carrying various types of troops to aid them in planning embarkations. OCT Misc Ltr 28, 14 Jul 44; 1st Ind, Mvmts Div for Contl Div OCT, 27 Nov 44; both in OCT 569.5 Pers Capacity of Transports.

Maintenance of morale required close attention on the part of transport commanders during the voyage back to the United States. Men returning from overseas who were eligible for further military service were inclined to take a gloomy view of the future and to allow their spirits to sag. To offset this tendency, transport commanders were instructed to make the maximum use of entertainment, exercise, and orientation courses to keep the men occupied.[4] Early in 1945 an experiment was undertaken at Hampton Roads to ascertain the feasibility of placing entertainers on vessels after their arrival in the harbor to provide diversion for the soldiers during the interval between arrival and debarkation. Although the experiment was an unqualified success as a morale lifter and the results were brought to the attention of other ports, the records do not disclose the extent to which the plan was adopted.[5]

The ports for which returning troopships were destined needed accurate information regarding the time of arrival in order to make arrangements for the prompt handling of the vessels and their passengers and to prepare for any repairs that might be necessary before the next voyage. The work of the ports was so closely scheduled that unexpectedly early or late arrivals were disconcerting. To emphasize this fact the Army port commander at New York stated that when a vessel with troops, patients, and other passengers was about to arrive there were forty-two agencies to be notified, and hospital cars and ambulances sometimes had to be brought from considerable distances.[6] The cryptographic messages from the ships were received at shore stations of the Navy and at first were transmitted "through channels" to the ports—a procedure that involved a loss of time. When the return traffic from Europe began to increase, direct communication between the Navy's Eastern Sea Frontier and the ports was authorized so that the ports might have a maximum amount of time in which to arrange for debarkations.[7] The requirement that vessels keep the ports informed regarding changes in the estimated time of arrival was in no sense burdensome, but uniform compliance was not obtained.[8] Failure of ships to notify ports of changes in estimated arrival times became a much more serious problem after redeployment began.[9]

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[3] Msg, Mvmts Div OCT to Theaters, 30 Aug 44, CM-OUT 23724; Msg, Mvmts Div OCT to POA, 2 Oct 44, CM-OUT 40317; Memo, Berzelius for Wylie, 16 Mar 45, sub: Problems That Concern Mvmts Div, OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[4] Memo, CofT for Mobilization Div ASF, 7 Aug 44, sub: Moralė of Troops Returning From Overseas, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; paraphrase of Msg to Theaters, 5 Dec 44, OCT HB PE Gen Troops Inbound. Transport commanders also were instructed to enforce preventive maintenance on rifles and other individual equipment during the voyage.

[5] Memo, CofT for CG SPE, 27 Mar 45, sub: Reception of Returning Pers, and atchd rpt from HRPE, 10 Mar 45, OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[6] Min of East Coast Port Comdrs Conf Relative to V-E Day Activities, 11 Apr 45, p. 14, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.

The port commanders were instructed to pass returning troops through their establishments as quickly as possible.[10] The soldiers heard a brief address of welcome immediately after debarkation, then were forwarded at once to the staging area, where they were to be processed. The staging area commanders endeavored to start the men on the next leg of their journey within twenty-four hours. Physical inspections were made, primarily with a view to preventing the spread of infectious diseases, except when there had been similar inspections by the ship's surgeon before debarkation. Pay records were checked and payments brought up to date. Fresh clothing and equipment suitable for the onward journey were provided. The records of each rotational and temporary duty group were examined to insure that they were intact and in possession of the group commander and that the entries were up to date. The movement orders of these groups were checked, and as soon as firm arrangements for rail transportation could be completed the reception stations for which the groups were destined were notified of the number of personnel involved and the probable time of arrival. Casuals that did not go to reception stations left the staging areas as individuals, or as groups when practicable, after their travel orders had been checked to verify the authority for their movement to new permanent stations, officer candidate schools, separation centers, or to other destinations when they were on emergency furlough or leave.[11]

Observation of troops arriving at New York from the European theater during the winter of 1944–45 disclosed that the morale of returning troops was being adversely affected by incorrect information received in the theater regarding their movements and responsibilities upon reaching the zone of interior. Promises made in the theaters and hopes thus built up in the minds of returnees could not be realized under the approved procedures. The Information and Education Division of the Army Service Forces was responsible for keeping theater commanders correctly informed regarding these matters, but adequate dissemination of information in the theaters was difficult because of the fluctuating military situation and changing personnel. The information-education organization in the European theater, initially attached to the headquarters of the Services of Supply, was transferred to

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[7] Remarks of Maj Jerry A. Griffin, C of Returning Troops Br, Mvmts Div OCT, at Mtg of Port Comdrs, Opng Representatives, and Port Air Officers, 8 Jul 44, in Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6–9 Jul 44, pp. 21, 22, OCT HB PE Gen.

[8] Memo, Farr for Gross, 29 Apr 43; Min of Mtg, Oversea Troop Br, Mvmts Div OCT, 22 Jul 43; both in OCT 370.5 Debarkation.

[9] See below, p. 189.

[10] This paragraph is based on PRI, 16 Aug 44, Secs. XI, XII, XIII. See also Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6–9 July 44, Mtg of Port Operating, Troop Mvmt, and Equip Representatives, 8 Jul 44, pp. 6–8, OCT HB PE Gen.

[11] Separation centers, the first of which was established in March 1944, and reception stations eventually were operated as components of the personnel centers that were created at eighteen military posts in the summer of 1944; the number of personnel centers was later increased to twenty-two. WD Cir 113, 20 Mar 44, Sec. IX; WD Cir 292, 11 Jul 44; WD Cir 422, 26 Oct 44; WD press release, 1 Sep 44, sub: 18 Centers Announced for Discharging and Processing Army Personnel, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.

USS *WAKEFIELD* LANDING TROOPS *from the European Theater of Operations.*

the staff of the theater commander in order that it might operate more effectively. The port commanders in the zone of interior were responsible for keeping transport commanders supplied with correct information so that the orientation given during the return voyage would coincide with that given in the theaters.[12]

Rotational and temporary duty troops made a number of trips in quick succession after leaving the ports of debarkation. As has been noted, all proceeded first to reception stations. While at the reception stations rotational troops, which were to remain in the zone of interior, received orders to proceed to redistribution stations but were allowed to take a furlough of twenty-one days en route; at the redistribution stations they received assignments to new stations to which they proceeded at once.[13] Temporary duty troops, which were to go back to their oversea stations after a thirty-day period of recuperation, returned at the end of that period to the same reception stations; AGF and ASF troops remained at the reception stations until called to the ports of embarkation, while AAF troops proceeded from the reception stations to AAF redistribution stations and thence to the ports.[14]

Although considerable experience was gained in handling returning troops before Germany surrendered, the War Department foresaw that redeployment would involve many adjustments in facilities and procedures. Accordingly, it started early and did a meticulous job in preparing to handle the troops that would be brought back to the United States after V-E Day.

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[12] Memos, CG NYPE for CofT, 27 Mar 45 and 14 Apr 45, sub: Info and Education for Returnees; 1st Ind, CofT for CG NYPE, 26 Apr 45; all in OCT HB Demob Plng Unit Gen Correspondence.

[13] WD Cir 303, 17 Jul 44; ASF Cir 235, 27 Jul 44; ASF Cir 253, 7 Aug 44; ASF Cir 402, 9 Dec 44.

[14] PRI, 16 Aug 44, pars. 76, 77; TC Cir 100-5, revised 20 Mar 45.

Preparations for Redeployment

The task of redeploying its forces after the defeat of Germany was recognized by the Army as both gigantic and complex.[15] A decision had to be made as to which units would be shipped from Europe directly to the Pacific and which would be returned to the zone of interior for either reassignment or demobilization. An equitable basis had to be established for the separation of some soldiers from the service and the retention of others. Means had to be found to maintain the morale of those who were being assigned to new oversea stations. All possible shipping had to be mobilized in order to effect redeployment with the greatest possible speed. Yet the flow of troops to and through the United States had to be regulated so as to avoid congesting the ports and the railroads. Care had to be exercised also to avoid glutting the limited number of ports in the Pacific areas that were to serve as bases for the invasion of Japan. The intricacy of the task was so apparent to the War Department, and to the other agencies concerned, that the planning to meet it was begun long before the invasion of continental Europe.

The planning for redeployment proceeded on several levels and therefore posed a broad problem of co-ordination. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff went into all aspects of the subject extensively, including transportation.[16] The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, a high-level British-American civilian agency, dealt with the employment of the shipping that was available to the United Nations.[17] The War Department developed plans relating to all phases of Army redeployment, to which Army Service Forces headquarters and the Chief of Transportation made contributions in their respective spheres. The Chief of Transportation joined with the Naval Transportation Service and the War Shipping Administration in planning for the readjustments in the allocation and operation of American vessels that would become necessary after the defeat of Germany. There also were discussions between the Chief of Transportation, the Office of Defense Transportation, and the Association of American Railroads regarding the effect of redeployment on domestic transportation. This brief review can present only those aspects of the broad subject that were of special interest to the Chief of Transportation.

Since planning for redeployment went hand in hand with planning for demobilization, such planning may be said to have started in the War Department in June 1942, when an advisory board of officers was appointed to initiate a study of the postwar Military Establishment.[18] Active planning in the Army Service Forces began in the spring of 1943. In July of that year a Special Planning Division was established in the War Department Special Staff to deal with both the industrial and the military aspects of demobilization. In September 1944 the War Department announced that the Army had "adopted a plan for the readjustment of military personnel after the defeat of Germany and prior to the defeat of Japan calling for a partial and orderly demobilization from its present peak strength."[19] This plan was subject to revision, of course, both before and after the end of hostilities in Europe, as further attention was given to requirements and procedures and as the circumstances of redeployment were more clearly seen.

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[15] See minutes of ASF press conference held immediately after V-E Day, especially remarks of General Somervell and General Gross, which relate to transportation, OCT HB Gen Redepl.

[16] Planning and TC participation is reviewed in Memo, Plng Div for Exec OCT, 23 Jul 45, sub: Redeployment Plng, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.

[17] See Wardlow, *The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations*, p. 165, for the purpose and organization of the CSAB.

[18] This paragraph based on Maj. John C. Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army, DA Pamphlet 20-210, July 1952, Ch. II.

The War Department readjustment regulations (RR) for personnel, in which the results of the extensive studies were crystallized, were published in a series of six pamphlets, all of which bore directly or indirectly on the responsibilities of the Chief of Transportation.[20] These regulations established four categories of troops: Category I troops were those to be retained in the same commands; Category II troops were those to be transferred from one theater to another; Category III troops were surplus units in the theaters that were to be reorganized and reclassified as Category I or Category II; and Category IV troops were units to be disbanded.[21]

Under the War Department's plan for redeployment, enough troops were to be shipped directly from Europe to the Pacific—the quickest route—to maintain maximum pressure against Japan. Consistent with that principle, as many as possible were to be redeployed by the slower route through the United States with time out for furlough before being reshipped to the Pacific. Some who returned to the United States were to be retained in the service and assigned to duty elsewhere than in the Pacific. As many as qualified for discharge under the Army's point system were to be returned to the zone of interior for immediate separation from the service.[22] All of these men would require ocean transportation—some for the long voyage from Europe to the Pacific, some from Europe to the United States and thence to the Pacific, and some only from Europe to the United States. In addition to troop transports, cargo shipping would be required for the organizational equipment and supplies of all troops destined for the Pacific. A basic responsibility of the Chief of Transportation in connection with redeployment was, therefore, the mobilization of the necessary shipping.

The plans formulated by the Chief of Transportation for the utilization of shipping during the redeployment period were necessarily tentative until the strategy and the troop basis for the final thrust against Japan had been determined. Nevertheless, such plans were made and remade with each change in the strategic formula so that the shipping aspect would always be assured of proper consideration. A member of the Chief of Transportation's Planning Division was transferred to the Special Planning Division of the Special Staff to work on the transportation phase of redeployment and to assure mutual understanding between the two offices.[23]

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[19] WD press release, 6 Sep 44, sub: WD Demobilization Plan After the Defeat of Germany; ASF Plan for Redeployment, Readjustment, and Demobilization (Period I), 13 Sep 44, OCT HB Demob Plng Unit Demob Plng WD Policies.

[20] These pamphlets, the latest revisions of which are in OCT HB Demob Plng Unit Redepl Gen, were as follows:

RR 1-1 Plan for Readjustment of Military Personnel After the Defeat of Germany
RR 1-2 Procedure for Readjustment Movements
RR 1-3 Athletic and Recreation Program
RR 1-4 Army Education Program
RR 1-5 Procedures for the Readjustment of Officers, Warrant Officers, and Flight Officers After the Defeat of Germany
RR 1-6 Standing Operating Procedures for the Demobilization of Category IV Elements.

[21] RR 1-1.

[22] Detailed procedures for the zone of interior and the theaters were published in AG Memo 320.2 (15 Feb 45), 27 Feb 45, sub: Policies and Procedures Governing the Redeployment of the Army; AG Memo 370.5 (25 Apr 45), 2 May 45, sub: Revision of Annex B.

In February 1945, when redeployment planning by both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff was taking final shape, General Gross contended that attention was being directed too largely to the problem of moving the troops and not sufficiently to the problem of making them operational—that is, having them equipped for action. At that time it was contemplated that over a period of about twelve months approximately 405,000 troops would be shipped from Europe directly to the Pacific and some 875,000 via the United States to the Pacific. General Gross urged that immediate consideration be given by all planning agencies to a study recently completed in his office that presented some essential data on the subject.[24]

The study presented an analysis of the time required to move troops and organizational equipment from Europe to the Pacific (Philippines), breaking down the total period into the time likely to elapse between the issuance of movement orders and actual departure from Europe, the time required for recuperation and training either in the United States or in the Pacific, and the time spent in travel over sea and land. The calculations indicated that, assuming no delay on account of equipment, 126 days would be required for troops to be redeployed directly and made operational; 179 days would be required in the case of troops redeployed through the United States. In contrast, 177 days would elapse before equipment shipped in unit assemblies direct from Europe to the Pacific would reach the troops, 187 days would elapse if equipment were shipped by the direct route in bulk and placed in depots before being issued to troops, and 262 days would elapse in the case of equipment shipped through the United States. From the calculations presented in this study, the Chief of Transportation concluded that the movement of equipment should be the controlling factor in scheduling the redeployment of troops; that the units to be redeployed directly should be nominated as early as possible so that their equipment might be started ahead of them; that so far as possible equipment should be shipped in bulk rather than as unit assemblies; and that the Pacific commands should be directed to establish equipment staging areas to facilitate bringing troops and their impedimenta together.

Although the poverty in troop lift, which had been one of the chief handicaps of the U.S. forces during the early days of war, had been largely overcome by increasing the capacities of existing passenger vessels, constructing new troopships, and converting freighters to troop carriers, as V-E Day approached this greatly expanded capacity was seen as inadequate to the needs of the redeployment period. Those needs involved not only the speedy transfer of troops from Europe and the United States to the Pacific, but the repatriation of troops from numerous areas that would become militarily unimportant with the surrender of Germany. A full year before V-E Day, the Planning Division in the Office of the Chief of Transportation pointed out that the completion of the troopship construction program for 1945 would not provide the troop spaces required for redeployment and that the conversion of further freighters would therefore be necessary.[25] A British-American study, submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in February 1945, recognized the danger of a substantial deficit in American troop lift and outlined ways of dealing with it. These ways included overloading of troopships, conversion of additional freighters, assistance from Allied, neutral, and captured enemy shipping, use of APA's and other naval vessels, full use of combatant aircraft, and careful co-ordination of the employment of all vessels under control of the Allied nations to insure maximum utilization of their capacities.[26]

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[23] Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Ronald B. Shuman, who had been with the OCT since its establishment, was transferred to the Special Planning Division soon after it was set up in 1943.

[24] Memo, CofT for Dir Plans and Opns ASF, 26 Feb 45, sub: Logistical Implications; Study, Redeployment Transportation Implications, 26 Feb 45, and appended Preliminary Revision of Redeployment; all in OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.

Redeployment required co-ordination between the Army and the Navy in scheduling the return of personnel to the United States, and it was foreseen that such co-ordination would be even more important when the large-scale repatriation of forces from the Pacific began. A proposal to this end was placed before the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Navy in November 1944.[27] Under this proposal the preparation and implementation of plans would have been handled on the staff level, and the Transportation Corps and the Naval Transportation Service would have been charged only with providing the means of transportation. Colonel Farr, as head of the Chief of Transportation's Movements Division, opposed the arrangement. He argued that staff decisions frequently involve long discussions, and the loss of time would prove a serious disadvantage in the effort to return troops at the maximum rate and to make maximum use of the transportation facilities. He urged that, after the basic policies had been established on the staff level, all operating matters relating to transportation be left to the appropriate operating agencies. Colonel Farr's stand was in harmony with the Chief of Transportation's protest, mentioned earlier, against the interference of higher echelons in technical matters. The Navy subsequently withdrew its proposal from the JCS docket on the ground that a study of redeployment policies had been undertaken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.[28]

The ports of embarkation, in addition to responsibility for processing Category II units (those being transferred from one theater to another) and forwarding them to reception stations, were given another responsibility for the redeployment and repatriation periods—that of inactivating Category IV units (those to be disbanded) and forwarding the members to personnel centers for further disposition. For the latter purpose the port commanders were directed to establish disposition centers in their staging areas, where the processing involved in disbanding the units and preparing the soldiers for their onward journey was to be performed.[29] Early planning in the War Department had contemplated that units to be disbanded would be forwarded from the ports to redistribution centers, where they would be inactivated and the men reclassified before being forwarded to reception stations or separation centers. The Chief of Transportation believed that the interposition of such redistribution centers involved an unnecessary waste of time and transportation, and it was for that reason that the inactivation of units was eventually assigned to the port commanders. For the same reason the Chief of Transportation favored placing reception stations and separation centers at the same installations, and the logic of this was recognized in the creation of personnel centers embracing both reception and separation activities.[30]

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[25] Memo, Stokes for Wylie, 8 May 44, sub: Proposals on C-4 Const Program, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.

[26] CCS 746/11, 8 Feb 45, title: Over-all Review of Cargo and Troop Shipping Position for Remainder of 1945, Tab D to Annex B to Appendix B, p. 30. This study, which represented the joint efforts of the CMTC and the CSAB, assumed the defeat of Germany by 1 July 1945.

[27] JCS 1154, 6 Nov 44.

[28] Memo, Farr for Stokes, 8 Nov 44, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; JMT 83/2, 11 Jan 45.

The adjustments that the east coast ports of embarkation would have to make when redeployment began were discussed at a conference held in New York on 11 April 1945. The chief problem was to retain sufficient staging capacity in active status and sufficient station personnel to handle the returning troops. The ports, along with other Army installations, had been under heavy pressure for some time to reduce personnel, and now they were confronted with a substantial increase in work load. Up to the time of this conference the port commanders had been handicapped in their planning by lack of information regarding the rate at which they would have to handle returning troops. In an off-the-record discussion, they were given such data as the Chief of Transportation possessed, and the estimate of the projected load, although it was tentative, enabled them to more competently compute and defend their estimates of requirements for personnel and facilities. The principal personnel needs were for clerks, typists, medical technicians, hospital ward attendants, and cooks. The need for such labor was abnormally heavy because returning troops passed through the staging areas very rapidly and usually were not available for kitchen, mess, or other work details.[31]

The planning that preceded the defeat of Germany did not neglect the Pacific coast, which was to carry the chief logistical load for both the Army and the Navy in the final drive against Japan. Care was taken to prevent shipping facilities from being diverted to nonshipping uses, and to build up staging area capacity to the level that would be required. Measures were taken also to clear depots and holding and reconsignment points of outmoded or excessive supplies in order that these installations might serve current needs more adequately. But the principal limiting factor was the capacity of the transcontinental railways. The Chief of Transportation had devoted much effort to helping the western rail lines increase their rolling stock and improve their right of ways, yet he recognized that Gulf and Atlantic ports would have to be used to some extent in supporting the forces in the Pacific.[32]

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[29] OCT Misc Ltr 133, 26 Oct 44, sub: Estab of Disp Centers; RR 1-6, 16 Feb 45; TC Pamphlet 39, 1 May 45, Disp Center Org and Procedures; TC Pamphlet 40, 15 May 45, Processing and Movement of Category II Units Returned from Overseas.

[30] Memo, Farr for Demob Plng Unit OCT, 24 Apr 44, OCT HB Mvmts Div Farr Staybacks; Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6–9 July 44, Mtg of Port Comdrs, Opng Representatives, and Port Air Officers, 8 Jul 44, p. 27, OCT HB PE Gen.

[31] Min of East Coast Port Comdrs Conf Relative to V-E Day Activities, 11 Apr 45; Min of Conf of Representatives of OCT and East Coast PEs on Handling Returnees, at NYPE, 11 May 45; both in OCT HB TC Gen Redepl; Memo, CofT for PMG, 6 Apr 45, sub: German POWs; Memo, NYPE for CofT, 14 Apr 45, sub: Post-V-E Day Requirements; last two in OCT HB Demob Plng Unit Gen Correspondence.

The processing of returning troops at the ports of debarkation was geared for speed. Early in the planning General Somervell pointed out that, whether they were to be separated from the service or to be sent on furloughs before being reassigned, soldiers would be impatient to reach their homes and any delay would increase the problems of morale and discipline. The Chief of Transportation therefore directed that there be no civic demonstrations at the ports; the brief receptions would be strictly military in character.[33] Under normal circumstances the processing of Category II units at the staging areas was to be accomplished within twenty-four hours, and the processing of Category IV units within forty-eight hours.[34] During the processing period constant attention was to be given to morale. Soldiers were to be relieved of work details when possible. A special meal was to be served to them soon after their arrival at the staging areas. Since a large percentage of the men would be intent on making telephone contact with their homes as quickly as possible, special telephone facilities were to be installed in the sections of the staging areas where the men would be housed, and portable telephones were to be provided in the hospitals for the use of bed patients. Arrangements were made for each man to have a thorough cleanup and to exchange any unpresentable articles of clothing for presentable ones.[35] The plan provided that while at the staging areas the troops would be briefed on the necessity of safeguarding military information and would be interrogated for information bearing on war crimes.

The Ground Forces and the Air Forces considered it necessary to maintain contact with Category IV troops while they were at the disposition centers, and the readjustment regulations provided for such liaison activities on the part of the major commands.[36] While recognizing that there were functions that the liaison officers could perform during this period, the Chief of Transportation and the port commanders viewed the arrangement with misgivings. This was particularly true because of the breadth of the instruction the AGF had issued to its liaison detachments. It was feared that the liaison activities would slow up the processing of troops and delay the onward movement. Great care had been taken to arrange for uniform and accurate information to be given the soldiers on the transports and at the ports of debarkation, and it was anticipated that the liaison detachments might introduce conflicting information. Such situations actually occurred during the initial stages of redeployment, but they were largely eliminated as the liaison groups gained a better knowledge of the responsibilities and methods of the disposition centers.[37]

According to War Department planning, troops, after being processed at the port staging areas, were to be forwarded to personnel centers located near their homes for further processing before being separated from the service, or released on furlough before reassignment. The plan provided that soldiers to be reassigned would return to the personnel centers at the end of their furloughs and be forwarded thence to assembly areas, where they would be prepared for further service.[38] The Chief of Transportation emphasized the desirability of handling this traffic in such a way as to minimize the strain on the passenger services of the railroads. He wanted to keep the number of trips that the men would make as low as possible and to have them travel in organized groups whenever practicable. Group travel in special cars or special trains, as distinguished from individual travel in regular trains, permitted more economical use of railway equipment, reduced the amount of ticketing and other paper work, and enabled the Army to exercise better control over the appearance and conduct of the troops. The Chief of Transportation had to combat numerous proposals that would have violated these canons, and it was not until early in 1945 that he was rewarded by the adoption of a procedure that conformed to his desires.[39]

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[32] Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 179, 180, 323-28.

[33] Min of Conf of CGs of SvCs, Dallas, Texas, 19 Feb 44, p. 41, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl; Min of Conf at NYPE, 11 May 45, p. 63, cited n. 31.

[34] Processing is defined in RR 1-1, RR 1-6, and TC Pamphlets 39 and 40, cited notes 20 and 29.

[35] Min of Conf at NYPE, 11 May 45, pp. 37-46, cited n. 31.

[36] RR 1-1, Chart I.

[37] OCT Misc Ltr 113, 5 Apr 45, sub: Liaison Detachments at PEs, and atchd Memo, AGF for ASF, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl; Min of Conf at NYPE, 11 May 45, pp. 7-16, cited n. 31; Ltr, Farr to author, 2 Jan 52, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

An effort was also made to avoid adding unnecessarily to the burden on the freight services of the American railroads. Most units returning to the United States in Categories II and IV were to be accompanied by only minimum essential equipment.[40] Heavy equipment that was still serviceable was to be shipped directly from Europe to the Pacific, and additional requirements were to be supplied from the United States. This would not only relieve the domestic carriers of the transportation of a large part of the impedimenta of redeployed units, but would also relieve U.S. ports of large transshipment operations. Equipment shipped to the Pacific from Europe and the United States was not to be marked for specific units, but rather was to be shipped in bulk and assigned to the units after their arrival at the Pacific bases.

To insure that the domestic transportation provisions of the redeployment plan were understood by all concerned, the Chief of Transportation arranged for a conference to be held in Chicago on 1 and 2 May. The first session was attended by transportation officers from the service commands, the transportation zones, the ports of embarkation, and the personnel centers, and the second session also included representatives of the carriers. In addition to clearing up any misconceptions regarding the plan of movement, these meetings were intended to give warning of the volume of traffic to be handled and the necessity for utmost economy in the use of railway equipment.[41]

It was anticipated that, despite the carefully devised arrangements for handling redeployment traffic, the railroads would encounter difficulties. Aside from the increase in the over-all load, the concentration of debarkations from Europe at a few east coast ports and the uneven rate of troop arrivals were expected to create periods of unusual strain. The outlook was discussed within the Army and by the other governmental agencies concerned with domestic transportation.[42]

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[38] Remarks by Col Finlay in Min of SvC Conf, Camp Grant, Ill., 28-30 Jun 45, pp. 199-206, OCT HB ASF; charts showing movements of Category II and Category IV troops, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.

[39] For more detailed statement of the issues, see OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 136-41; Memo, CofT for ACofS OPD, 20 Nov 44, OCT 370.5 Redpl of Units and Equip; Handwritten Memo, Wylie for Gross, 11 Jan 45, and atchd statement by Col Morris, Traf Contl Div OCT, sub: Redeployment, OCT HB TC Gen Redpl.

[40] RR 1-1, 15 Feb 45, par. 18; RR 1-2, 11 Apr 45, par. 16; Min of SvC Conf, Camp Grant, Ill., 28-30 Jun 45, p. 206.

[41] OCT Misc Ltr 130, 16 Apr 45; Notes on TC Conf, Chicago, 1-2 May 45, by Capt William H. Schmidt, Hist Off of Traf Contl Div; both in OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.

In accordance with a suggestion of the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, the domestic transportation implications of redeployment were considered early in the spring of 1945 by a panel representing the Office of Defense Transportation, the War Department, the Navy Department, the War Shipping Administration, the War Production Board, and the War Food Administration.[43] The ODT representative was the steering member of this panel. The statements submitted to the panel by the Director of ODT, Mr. Johnson, emphasized that, although the over-all transportation load would not be materially different from that handled in 1944, the cumulative strain of three years of war, the insufficiency of the new equipment provided during these years, and the inadequacy of manpower would result in a shortage of transportation during the period from V-E Day to V-J Day. Unless the programs relating to new equipment and manpower were revised, Mr. Johnson foresaw the necessity of curtailing nonmilitary traffic and possibly also establishing priorities on the movement of goods for war production. Although both passenger and freight traffic were considered, the chief concern appears to have centered about freight; yet the movement of troops became the more critical problem after redeployment began.

In formulating plans for redeployment it was contemplated that the water lift from the European and Mediterranean theaters would be supplemented by airlift for troops. The Army Air Forces estimated that the normal airlift would not exceed 12,000 per month, including 5,000 patients who were to have top priority. Shortly before V-E Day, however, the Chief of Staff directed the AAF to increase its transatlantic capacity so that 50,000 could be transported monthly, this figure to be attained not later than 1 July 1945. Measures to add the necessary aircraft to the services of the Air Transport Command were undertaken at once.[44] It was foreseen also that a large number of AAF personnel would be returned from the ETO and the MTO in tactical aircraft. Although initially it was expected that this AAF personnel would be moved directly from the aerial ports of debarkation to the places where they were being sent for recuperation, before redeployment began it was arranged that all troops landed at eastern airports would be forwarded first to the nearest water port staging area to receive the customary processing and to be organized into groups for the onward journey.[45] This arrangement avoided the necessity of setting up machinery for processing troops at the airports and furthered the Chief of Transportation's aim to move troops in groups of a carload or more to the greatest extent possible.

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[42] Ltr, ICC to CofT, 30 Jun 44, OCT 511 Misc TC; Min of ASF Staff Conf, 18 Jan 45, p. 10, OCT HB ASF; ODT press release, 31 Jan 45, OCT HB Topic ODT.

[43] OWMR Study V-E-9, sub: Transportation V-E Day to V-J Day, undated, but apparently issued in March or April 1945, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.

[44] Memo, ACofS OPD for CG AAF, 17 Apr 45, sub: Return of Casual Mil Pers from Europe, OPD 370.9, Sec. IX-A, Case 145; Memo, CG AAF for CofS, 22 Apr 45; Draft Memo, CofS USA for Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, 26 Apr 45, file copy indorsed "not used—discussed by Gen Giles with Adm Fitch"; Summary by G-4, 25 Apr 45; last three in G-4 580; Memo, ACofS OPD for Marshall, 3 May 45, OPD 370.9, Sec. IX-A, Case 145.

[45] Min of Conf at NYPE, 11 May 45, cited n. 31; Memo, ACofS OPD for CGs of AAF, ASF, etc., 12 May 45, sub: Return of Certain Aircraft and Crews, AG 370.5 (10 May 45); Memo, TAG for CGs AAF, ASF, etc., 21 May 45, sub: Disp of Individuals Returned under Green Project, AG 200.4 (18 May 45).

The War Department plan for redeployment included procedures to govern the disposition of troops and troop impedimenta that on V-E Day were en route to theaters then becoming inactive and troops that were under movement orders to proceed to those theaters. The intention, naturally, was to stop all outbound shipments except those which would be required in the theaters despite their inactive status. Provision was also made for the disposition of rotational and temporary duty troops whose further employment might be affected by the surrender of Germany.[46]

The Operations Division of the General Staff was charged with over-all responsibility for co-ordinating the actual redeployment of troops. The commanders of the AAF, the AGF, and the ASF each designated a liaison officer to work with the Troop Control Section of OPD, and the Chief of Transportation did likewise. The specific responsibility of the OCT liaison officer was to have on hand at all times information regarding the troops and the impedimenta that were en route and the location of all ships, as well as a plan for rescheduling the ships when redeployment began. Direct responsibility for controlling the disposition of troops and supplies was charged to the Movement Coordinating Center, which had been set up in the Mobilization Division of ASF headquarters.[47]

In order to test the adequacy of the procedures for redeployment and the readiness of the several agencies to carry those procedures into effect, the War Department ordered a dry run on 25 March. The actions that each agency would be required to take on V-E Day were simulated. After studying the results of the practice operation as it affected troop movements, the Chief of Transportation reported that he considered the prescribed procedures basically sound. There were, however, some details that required further attention. General Gross recommended particularly that each troop movement order issued thereafter be specifically marked to indicate whether the shipment would be stopped on V-E Day or continued. This arrangement already had been made in connection with cargo and had been found helpful. Accordingly the symbol "#" was placed on the order opposite the name of each individual who was to continue his oversea trip despite the intervention of V-E Day, and such troops were referred to as having been "crosshatched." One of the principal advantages anticipated from this system of marking was that it would enable the Transportation Corps, when practicable, to assign only shipments of the same classification to a troopship and thus simplify the disposition of shipments at sea on V-E Day.[48]

In the Office of the Chief of Transportation the planning for redeployment, as well as for demobilization, was the direct responsibility of each director and division chief, so far as his particular activities were concerned. Such planning involved many individuals and units within the OCT, and all proposals had to be co-ordinated with the other War Department agencies involved. In accordance with instructions from the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, to all technical services, the Chief of Transportation established a Demobilization Planning Unit in his office in November 1943. Headed by Col. Halsey Dunwoody (Ret.) and supervised by the OCT executive, Col. Luke W. Finlay, this unit served as a co-ordinating center for all Transportation Corps plans affecting redeployment, readjustment, and demobilization.[49]

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[46] Memo, TAG for CGs AAF, AGF, and ASF, 3 Apr 45, sub: Disp of Individuals in or En Route to U.S. for Rotation or TD, AG 210.31 (31 Mar 45).

[47] ASF Cir 112, 24 Apr 44, Sec. VI; ASF MCC Sp Memo 2, 7 Apr 45, sub: SOP for Sp Operation, OCT HB Demob Plng Unit Redepl Policies and Procedures; Memo, ACofS OPD for CGs ASF, AGF, and AAF, 9 Apr 45, sub: Procedure for Implementation of Redepl, OPD 370.9 (9 Apr 45), and Tabs A–G.

[48] Memos for Record by Col Farr and Maj Ouderkirk, both dated 25 Mar 45, OCT HB Ouderkirk Staybacks; Memo, Gross for Lutes, 29 Mar 45, OCT 387 Trail Run of V-E Day Actions; Memo by Ouderkirk, 14 May 45, par. 9, included in Mvmts Div Hist, Apr 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

Responsibility for the execution of approved plans on behalf of the Chief of Transportation also rested with the respective directors and division chiefs, or with the commanders of Transportation Corps field installations acting under their supervision. All actions to be taken by the Transportation Corps relating to redeployment, readjustment, and demobilization were described in detail in a pamphlet that was issued first in May 1944 and revised from time to time.[50] Immediately after V-E Day, as a further aid to those concerned with the redeployment of troops, the Chief of Transportation issued a schedule briefly outlining the actions to be taken and indicating the other War Department agencies with which co-ordination was necessary, the element of the OCT having primary responsibility for each action, and the other elements of the OCT concerned.[51]

The careful preparations that were made for redeployment, with respect to both the formulation of procedures and the assignment of responsibilities, reflected the realization that V-E Day might come suddenly and would call for a drastic readjustment in troop and cargo movements. They also reflected the realization that the smoothness and speed with which redeployment was effected would have a considerable bearing on the morale of the troops and the rapidity with which the war against Japan could be brought to a conclusion.

Redeployment Between V-E Day and V-J Day

When Germany surrendered on 8 May 1945 there were approximately 8,300,000 men and women in the U.S. Army in all parts of the world. About 5,400,000 of them were overseas, and some 3,500,000 of those were in the European and Mediterranean theaters. It was planned that by discharging about 2,000,000, moving a considerable number of troops from Europe to the Pacific, and continuing the draft about 6,968,000 men and women would be in service at the end of twelve months, a force considered necessary for the early defeat of Japan. The War Department explained to the nation that, although all physically fit soldiers who had not yet served overseas would be assigned to foreign service, it was still necessary for many of the troops that had fought in Europe to be redeployed to the Pacific. During the winter of 1944–45 the demands of the European theater had been so heavy that as V-E Day approached not a single combat division and few smaller tactical units remained in the United States. In order to meet the timetable of the war against Japan, about one third of the troops being redeployed to the Pacific would have to be shipped directly from Europe. The remaining two thirds could be redeployed through the United States and given furloughs en route.[52]

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[49] Memo, CofT for Dir of Industrial Demob ASF, 24 Nov 43, OCT 387 Demob Plng—Matériel; OCT Off Order 5-22, 25 Nov 43, sub: Demob Plng Unit; Memo, CofT for Dirs and Div Cs OCT, 10 Apr 45, sub: Responsibility for Preparing and Perfecting Redepl, Readj, and Demob Plans, OCT 387 Demob Plng.

[50] The first edition of TC Pamphlet 12 dealt only with matériel demobilization; actions relating to personnel redeployment were added later.

[51] OCT Misc Ltr 153, 9 May 45, sub: WD Agencies and OCT Divs Concerned with Redepl and Readj.

A few days after the German capitulation, Generals Somervell and Gross summarized the transportation aspects of redeployment as they then appeared. Assuming that an occupation force of about 400,000 would be left in Germany, some 3,100,000 soldiers would have to be transported from Europe during the ensuing ten to twelve months. It was estimated that approximately 845,000 would be moved during the first three months, 1,185,000 during the next three months, and 807,000 during the third quarter of redeployment. The Air Transport Command was expected to fly about 50,000 per month from Europe to the United States and the remainder would be transported by water. The long voyages to the Pacific, measuring up to 14,000 miles for troops proceeding directly from Europe to Manila, would necessitate an intensive use of all available shipping. The shipping problem was accentuated by the necessity of using many vessels for the "roll-up" of troops and supplies already in the Pacific areas and the inadequate port facilities in the Philippines and in other islands that were to serve as bases for the attack on Japan. They explained that, while the major task of redeployment from Europe to the Pacific was being performed, the Transportation Corps would also have to provide shipping to transport troops to and from numerous other oversea areas in order to carry out readjustments made necessary by the change in the strategic situation, and would have to transport troop replacements and supporting supplies to all forces stationed outside the United States.[53]

The effect of V-E Day on troopship movements in the Atlantic was moderate because the gradualness of the German collapse had permitted numerous adjustments to be made in advance. No large units had been shipped to Europe or the Mediterranean for some weeks, and the flow of replacement troops and combat equipment had been reduced to the minimum.[54] A week before the German surrender steps were taken to check the return to the theaters of temporary duty and furlough personnel that were in the United States, except those designated for return regardless of military developments.[55] As a result, so few troops were outbound when V-E Day arrived that it was not necessary to turn back any troopships then en route to Europe; they were permitted to continue to their destinations in order to be used immediately for redeployment.[56]

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[52] Public statement by the War Department summarizing testimony given in executive session of the House Committee on Military Affairs, issued 5 May 1945, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.

[53] ASF press conf, 10 May 45, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl. The transportation of about 90,000 American RAMP's (Recovered Allied Military Personnel) from Europe to U.S. had begun in April, and the bulk of the movement was embarked in May and June.

[54] Memo, Ouderkirk for Farr, 27 Apr 45, sub: Troops for May Shipment, OCT HB Mvmts Div Ouderkirk Staybacks.

[55] Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 1 May 45, CM-OUT 75415; Msg, Marshall to McNarney, 2 May 45, CM-OUT 76169.

[56] Memo, C of Mvmts Div for Hist Unit OCT, 20 Jun 45, par. 15, OCT HB Mvmt Div Rpts. In view of the prospective reduction of supply requirements in the ETO and the MTO, more than sixty cargo ships were either turned back to U.S. ports while at sea or were returned from Europe without unloading.



USS *WEST POINT* EMBARKING TROOPS AT NAPLES *a few days after the German surrender.*

About a dozen ships that had sailed or were about to sail to the United States with prisoners of war were ordered to discharge their passengers at the ports of origin so that they might embark troops without delay.[57]

Redeployment got under way quickly. The first troopships sailing from Europe to the United States carried small units and patients. The first large unit to arrive in the United States was the 86th Infantry Division, which reached New York on 17 June. By 7 July, within two months after V-E Day, two more complete infantry divisions and parts of seven others were back in the United States being prepared for reshipment to the Pacific.[58] The first American troops to sail from Europe directly to the Pacific left Leghorn, Italy, on 8 June and arrived at Manila on 15 July. The shipment included 4,275 service troops, urgently needed at Manila, whose relatively limited organizational equipment made their early departure possible.[59]

Co-ordination of the movement of troops and equipment was the greatest problem in direct redeployment. Although

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[57] Memo, CofT for Dir Plans and Opns ASF, 12 Apr 45, sub: V-E Day Action; Memo, Col Griffin for C of Mvmts Div, 9 May 45, sub: POW; Msg, Mvmts Div OCT to theaters, 11 May 45, WARX 81054, and appended note for record; all in OCT HB Mvmts Div Griffin Staybacks.

[58] WD press release for 8 July 1945 lists divisions scheduled for return to the United States by 31 December, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.

[59] Memo by Maj Ouderkirk, 5 Oct 45, included in Mvmts Div Hist for Jun 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.



86TH DIVISION TROOPS ARRIVING AT NEW YORK *are met by the "Welcome Home" boat.*

a number of fast freighters were assigned to lift the equipment, much of it had to move in slow freighters, and in some instances the departure of troops had to be delayed so that they would not arrive in the Pacific too long before impedimenta was available. The slowness in shipping equipment was due chiefly to the inadequate facilities at European ports for processing vehicles for the ocean voyage and to delays on the part of the Pacific commands in naming destination ports.[60]

Various measures were taken to enlarge troop-carrying capacity in order that the rate of redeployment might be increased. In anticipation of its need, the Army in March had urged the Maritime Commission to expedite the delivery of troopships then under construction.[61] Work was started soon after V-E Day on a program to install temporary accommodations on about 200 Liberty cargo ships to give them a capacity of 550 each, and to convert 100 Victory cargo ships to carry 1,500 troops each.[62] Late in June the Chief of Staff directed the Transportation Corps to "exploit every possible method of loading troopships to the maximum, including

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[60] Memo, CofT for OPD, 16 May 45, sub: Pacific Destinations, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Draft of Rad to CINCAFPAC Manila, 3 Jul 45, and atchd memo for record, OCT HB Ouderkirk Staybacks; Memo, C of Mvmts Div for Hist Unit OCT, 20 Jun 45, par. 15, OCT HB Mvmts Div Rpts.

[61] Ltr, Somervell to Rear Adm Emory S. Land (Ret), 28 Mar 45, OCT 561.4 Troop Transports.

[62] These Liberties had been equipped to carry up to 500 troops in 1943–44; see above, Ch. II, pp. 90–91, 145–48.



THE *QUEEN MARY* ARRIVING AT NEW YORK *with about 15,000 soldiers aboard.*

converted cargo ships, not in excess of the lowest acceptable standards." [63] It was anticipated that this would entail double bunking, subnormal ventilation and sanitation, and the extensive use of dried and prepared foods. Arrangements were made with the Navy that whenever practicable naval personnel returning from Europe would be accommodated on combatant ships in order that the troopship space allotted to the Navy might be used for redeploying soldiers.[64] The discontinuance of troopship convoys in the Atlantic on 4 June enabled the Army to quicken the turnaround of vessels.

The plans for achieving a speedy redeployment of troops included the continued use of vessels under British control and the employment of such passenger ships as might be surrendered by Germany. The British made their three largest liners—the *Queen Mary,* the *Queen Elizabeth,* and the *Aquitania*—available for the transportation of American troops from Europe to the United States until the end of 1945. At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, seven vessels that had been under German control were assigned to the United States.[65]

With the vessels thus obtained and with the aid of overloading wherever feasible, the Chief of Transportation calculated that by 1 October the troop shipping available to the U.S. armed forces would accommodate more than 1,000,000 men.[66] He estimated that about 660,000 troops could be embarked in all parts of the world in August with the troop lift then available.[67]

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[63] Memo, ACofS OPD for CG ASF, 28 Jun 45, OPD 370.5 PTO (25 Jun 45).

[64] Msg, CNO to COMNAVEU, 16 May 45, CM-IN 15801 (17 May 45).

[65] Wardlow, *op. cit.,* pp. 225–26.

Throughout redeployment the distribution of shipping was governed by plans for the build-up of strength in the Pacific. Although in the beginning vessels aggregating about 200,000 troop spaces were transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic, it was intended that they should lift only one shipment from Europe and then return to the Pacific.[68] Early in July OPD requested that the troop lift in the Pacific be increased by 111,000 spaces. This request was met by the reassignment of seventy-four Victory ships that had been designated for service in the Atlantic after conversion to troop carriers. By that time the flow of troops from Europe to the United States by water and air had so far exceeded expectations that the transfer of this large number of vessels could be made without prejudicing the ability of the Transportation Corps to complete the removal of troops from Europe by 30 June 1946.[69] Arrangements with the Navy assured that all available space in combatant vessels sailing from the United States to the Pacific would be used for troops.[70]

Because of the intensity with which the ships were used, close co-ordination was necessary between the War Department and the theater commanders, and this was particularly true of the European theater. Soon after V-E Day Maj. Gen. Frank S. Ross, Chief of Transportation, ETOUSA, and a group of officers came to Washington to work out the details of redeployment procedures. The Army Service Forces sent a group to Europe, including representatives of all technical services and some of the staff divisions, to assist the ETO and the MTO with their redeployment problems.[71] The Chief of Transportation kept the theater commanders informed regarding troopship schedules, including anticipated arrival and departure dates at American and European ports. Each theater commander was required to send a pre-embarkation message to the War Department about five days in advance of every homeward sailing giving a summary of the troops to be embarked, and to dispatch complete troop rosters by air mail on the same day. Within twenty-four hours after a sailing the theater commander notified the War Department by radio concerning any corrections in the data previously forwarded.[72]

An observer from the New York Port of Embarkation who was detailed to the ETO during the greater part of the redeployment period reported that one of the chief difficulties in the theater was to reconcile the troop movement directives received from OPD with the troopship schedules and capacities provided by the Chief of Transportation, since the former consistently exceeded the latter notwithstanding the general practice of overloading the vessels to the maximum.[73] This difficulty suggests that the co-ordination between OPD and the OCT regarding homeward movements was less complete than it had been during the period of heavy outbound shipments.

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[66] Estimate by Water Div OCT, 10 Jul 45, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.

[67] Memo, CofT for Dir Plans and Opns ASF, 7 Aug 45, sub: Available Troop Lift, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.

[68] Memo by Maj Russell H. Nies, 14 Jun 45, in Mvmts Div Histories, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

[69] Memo, ACofS OPD for CG ASF, 7 Jul 45, sub: Increased Lift for Pacific, OPD 370.5 (7 Jul 45); Memo, Wylie for Stokes, 9 Jul 45, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl; Ltr, JCS to Adm Land, WSA, 28 Jul 45, OPD 561, Sec. III.

[70] Min of OCT Opns Mtg, 25 Jun 45, OCT HB Dir of Opns.

[71] Min of ASF Staff Mtg, 29 May 45, p. 16.

[72] Memo, Farr for Finlay, 24 Jul 45, OCT HB Griffin Staybacks.

The Army in its planning for redeployment attached considerable importance to maintaining morale. The morale problem had to be met first in the theaters while the troops were in a state of comparative idleness awaiting transportation. The prime necessity was to keep the men occupied, and this was done as far as possible by programs of athletics, recreation, and education.[74] Care was taken also to provide correct information on redeployment objectives and procedures so that the troops would not build up expectations that could not be realized. Indoctrination was not always accomplished before sailing, and the transport commanders were accordingly directed to give the matter special attention during the voyage.[75] One result of misinformation, which had to be corrected, was that the troops believed they were on leave from the time they left the theater. Actually they were in duty status until their furloughs started at the reception stations.

When the fighting ceased the general attitude of troops in Europe was that they would willingly endure any discomfort on the voyage homeward if that would hasten their arrival, yet many voiced complaints after reaching the United States. In a broad survey of soldier opinion on the manner in which redeployment was being accomplished, The Inspector General heard many criticisms of conditions on the ships and the handling of the troops.[76] The difference in attitude before and after the voyage is not difficult to understand. In Europe the soldier was filled with the desire to get home and nothing else seemed important. Once on the way, he was face to face with the abnormal conditions that inevitably attend troop movements executed under pressure, and he found them not to his liking. It is probable that some men registered complaints when approached by press reporters after debarkation because they believed that that was the only way to make the news columns. It is clear, on the other hand, that because of overcrowding the ocean voyage could scarcely have been a pleasant experience. Many of the complaints were from men who had returned on the temporarily converted Liberty ships. It would have been fortunate if the use of these ships could have been avoided, but they were needed to carry out the timetable of redeployment, and their use before and after V-J Day enabled 375,000 soldiers to reach home earlier than would have been the case otherwise.[77]

Because of the increased number of ships to be debarked at U.S. Atlantic ports during redeployment, careful planning was necessary for the most efficient use of port facilities and rail transportation. Accurate information regarding the time of arrival for each vessel was needed, and this information was supplied by radio reports from the ships to the Navy's Eastern Sea Frontier (ESF). These reports were relayed to the Chief of Transportation and the ports of embarkation. After V-E Day in order to assure the prompt distribution of such information, the Chief of Transportation arranged for the establishment of a liaison staff at ESF headquarters in New York. This staff, which began functioning on 22 May, consisted of an officer from the OCT and officers and enlisted men assigned by the port commanders at Boston, New York, Hampton Roads, and Charleston. It maintained a twenty-four-hour watch and made one comprehensive report to the port commanders each day in addition to such special reports as might be found necessary.[78]

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[73] Memo, Lt Col Milton Wallach for CofT, 5 Sep 45, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.

[74] Such programs were outlined in RR 1-3 and RR 1-4.

[75] Memo, CofT for CG ETO, 23 Apr 45, sub: Orientation Before Embarkation at Oversea Ports, OCT HB Griffin Staybacks; Memo, TAG for All Theaters, 27 May 45, AG 370.5 (24 May 45); Memo, CofT for CGs of PEs 29 May 45, sub: Info for Returned Troops, OCT HB Mvmts Div Troop Mvmts Inbound.

[76] Memo, TIG for CG ASF, 28 Jul 45, sub: Conditions Surrounding and Treatment Afforded American Troops Being Returned to U.S.; 2d Ind, CofT for CG ASF, 21 Aug 45, commenting on the various complaints; both in OCT 370.5 Returning Overseas Veterans. Cf. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1949), pp. 420-22, on attitude of RAMP's.

[77] Col Marcus B. Stokes, Jr., Shipping in War, p. 22, OCT HB Topic Logistics Gen.

With the arrival of V-E Day the adjustments that had been planned for the port staging areas were placed in effect. The procedures for the operation of disposition centers for disbanding Category IV units had been recently tested at the New York Port of Embarkation, and such centers were immediately placed in operation by the port commanders at Boston, Hampton Roads, and New Orleans,[79] as well as at New York. Redeployment areas were established by these port commanders to handle Category II troops, which were being sent on to the Pacific. A section of the staging area at the Charleston Port of Embarkation, which handled a relatively small volume of troop traffic, was designated to serve as a disposition center or redeployment area as conditions might require. Since redeployment involved the return of many seasoned troops from the Pacific for demobilization, disposition centers were set up also at San Francisco, Seattle, and Prince Rupert. The basic purpose in establishing disposition centers and redeployment areas in the staging areas at the ports was to segregate inbound troops completely from those en route to the theaters in order that the different types of processing might be accomplished without interference or delay.

The plan to increase redeployment by utilizing aircraft resolved itself into two projects. The Green Project, which involved the assignment of additional transport planes to the Air Transport Command for transatlantic service, continued until 10 September 1945 and transported about 166,000 troops from the ETO and the MTO to the United States. At its height the undertaking exceeded somewhat the target of 50,000 troops per month, but in August the Army began to withdraw aircraft from it as part of a plan to augment the flow of troops from the United States to the western Pacific. The White Project involved the transportation of AAF crews and such other personnel as could be accommodated in bombers that were being returned from Europe to the zone of interior. About 85,000 men were returned in this manner.[80]

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[78] Msg, Mvmts Div OCT to CG BPE, *et al.*, 18 May 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Griffin Staybacks; Rpts of Returning Troops Br and Liaison Staff in Mvmts Div Hist for Jun 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

[79] OCT Misc Ltr 159, 14 May 45; 1st Ind, NYPE for CofT, 18 Jun 45; both in OCT HB TC Gen Redepl. The latter document outlines readjustments made at NYPE for handling inbound troops.

[80] WD press release, 23 Jul 45, sub: 125,370 Troops Flown from Europe Since May 1; Memo, ACofS OPD for CofS USA, 4 Aug 45, sub: AAF Plan for Increasing Pacific Troop Lift, and other documents in OPD 320.2 TS, Sec. V; data provided by Hist Br, Int Div MATS, 19 Jun 51, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.

The number of troops arriving in the United States from the European and Mediterranean theaters during June was much greater than the number that had been forecast. Early in May the Chief of Transportation had estimated that June arrivals by water would approximate 107,000; this estimate was later revised to 154,000 and actual arrivals were slightly in excess of 236,000. The increase was explained by the Movements Division on several grounds. The Navy's discontinuance of troopship convoys on 4 June permitted faster turnaround of the vessels. The resort to maximum overloading on all vessels ordered by the General Staff added substantially to the capacity of each ship. Several ships that had been scheduled for direct sailings to the Pacific were used for one voyage in the North Atlantic. The Army Air Forces also exceeded expectations by landing 56,000 troops in the United States under the Green and White Projects.[81] The total of approximately 292,000 troops landed on the Atlantic seaboard by water and air in June was exceeded by about 49,000 in July, when 341,00 were returned to the United States from the ETO and the MTO.[82]

The impact of the unexpectedly heavy influx of troops on the American railroads was severe. All of the returning soldiers, whether they were being redeployed or demobilized, had to make a number of trips in quick succession. The entire process was geared to speed, which gave no opportunity to regulate the flow and level off the peaks. Many of the troops arriving from Europe and the Mediterranean were destined for personnel centers in distant western states. The traffic from the eastern ports was largely one-way, so that a great deal of deadheading of railway equipment was involved. The demand for Pullman equipment, which had been heavy throughout the war, now became heavier, and the new troop sleepers that had been ordered after V-E Day were not yet available.

The carriers were able to provide transportation for the heavy movements from the ports, but they frequently were unable to provide sleeping cars for soldiers who were entitled to them under Army regulations. Many complaints were received through Congressional and other channels because returning veterans were required to make long trips without proper sleeping facilities. General Gross had already given the Office of Defense Transportation his opinion that a "firm denial of transportation means to the public" would be necessary and had suggested ways of making more sleeping cars available for troops.[83] On 26 June the matter was again presented to the ODT in a joint letter from the Army, the Navy, the Coast Guard, and the Marine Corps. The armed forces expressed concern because of "the inadequate response" made thus far in the provision of passenger equipment for military personnel returning from overseas. They stated that between 1 and 24 June, 143,000 Army troops had traveled an average distance of 1,251 miles in coaches because sleepers were not provided; meanwhile regular overnight sleeping car services were being maintained for the general public. While recognizing that the manner of meeting the military need must be left to the ODT and the carriers, the armed forces suggested that Pullman equipment be withdrawn from all regular routes of 400 miles or less and that reservations for sleeping car space be restricted to a period of five or six days in advance of the journey.[84]

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[81] Ltr, Johnson, Dir ODT, to USW, 18 Jul 45, OCT 511; Memo, Finlay for Farr, 23 Jul 45, and reply 24 Jul 45, OCT 387 Demob Plng.

[82] Ltr, SW to Sen William F. Knowland, 30 Oct 45, WDCSA 370.01, Sec. VIII, Cases 221-320.

[83] Ltr, Gross to Johnson, 30 May 45, OCT HB Gross ODT.

Early in July the press carried the story of a movement of 500 officers and enlisted men from Camp Myles Standish in Massachusetts to Camp Beale in California that had been made in day coaches. During the trip a rumor spread among the troops to the effect that sleeping cars had been passed that were occupied by German prisoners of war. The investigation that followed disclosed that the cars assigned to this movement were entirely unsuitable for so long a trip, but failed to locate any member of the party who claimed to have actually seen prisoners of war in sleeping cars. In his news conference on 5 July, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson was requested to give the facts concerning the matter. He stated that the report regarding prisoners of war was not true and that sleeping cars were never used for such traffic except in the few cases where prisoners were also hospital patients. Referring to the assignment of day coaches, Mr. Patterson observed that the War Department some weeks previously had called the situation to the attention of the railroads and the Office of Defense Transportation and had urged that sleepers be provided for long trips, but that adequate relief had not yet been forthcoming.[85]

The public statement by the Under Secretary of War brought a vigorous response from the Director of Defense Transportation and also some countercharges. Mr. Johnson denied that the cars used for the trip from Camp Myles Standish to Camp Beale had been commuter cars as had been reported; they were all standard, steel day coaches. He objected to the implication in Mr. Patterson's statement that the entire blame for the necessity of carrying soldiers across the continent in day coaches lay with the ODT and the carriers. Rather, he contended, the War Department had never consulted the ODT regarding any of its troop movements and had not kept the ODT informed regarding the fluctuations in the volume of its redeployment traffic. He referred particularly to the great increase in troop arrivals from Europe and the Mediterranean during June compared with earlier estimates, and the prospective increase in July arrivals. He stated: "If you expect transportation to be furnished adequately, the Office of Defense Transportation and the Association of American Railroads must be informed of any such fluctuations."[86]

Mr. Patterson promptly answered these charges. He asserted that whether or not the cars assigned to the movement in question were, strictly speaking, commuter types they were quite unsuitable for transcontinental travel. He did not believe that lack of detailed information regarding projected movements justified the failure to provide proper equipment. He cited various occasions on which the ODT and the railroads had been warned of the heavy demand that would be made on them for equipment and the specific suggestions that had been made to increase the number of sleepers available for troops. He asserted that with regard to withdrawing additional sleepers from regular services the Army had observed a "hesitating attitude" on the part of the carriers and a "desire to escape a direct solution." The Under Secretary added that in order to meet the charge that the load had not been adequately defined for the ODT, the Chief of Transportation thereafter would furnish the ODT with all forecasts and any modifications that might become necessary.[87]

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[84] Ltr, Armed Forces to Johnson, 26 Jun 45, OCT HB Gross ODT. Concerning the Canadian Government's control of the use of rail equipment, see Ltr, Thomas C. Lockwood, Canadian Transport Controller, to Johnson, 15 Jun 45, and Ltr, Gross to Lockwood, 21 Jun 45, both in OCT HB Gross ODT.

[85] Memo for the press, 5 Jul 45, ASF Hq Control Div 531.2. Reports and affidavits concerning this troop movement are in OCT HB Wylie Troop Mvmts.

[86] Ltr, Johnson to Patterson, 6 Jul 45, ASF Hq Control Div 531.2.

The Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program took cognizance of the complaints regarding the transportation furnished to returning troops and the controversy over responsibility for the situation. The committee's hearings gave Mr. Johnson an opportunity to review his differences with the armed forces and the circumstances that he felt had intensified the problem. He reiterated his contention that the Army had failed to keep him properly informed regarding the volume of railway traffic to be expected as a result of redeployment, and that in the absence of such information adequate plans to meet the requirements for equipment could not be made. This, however, was only the immediate cause of the difficulty. Deeper causes lay in the failure throughout the war to make adequate provision for new railway equipment and for the protection of railway manpower. These failures were largely due to the heavy demands of the armed forces for military equipment and military manpower, and Mr. Johnson stressed the point, which he had made before, that it was inconsistent to make extraordinary efforts to destroy the enemy's transportation system while at the same time allowing our own to deteriorate.[88]

Since General Gross was in Europe at the time of the hearing, the Chief of Transportation's position was presented to the committee by Maj. Gen. John M. Franklin, Acting Chief of Transportation, aided by Colonel Finlay, Executive. Their statements indicated that the Office of the Chief of Transportation, in accordance with arrangements in effect throughout the war, had furnished advance information regarding specific troop shipments to the Association of American Railroads, which then took steps to provide the required equipment. The OCT had provided the Director of Defense Transportation with forecasts of the number of troops to arrive each month, but had not given him further details because such details had not been requested and he had no apparent need for them. The failure to keep Johnson currently informed regarding the increase of redeployment traffic over forecasts was explained on the ground that in the new undertaking to bring large numbers of troops back to the United States the excess of shipments over estimates became apparent only from day to day. In the testimony on behalf of the Chief of Transportation, the point was stressed that the problem was not one of furnishing equipment for the movement of troops, since that was already being done, but one of providing sleeping cars for those who were required to make long trips.[89]

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[87] Ltrs, Patterson to Johnson, 9 Jul 45 and 26 Jul 45, both in OCT 511 Redepl; Memo, CofT for Dir Opns OCT, *et al.*, 1 Aug 45, sub: Rpts of Troop Mvmts for ODT, OCT 511 1943-45. In a letter to the Under Secretary of War, Mr. Johnson denied that there had been any disposition to withhold equipment from the military services and attributed any such appearance to lack of adequate information with which to work. (Ltr, Div OCT to USW, 18 Jul 45, OCT 511 Redepl).

[88] Press release by the committee, 19 Jul 45, ASF Hq Contl Div 032.3 Mead Committee; Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., *Hearings*, July 23 and 24, 1945.

Reading the testimony and related correspondence, one cannot escape the conclusion that neither party was without fault. If the Director of Defense Transportation, feeling that he was not being kept properly informed, had requested more up-to-date and detailed information, he undoubtedly would have received all the data that were available. He did not do this, however, until eight weeks after V-E Day, when the use of unsuitable equipment to transport troops was receiving widespread publicity. On the other hand, it is difficult to understand why the Chief of Transportation, having repeatedly asserted that the Director of Defense Transportation was responsible for the adequacy of transportation to meet the Army's need, should not have voluntarily provided that official with any and all information bearing on the extent of the need.

Several weeks after the issue came into the open, Under Secretary Patterson in a letter to John W. Snyder, Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, stated that the failure to keep Mr. Johnson fully informed had been due partly to inadvertence and partly to the lack of a clear understanding of the type of information desired.[90] This no doubt is a fair statement. More fundamental are the facts that Johnson and Gross did not agree regarding the extent to which civilian travel should be curtailed in favor of military traffic, and that while in many respects the two offices co-operated freely the relationship between them on matters involving this issue was not a sympathetic one.

The contention of the Director of Defense Transportation that throughout the war the requirements of the domestic carriers for new equipment and manpower had been neglected because of the heavy demands of the armed forces goes to the heart of the problem of war production and manpower utilization. The armed forces had been given certain strategic objectives, and their requirements for soldiers, equipment, and supplies were based on their estimates of what was necessary to accomplish those objectives. They did not fail to recognize the importance of the transportation industry in the military effort and made certain concessions to aid the carriers, but those concessions were not sufficient to meet the ODT point of view. In this connection two aspects of the military point of view must be understood. With regard to transportation equipment, the Army contended that the military need could and should be met with the available facilities by restricting the civilian use of transportation for nonessential purposes. With regard to manpower, the Army believed that the problems of both industry and the military forces could have been greatly eased by a more judicious use of the nation's labor force, possibly under a national service law.[91]

As a result of the situation that developed in June and early July, several orders were issued by the ODT to regulate the use of railroad passenger cars. The carriers were directed not to reserve, allocate, or sell reserve seats or sleeping car space more than 120 hours in advance of the scheduled departure of the train.[92] The measure was designed to check the practice adopted by some individuals and business firms of tying up space for which they did not have a specific or legitimate need. The operation of sleeping cars on routes of 450 miles or less was prohibited. The ODT stated that as a result of this order about 900 sleeping cars were withdrawn from regular service and placed in a pool for use of the military forces.[93] All railway passenger coaches were placed in a pool to be employed under the direction of the ODT, and the chairman of the Car Service Division of the Association of American Railroads was designated the agent of the ODT to administer the order.[94] The armed forces were required, when making organized military movements, to place three persons in each sleeping car section and corresponding coach space. This requirement made uniform the practice the Army had followed throughout the war and brought to an end the Navy's insistence on placing only two men in a section.[95] The ODT had proposed that four soldiers be placed in a section, but the Army refused to concur contending that such crowding was "beyond practicable limits," and pointing out the unfairness of requiring soldiers to travel under such conditions when civilians "vacation-bent" could have sole occupancy of berths.[96]

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[89] *Hearings* cited n. 88, July 27, 1945.

[90] Ltr, Patterson to Snyder, 30 Jul 45, OCT HB Gross ODT. For a summary of the information given the ODT, see TWX Conf, Gen Franklin, *et al.*, in Washington with Gen Gross in Berlin, 24 Jul 45, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.

[91] For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 328-41.

A number of measures were taken by the Army to relieve the acute transportation situation. The War Department renewed its instructions on reducing official military travel wherever practicable.[97] Local transportation officers were directed to consolidate small groups whenever possible in order to conserve car space, and officers ordering such movements were directed to set dates between which the movement might be made, rather than specific dates.[98] Local transportation officers were again reminded that they must give the carriers as much advance notice of their equipment requirements as possible.[99] The passenger associations of the railroads were urged to select the shortest routes for troop movements so far as practicable.[100] The regulation providing that troops were entitled to sleeping car accommodations for overnight trips was temporarily suspended, and transportation officers were directed not to request sleeping cars for trips of less than forty-eight hours.[101] The Chief of Transportation maintained a time record for each movement, indicating each step in the process of ordering equipment and moving troops, in order to ascertain where unnecessary delays were encountered.[102]

A plan of "rotational sleeping," which

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[92] ODT GO 52, 29 Jun 45.

[93] ODT GO 53, 7 Jul 45; ODT, *Civilian War Transport*, pp. 82, 83.

[94] ODT GO 55, 17 Jul 45.

[95] ODT GO 56, 20 Jul 45; Ltr, SW to SN, 5 Jul 45; Ltr, SN to SW, 13 Jul 45; last two in G-4 510, Vol. III.

[96] Ltr, Johnson to Patterson, 30 Jun 45; Ltr, Patterson to Johnson, 4 Jul 45; both in ASF Control Div 531.2.

[97] Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS and SW, 3 Aug 45; Ltr, SW to Dir ODT, 6 Aug 45; Ltr, Acting SW to Dir ODT, 22 Aug 45; all in G-4 510, Vol. III.

[98] WD Cir 199, 3 Jul 45.

[99] WD CTB 35, 10 Jul 45.

[100] Memos, CofT for the respective passenger associations, 18 Jul 45 and 26 Jul 45, OCT 387 Demob Plng—Redepl Traf.

[101] Msg, TAG for SvCs, 11 Jul 45; Memo, CofT for TAG, 9 Aug 45, sub: Sleeping Car Equip, AG 510 (27 Aug 42)(2).

[102] Ltr, White to IMC, 25 Jun 45, OCT 531.7 Train Service; Memo, MTS for White, 7 Aug 45, OCT 080 AAR.

promised a substantial saving in sleeping car space, was tried by the Transportation Corps in July. The two trains that were operated experimentally on this basis were made up of both sleepers and coaches. The troops that had occupied the sleepers during half of the day were moved to the coaches, and the troops that had occupied the coaches were moved to the sleepers. Theoretically the plan seemed good, but in practice it presented difficulties and accordingly was not employed further. Aside from the inevitable disorder involved in changing cars, the transfer of troops from air-conditioned sleepers to non-air-conditioned coaches in midsummer created more dissension than if the men had been obliged to travel in coaches all the way.[103]

The Director of Defense Transportation requested the Army to ascertain whether greater use could be made of airlift and motorbuses in the effort to lighten the load on the railroads. The Army Air Forces determined that it would be practicable to release from seventy-five to eighty transport planes and about 260 airline pilots then in the service, and to place the equipment and personnel at the disposal of the transcontinental commercial airlines for their use in transporting military passengers. This supplementary airlift was expected to provide transcontinental passage for about 25,000 troops per month. The project was approved by the War Department late in July, but the commercial airlines did not begin moving troops until after the Japanese surrender.[104] The use of buses in lieu of rail transportation was limited by the agreement between the armed forces and the railroads to cases where the highway carriers could provide more satisfactory service than the rail lines, but local transportation officers, particularly those at personnel centers, were encouraged to keep in mind the possibility of using the highway carriers when they offered superior service.[105]

The Director of Defense Transportation also recommended that the War Department endeavor to arrange a more even flow of troops into the Atlantic coast ports. He pointed out that during a ten-day period in mid-July approximately 30,000 troops had arrived on each of two peak days, whereas the daily average for the period was less than 12,000. The War Department recognized that such heavy concentrations placed an unusual burden on the railroads, but it stated that in order to carry out the plan to return troops from Europe as quickly as possible and to be in a position to transfer ships to the Pacific for a rapid build-up against Japan, it had to make maximum use of the vessels. An attempt to smooth out the inbound flow of troops would involve retarding some of the ships, which the War Department did not consider feasible.[106] It was evident also that the measures taken had somewhat improved the military sleeping car situation, for General Williamson was able to report on 28 July that during the preceding ten days the carriers had provided sleeping cars for all movements of forty or more troops when the travel time was forty-eight hours or more.[107]

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[103] WD press release, 20 Jul 45; Interv with Maj Farley, 24 May 51; both in OCT HB TC Gen Redepl. Major Farley represented the Traffic Control Division, OCT, as an observer on one of these trips.

[104] See below, pp. 208–09; Memo, Maj William H. Henderson, Jr., for ACofS G-4, 19 Jul 45, sub: Investigation of Air Lift; Memo, CG AAF for CofS USA, 27 Jul 45; Ltr, USW to Dir ODT, 31 Jul 45; all in G-4 510, Vol. III.

[105] Memo, CofT for ACofS G-4, 31 Jul 45, sub: Use of Commercial Bus Lines; WD CTB 43, 23 Aug 45; both in AG 537 (31 Jul 45).

[106] Ltr, Dir ODT to USW, 24 Jul 45; Ltr, USW to Dir ODT, 31 Jul 45; both in G-4 510, Vol. III.

Because of the several categories of troops that were in a sense competing for the available sleeping car space, the Traffic Control Division in the Office of the Chief of Transportation had employed an informal plan of priority throughout the war. In August 1945 this plan was elaborated and adopted by all of the armed forces.[108] The joint preference agreement was applicable to all carload traffic moving under the Joint Military Passenger Agreement and to individuals engaging sleeping car space through the government reservation bureaus. First preference was given to hospital and litter patients regardless of the distance to be traveled. Second preference was given to troops moving to staging areas or replacement depots for shipment overseas. Third preference was applicable to redeployed troops moving from ports of debarkation to personnel centers and from personnel centers to assembly stations before embarkation for Pacific destinations, and also to certain civilian technicians moving under military orders. The remaining traffic was covered by preferences four and five. Within a preference category, priority was given to the movement involving the greatest number of nights of travel. This joint preference agreement did not go as far as the Chief of Transportation had gone in directing that movements of less than forty-eight hours should use coaches; it provided instead that movements of 450 miles or less would not use sleepers unless the cars otherwise would have to be deadheaded, and that movements involving only one night en route would use coaches if they were available. Probably the improvement in the sleeping car situation that occurred in July and the prospect of early delivery of the 1,200 special troop sleepers on order influenced the decision.

The heavy and steady flow of troops from port staging areas to personnel centers gave rise to some new problems in the operation of troop trains. The number of troop train commanders had to be greatly increased, and many inexperienced officers had to be trained to perform the exacting duties; arrangements were made so that they could shuttle back and forth with as little delay as possible. In addition to the train commander, the commander of a staging area assigned a group supervisor for the troops destined for a single personnel center, a car leader for each car, and the required number of kitchen and mess personnel. The Chief of Transportation issued a special pamphlet setting forth in detail the responsibilities of the staging area commanders and the troop train complements.[109] Pending the delivery of the new kitchen cars ordered in May, arrangements were made with the railroads for the assignment of additional baggage cars to be converted to kitchen cars. In July there were 500 baggage cars in this pool.[110]

Although traffic calculations were necessarily tentative and were completely upset by the early surrender of Japan, the forecasts prepared in the Office of the Chief of Transportation after two months of experience with redeployment are of interest. They give an indication of the rates at which troop withdrawals from inactive theaters and the build-up of strength in the Pacific were to have been accomplished, and of the effect of this redeployment on troop travel within the United States. According to these forecasts the heaviest shipments of troops from inactive theaters would be in July, the heaviest shipments of troops from the United States to the Pacific would be in November, and the arrivals of units in the Pacific would reach a crest in December. *(Chart 5)* The volume of Army rail traffic in organized movements (forty or more troops), which had attained a monthly peak of 1,001,000 passengers in April 1943 and then had declined to slightly over 430,000 just before the German surrender when the larger part of the Army was overseas, was expected to reach almost 1,500,000 in some months in late 1945 and early 1946.[111]

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[107] Ltr, Williamson to ODT, 28 Jul 45, OCT HB Gross ODT.

[108] Ltr, C of Traf Contl Div to AAR, 7 Aug 45, OCT 531.7 Preference Plan; WD CTB 40, 13 Aug 45, sub: Preference Plan for Ordering and Furnishing Pullman Equip, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.

[109] TC Cir 100-10, revised 13 Jun 45, sub: Mvmts to Pers Centers; ASF Cir 253, 3 Jul 45, Sec. I; TC Cir 101-2, 11 Aug 45; TC Pamphlet 45, 11 Aug 45, sub: TC Manual for St Area and Troop Train Comdrs.

[110] OCT HB Monograph 22, p. 124.

Of the total force of somewhat more than 400,000 troops that was to have been redeployed directly from the European and Mediterranean theaters to the Pacific, approximately 155,000 had been embarked when the end of hostilities disrupted the redeployment plan. Of this number, 117,000 were from the ETO and most of them had been embarked at Marseille. The 38,000 shipped from the MTO had been embarked at Naples and Leghorn.[112]

Repatriation After the Surrender of Japan

Although the Japanese surrender on 14 August 1945 came much earlier than had been expected, plans for making the necessary adjustments in oversea troop movements had been worked out, and they were placed in effect at once.[113] The records of the Chief of Transportation's Movements Division, showing the position of all ships and the troop units en route or scheduled for movement, facilitated this action. Eighteen troopships that were en route between Europe and the Panama Canal destined for the Pacific were diverted to U.S. east coast ports. Twenty troopships at or en route to Marseille and Naples to embark troops for the Pacific were ordered to embark troops for discharge in the United States. Twenty-four freighters carrying organizational equipment from Europe to the Pacific were diverted to U.S. east coast ports. The troop movements scheduled to leave U.S. west coast ports for the Pacific during August were not greatly affected by the cessation of hostilities. High-point men were screened out, but otherwise units and replacements sailed as planned, and the number of Army personnel embarked for the Pacific in August (about 158,000) far exceeded that of any previous month. These troops, and the smaller numbers shipped in subsequent months, were intended to relieve from occupational duty troops that had already seen long service overseas.[114]

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[111] Chart prepared in Transport Economics Br, Traf Contl Div, OCT, 4 Jul 45, OCT HB Gen Redepl.

[112] ASF MPR, Oct 45, Sec. 3, p. 16. For a discussion of assembly areas and port staging areas for troops being shipped from Europe as well as the work of the Redeployment Coordinating Group, which functioned in Europe, see Sparrow, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-97.

[113] Memo, TAG for CGs AAF, AGF, *et al.*, 14 Aug 45, sub: Procedure for Disposition of Units, etc., Upon Surrender of Japan, AG 370.01 (13 Aug 45).

[114] Mvmts Div Hists for Aug, Sep, Oct 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen. Movements of cargo ships carrying maintenance supplies were more extensively affected, as will be explained in Ch. V, below.

CHART 5—FORECAST OF TROOP REDEPLOYMENT, PREPARED BY THE CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION, AS OF 11 JULY 1945


DEPARTURES FROM EUROPE AND OTHER INACTIVE THEATERS


DEPARTURES FROM UNITED STATES FOR PACIFIC


ARRIVALS OF TROOPS IN UNITS FOR BUILD-UP IN PACIFIC*

* Since this diagram is intended to indicate monthly additions to strength in the Pacific, it does not include replacements.

Source: Charts A, C, and D, prepared by the Planning Division, OCT; copies in OCT HB TC General, Redeployment.

When Japan surrendered the Army had about 4,500,000 troops overseas. The size of the occupational forces had not been fixed, but it was calculated that more than 3,500,000 of these troops would have to be repatriated as soon as possible. The Army realized that there would be an insistent popular demand for speedy demobilization and that regardless of the rate of repatriation it could not be fast enough to satisfy the desires of the soldiers and their relatives. Nevertheless, the military authorities assured the nation that all resources would be utilized to bring the troops home and return them to civilian life. General Somervell and several members of his staff held a press conference on 16 August, in which many aspects of the demobilization plans were explained. On that occasion General Gross stated that in the months to come the movement of soldiers to the United States would far exceed anything achieved during redeployment. He asserted that every available ship would be used, and at the same time emphasized that the load on the American railroads would be exceedingly heavy. "All of us at home," he said, "must be prepared to accept inconveniences in order that the reunion of families in peace may be accomplished as quickly as possible." [115] He meant, of course, that regular railway services would have to be further reduced in order to provide adequate and suitable transportation for troops.

During August General Gross discussed at length with the Association of American Railroads the heavy burden that would fall on the carriers when repatriation from both Europe and the Pacific got under way. AAR officials were confident that by giving preference to military over civilian traffic the railroads could transport inland all of the soldiers that the Transportation Corps could land at the ports. In order to shorten the rail haul as much as possible, they suggested that troops returning from Europe be regrouped at the oversea staging areas and embarked on ships that would land them at the U.S. ports nearest the separation centers for which they were destined, and also that troops returning from the Pacific be assembled at Hawaii and similarly regrouped for discharge at the ports nearest their separation centers. General Gross, while recognizing the merit of these suggestions from the standpoint of the railroads, saw only limited possibility of putting them into effect because the proposed arrangements would interfere with the operation of the point system—which was being closely followed in determining the order in which soldiers would be repatriated—and because they would involve an "extravagant use of shipping capacity." [116]

The discussions between General Gross and the AAR did not bring about a complete meeting of the minds regarding the extent of military rail traffic during repatriation or the manner in which it would be accommodated. General Gross wanted a specific statement from the carriers as to the number of troops they would be able to handle. The response of the Association of American Railroads was that the only limiting factor would be the extent to which civilian travel could be reduced, a response that left the point unsettled. The AAR wanted a firm estimate of the number of troops to be landed at U.S. ports during succeeding months. General Gross could only state that, while he had provided and would continue to provide the best possible estimates, the figures necessarily would be tentative for a period because of the suddenness with which the war had ended and the necessity of completely revising troop movement and shipping plans.[117]

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[115] ASF press conf, 16 Aug 45, OCT HB TC Gen Demob.

[116] Ltr, Buford to Gross, 13 Aug 45, and reply, 17 Aug 45, both in OCT 387 Demob Plng.

The rate of repatriation from Europe depended chiefly on the amount of shipping that could be assigned, but the rate from the western Pacific was affected by a number of factors. General MacArthur's troops were scattered among many small and widely separated bases, and it was uncertain how quickly they could be transported to assembly areas for embarkation on transpacific vessels.[118] The number of troops required for the occupation of Japan was difficult to determine. Because of these imponderables, MacArthur could not at once give a firm estimate of monthly shipments, and his early figures were considerably below those that he submitted later.[119] As a result, the removal of troops from Europe, which had been under way for three months and was already well organized, made much better progress during the early weeks of the repatriation period than did the return of troops from the western Pacific. By late September, however, the situation in General MacArthur's command had become clearer and the deployment of shipping to meet the requirements was well under way.[120]

The early negotiations on rail transportation for repatriated troops again brought out the differing attitudes of the Army and the Director of Defense Transportation, and these differences were sometimes expressed with more candor than diplomacy.[121] The root issue was still the division of railroad equipment, especially sleeping cars, between military and civilian traffic. Although the joint preference agreement made by the armed forces in August allowed greater latitude, General Gross had also agreed with the ODT that Army personnel would use coaches for trips of less than forty-eight hours unless sleepers were available that otherwise would have to be deadheaded, and he insisted that the latter agreement was being honored. The ODT, on the other hand, presented data to show that it was not being uniformly carried out, and contended that the failure of the carriers in some instances to provide sleepers for trips of more than forty-eight hours was due to their employment on shorter Army hauls.[122]

Late in August the Army learned that the railroads and the Pullman Company desired to withdraw about 400 sleeping cars from the military pool so that they could be used in regular overnight services. The Army notified both the Director of Defense Transportation and the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion of its opposition, with the result that the cars were not withdrawn.[123] The Army's view was that during repatriation more, rather than fewer, sleeping cars should be assigned to the military pool, which served all of the armed services. At about this time the Director of Defense Transportation took steps to abolish the government reservation bureaus, which the railroads had maintained primarily for the benefit of military personnel traveling as individuals, but reconsidered the plan when the armed forces made a joint protest.[124]

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[117] Ltr, Gross to Pelley, 21 Aug 45, and reply, 25 Aug 45, both in OCT 511, 1943-1945; Ltr, Gross to Pelley, 31 Aug 45, OCT 080 AAR.

[118] Eleven such assembly areas were established to relieve transpacific troopships of the necessity of calling at many small ports, thereby saving ship time. See WD press release, 18 Oct 45, OCT HB TC Gen Demob Trans.

[119] WD press release, 10 Sep 45, sub: Target Dates for Return of Troops, OCT HB TC Gen Demob; Memo, CofT for Dir Plans and Opns ASF, 2 Nov 45, pars. 5 and 6, OCT HB Plng Div Mead Com.

[120] Rads between WD and CINCAFPAC, CM-OUT 65131, 15 Sep 45; CM-IN 23948, 29 Sep 45; CM-OUT 72042, 1 Oct 45.

[121] See last paragraphs of Ltrs, Gross to Johnson, 14 Aug 45, and Johnson to Gross, 17 Aug 45; both in OCT HB Gross ODT.

[122] Ltr, Gross to Johnson, 29 Aug 45; Ltr, Johnson to Gross, 29 Aug 45; Ltr, Gross to Johnson, 4 Sep 45; Ltrs, Johnson to Gross and USW, 6 Sep 45; Ltr, USW to Johnson, 10 Sep 45; Ltrs, Williamson to Johnson and the Pullman Co., 19 Sep 45; all in OCT HB Gross ODT.

The Chief of Transportation evidently believed that there was nothing to be gained by entering into detailed negotiations with the ODT regarding rail equipment. Late in August Mr. Johnson appointed a committee representing his own office, the Association of American Railroads, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Army to study military requirements and make recommendations to him. Col. Joshua R. Messersmith, deputy chief of the Traffic Control Division, was the appointee for the Army. When the time came to approve the committee's final report, Messersmith did not attend the meeting. In explaining his absence he informed Mr. Johnson, undoubtedly with the approval of the Chief of Transportation, that since the War Department had no control over the distribution of equipment it would neither accept nor reject any estimates submitted by the AAR. He stated that the War Department provided the railroads and the Pullman Company with estimates of its requirements and considered the carriers responsible for meeting such requirements "with dispatch and the same degree of efficiency and comfort as is accorded the public." [125]

In his response Johnson made it clear that whereas the Chief of Transportation had requested the assignment of 200 additional sleeping cars to the military pool, he (Johnson) was of the opinion that military traffic already was using a disproportionate share of the equipment. In support of his contention, Johnson stated that on 12 September about 72 percent of these sleeping cars were in military service, leaving only 28 percent to serve the rest of the nation. General Gross then presented the following analysis from data available to him:

Sleeping Cars	*Number*	*Percent*
Total	8,034	100.0
Cars in regular service	2,544	31.7
Cars in military service	5,090	63.3
Standard and tourist sleepers in troop service	3,705	46.1
Special troop sleepers in troop service	1,237	15.4
Standard sleepers in military sleeping car lines	148	1.8
Cars under repair	400	5.0

Johnson took no exception to these figures, but he stated that in his calculation of cars in military service he had included an estimate of the number of cars represented by the military personnel that used the regular sleeper services.[126]

While the Chief of Transportation foresaw trouble in providing adequate rail transportation after repatriation from the Pacific got into full swing, the immediate problem confronting him was the build-up of shipping capacity. He tackled the job aggressively, in co-operation with the War Shipping Administration and the Navy, and the results were gratifying.

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[123] Ltrs, USW to Dir ODT and Dir OWMR, 31 Aug 45; Ltr, Dir OWMR to USW, 5 Sep 45; Ltr, Dir ODT to USW, 6 Sep 45; all in OCT HB Gross ODT; Ltr, Buford to Gross, 18 Sep 45, OCT 531.2 Troop Sleepers.

[124] See above, Ch. I, p. 65.

[125] Ltr, Messersmith to Johnson, 4 Sep 45; Ltr, Johnson to Messersmith, 7 Sep 45; Ltr, Johnson to USW, 7 Sep 45; all in OCT HB Gross ODT.

[126] Ltr, Johnson to Gross, 12 Sep 45; Ltr, Gross to Johnson, 18 Sep 45; Ltr, Johnson to Gross, 21 Sep 45; all in OCT HB Gross ODT.

On the day Japan surrendered there were 282 American-controlled vessels in U.S. Army troop service, including the small number of Liberties and Victories on which conversion work had been completed, and 5 vessels under British control. The American pool was distributed 108 to transatlantic and 174 to transpacific routes.[127]

The repatriation fleet was rapidly increased. The program of Liberty ship and Victory ship conversion was pressed. The cessation of hostilities meant that naval assault transports and naval combatant ships could be used for repatriation to a greater extent.[128] As soon as they could be released from patient evacuation, hospital ships were employed as passenger vessels. Passenger space on freighters returning to the United States was used for troops whenever practicable. For a time tankers also were employed in this way, but the practice had to be discontinued because tankers were frequently diverted en route and the troops were then landed at ports where there were no facilities for staging and processing them.[129]

In addition to increasing the repatriation fleet, other steps were taken to facilitate the return of troops. The staging capacity at west coast ports, which had been limited during the war, was enlarged. Overloading was continued to the extent weather permitted.[130] A liaison office, similar to the one established earlier on the east coast, was set up in the headquarters of the Navy's Western Sea Frontier to keep the respective Army port commanders informed regarding prospective arrivals of troopships.[131] A Ship Regulating Branch was organized in the Movements Division to control the flow of troops into the several ports in accordance with percentages established by the railroads.[132] Representatives of the Chief of Transportation and the Pacific coast Army port commanders met at San Francisco early in September for a full discussion of all matters pertaining to repatriation.[133]

The task of simultaneously repatriating Army and Navy personnel from many scattered Pacific bases gave rise to new policies regarding the use of transportation facilities. Instead of the wartime policy of considering Army and Navy troopships in a single pool and using them jointly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September decided that all troop-carrying vessels in the Pacific would be divided into two blocks, one for the Army and one for the Navy. The Joint Military Transportation Committee was assigned the task of allocating specific vessels to the respective blocks in accordance with the estimated requirements. The vessels in each block were to be operated primarily to meet the needs of the service to which they were allocated, but they could be used jointly when this would enable a larger number of passengers to be embarked. The use of domestic transportation also was to be apportioned between the Army and the Navy according to the number of troops to be moved inland.[134]

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[127] Memo, Plng, Int, and Mvmts Div OCT for Hist Unit, 16 Oct 46, sub: Hist of Mvmts Contl Div to 15 Aug 46, OCT HB Mvmts Div Rpts.

[128] Memo, Farr for Wylie, 15 Oct 45, OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[129] Rad, WD to Theater Comdrs, 3 Oct 45, CM-OUT 10998.

[130] Overloading of Liberties in the Atlantic was stopped in October, but overloading of Victories continued through November.

[131] Hist of Returning Troop Br, 31 Oct 45, in Mvmts Div Hist for Sep 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

[132] Hist of Ship Reg Br, 11 Dec 45, in Mvmts Div Hist for Nov 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

[133] Summary of West Coast Port Comdrs Conf on Returning Troop Mvmts, 6-7 Sep 45, OCT HB Wylie Troop Mvmts.

Because of growing public criticism of the rate at which troops were being returned, the Chief of Transportation decided in mid-November to issue a detailed statement to show what had been accomplished and what was in prospect.[135] He summarized the shipping then assigned to the repatriation of military personnel as follows:[136]

Type	*Number*
Total	871
U.S.-controlled troopships	253
Converted Liberties	210
Converted Victories	87
Hospital ships	31
Naval assault transports	178
Naval combatant ships	111
British troopships	1

Of these 871 vessels with spaces for 1,370,479 troops, 400 vessels with 578,520 spaces were employed in transatlantic services and 471 with 791,959 spaces were employed in the Pacific. All of the naval assault vessels and most of the combatant vessels were in the Pacific. At that time only about 45 percent of the troop space on these ships was available to the Army, but more was expected to become available as the Navy's repatriation program progressed. The Chief of Transportation further explained that only one British vessel, the *Queen Mary,* remained in U.S. troop service because the British themselves had a large repatriation task, and that only two of the vessels that had been surrendered by Germany were being used because the others could not have been rehabilitated in time to be of great value in repatriation.

The complaints regarding the rate of repatriation, the majority of which concerned the Pacific, alleged negligence on the part of the Army in not using more cargo ships to transport returning troops. The Army carefully explained its position in public statements and in private correspondence. It pointed out that the shipping facilities at the west coast ports were operating at full capacity and that voyage repairs required by ships returning from the Pacific already were overtaxing the yards that would have to make any further cargo ship conversions. Of the Liberty ships selected for conversion early in the summer, the last had not been ready for service until October, and the last converted Victory ship would not be ready to sail until the end of November. Under these circumstances and in view of the fact that the peak of the repatriation movement would be reached in December, further cargo ship conversions were considered uneconomical. The Army stressed the inadvisability of placing troops on freighters that were not properly equipped and explained why the hasty conversions that had been made at Manila for the return of troops to the United States had been limited to a small number of vessels.[137]

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[134] JCS Policy Memo 27, 21 Sep 45.

[135] WD press release, 20 Nov 45, OCT HB TC Gen Demob Trans.

[136] Conflicting statements have been made regarding the number of Liberties converted in 1945. Charles, *Troopships of World War II,* pp. 356-60, lists 201 actually converted in 1945 to carry 550 troops each. The figure of 210 may include some Liberties that had been permanently converted. Ninety-seven Victories were converted, but 10 were assigned to the British in exchange for the *Queen Mary;* see Wardlow, *op. cit.,* pp. 226-27, 301.

[137] WD press release, 20 Nov 45, cited n. 135; letters in answer to complaints are filed in OCT 370.5 Return of Troops from Overseas; messages regarding conversions at Manila are in OCT 564 Cargo Vessels; James R. Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in

The Army further pointed out that in November, despite the wide dispersal of troops and the long voyages in the Pacific, it was repatriating more than twice as many troops as had been returned from Europe during the peak month following World War I. It also stated that, since the removal of troops from the European and Mediterranean theaters was so far advanced, beginning in December many fast troopships would be transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific so that the rate of repatriation from General MacArthur's command would be accelerated.

These explanations did not convince persons who were willing to accept at face value the statements of soldiers that they were eager to travel under any conditions so long as they were allowed to sail, or were intrigued by the slogan "get the boys home by Christmas." Such persons could view the matter from a purely personal or sentimental standpoint, since they would not be responsible for the hardships imposed, nor affected by the complaints that would be made by many soldiers after arrival in the United States. On November 27 maritime and longshore unions, which were opposed to the policy of laying up American cargo ships or turning them over to foreign countries, championed the cause of the soldiers who were still overseas and threatened one-day strikes to emphasize their position.[138] On the same day resolutions were introduced in the House of Representatives to require the War Department to submit a forecast of troops that would be eligible for discharge within ninety days, and to require the Army, the Navy, and the War Shipping Administration to give a full accounting of ships used and not used for repatriation purposes.[139] The War Department was quick to provide such information as it possessed, although the resolutions were not formally adopted.

Air transport was used for the repatriation of troops after V-J Day, but not to the extent that it had been employed during redeployment from Europe and the Mediterranean. Two projects were set up for repatriating troops by air. In the Rainbow Project transport planes were used from the middle of September to the middle of November for the return of troops from North Africa, South America, and the Caribbean. This project had a total lift during the two months of about 12,200. In the Sunset Project bombers returning from the Pacific transported as many troops as they could accommodate.[140] After the transport planes in the western Pacific had played their role in the delivery of occupation forces to Japan, they also brought troops back to the zone of interior.

The heavy influx of troops at Pacific coast ports during November and December and the unevenness of the flow meant

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the Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-47, pp. 473-75, OCT HB Monographs. Numerous cargo ships were hastily converted in the western Pacific to transport soldiers from outlying bases to assembly ports, where they were to be embarked for the long transpacific voyage, and to repatriate Japanese soldiers to their homeland.

[138] Transcript of radio address by Joseph Curran, Pres, National Maritime Union, over Mutual Broadcasting System, 27 Nov 45, OCT HB Gen Demob Trans; *The New York Times,* November 29, 1945, "Ship Unions to Quit Over Troop Delays."

[139] H. Res. 420, 421, and 422, November 27, 1945; Ltr, SW to Rep Andrew J. May, Chm House Com on Military Affairs, 11 Dec 45, Legislative and Liaison Division WDSS, file on H. Res. 421.

[140] Information furnished by the Hist Br, Int Div MATS, 19 Jun 51, OCT HB Gen Redepl.

that there were times when the railroads had more traffic than they could move promptly. The situation was more acute on the Pacific coast than on the Atlantic seaboard because the facilities of the western rail lines were not as great and because a larger percentage of the troops arriving at western ports had long rail hauls ahead of them.[141] During this period the problem of providing sleeping cars for the troops entitled to them gave way to the problem of moving the traffic by any means. On 23 November the Chief of Transportation indicated that numerous troops had been held at the ports for four days, and a few for more than seven days, rather than being cleared in the specified forty-eight hours.[142] Thereafter the situation became progressively worse, and on 25 December the number of troops held at Pacific ports beyond forty-eight hours because of lack of transportation reached a peak of 99,000. The port staging areas and improvised housing facilities were not able to absorb the backlog so that as many as 40,000 men had been kept on the ships overnight rather than being debarked immediately upon arrival.[143] This situation existed despite the fact that additional rail equipment was assigned to the western lines and that cars were deadheaded back to the ports as quickly as they discharged their loads at the inland personnel centers.

Early in November the armed forces had made a final joint appeal to the Director of Defense Transportation for the assignment of additional sleepers to troop movements from the Pacific coast. They had pointed out that the number of repatriated veterans who were required to travel from coast to coast in coaches was increasing daily. They had stated that, while a further curtailment of regular sleeper service was not a desirable action, the heavy influx of troops was the direct result of the public demand for speedy demobilization and therefore no criticism could properly be made if the public were deprived of sleeping cars on some of the shorter routes in order to give veterans proper accommodations on long journeys. The armed forces accordingly had recommended that sleeping cars be withheld from regular sleeping car services of less than 500 miles—instead of 450 miles as provided for in the existing regulation—while the military need was so great.[144] This recommendation was not placed in effect, but about 1,000 additional day coaches were assigned to troop service.

The effect of the peak repatriation movement on the carriers is reflected in two statements issued by the Association of American Railroads. In mid-December the AAR reported that the carriers' total equipment embraced 10,217 all-steel coaches suitable for long distance service, and 8,200 sleeping cars of which 1,400 were government-owned troop sleepers. More than one third of the coaches and about four fifths of the sleepers were being used in troop trains, and in addition large numbers of military personnel were using the regular trains.[145] A few days later the AAR announced that during the two

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[141] In his public statement of 20 November, cited n. 135, the Chief of Transportation stated that in October 82 percent of the troops arriving at west coast ports were entitled to sleeping cars as compared with 34.5 percent debarking on the east coast.

[142] Memo, CofT for Legislative and Liaison Div WDSS, sub: Delays of Troop Mvmts, OCT 511.

[143] ASF MPR, Dec 45, Sec. 3, p. 3; Hist of Returning Troops Br, 16 Jan 45, in Mvmts Div Hist for Dec 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

[144] Ltr, Armed Forces to Dir ODT, 8 Nov 45, OCT 510 Veterans.

[145] Ltr, AAR to Sen Joseph C. O'Mahoney, 17 Dec 45, OCT 510 Veterans.

CHART 6—PASSENGERS DEBARKED MONTHLY BY THE ARMY AT U.S. PORTS FROM OVERSEA COMMANDS: 1943–1946*



* Passengers include all Army troops debarked from ships under Army, Navy, and British control, plus naval, Allied military, civilian personnel, and prisoners of war debarked from ships under Army control. The percentage relationship that Army troops bore to the total was 47.4 in 1943, 61.1 in 1944, 95.6 in 1945, and 94.4 in 1946.

Source: ASF Statistical Review, World War II, pp. 126–27, through August 1945; later months from data compiled for statistical volume of this series, from Recapitulation of Passengers Debarked and predecessor reports from the ports of embarkation to the Chief of Transportation.

weeks that ended on 19 December the railroads had moved a daily average of thirty-six special troop trains from the Pacific coast, carrying slightly more than 19,000 servicemen; including those accommodated on regular trains, the daily movement of servicemen had been about 25,000. The AAR further stated that on the basis of estimates furnished by the Army and the Navy earlier in the fall it had planned to handle about 14,000 servicemen per day at the peak.[146] The increased military load, it emphasized, was being handled against a background of heavy pre-Christmas civilian travel.

During the month of December 1945, 834,470 passengers arrived at U.S. ports under Army auspices.[147] More than 99 percent of these passengers were Army troops, the remainder being naval personnel, military personnel of Allied nations, and civilians. West coast ports received 387,130, while Atlantic and Gulf ports debarked 447,340. A comparison of arrivals during this peak month with preceding and succeeding months may be made by referring to Chart 6. Passengers debarking during the years 1945 and 1946 were distributed among the ports as shown in Chart 7, and passengers debarking during

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[146] AAR press release, 21 Dec 45, OCT HB Gen Demob Trans.

[147] This figure may be compared with 343,786 debarked by the Army during the month of June 1919, which was the peak of the repatriation movement after World War I; see *Annual Report of the Chief of Transportation Service, 1919*, p. 31.

CHART 7—PASSENGERS DEBARKED BY THE ARMY AT THE RESPECTIVE U.S. PORTS: 1945–1946 [a]



[a] Concerning passengers included, see note to chart 6.
[b] Boston was inactive during 1946.
[c] New York includes a small number of passengers debarked at the Philadelphia cargo port.
[d] Hampton Roads includes a small number of passengers debarked at the Baltimore cargo port.
[e] New Orleans includes a small number of passengers debarked at Mobile and Miami.
[f] Seattle includes a small number of passengers debarked at Portland during early 1945 and late 1946.

Source: Data compiled for statistical volume of this series from monthly report, Recapitulation of Passengers Debarked, from the ports of embarkation to Chief of Transportation.

the month of December 1945 were distributed as follows: [148]

Port	*Passengers*
Boston	74,185
New York	261,778
Hampton Roads	106,835
New Orleans	4,542
Los Angeles	119,256
San Francisco	146,295
Portland	22,298
Seattle	99,281

Since the Army had stressed the need for additional sleeping cars to handle the heavy influx of troops, its experience in securing sleeping cars in December 1945 is of interest. During that month the Army requested the assignment of 10,846 sleepers for troop movements of forty-eight hours or longer, including domestic as well as repatriation traffic. The sleepers actually assigned to these movements fell 2,824 short of the requests. As a result, 91,359 soldiers who were entitled to sleeping-car space under the forty-eight-hour rule had to be moved in coaches.[149]

The heavy repatriation traffic created problems for the Army other than those of clearing troops from the ports. The large number of troop trains in operation, combined with the rapid rate of demobilization, made it difficult for the Chief of Transportation to hold sufficient personnel to provide these trains with competent commanders and crews. In order to speed up the return of these men to the ports after they had delivered troops to the personnel centers, special arrangements were made for the immediate audit of their accounts and for their return to the ports by Army or commercial aircraft when necessary.[150] Immediately after the Japanese surrender the Army announced its intention to increase the number of separation centers (components of the personnel centers) from twenty-two to twenty-seven, but this was not done immediately. As a result, some of the separation centers became congested during September and it was necessary to divert troop trains to other centers thus increasing mileage and delaying trains. To meet this situation 152 temporary separation facilities—44 of them for AAF troops and the remainder for AGF and ASF troops—were opened on 24 September, and later 4 additional separation centers were established. By November this problem had been overcome despite the unexpectedly heavy rate of demobilization.[151]

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[148] Monthly Rpt, PEs to OCT, Recap of Passengers Debarked; data compiled for statistical volume of this series, now in preparation. Figures for New York and Hampton Roads include small numbers debarked from freighters at the cargo ports of Philadelphia and Baltimore, respectively. Boston debarkations were less in December than in previous months and troop movements through Boston were discontinued thereafter. Small numbers of troops had been debarked at Charleston, South Carolina, and Prince Rupert, British Columbia, earlier.

[149] Statistical Tabulation, Utilization of Sleeping Cars, October 1945–March 1946, based on records of Pass Br, Traf Contl Div, OCT HB TC Gen Demob Trans.

Beginning early in the repatriation period the railways received appreciable though not extensive aid from air transport. In July 1945 arrangements were made for the use of military aircraft to move repatriated soldiers east and west across the continent.[152] The aircraft were assigned to commercial airlines, which operated them under contract. These so-called TRANSCON services, which began 27 August, were from the Newark Air Base in New Jersey, Mines Field and McClellan Field in California, and Paine Field in Washington. The Chief of Transportation established special TRANSCON Centers at staging areas of the ports of embarkation at New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle to receive, process, and dispatch troops being forwarded by air.[153] The TRANSCON project, which was set up to move about 25,000 troops per month, continued through the following March and lifted a total of 174,501 soldiers. The peak month was January 1946, when 35,305 troops were transported.[154]

After port congestion on the Pacific coast became acute, the Director of Defense Transportation took steps to augment the eastbound airlift. On 20 November 1945, the ODT announced arrangements under which the commercial airlines would make at least 70 percent of the space on their regularly scheduled flights from Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego to the eastern seaboard available for repatriated military personnel. This undertaking was known as COM-AIR.[155] In his effort to expand the project beyond the facilities of the airlines, Mr. Johnson appealed to the Army; he found it ready to provide additional aircraft but unable to assign personnel "in view of the necessity of releasing Army air and ground crews in accordance with the general demobilization plans." [156] COM-AIR movements began on 3 December 1945 and continued into February 1946, during which period a total of 23,156 Army and Navy personnel were transported.[157]

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[150] ASF Cir 253, 3 Jul 45; ASF Cir 375, 4 Oct 45.

[151] ASF press conf, 16 Aug 45, statement by Maj Gen Joseph N. Dalton; WD press release, 13 Sep 45, sub: Temporary Separation Points and Bases; Ltr, SW to Rep James C. Auchincloss, 26 Oct 45, WDCSA 370.01, Sec. VIII; Hist of Returning Troops Br, 6 Dec 45, in Mvmts Div Hist for Oct 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

[152] Memo, Mobilization Div ASF for TAG, 11 Aug 45, sub: Mvmts of Pers under TRANSCON Project, and atchd Memo for Record, AGO 370.5 (11 Aug 45).

[153] TC Cir 101-3, 24 Aug 45, sub: Org and Opn of TRANSCON Centers.

[154] Statistical Tabulation, Passengers Moved by Air Between East and West Coasts, based on monthly troop records of Transport Economics Br, Traf Contl Div, OCT HB Topic Air Transport Gen.

[155] WD CTB 53, 14 Dec 45, sub: Mvmt of Traf Under COM-AIR Project.

The Director of Defense Transportation felt that neither the Army nor the commercial airlines had given adequate attention to the development of transcontinental airlift to relieve the rail lines, and he said so early in December in a letter to which he gave wide circulation. He had argued for a total lift of 100,000 per month, but this figure was never approached. In the peak month (January 1946) TRANSCON and COM-AIR together transported only 46,000 troops, and during the entire period of operation the combined lift was less than 200,000. Naturally neither the Army nor the Air Transport Association of America could accept a charge of non-co-operation; each had its peculiar problems and explanations. In the light of the rail situation in December, Mr. Johnson's chagrin at the limited results of the air projects is understandable. Evidently the pressure for a large airlift was not applied early enough. General discussion of the use of aircraft in moving repatriated troops within the United States began in the spring of 1945. It seems probable that if there had been a realization at that time, or even in August, that in a single month more than 800,000 returning troops would be landed at U.S. ports with serious congestion on the Pacific coast, arrangements for a heavier airlift could have been made.[158]

Since Mr. Johnson had stated frankly that his letter regarding lack of co-operation in his effort to increase the airlift was written primarily for the record, General Wylie replied on behalf of the Chief of Transportation in like manner, presenting the broad aspects of the problem from the Army angle. He pointed out that the armed forces had been under heavy pressure from the public, the press, and the Congress to speed up the return of troops from overseas. Excellent results in providing water transportation had been accomplished with the aid of the War Shipping Administration. The Chief of Transportation repeatedly had inquired of the railroads and the ODT whether they wanted the inflow of troops retarded, but they had expressed no such desire. The armed forces then had requested the assignment of additional sleeping cars to the western lines because the need for sleepers was especially great; this request had not been granted, although additional day coaches had been provided. The armed forces had diverted ships from one port to another in accordance with the desires of the railroads, but that action had not greatly alleviated the difficulty. A proposal that troops from the Pacific destined for personnel centers in the eastern states be routed through the Panama Canal to Atlantic ports had been considered, but the proposal had not been found acceptable because it would have involved a wasteful use of shipping and slower repatriation. General Wylie reiterated the contention of the armed forces that more sleepers and coaches should be withdrawn from regular service to enable the western railroads to handle returning veterans properly, notwithstanding the fact that this would mean a further cut in civilian travel during the critical weeks of repatriation.[159]

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[156] Memo, CofT for Mobilization Div ASF, 26 Nov 45; Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 5 Dec 45, sub: COM-AIR Lift; Ltr, SW to ODT, 5 Dec 45; all in OCT 584.1 COM-AIR Project.

[157] Statistical Tabulation, Passengers Moved by Air Between East and West Coasts, cited n. 154.

[158] Ltr, Johnson to ATC, OCT, BuPers, and Air Transport Assn of America, 6 Dec 45, OCT HB Wylie Troop Mvmt; Ltr, Air Transport Assn of America to Johnson, 10 Dec 45; Ltr, Johnson to ATAA, 26 Dec 45; last two in OCT HB Gross ODT; Ltr, Johnson to CofT, 26 Dec 45, OCT 584.1 COM-AIR Project.

Replying to General Wylie's presentation, Johnson stated that the carriers had not requested that the inflow of troops be reduced and would not do so; he implied that better regulation of the flow, not less traffic, should be the Army's contribution. He contested Wylie's statement that the ODT and the railroads had been properly informed regarding the peak loads to be handled during recent weeks. He asserted that the assignment of additional cars to the western lines would not solve the problem of port congestion; the line-haul capacity of the seven single-tracked railroads that served the Pacific coast had become the bottleneck.[160]

During December the Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense program again took cognizance of the transportation situation, both ocean and rail. Its inquiry into shipping was directed particularly to the large number of cargo vessels then idle, some of them laid up at U.S. ports and some of them held in the western Pacific under load since V-J Day. Consideration of troop transportation was incidental. The committee apparently was satisfied with the statement of Capt. Granville Conway, Deputy War Shipping Administrator, that no American troopships had been diverted from military service to resume commercial operations and that shipping was not the bottleneck in demobilizing troops.[161]

The committee made a much more thorough inquiry into the railway situation as it affected repatriation and demobilization. Despite the earlier complaints and countercomplaints, the testimony given at the hearing on 21 December displayed no sharp differences of opinion between the armed forces and the representatives of the carriers. Mr. Johnson, Director of Defense Transportation, Mr. Charles H. Buford of the Association of American Railroads, Rear Adm. James F. Holloway of the Navy, and General Wylie, speaking for the Army Chief of Transportation, seemed in agreement that all had been done that could have been done to meet the extraordinary situation. It was recognized that peaks and valleys in the rate of arrivals at west coast ports were inevitable since "shipping can't be scheduled like trains." The distribution of troop arrivals among the ports had been carefully made in accordance with the desires of the railroads. The assignment of more cars from the eastern and southern lines to the Pacific coast would not have substantially helped the situation since the western lines already were handling the maximum traffic that their track facilities and manpower would allow. The airlift had been helpful but had not moved the numbers that had been hoped for. The relief afforded by the use of buses had been limited because only a few of the bus operators had facilities and personnel to handle transcontinental traffic. There was some question whether greater use might not have been made of the Canadian railway lines, but it was recognized that they also had been heavily burdened in handling Canadian traffic.[162]

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[159] Ltr, Wylie to Johnson, 12 Dec 45, OCT HB Wylie Troop Mvmts.

[160] Ltr, Johnson to Wylie, 19 Dec 45, OCT HB Wylie Troop Mvmts.

[161] *Hearings* cited n. 88, Pt. 32, December 12, 1945, pp. 16227-29.

When these hearings were held the peak of repatriation traffic had been reached and relief was in sight. In other words, the situation was expected to improve rather than get worse. This fact no doubt accounts for the equanimity with which the situation was discussed by representatives of the armed forces, the ODT, and the transportation industry, in contrast with their earlier disputations.

Some of the facts brought out in the hearings are of interest. Because of the bunching of traffic, the number of troops landed on the Pacific coast on some peak days in December (47,000–48,000) had been nearly three times the average daily arrivals forecast in September (17,000). Although over a period in early December the railroads had moved a daily average of about 25,000 troops of all services out of Pacific coast ports, it was not to be expected that they could sustain this rate during winter weather when more cars would be in the shops and more delays would be encountered on the right of ways. A check of all trains from the Pacific coast for the period 5–7 December disclosed that military personnel had utilized 89.1 percent of the total sleeping car space and 90.4 percent of all coach seats. On 20 December, the day before the representatives of the armed forces and the carriers testified at the hearing, the Army had about 70,000 returning troops in its west coast staging areas and approximately 40,000 troops on ships in the ports, a total of 110,000. On the same day the Navy had some 17,000 at its Pacific port stations and none were detained on board ship. Only about 200 of the special troop sleepers ordered in May were in service in December because of a strike in the plant manufacturing the beds; this strike had just been settled.

It is clear that some of the difficulties encountered during the repatriation period stemmed from the facts that the peacetime capacity of the western railroads had been limited, that the expansion of their facilities during the war had been restricted by shortages of materials and manpower, and that after V-J Day these limitations could not be quickly overcome. As to other factors, one can raise questions but cannot provide definitive answers. Should the Army have disregarded the public demand for the speediest possible demobilization to the extent that was necessary to effect better co-ordination between water and rail movements? Could the peaks in the arrivals curve have been leveled off somewhat without seriously delaying the movements of vessels? Should the Army have made a greater effort to land troops at the ports nearest the personnel centers for which they were destined in order to shorten the rail haul? Could the heavy movement of troops in the Pacific have been started earlier and the exceptionally heavy arrivals in November and December have thus been reduced? Could more materials and manpower have been devoted to building up the western railroads during the war without deleterious effects on the military effort? Could the ODT have reduced regular sleeper services further without serious damage to the civilian economy? Each of these questions has many facets and about all that can now be said with conviction is that future military planners should give them full consideration.

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[162] *Hearings* cited n. 88, Pt. 32, December 21, 1945, pp. 16279-302.

Looking back at the repatriation period after a lapse of years, one may wonder why public reaction to the rate of repatriation and demobilization should have been so unreasoning, and why the delay of a few days at the debarkation ports should have caused so much criticism. The entire operation had proceeded with a rapidity that had surpassed the hopes of most Army officers.[163] Possibly these reactions can be attributed in part to the War Department's early assurances that it would carry out demobilization with the utmost dispatch and to the inadequacy of its subsequent efforts to keep the public informed regarding the results achieved and the difficulties involved; yet it is doubtful if any course of action would have forestalled the criticism. After several years of war strain the national temper was taut and individual feelings were sensitive. Many troops had been overseas for long periods and had undergone hardship and deprivation. The average citizen did not see the problem in its larger context; he was aware only of the delayed return of the soldier in whom he was personally interested. Readiness to accuse the government of needless bungling is not an uncommon trait. These are circumstances that the military authorities will always have to take into account.

Evacuation of Patients From Oversea Theaters

The wartime evacuation of sick and wounded soldiers from oversea areas involves problems quite different from those encountered in peacetime because of the volume of the traffic and the abnormal transportation conditions. Since the Army had not made adequate advance plans, much had to be done in developing facilities and procedures after the United States entered World War II. The early measures to provide hospital facilities afloat were taken somewhat haltingly, partly because it was difficult to forecast the extent of the need and partly because of differing opinions regarding the extent to which hospital ships should be used. The procedures were evolved gradually as the result of experience. There were extensive evacuation operations within the active theaters from the forward areas to the rear bases, but this discussion concerns primarily the removal of more than 500,000 patients from the theaters to the United States.[164]

The regulations pertaining to the movement of patients were changed in many respects, but the following distribution of basic responsibilities was in effect virtually throughout the war: Hospitalization and evacuation for the Army were under the general direction of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, and his headquarters included a unit to supervise these activities. The Surgeon General was directly responsible for the co-ordination and completion of evacuation plans; he controlled bed credits in the general hospitals in the zone of interior and was the chief medical regulator for controlling the flow of patients from ports to the hospitals; he made sure that the medical personnel, equipment, and supplies for the care of patients being transported were adequate and made recommendations regarding the number of hospital ships and hospital cars to be procured. The Chief of Transportation was responsible for providing adequate shipping and rail facilities for the transportation of patients and for scheduling and operating the ships; he was also responsible for the care of patients at sea, for the debarkation of patients at U.S. ports, and for their transfer to hospital trains or ambulances. Commanders of the service commands staffed and operated the hospital cars and ambulances that were used for the removal of patients from the ports to hospitals. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, was responsible for the development of plans and the actual evacuation of patients by air from the oversea theaters.[165]

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[163] In a lengthy statement issued to the press on 15 January 1946 designed primarily to apprise the nation of our continuing military commitments overseas, General Eisenhower, then Chief of Staff, stated that approximately 5,000,000 members of the V-E Day force in the zone of interior and overseas had been returned to civilian life; the demobilization since V-J Day had exceeded the September estimate by about 1,665,000. Eisenhower said that, while the desire for quick demobilization was understandable, he had not anticipated that "this emotional wave would have reached proportions of near-hysteria."

[164] For a month-to-month general review of evacuation, see appropriate sections of ASF MPR, Sec. 7, Health. For a more detailed discussion, see Smith, *The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior,* Chs. XIX-XXIV.

Although the movement of patients by water and rail was a responsibility of the Chief of Transportation, he required technical advice and assistance from The Surgeon General in order to perform that function properly. Close co-ordination between the two offices was necessary on many details pertaining to the headquarters organizations in Washington, the ports of embarkation, the ships, and suitable inland transportation. Although the Hospitalization and Evacuation Branch of ASF headquarters served as a co-ordinating agency, in May 1943 The Surgeon General assigned a liaison officer to the Chief of Transportation in order to effect a closer working relationship.[166] A year later a medical regulating officer, who took over the functions of the medical liaison officer, was designated by The Surgeon General.[167] Col. John C. Fitzpatrick, Medical Corps, who served first as medical liaison officer and then as medical regulating officer, had his office in and was virtually a part of the Movements Division, OCT. In June 1945 his staff included six officers and twenty-one civilians.[168]

As liaison officer Colonel Fitzpatrick provided co-ordination between the Chief of Transportation and The Surgeon General in matters relating to medical practices at the ports and on the vessels, the suitability of shipping schedules to meet evacuation requirements, and the adequacy of medical personnel and supplies at the ports and on the ships. As medical regulating officer he maintained records of bed vacancies in medical installations where evacuated patients were to be treated, regulated the movement of patients from the ports to the respective medical installations, and consulted with the Chief of Transportation in regard to appropriate transportation arrangements.[169]

The flow of patients from overseas was governed by the War Department evacu-

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[165] Memo, TAG for CGs AGF, AAF, *et al.*, 18 Jun 42, sub: WD Hosp and Evac Policy, AG 704 (6-17-42); Pamphlet, Mil Hosp and Evac Opns, transmitted with Memo, CG SOS for CGs of SvCs, PEs, *et al.*, 15 Sep 42, SPOPH 322.15, OCT HB PE Gen Evac of Patients; Memo, TAG for CGs All Depts, Theaters, *et al.*, 25 Jan 43, sub: Sea Evac of Patients, AG 370.04 (1-19-43); WD Cir 316, 6 Dec 43, sub: Hosp and Evac of Pers; Memo, TAG for CGs of Forces in ZI and Overseas, 8 Jan 44, sub: Procedure of Evac of Patients by Water and Air, AG 704.11 (3 Jun 44).

[166] Hist Med Liaison Off, par. 1.8; 1st Ind, CofT to CG ASF, 10 May 43, OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[167] ASF Cir 147, 19 May 44, Sec. II. For a discussion of the conditions that caused the establishment of the medical regulating office, see Hist Med Liaison Off, pars. 6.1-6.92.

[168] Hist Rpt, Mvmts Div, 20 Jun 45, par. 19, OCT HB Mvmts Div Rpts.

[169] See extract from SGO Manual and Organization Chart of the Medical Regulating Office in Hist Med Liaison Off, Preface and Incl 7.2.



U.S. ARMY HOSPITAL SHIP *ST. MIHIEL*

ation policy. The evacuation policy in effect determined which patients were to be treated in the theaters and which were to be treated in the zone of interior. Broadly speaking, this policy was expressed in terms of days—that is, patients likely to be hospitalized for longer than a specified number of days were eligible for evacuation as soon as their condition would permit. The number of days differed according to conditions such as the hospital capacities in the respective theaters, the hospital space situation in the zone of interior, and the ships available for transporting patients. In August 1943 the War Department, after consulting the theater commanders, announced that its policy of evacuation would be 180 days for the European theater (except Iceland), China, Burma, and India; and 120 days for all other oversea commands.[170]

The effect of changing circumstances on the evacuation policy is illustrated by developments in the ETO. In the fall of 1944 with battle casualties mounting and ship hospital facilities greatly increased, the number of days was reduced from 180 to 120.[171] Still later the policy was changed to 90 days. In the spring of 1945, in order to evacuate as many patients as possible before hostilities ended and troopships were withdrawn from the transatlantic service, the policy was fixed temporarily at 60 days. In July 1945, with the major part of the evacuation task completed, the 120-day basis was restored. In recommending the last change General Somervell pointed out that the Army at that time was "long on hospital space in Europe and crowded in the United States," and that westbound ship hospital space in the Atlantic had been greatly reduced by the transfer of vessels to the Pacific.[172]

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[170] WD Memo W 40-19-43, 28 Aug 43, sub: Policy on Evac of Sick and Wounded. For a general discussion, see remarks of Col Fitzpatrick at Conf of Port Surgeons and Troop Mvmt Officers, Fort Hamilton, N. Y., 12-14 Oct 43, pp. 72-74, in OCT HB PE Gen Evac of Patients.

[171] Memo, CG ASF for TAG, 30 Sep 44, and atchd note for record; Memo, WD for CG ETO, 5 Oct 44; both in AG 704 (25 Aug 43)(2).

[172] Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 18 Jul 45, sub: Change in Evac Policy, OCT HB PE Gen Evac of Patients.

Since the great majority of patients were evacuated by water, the rate of evacuation was largely dependent on the availability of ship hospital facilities. The Army's aim was to have enough ship hospital facilities to meet evacuation needs as they arose, but this aim was not entirely fulfilled. The periodical estimates of future needs were affected by the fact that U.S. forces were engaged in areas and in types of combat with which the Army had had no previous experience, and in the beginning the estimates proved to be conservative.[173] In view of the acute shortage of troop lift in the early part of the war, there was a natural reluctance to convert troopships to hospital ships or to convert troop spaces on transports to hospital spaces to a greater extent than was absolutely necessary. In addition, there were differences of opinion as to how far evacuation should be accomplished by hospital ships protected under the Hague Convention X of 1907 and how far by regular troopships. The time lost in deciding these shipping questions delayed the Army's preparations for meeting its evacuation responsibilities.

In view of the early controversy over the use of troopships and hospital ships for evacuating patients, it is worth noting the advantages and disadvantages that each presented. When troopships could be used, the evacuation operation did not require the sacrifice of a great amount of outbound troop lift. On the other hand, troopships were always subject to attack by the enemy, a fact that created special problems in providing for the safety of patients on board. The employment of troopships was governed by the outbound traffic, with the result that evacuation needs at some oversea bases could not be promptly met by this means. Sometimes the hospital facilities on troopships did not measure up to the desires of The Surgeon General or of the theater surgeons, although they were greatly improved during the war. In contrast, hospital ships could with reasonable assurance be considered safe from enemy attack; they had but one purpose and could be employed in the manner that would best serve that purpose. They also provided the best facilities that the limitation of ship space and the exigencies of war would permit. But hospital ships once registered under the Hague Convention could not be used for any military purpose such as transporting troops to and from the theaters.[174]

Army efforts to secure hospital ships were blocked during the early months of the war by uncertainty as to who should pay for and who should operate such vessels. Although there was no unanimity within the War Department on the subject, a proposal that six hospital ships be built was taken by G-4 as a basis for preliminary action.[175] In January 1942 the Army requested $36,000,000 for the construction of six hospital ships, but the request was disallowed by the Bureau of the Budget on the ground that the Maritime Commission should procure the vessels from funds available to it.[176] When the Army approached Rear Adm. Emory S. Land (Ret.), Chairman of the Maritime Commission, he took the position that such ships properly came under the cognizance of the Navy.[177] His position was predicated on a provision in joint war plans that in case of hostilities the Navy would operate all vessels required by the Army.[178] However, the Army and the Navy had informally set aside the provision immediately after Pearl Harbor because of the Navy's inability to provide crews for the Army's transports. The Army, moreover, ascertained that the Navy had no plans for operating hospital ships under the Hague Convention.[179] The Army therefore did not agree with Admiral Land's view, and several months elapsed before any further action was taken. Finally, on 1 May 1942, the Secretary of War placed the situation before the Secretary of the Navy and proposed a conference of representatives of the two services to resolve the problem. He pointed out that the Army desired hospital ships that were protected under the Hague Convention and that naval hospital ships ordinarily were not eligible for such protection since they operated tactically with the Fleet.

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[173] Remarks by Col Fitzpatrick cited in n. 170.

[174] See Hist Med Liaison Off, par. 1.3; the Hague Convention X of 1907, Art. 4. The Convention is included in AR 55-530, 30 Dec 43.

[175] Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 24 Jan 42, and note for record, G-4/29717-100.

[176] Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 8 Feb 42, G-4/33006-4.

[177] Ltr, CofS USA to Land, 12 Feb 42, and reply, 24 Feb 42, both in G-4/33006-4.

At the suggestion of the Secretary of the Navy the question was referred to the Joint Staff Planners for study. From the discussions by the Joint Staff Planners it was evident that the Navy considered the operation of hospital ships a naval responsibility; but being concerned primarily with the forward areas of the Pacific and having no assurance that the Japanese would respect the markings on Convention hospital ships, the Navy intended to rely on hospital ships operating with the Fleet and evacuation ships (APH's), which would carry troops and cargo outbound and would accommodate about 600 patients on the return voyage. Neither type of ship met the Army's desire for protected vessels for use in repatriating its sick and wounded.[180]

Consideration of the subject by the Joint Chiefs of Staff resulted in agreement on two points—a tentative doctrine on the use of troopships and hospital ships for Army evacuation purposes, and the authorization of three hospital ships for Army use. With a view to economy of shipping, the JCS decided that evacuation normally would be accomplished by using troopships returning from areas that were served more or less regularly by troopships. To provide for additional Army requirements in the Pacific, where many small bases were involved, the JCS decided to request the Maritime Commission to provide three vessels for conversion to hospital ships to be registered under the Convention. These vessels were to be fitted as hospital ships in accordance with Army specifications, employed under the direction of the Army, and provided with medical complements by the Army; but they were to be converted under the supervision of the Navy and manned and operated by naval personnel.[181]

The JCS action provided only half the number of hospital ships that the Army originally had asked for, and the conversion of these three vessels occupied a much longer period than Army officers had anticipated. Since the conversion of troopships would have deprived the Army of sorely needed troop lift, it was decided to use cargo ship hulls (C-1B type) for the hospital ships, and this meant that the superstructure and all accommodations and hospital fittings had to be newly designed and constructed.[182] Commencement of the conversion work was considerably delayed by a misunderstanding as to which service would provide the specifications for the machinery and the electrical equipment. The Navy expected the Army to provide these specifications, while the Army believed that it was responsible only for the specifications pertaining to hospital facilities and that since the Navy would man and operate the vessels it would provide all other specifications.[183] The hulls were built and the conversion work was accomplished on the Pacific coast, where the shipbuilding and the ship repair yards were heavily committed, and, as the Army learned in September 1943, the job was originally given a low priority. These factors, together with the Navy's usual insistence on the highest technical standards, delayed the deliveries well beyond the time the Army had foreseen.[184] The vessels, named *Comfort, Mercy,* and *Hope,* did not enter service until June, August, and September 1944, respectively.[185]

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[178] Wardlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 200–202.

[179] Ltr, C of Trans Br G-4 to WSA, 7 Mar 42, G-4/33006; Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, file copy undated, sub: Hospital Ships, and atchd draft of Ltr, SW to Adm Land, both in OPD ABC 370.05 (2-8-42), Sec. 1.

[180] JPS 27/D, 6 May 42; Memo, ACofS OPD for CG SOS, 9 May 42, OPD ABC 370.05 (2-8-42); JPS 27/1, 16 May 42.

[181] JCS 16th Mtg, 25 May 42; JPS 27/2/D, 26 May 42; JPS 52/1, 29 Jun 42; JCS 22d Mtg, 30 Jun 42.

These three Army-controlled, Navy-operated hospital ships were earmarked for service in the Pacific, and when the Allies decided in July 1942 to invade North Africa in the fall of that year the question of additional hospital ships to serve in the Atlantic was immediately raised. General Eisenhower, who did not favor heavy reliance on troopships for evacuating patients, wanted five hospital ships by April 1943 and an additional hospital ship each month until a total of ten or possibly more were in service. The Surgeon General also favored ordering more hospital ships, particularly for the evacuation of patients from the smaller and more isolated oversea bases not served regularly by troopships. The Chief of Transportation, while recognizing that eventually such vessels would be required, was opposed to immediate action. He contended that emphasis should be placed on using all available troopships for moving troops to the theaters rather than withdrawing some of them from service for conversion, a step that would be necessary if early delivery of hospital ships was to be obtained. He pointed out that in any event the major part of the evacuation from the active theaters would have to be accomplished with troopships. Finally, he argued that if the need for hospital ships should become urgent, troopships could then be converted very quickly. Although the Commanding General, Services of Supply, was inclined to follow The Surgeon General's recommendation that three additional hospital ships be provided with the least possible delay, further deliberation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff resulted in a decision in November 1942 to delay action and await developments.[186]

In the spring of 1943 with the demand

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[182] Memo, CG SOS for VCNO, 14 Jul 42, OCT HB Wylie Hosp Ships; Memo, CG SOS for VCNO, 9 Sep 42, OCT 564 Hosp Ships; Memo, VCNO for BUSHIPS and BUPERS, 12 Sep 42, OCT HB Gross Hosp Ships.

[183] Memo, VCNO for CofS USA, 18 Dec 42; Memo, ACofS OPD for CofS USA, 8 Jan 43; Memo, CofS USA for VCNO, 11 Jan 43, sub: *Comfort, Hope, Mercy;* all in OPD ABC 570 (2-14-42), Sec. IV.

[184] Memo, CG ASF for VCNO, 21 Sep 43, sub: Missions for Hosp Ships to be Operated by USN, and atchd Rad, Bradley for Ralph Keating, 13 Sep 43, both in OCT HB Meyer Stayback.

[185] Hist Med Liaison Off, Tabs 7, 13, and 20.

[186] JPS 27/5/D, 24 Aug 42; 1st Ind, SG for DCofS for Opns SOS, 23 Oct 42; 2d Ind, CG SOS for CofT, 28 Oct 42; Memo, CofT for Secretariat JPS, 2 Nov 42; last three in OCT 564 Hosp Ships; JPS 27/6, 6 Nov 42; JCS 52/3, 12 Nov 42; Memo, CG SOS for CofT, 21 Nov 42, OCT 564 Hosp Ships.

for evacuation from the North African theater increasing and further campaigns in the Mediterranean and in Europe impending, The Surgeon General again proposed that additional hospital ships be authorized. He made it clear that he wanted these vessels for evacuation purposes, not for use as floating hospitals.[187] The first result of this proposal was a decision to convert two small troopships, the *Acadia* and the *Seminole,* to hospital ships and to register them under the Convention.[188] The general question was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the result that an entirely new approach to the problem was adopted.

In accordance with a recommendation of the Army, the JCS decided in June 1943 that Convention-protected ships thereafter would be considered the "normal means" for evacuating helpless patients, and that enough hospital ships would be provided to implement the policy. At the recommendation of the Joint Military Transportation Committee it was agreed that thirteen additional hospital ships would be provided by 31 December 1943, and six more by 31 December 1944. This program, together with the three Navy-operated and two Army-operated vessels already authorized, would give the Army twenty-four hospital ships by the end of 1944. The Army indicated its readiness to convert, man, and operate these vessels, and the Navy agreed to that arrangement. In order to provide early additions to the hospital ship fleet, ten of the smaller and slower troopships were to be converted as soon as equivalent troop lift could be provided by converting fast cargo ships to troopships. The remainder of the hospital ship program was to be accomplished by the conversion of freighters.[189]

The desire to place the majority of the new hospital ships in service during 1943 was not realized. In fact, aside from the *Acadia* and the *Seminole,* only one vessel had sailed on its first trip up to the end of the year. *(Table 13)* The delays were due to general conditions prevailing in the shipbuilding and ship repair industries—heavily committed yards and shortages of materials and labor—and to the initial failure to obtain a sufficiently high priority for this work. In the spring of 1944 the Chief of Transportation reported that he was feeling some embarrassment in his effort to keep up with the evacuation program. The matter of obtaining a higher priority was pressed through the War Shipping Administration and the Coordinator of Ship Repair and Conversion, and by the end of that year all but two of the projected hospital ships had been made ready for service.[190]

In the spring of 1944 the Joint Military Transportation Committee estimated that more hospital ships than had been projected would be needed, but no additions to the program were authorized at that

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[187] Memo, Col Harry D. Offutt, Dir Hosp and Evac Div SGO, for Brig Gen Larry B. McAfee, Asst to SG, 29 Mar 43, SGO 560.2 Hosp Ships; Memo, SG for OPD through CG ASF, 30 Mar 43, OCT 564 Hosp Ships.

[188] OCT HB Monograph 7, Army Hosp Ships in World War II, pp. 22–32. The *Acadia* had been serving the North African theater as an ambulance ship—that is, it was equipped to handle a large number of patients inbound but was not registered under the Convention and so could carry troops outbound.

[189] Memo, Gross for Somervell, 11 May 43, OCT 564 Hosp Ships; JCS 315, 13 May 43; JPS 187/1, 28 May 43; JCS 315/1, 30 May 43; Memo, Wylie for Somervell, 31 May 43, OCT 564 Hosp Ships; Memo by JCS Secretariat, 11 Jun 43, OPD ABC 370.05 (2-8-42), Sec. 2.

[190] Memos, ACofT for Maj Gen Lucius D. Clay, 19 May 44 and 5 Jun 44, sub: Hosp Ship Conversion, OCT 564 Hosp Ships.

TABLE 13—ARMY HOSPITAL SHIPS ENTERING SERVICE DURING WORLD WAR II [a]

Name	Cruising Speed (Knots)	Patient Capacity	First Voyage From the United States	
			Departure Date	Destination
Acadia	16	787	5 June 1943	North Africa
Shamrock	14	543	4 September 1943	North Africa
Seminole	14	454	20 September 1943	North Africa
Algonquin	14	454	2 February 1944	North Africa
Chateau Thierry	13	484	5 March 1944	North Africa
Thistle	15	455	8 April 1944	North Africa
St. Mihiel	13	504	10 May 1944	North Africa
John L. Clem	14	286	15 June 1944	North Africa
Comfort**	14	702	21 June 1944	Australia
Blanche F. Sigman	11	590	7 July 1944	United Kingdom
Emily H. M. Weder	13	738	12 July 1944	Italy
Ernest Hinds	14	288	14 July 1944	Italy
_Wisteria_*	11	588	16 July 1944	United Kingdom
Marigold	13	758	19 July 1944	Italy
_Dogwood_*	11	592	21 July 1944	United Kingdom
_John J. Meany_*	11	582	27 July 1944	Italy
_St. Olaf_*	11	586	12 August 1944	United Kingdom
Larkspur***	10	592	31 August 1944	United Kingdom
Mercy**	14	702	31 August 1944	Southwest Pacific
_Jarrett M. Huddleston_*	11	582	7 September 1944	United Kingdom
Charles A. Stafford	16	706	21 September 1944	United Kingdom
Hope**	14	702	23 September 1944	Southwest Pacific
Louis A. Milne***	12	952	19 March 1945	United Kingdom
Ernestine Koranda***	13	722	13 April 1945	United Kingdom
Aleda E. Lutz	15	778	18 April 1945	United Kingdom
Frances Y. Slanger	19	1,628	30 June 1945	United Kingdom

[a] All listed vessels were previously passenger ships or troopships except those marked (*) which were war-built Liberty-type freighters, those marked (**) which were war-built C-1B type freighters, and those marked (***) which were older freighters. In addition to those listed, three vessels were selected for conversion to Army hospital ships in January 1945—the _Armin W. Leuschner_ and the _Howard A. McCurdy_ on which conversion work was suspended in August 1945, and the _Republic_, which was completed but had engine trouble on her voyage to the Pacific coast and did not enter hospital ship service until January 1946.

Source: History, Medical Liaison Office to OCT and Medical Regulating Service SGO, Incl 3.0, in OCT HB Mvmts Div Med Reg Sv. For additional data, see Charles, _Troopships of World War II_, pp. 327–51. The data given by these sources do not always agree, but the discrepancies are not serious.

time.[191] In the following November consideration of the subject was given sharp impetus by an urgent request from General Eisenhower, then supreme commander in the ETO, that additional hospital ships be assigned to serve that theater. The War Department did not approve this request; it replied that ten hospital ships already were serving the ETO and that the requirements of other theaters prevented any transfers; it further pointed out that the ETO had not been making full use of the hospital spaces on homeward-bound U.S. troopships and emphasized that this must be done; it urged also that efforts be made to increase the number of patients evacuated on the large British liners. The War Department informed the ETO that a study of the over-all evacuation problem was under way, but that even if additional hospital ships should be authorized they would not be available before March 1945.[192]

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[191] JCS 777/1, 2 Apr 44. For a re-estimate of patient load and facilities, see study by SGO, Feb 44, sub: Hospitalization and Evacuation, in OCT HB Gross Hosp and Evac.

The study of the over-all evacuation problem was being made by the Joint Logistics Committee and the Joint Military Transportation Committee, and the results were presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in mid-December 1944. The announced purpose of the inquiry was to determine the adequacy of existing evacuation programs of the Army and the Navy for the maximum war effort. The committees found deficiencies for certain periods and recommended that additional hospital ships with a total capacity for 5,500 patients be provided. They called attention to the heavy evacuation requirements of the ETO and pointed out that evacuation from that area by troopships would be reduced as the theater's need for additional replacements declined and troopships were transferred to the Pacific. In the Pacific, the repeated amphibious assaults on Japanese-held bases were expected to create heavy and continuous evacuation requirements. The committees' recommendation that these additional hospital ships be obtained by converting troopships was approved by the JCS, and the JMTC promptly designated five vessels to be converted and operated by the Army.[193]

Twenty-nine hospital ships were thus authorized for the Army, but only twenty-six were in service when the war ended. The conversion plans for two vessels were changed upon cessation of hostilities, and the ships were completed as troopships; another vessel was completed as a hospital ship in August but was delayed by machinery repairs after arrival at Los Angeles and did not enter service until January 1946. The twenty-six vessels actually in service before V-J Day had total accommodations for 16,755 hospital patients. As shown in Table 13, the patient capacities ranged from 286 to 1,628. Most of the vessels were relatively small and slow. Only five had cruising speeds of 15 knots or more, and only one had capacity for more than 1,000 patients. The largest and fastest was the *Frances Y. Slanger,* formerly the Italian liner *Saturnia,* which did not enter hospital ship service until June 1945.[194] In addition to these Army vessels, the Navy, which initially did not plan to operate hospital ships under the Convention, had twelve such ships at the end of the war, and they sometimes carried Army patients.[195]

The conversion and operation of hospital ships by the Army called for close collaboration by The Surgeon General and the Chief of Transportation. The conversion work was done under the supervision of the Chief of Transportation, but The Surgeon General passed on the suitability of the ships selected and determined the conversion plans and specifications so far as they affected the accommodation and treatment of patients and the accommodation and equipment of the medical staff.[196] The Chief of Transportation was responsible for the marking, equipment, and operation of the vessels in accordance with the Hague Convention.[197]

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[192] Msg, ETO to WD, 30 Nov 44, E 69073 (CM-IN 101, 1 Dec 44); Msg, WD to ETO, 2 Dec 42, WARX 72113.

[193] JCS 1199, 16 Dec 44; Memo, CG ASF for ACofS OPD, 27 Dec 44, sub: Implementation of Hosp Ship Program, OPD ABC 370.05 (2-8-42), Sec. 2; Ltr, C of Water Div OCT to WSA, 29 Dec 44; Memo, C of Water Div for Lt Col William M. Day, ASF Hq, 7 Feb 45; last two in OCT 564 Hosp Ships.

[194] For capacities and patients carried on each voyage, see Hist Med Liaison Off, Incls 3.0 and 4.41.

[195] *Ibid.,* par. 4.9.

The Army employed civilian crews in the deck, engine, and stewards departments of its hospital ships as on other Army-operated vessels, but it used military personnel in all positions pertaining to the medical care of patients. The relatively large amount of space assigned to civilian crewmen under standards adopted by the maritime industry was a matter of concern to The Surgeon General, because it reduced the patient capacities of the vessels and sometimes forced medical enlisted personnel into undesirable space. But an attempt to replace civilians with military personnel in the stewards department met with labor union opposition and therefore was carried out on only a limited scale.[198] Since the high rate of turnover among seamen was not conducive to the orderliness and *esprit de corps* essential on hospital ships, the Chief of Transportation made a special effort to induce crewmen to stay with the vessels, but he obtained no appreciable results.[199]

The medical staffs on hospital ships—at first called hospital ship companies, and then hospital ship complements—varied in size with the patient capacities of the vessels. According to the scale approved in March 1945, the complement for a vessel with capacity for 500 patients was 179 officers and enlisted men; a vessel with capacity for 800 patients carried a complement of 251; a vessel with a capacity for 1,000 patients carried a complement of 306.[200] Because of the scarcity of personnel, the complements employed during the latter part of the war were somewhat smaller than those authorized earlier. The senior medical officer permanently stationed on board was designated hospital ship commander; in addition to medical duties, he had responsibilities similar to those of the transport commander on a troopship.[201] Utilization of both military and civilian personnel on Army hospital ships necessitated the issuance of explicit instructions on matters of jurisdiction, and for the three ships that were operated by naval crews these matters were covered by an Army-Navy agreement.[202]

The Chief of Transportation assigned direct responsibility for the operation of Army hospital ships to the commanders of the vessels' home ports. The port commanders provided the civilian crews, put on board the supplies and equipment those crews required, supervised the performance of maintenance and repairs, and issued the necessary operating instructions. The port commanders also were responsible for placing on each vessel the required number of medical personnel and the required quantities of medical supplies. The medical staff and their activities on board were under the technical supervision of The Surgeon General.

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[196] Memo, SG for CofT, 31 Dec 42; Memo, SG for Col Fitzpatrick, 30 Jun 43; both in SGO 560.2 Hosp Ships. SGO file 632.1 BB for the years 1940–45 includes extensive correspondence on this subject.

[197] AR 55-530, 30 Dec 43, sub: Hosp Ships; TC Pamphlet 16, 4 Apr 45, sub: U.S. Army Hosp Ship Guide.

[198] Memo, SG for CG ASF, 13 Nov 43, par. 6, sub: T/O 8-537, AG 320.3 (20 Nov 43)(2); Memo by Col Achilles L. Tynes, 30 Jan 45, and atchd statement, Data for Hist Record of Constr Br, in Hist Records SGO; Memo by Maj Howard A. Donald, 18 Jun 44, sub: Plans for Conversion of SS *Dorothy Luckenbach*, SGO 632.1 BB; Smith, *op cit.*, Ch. XXIII, pp. 420–21.

[199] Ltr, Gross to Groninger, 26 Jun 43, OCT HB Gross Hosp Ships; Memo, CofT for CG CPE, 9 Dec 44, OCT 231 Hosp Ships.

[200] T/O 8-537, 1 Apr 42, Hosp Ship Company; T/O&E 8-537T, 7 Dec 43, Hosp Ship Complement; T/O&E 8-537, 3 Mar 45.

[201] See above, Ch. II; Instruction to Hosp Ship Comdrs, issued by CPE, 4 Feb 44, OCT HB CPE.

[202] OCT Cir 164, 10 Dec 43, TC Cir 80-14, revised 15 May 44; ASF Cir 36, 31 Jan 45; Principles Applying to Army-Staffed and Navy-Manned Hospital Ships, undated, OCT HB Wylie Hosp Ships.

Preparing hospital ships for their voyages and making preparations for the debarkation of patients were specialized jobs. For that reason, it was decided in 1943 that so far as practicable the hospital ships serving in the Atlantic should be operated out of the Charleston Port of Embarkation.[203] There was an advantage in having such vessels sail from and discharge their patients at a port that was not burdened with heavy troop or cargo movements. Also, as pointed out by Brig. Gen. James T. Duke, the port commander at Charleston, the experience gained in regularly handling a number of hospital ships enabled port officers to deal more expertly with the problems of personnel and supply that were continually arising.[204]

The deployment of Army hospital ships was determined chiefly by combat operations. They were employed mainly in evacuating patients to the United States from North Africa, the Mediterranean, the United Kingdom, continental Europe, the Southwest Pacific, and the western Pacific, and in evacuating patients from forward to rear bases in the Mediterranean and the Pacific.[205] Voyage assignments were made by the Chief of Transportation in accordance with reports of patients awaiting evacuation and estimates of casualties likely to result from impending military actions.[206] As shown in Table 13, the twenty-three Army-operated hospital ships made their first voyages to the transatlantic theaters. Some of them were transferred to the Pacific before and some after the Japanese capitulation, and others were decommissioned as hospital ships after they were no longer needed for evacuating patients from Europe.[207] The three Navy-operated hospital ships served entirely in the Pacific, a considerable part of their time being spent in moving patients within the southwest and western Pacific areas.

Regardless of the number of hospital ships in service, the greater part of the patients evacuated by water to the United States was moved by troop transports—97 percent in 1943, 75 percent in 1944, and 74 percent in 1945.[208] *(Tables 14 and 15)* In September 1942 the Commanding General, Services of Supply, instructed the Chief of Transportation to provide hospital beds equal to 5 percent of the troop berths on Army-owned transports and 4 percent on "chartered" transports.[209] These percentages were later increased to 8 and 7, respectively.[210] Not all patients required hospital beds, and during the

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[203] Memo, CofT for SG, 22 Sep 43, OCT 353-370.5 Africa.

[204] Hosp Ship Opns, by Gen Duke, undated, OCT HB Wylie Hosp Ships.

[205] British hospital ships were also used for U.S. intratheater evacuation in the Mediterranean and between the Continent and the United Kingdom.

[206] See Memo, SG for Somervell, 23 Dec 43, and Memo, CofT for Somervell, 11 Jan 44, in OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

[207] Concerning the schedule of transfers to the Pacific and delays in making necessary improvements in ventilation, see Memo, Farr for Wylie, 14 Jul 45, OCT HB Wylie Hosp Ships.

[208] Hist Med Liaison Off, Sec. 7.00.

[209] Memo, CG SOS for CofT, 8 Sep 42, sub: Ship Hosp Facilities, AG 704 (6-17-42) (1). The term "chartered" covered WSA troopships allocated to the Army.

[210] Memo, TAG for CGs AAF, AGF, ASF, *et al.*, 8 Jun 44, sub: procedure for Evac of Patients by Water or Air, Incl 1, AG 704.11 (3 Jun 44).



USS *COMFORT* OFF LOS ANGELES HARBOR. *Army medical personnel and Navy crew members of the ship on deck.*

TABLE 14—PATIENTS EVACUATED FROM OVERSEAS BY WATER AND DEBARKED AT ARMY PORTS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1943–1945 [a]

Port	1943	1944	1945
Total	67,395	144,923	299,017
Boston	5,931	8,296	35,383
New York	17,810	39,850	127,748
Hampton Roads	3,814	12,807	14,800
Charleston	1,128	31,148	41,299
New Orleans	1,261	971	656
Los Angeles	1,945	3,528	15,417
San Franscisco	30,545	45,380	55,789
Seattle	4,961	2,943	7,925

[a] Includes Army, Navy, and Allied military patients debarked at Army ports indicated. In addition 168 patients were debarked at the Baltimore cargo port in 1943 and 1 in 1944.

Source: History, Medical Liaison Office to OCT and Medical Regulating Service SGO, Sec. 7.00, in OCT HB Mvmts Div Med Reg Sv.

heavy evacuation operation of 1945 many troopships carried more than a thousand patients. A few of the larger U.S. troopships accommodated 2,800 patients, and the larger British vessels exceeded that number. The "safe" patient capacity of each vessel was determined by a survey team representing The Surgeon General, the Chief of Transportation, the master of the vessel, and the transport commander, and the oversea commanders were kept informed of the current capacity of each vessel for each class of patients.[211] Changes in hospital facilities were effected through the co-operative efforts of The Surgeon General and the Chief of Transportation, and when such changes were of a nature that would affect the patient capacity of the ship a resurvey was made.[212]

Since the number of patients carried on troopships varied widely from trip to trip, it was necessary to devise a flexible and economical method of assigning medical personnel. The plan adopted was to assign to each troopship a small permanent medical staff headed by a transport surgeon, and to provide medical hospital ship platoons to be assigned to transport surgeons as supplemental personnel when needed.[213] In the beginning these platoons ranged in size from seven to eighty-eight officers and enlisted men organized to provide average care, when supplementing the permanent medical staff, for groups of patients ranging from twenty-five to five hundred. Later, the size of the platoons was reduced and nurses were eliminated.[214] Eventually it was found feasible to standardize these units

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[211] 1st Ind, C of Mvmts Div OCT for C of Contl Div OCT, 27 Nov 44; OCT Misc Ltr 28, 14 Jul 44; both in OCT 569.5 Pers Capacity of Transports.

[212] General specifications for hospital areas on troopships are given in Memo, SG for CofT, 26 Nov 42, and 1st Ind, SG for CofT, 4 Jan 43; see also Memo, Col Tynes for SG, 3 Jul 43, sub: Rpt of Conf; all in SGO 632.1 BB.

[213] On the transport surgeon, see AR 55-350, 14 Sep 42, Sec. II; see also Instructions for Transport Surgeons, issued by CPE, 1 Dec 43, OCT HB CPE.

[214] T/O 8-534, 27 Oct 42, sub: Med Hosp Ship Platoons Separate; T/O&E 8-534, 21 Oct 43.

TABLE 15—PERCENTAGE OF PATIENTS DEBARKED BY THE ARMY FROM TROOPSHIPS, HOSPITAL SHIPS, AND AIRCRAFT: 1943–1945 [a]

Means of Transport	1943	1944	1945
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Troopships	92.8	61.4	57.4
Hospital Ships	2.7	20.4	20.1
Aircraft	4.5	18.2	22.5

[a] A total of 2,390 patients was debarked in 1941, 9,240 in 1942, and 22,909 in 1946. The patients debarked were chiefly Army personnel, but limited numbers of U. S. Navy and Allied personnel were included.

Source: Smith, *The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior*, Table 16.

on the basis of one medical officer, one dental officer, and fifteen enlisted men to care for one hundred patients.[215]

The personnel for hospital ship platoons, and also for hospital ship complements, after being trained at Medical Corps schools, was placed under the control of the commanders of the ports of embarkation. The port commanders were responsible for the organization of the required number of units and for providing such additional training as was necessary to enable the units to function properly on board.[216] At the end of June 1945 the 322 medical hospital ship platoons then in service embraced 661 commissioned officers and 4,955 enlisted men, a total of 5,616. On the same date there were 481 commissioned officers, 29 warrant officers, 1,112 nurses, and 4,351 enlisted men—a total of 5,973—assigned to hospital ship complements.[217] The training and technical supervision of such personnel was a function of the port surgeon. The supervision of medical supplies was charged to the port medical supply officer. These officers were assigned to the ports by The Surgeon General, but each officer was responsible directly to the port commander as a member of his technical staff.[218]

Until late in 1944, medical hospital ship platoons were assigned to service by the commanders of the ports to which they were attached; at that time they were placed under the control of the Movements Division, OCT, which was in a better position to direct their employment in accordance with the over-all need. The platoons were sent overseas for temporary attachment to the theater commanders, who placed them on returning troopships as their services were required.[219] Despite the effort to use them as intensively as possible, there were not enough platoons to meet requirements after evacuations became heavy, and oversea commanders were directed to make maximum use of medical personnel returning from the theaters on leave, rotation, or temporary duty, by organizing them into provisional platoons.[220]

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[215] Memo, CofT for Mob Div ASF, 10 Jun 43, OCT 322 Med Hosp Ship Platoons; Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 1 Apr 44, Reorg of Med Hosp Ship Platoons, OCT HB Gross Hosp and Evac; Memo, Mvmts Div OCT for Hist Unit OCT, 20 Jun 45, par. 19, OCT HB Mvmts Div Rpts.

[216] The extent of the medical training given personnel was determined by the Medical Corps.

[217] Tabulation, T/O Units Used on Ships as of 30 Jun 45, prepared by Dir of Pers OCT, in OCT HB Dir of Pers.

[218] Memo,SG for CofT, 30 Apr 42; Memo, CofT for PEs, 2 May 42; sub: Port Med Supply Off; both in OCT 323.6 Duties of Med Off.

[219] Memo, TAG for CGs of Depts, Theaters, *et al.*, 25 Jan 43; sub: Sea Evac Opns, par. 2*c*, AG 370.05 (1-19-43); Memo, CofT for PEs, 5 Jun 43, sub: See Evac of Patients, OCT 370.05 Plans, Policies, and Procedures.

The military operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean in 1943 made heavy demands on troopship hospital facilities. The first Army hospital ships did not become available until the summer of that year; the patient capacities of the troopships were small and not definitely established; and full co-ordination between the theater and the zone of interior had not been worked out. In June Col. Thomas G. Tousey, a medical officer from the New York Port of Embarkation, was dispatched to North Africa to study the situation, and his report disclosed many shortcomings.[221] He found that medical hospital ship platoons were being held in idleness in some base sections pending assignment to troopships, whereas the individual members might have been assigned to temporary medical duties on shore that would have provided training and helped morale. This situation was due in part to the attitude of some platoon officers who did not consider their units subject to shore duty. A definite plan for the assignment of platoons to ships was not being followed. The Army regulation requiring that platoons be assigned as units could not be uniformly enforced without great waste of personnel because it often happened that only a large platoon was available for assignment to a ship with small patient capacity. Sometimes the transport surgeons would not accept as many patients, or as many of a particular class, as the oversea medical officers desired to embark, and there were instances where patients were brought to the dock and then taken back to the hospital. Surgeons on naval transports refused to accept Army nurses, with the result that nurses had to be left behind when the rest of the platoon sailed. Colonel Tousey reported also that not enough forethought was being given to the proper kinds and quantities of medical supplies to be stocked on the respective transports. While his findings contributed substantially to the improvement of procedures, the insufficiency of ship hospital facilities continued, and at the end of the year there was a considerable backlog of patients in North Africa.[222]

A backlog of patients also developed in the European theater after the invasion of Normandy. Reference has been made to the instructions sent to ETOUSA early in December 1944 that U.S. troopships would have to be used to the maximum in evacuating the sick and wounded and that an effort should be made to use the British liners more extensively for this purpose. Such a program was necessary in order to avoid accumulating a backlog of patients that would require a long period to liquidate after the Germans had surrendered and the majority of the troopships had been transferred to the Pacific.

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[220] AG Memo, 8 Jun 44, cited n. 210, par. 14*b;* OCT Misc Ltr 111 to PEs, 3 Apr 45, sub: Med Hosp Ship Platoons, OCT HB PE Gen Evac of Patients; Ltrs, CofT ASF for CofT ETOUSA and CofT MTOUSA, 10 May 45, OCT HB Gross Hosp and Evac; Rad, WD to ETOUSA and MTOUSA, 25 May 45, WARX 88847.

[221] Memo, Col Tousey for CG NYPE, 20 Aug 43, sub: Rpt of Oversea Observer, OCT 370.05 Patients.

[222] Rad, Algiers to WD, 8 Nov 43, CM-IN 4781; CMTC 76th Mtg, 2 Dec 43, Item 4; Memo, SG for Somervell, 23 Dec 43; Memo, CofT for Somervell, 11 Jan 44; last two in OCT HB Farr Staybacks Jan 1944, No. 35.

In Washington the Chief of Transportation and The Surgeon General, Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, were in agreement on this point, but it was evident that the same understanding did not exist between their counterparts in Europe. The theater medical staff had a strong preference for hospital ships and also regarded the rated capacities of many troopship hospitals as too high in view of the facilities. In October 1944 General Gross requested General Ross, Chief of Transportation, ETOUSA, to give particular attention to the matter, and during a trip to Europe in December Gross made the settlement of the question one of his objectives. As a result, a much better understanding was established between the Transportation Corps organization and Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, the theater surgeon, and an agreement was worked out with the British whereby the number of patients to be accommodated on the Queens was greatly increased. After necessary improvements in facilities and additions to the ships' medical personnel, first priority was given to 3,500 U.S. sick and wounded on each westbound trip of the *Queen Elizabeth* and to 3,000 on the *Queen Mary*.[223]

During the winter of 1945 General Somervell continued to stress the policy of evacuating patients from the ETO as rapidly as possible; he did not want a repetition of the slow evacuation following World War I, which he termed "the scandal and disgrace of the military service." [224] In line with this policy the Chief of Transportation instructed the port commanders on the Atlantic coast to resurvey all troopships under U.S. control in order to establish the greatest "practical patient capacity," and he was careful to see that full advantage was taken of the increased patient capacities of these vessels and the British Queens.[225] Shortly before V-E Day eighteen troopships were designated to carry as many sick and wounded as they could accommodate, and the number of able-bodied troops to be transported was correspondingly reduced.[226]

May 1945 was the peak month for evacuation by water from the ETO and the MTO, with 35,680 patients arriving at U.S. Atlantic ports during that period.[227] Those theaters had also been instructed to give top priority to patients on the westbound airlift.[228] Late in July the War Department announced that its plan to bring all transportable sick and wounded soldiers home from Europe within ninety days after V-E Day would be accomplished.[229]

For the movement of patients from the Pacific theaters the Army relied heavily on troopships until after evacuation from the ETO and the MTO had progressed to a

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[223] Ltrs, Gross to Ross, 9 Oct 44 and 17 Nov 44, OCT HB Gross Day File; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 28 Oct 44, OCT HB PE Gen Evac of Patients; TWXs between OCT ASF and OCT ETOUSA, 1035 of 27 Sep 44, 1137 of 17 Oct 44, 1149 of 19 Oct 44, 1176 of 24 Oct 44; Memo, SG for Wylie, 14 Nov 44, OCT HB PE Gen Evac of Patients; Memo, Wylie for Somervell, 15 Dec 44, ASF Hq Trans 1944; CCS 751/1, 3 Jan 45; CMT 67, 16 Jan 45; Ltr, Wylie for CG NYPE, 1 Mar 45, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks.

[224] Memo, Somervell for Wood and Gross, 23 Feb 45, ASF Hq Trans 1945.

[225] Memo, CofT for BPE, NYPE, HRPE, 5 Feb 45; Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 6 Feb 45; both in ASF Hq Trans 1945; Memo, CofS USA for CG ETOUSA, 22 Mar 45; Memo, Farr for Gross, 19 Apr 45; last two in OCT HB Gross Hosp and Evac.

[226] Memo, C of Mvmts Div for C of Water Div, 27 Apr 45, sub: Troopship Utilization, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Memo by Nies, 14 Jan 45, in Mvmt Div Histories, OCT HB Mvmt Div Gen.

[227] Hist Med Liaison Off, Sec. 7.00.

[228] Msg, G-4 to Hq COMZONE ETO, 4 May 45, WARX 80042.

[229] WD press release, 23 Jul 45, sub: All Transportable Sick and Wounded in Europe Will Be Home by End of July.



WARD ROOM ON THE ARMY TROOPSHIP *MONTEREY*

point that permitted the transfer of hospital ships from the Atlantic.[230] The Navy's troop transports as well as those of the Army were used throughout the war. Some patients were moved on freighters, and airlift also was employed when available. Because of the numerous widely scattered bases, a well-regulated utilization of ship hospital spaces was difficult to attain; some vessels returned to the United States without patients, while others carried sick and wounded in excess of their proper capacities.[231] The evacuations during 1943 and 1944 were substantial despite the small number of hospital ships in the Pacific. The peak months for the arrival of patients at U.S. Pacific ports were May and October 1945, when the number exceeded 10,000.[232] By the end of the year the evacuation of battle casualties had been virtually completed.

Theater commanders provided the zone of interior with full information regarding prospective and actual evacuations. They dispatched a radiogram on the first of each month reporting the number and classes of patients awaiting embarkation from each port in the theater and the number and classes expected to be eligible for evacuation within the next thirty

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[230] Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-47, pp. 407-11, OCT HB Monographs.

[231] Memo, Meyer for Farr, 28 Jan 44, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.

[232] Hist Med Liaison Off, Sec. 7.00.

DISPENSARY ON THE *MONTEREY*

days.[233] These reports enabled the Chief of Transportation and his port commanders to adjust ship schedules to meet evacuation requirements so far as practicable and to insure that the ships were adequately equipped and supplied; they also furnished a basis for advance planning by The Surgeon General and the service commands for the use of hospital facilities in the zone of interior.

When each ship sailed the theater commander sent a radio report to the port of debarkation giving the number of patients of each class on board and the expected time of arrival.[234] On the basis of these advices, which were forwarded to all interested offices in Washington, the debarkations were planned, the debarkation hospitals to which the patients were to be forwarded were determined, the number of hospital cars and other railway equipment needed to move the patients from the ports was arranged for, and the service commands were requested to provide the number of ambulances required to make the transfer from ship to train or from ship to debarkation hospital.

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[233] Memo, TAG for CGs of Oversea Comds, 16 Sep 42, sub: Essential Info Concerning Evac, AG 370.05 (9-15-42). For examples of reports, see Msg, Algiers to WD, 11 Nov 43, CM-IN 6989 (12 Nov 43), and similar messages in OCT 353-370.5 North Africa.

[234] Memo, CG SOS for TAG, 6 Jan 43, sub: Essential Info Concerning Evac, and atchd note for record; Memo, TAG for CGs of Oversea Comds, 13 Jan 43, same sub; both in AG 370.05 (1-6-43). For a time these reports were sent by air mail, but deliveries were found to be uncertain.

sponsibility, the Chief of Transportation got off to a late start in the development of packing, packaging, and processing instructions, and then subordinated this project to tasks that seemed more pressing, with the result that progress was slow.[148] In September 1944 The Inspector General reported that many manufacturers were still failing to provide proper protection for equipment before shipment, and that the Transportation Corps depots were therefore overburdened with the task of correcting deficiencies. The depots, on the other hand, complained that they had not been given adequate written directions but had received most of their instruction orally from visiting officers.[149] Even during the late months of the war satisfactory performance in this field was a goal rather than an achievement.[150]

Although his problems with the various phases of maintenance were acute, the Chief of Transportation was unwilling to surrender any part of that responsibility. Late in 1943 a proposal was placed before ASF headquarters that the heavier types of maintenance (third, fourth, and fifth echelons) for all vessels except Army transports be made a responsibility of the Corps of Engineers, which already was maintaining certain specialized types of vessels used in its construction work and for tactical purposes. In opposing this proposal, the Chief of Transportation pointed out that in order to provide for the maintenance of transports and small boats the Transportation Corps had established marine repair shops at the ports, and that if the Corps of Engineers were to take over the maintenance of the smaller vessels a duplication of facilities and personnel would result.[151] He contended that supervision of the lighter types of maintenance (first and second echelon maintenance, which were performed by the operating crews) and the heavier maintenance could not be placed under separate agencies without danger of loss of co-ordination and detriment to the operation of the vessels. He further emphasized that maintenance requirements had to be considered in relation to the design of vessels, the procurement and storage of spare parts and maintenance supplies, and the training of crews to operate the vessels, all of which were Transportation Corps responsibilities. The technical soundness of the Chief of Transportation's position was apparent, and the proposal was not adopted.[152]

Spare parts for internal combustion engines presented one of the more difficult aspects of maintenance. The number of these engines included in the wartime programs for both marine and land equipment was great, and the manufacturers were beset with heavy backlogs. The problem was felt especially keenly in the Southwest Pacific Area, to which the Chief of Transportation had shipped a large number of vessels in the early part of the war. Since many small naval craft were

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[148] Memo, C of Packing and Crating Br for C of Maintenance Div OCT, 21 Feb 44; Memo, CG ASF for CofT, 27 May 44; both in OCT 400.162; TC Cir 90-8, 23 Jun 44, sub: Packaging, Packing, and Processing.

[149] Memo, TIG for ACofS G-4, 15 Sep 44, sub: Packaging of Supplies, OCT 400.162; TC Cir 80-57, 2 Nov 44, sub: Rpt of Insp on Packing.

[150] Memos, CG ASF for CofT, 19 Dec 44, 23 Jun 45, 16 Jul 45, all in OCT 400.162; TC Off Order 5-37, 3 Apr 45; OCT Misc Ltr 243, 17 Jul 45; WD SB 55-14, Oct 45, sub: Processing, Packaging, and Packing TC Equip and Parts.

[151] The Chief of Transportation also converted, manned, and operated six marine repair ships that were sent to oversea ports where shore facilities for repairing floating equipment were inadequate or nonexistent; Wardlow, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

[152] Memo, CofT for Dir of Sup ASF, 14 Dec 43, sub: Maintenance Responsibility, OCT 563 TC.

PROCESSING AND CRATING SHOP *at the Lathrop, California, Holding and Reconsignment Point.*

equipped with similar engines, the Army in emergencies was able to obtain some spare parts from naval depots, although the extent of such help naturally was limited so long as the Navy had not taken Army requirements into account in building up theater stocks.[153]

In the summer of 1944 the War Department and the Navy Department entered into a formal agreement under which the Navy would supply parts having high usage factors for the types of internal combustion engines used by both the Army and the Navy. The naval spare parts distribution centers in all theaters were directed to honor Army requisitions, but within limits set by the number of Army engines in the theater, the Navy's usage factors, and the supply of spare parts on hand.[154] Although Army requirements in the theaters were not always met in this way, the arrangement greatly simplified the problem of requisitioning and avoided the maintenance of duplicate stocks.

The progress that the Chief of Transportation had made during the latter part of the war in building up stocks of spare parts in the zone of interior did not forestall a renewed crisis in this field after V-J Day. In accordance with blanket instructions issued to the technical services, all contracts for equipment and spare parts,

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[153] Memo, Col Thomas G. Plant, CTO USASOS SWPA, for CofT, 30 Nov 43, sub: Engine Spare Parts, OCT 561.4 SWPA.

[154] Memos, AG 412.5 (27 Jul 44) 28 Jul 44; AG 412.5 (21 Aug 44), 22 Aug 44; AG 412.5 (14 Dec 44), 14 Dec 44, sub: Spare Parts for Marine Engines.

MARINE ROPE IN STORAGE *at the Montgomery, Alabama, Holding and Reconsignment Point.*

except those covering railway equipment for the Foreign Economic Administration, were summarily canceled. Although the end of the war meant the end of heavy requisitions for new equipment, much of the marine and rail equipment already in the theaters was kept in service and still required maintenance. As a result, the Transportation Corps supply organization during the early postwar period was placed in the position of having to operate on a "hand-to-mouth basis," and for a period of about nine months spare parts and maintenance supplies were procured wherever they could be found as requisitions were received. The policy was not modified until April 1946, when planned procurement on a limited basis was again authorized.[155]

Progress in Technical Matters

Transportation Corps equipment, generally speaking, consisted of commercial types modified to meet Army requirements. In a measure this circumstance lightened the responsibility of the Chief of Transportation for technical development, as compared with the services that procured equipment of a strictly military nature without prototypes in the commercial field. Yet his responsibility was considerable for a number of reasons. The modifications in commercial designs to adapt them to Army requirements were often extensive. The equipment had to meet the needs of a variety of users—the Air Forces, the Corps of Engineers, the Coast Artillery Corps, the tactical commanders, the port commanders, and the beneficiaries of the lend-lease program. The conditions of employment varied widely in different parts of the world because of differing military, climatic, and other factors. The using services were constantly developing new ideas to make the marine equipment that the Chief of Transportation procured for them more exactly meet their needs. The differences between U.S. and foreign railway equipment and operations had to be taken into account in manufacturing locomotives and cars for use overseas. Relatively little had been done before the war to prepare for meeting the requirements of a world-wide transportation operation.

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[155] Memo, ACofT for Sup for C of Procurement Div OCT, 4 Sep 45, sub: Readj and Demob; Memo, CofT for CO Marietta Depot, 10 Apr 46; Interv with Col Herbert D. May, 17 Jul 46; all in OCT HB Dir of Sup Gen. During the war Colonel May was chief of the Field Service Group, and later executive to the Director of Supply; at the time of this conversation he was chief of the Supply Division, which was a consolidation of all supply agencies of the OCT.

The latter point adds to the evidence already presented in this volume that a technical service that has to organize and start operations after war has begun is at a great disadvantage. This is true not only because the service has missed the opportunity for advance research and planning, but also because it encounters extraordinary difficulties during wartime in assembling technicians, orienting them to their task, and establishing procedures to assist them in functioning effectively. Work on the adaptation of marine equipment had been carried on in the Quartermaster Corps and work on the adaptation of rail equipment in the Corps of Engineers before the Chief of Transportation took over these functions. But the development accomplished up to that time was limited, partly because of small budgets and partly because the scope and variety of the oversea requirements were largely unforeseen. The Chief of Transportation therefore assumed the major part of the task of technical development, as well as of procurement.[156]

The technical organization was built up gradually.[157] In the beginning the Engineering Division was responsible for all aspects of the work—engineering plans, designs, specifications, standardization, research, and development. When the Field Service Group was established in early summer of 1943, part of the technical personnel was moved to Cincinnati, where it continued to function as the Engineering Division, charged only with those functions that pertained to production engineering; the rest of the personnel remained in Washington and was designated the Technical Staff. Because of the difficulty of engaging a sufficient number of technicians to enable the Engineering Division to cope with the expanding program, the Director of Supply made an arrangement with an engineering firm to assign personnel to supplement that of the division.

The Technical Staff in Washington assumed a general supervision of technical developments. It was aided by a Technical Committee representing the Director of Supply, the operating divisions in the Office of the Chief of Transportation, and the other technical services that were invited by the Chief of Transportation to participate. In addition to this general advissory committee, subcommittees were established late in the war to deal with the design of specific types of equipment; they were known as the Marine Design Committee, the Rail Design Committee, and the Highway and Materials-Handling Design Committee.[158]

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[156] The Army's general instructions relating to technical research and development are in AR 850-25, 30 Jun 43, and changes.

[157] OCT HB Monograph 28, pp. 145-51.

This organization continued until 1945. In January of that year the Transportation Corps Board was established to aid the Chief of Transportation in improving all phases of his service, including matériel, training, and procedures.[159] In June 1945 the Technical Staff was redesignated the Research and Development Division.[160] There was obvious overlapping in the fields assigned to the Transportation Corps Board and the Research and Development Division. The arrangement eventually worked out was that the division would serve in a staff capacity to assist the Director of Matériel and Supply in fulfilling his technical responsibilities, while the board would work on specific projects assigned to it by the Chief of Transportation.[161]

The technical objective was to develop plans, designs, and specifications that would assure equipment that was sound from an engineering standpoint and at the same time satisfactory to the users. This objective was especially difficult to attain with marine equipment because of the many uses to which tugs, boats, barges, and floating cranes were put during the war and the divergent and changing operating conditions. With railway equipment the technical requirements were less changeable, but here again there were many problems because of the differing gauges, clearances, and railroading methods encountered in the oversea commands. Materials-handling equipment for docks and warehouses required no noteworthy departures from commercial types. The same was true of motor equipment for over-the-road service in the theaters.[162]

In working out satisfactory designs for such equipment there was close collaboration between the Director of Supply's technical personnel and the operating divisions concerned with the respective types—that is, Water Division, Rail Division, Transit Storage Division, and Highway Division. These divisions were represented on the technical subcommittees that dealt with the respective types of equipment. Changes in design were made only with the concurrence of the chief of the interested operating division.

The effort to meet the desires of those that used the equipment was paralleled by an effort to avoid an excessive number of designs. Reference has been made to the fact that when the Transportation Corps began procuring large amounts of floating equipment for the theaters in the fall of 1942, it had to contract for designs that the builders could most readily produce and to utilize the kinds of engines, electrical systems, and other mechanisms that were promptly available. The result was that a great variety of vessels was put into service. This was recognized to be an unsound situation, since the multiplicity of types complicated the task of providing spare parts and issuing maintenance instructions, and also militated against the development of mass production methods by the builders. Although such a program was unavoidable in the beginning, an effort to standardize was begun at once.[163]

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[158] For a discussion of the work of the Technical Staff, see Rpt, Dir of Sup, FY 1944, Tab labeled Tech Staff; Rpt, Tech Staff and Research and Development Div, year ending 30 June 45; both in OCT HB Dir of Sup Rpts.

[159] ASF Cir 412, 16 Dec 44; TC Cir 5-7, 17 Jan 45.

[160] OCT Info Bull 61, 11 Jun 45.

[161] TC Cir 5-30, 18 Jan 46, revised 29 May 46.

[162] The Chief of Transportation did not contract for motor equipment, but during the last half of the war he collaborated with the Chief of Ordnance in obtaining types of trucks, tractors, and trailers that would be most serviceable in the mass movement of freight in the theaters; see Wardlow, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

Standardization involved not only refusing to reorder the nondescript types that had been procured earlier, but also holding down the number of changes made in standard types to meet requests from the users. During the first year—that is up to the fall of 1943—about 60 percent of the basic designs were eliminated and the remaining 40 percent were simplified so far as possible. On 1 September 1943 there were 156 active designs of floating equipment, including 25 tugs, 22 freight and passenger boats, 30 cargo barges, 14 miscellaneous barges, 6 crane and derrick barges, 19 rescue and salvage boats, 10 harbor defense boats, and 30 miscellaneous types of small boats. Procurement in the calendar year 1944 included only seventy-one designs; only two new types were built during that year.[164] It was hoped that the number of marine designs could be brought below forty, but that had not been achieved when the war ended.

In attempting to reduce the number of types of rail equipment, the Director of Supply was confronted with problems of a different nature—the relatively inflexible requirements for operation on foreign railroads and in conjunction with foreign equipment.[165] Cars and locomotives were built to forty different combinations of gauges, brakes, and couplers. The size of rail equipment sent overseas had to take into account also the roadbeds and the clearances on the lines over which it would move. The decision to use diesel-driven locomotives in Italy and Iran added to the number of designs on the active list. On 1 September 1943, there were 69 active designs for locomotives, 35 for locomotive cranes, 43 for freight cars, 31 for tank cars, and 64 for miscellaneous types of rolling stock—a total of 242 on the comprehensive railway equipment list.[166] In June 1944, there were seventy-three rail end items under procurement; that was a "spot picture," however, and the figure does not indicate how many designs were on the active list at that time.[167]

Although considerable progress was made toward standardization as the war went on, there were limits beyond which the Chief of Transportation could not go. He had to meet the constantly developing or changing needs of the users of the equipment, and a complete "freeze" of designs was therefore impracticable.[168] But the goal of standardization was never lost from sight. To that end and also with a view to reducing the production delays and the additional costs involved in unnecessary modification, a close control was established over change orders, including those originating with the builders as well as those initiated by the users of the equipment.[169]

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[163] Memo, CG SOS for CofT, 22 Feb 43, sub: Production Conf, par. 2; Memo, CofT for ACofS for Matériel SOS, 27 Feb 43; both in OCT 400.17.

[164] OCT HB Monograph 28, pp. 152–53; List, Marine and Rail Items Procured by TC as of 1 Sep 43, OCT HB Dir of Sup Program; Rpt, Reqmts and Distribution Div, 30 Jun 45, Reqmts and Stock Contl Br, p. 10, OCT HB Dir of Sup Rpts. Numerous statements were made during the war regarding the number of designs in use, but the bases of computation differed; the figures used here apply to designs for marine end items and appear to give a correct indication of the extent to which standardization was accomplished during the period of heavy procurement.

[165] Some of the refinements that the Russians and the British requested were refused; Memo, CofT for Gen Clay, 6 Jul 44, sub: Diesel Locomotives for USSR, ASF Hq Dir of Matériel Ry Equip & Reqmts; Memo, BAS Washington for Dir of Sup, 16 Aug 44, OCT 453 England, and reply, 26 Aug 44, OCT 453.3 England.

[166] List, Marine and Rail Items Procured by TC as of 1 Sep 43, OCT HB Dir of Sup Program.

[167] Rpt, Reqmts and Distribution Div, 30 Jun 45, Reqmts and Stock Contl Br, p. 9, OCT HB Dir of Sup Rpts.

[168] Memo, ACofT for Sup for Plng Div, 24 Feb 43, sub: Standardization of Marine Equip; Interv with Col Bunker, 4 Sep 52, sub: TC Supply Problems, OCT HB Dir of Sup Production.

A plan of classification, prescribed by the War Department, supported the idea of standardization and aided in determining the quantities of end items and spare parts that should be procured.[170] The designations for the classes were changed in August 1944; thereafter all items of equipment for which there was recurring demand were placed in one of four classes: "standard" items were those that would be procured in preference to others; "substitute standard" items were those that were not as satisfactory as standard items but could be procured when the latter were not available; "limited standard" items could not be reordered, but existing equipment could be repaired and returned to service; and "obsolete" items were to be dropped from use entirely. Classification was made by the Technical Committee, on which not only the Director of Supply but the operating divisions and other interested technical services were represented.[171] Classifications were based on conditions affecting the procurement of the items as well as on reports from the theaters regarding performance and operating conditions.

Standardization and classification called for a system of item identification that would enable officers overseas to know exactly what equipment and supplies were available and to prepare their requisitions in terms that could be readily understood at depots in the zone of interior. The Transportation Corps plan of identification included the design number and a short description of each item; it did not include code numbers. Like some other aspects of Transportation Corps supply, development of a standard nomenclature was still under way when the war ended.[172]

Although the major technical task was to adapt commercial equipment to military needs and modify existing Army designs to meet new conditions, some projects were undertaken that involved research and experimentation. Among the newly developed equipment placed in service during the war was a refrigerator barge for use in the Pacific, consisting of a standard 112-foot knockdown steel barge with nine refrigerating units mounted on the deck and machinery for the generation of electrical power installed in the hull. A light four-man lifeboat that could be employed for a variety of purposes was developed for use in connection with the 85-foot aircraft rescue boat. A yoke-type life preserver, which would support a soldier carrying a full pack and small arms more satisfactorily than the vest type or belt type, was designed. In addition to work done in collaboration with The Surgeon General on the design of a "self-contained" unit hospital car for use in the zone of interior, a light ten-car hospital train was developed for service on European railroads. In collaboration with the Coast Artillery Corps, plans and specifications were worked out for a new mine planter, which could handle the larger and heavier types of submarine mines that were being developed. Several types of life floats were constructed to meet special conditions encountered in the oversea commands.[173]

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[169] TC Cir 110-3, 13 May 44, sub: Engineering Changes or Modifications.

[170] AR 850-25, 30 Jun 45, pars. 14, 15.

[171] TC Cir 160-15, 28 Aug 44, and Supps. 1-7, sub: Classification of Equipment as to Types and Specifications; TC Cir 160-19, 19 Jan 45. Results of Technical Committee studies are given in reports in OCT 344 TC Tech Com.

[172] See TC Standard Nomenclature for Major Articles of Equipment, 7 Mar 46, in OCT HB Monograph 28, App. XIX.

When the war ended a number of other projects were under way. A railway flatcar to transport heavy tanks was being developed with a view to distributing the load so as to make it operable over recently repaired roadbeds and bridges. A 50-ton diesel-electric locomotive was being designed, especially for use in forward areas, which could be employed either singly as a switcher or in multiple when heavy tractive power for line hauls was needed. A 30-ton gasoline mechanical locomotive was being worked on that would have high tractive power but an axle load no greater than the cars that it would draw. Study was being given to various types of propellers and propulsion methods, including jet propulsion, with a view to increasing the speed and maneuverability of small craft and to improving performance in shallow or weed-infested waters. Data regarding German transportation equipment were being gathered and analyzed. The Transportation Corps Board had undertaken tests of numerous materials and devices to determine their suitability for use by the Army.[174]

The Transportation Corps contributed to the development of a number of other items of equipment that were not its direct responsibility. The most important of these was the amphibious 2½-ton truck, or DUKW. The idea of a cargo vehicle that could operate on either land or water had appealed to both the Army and the Navy, and both had done some work on it. When satisfactory results seemed to be in doubt because of indifference or preoccupation, Brig. Gen. Theodore H. Dillon, Deputy Chief of Transportation, got behind the project and kept it active until a serviceable vehicle had been developed and tested under the auspices of the Office of Scientific Research and Development.[175] The Brodie System for landing and launching aircraft by use of a portable rig attached to the side of a vessel or set up on shore was conceived by a Transportation Corps officer at the New Orleans Port of Embarkation and developed with Transportation Corps funds.[176] The Chief of Transportation sponsored tests to develop a method of laying pipeline under water, particularly with a view to piping petroleum from England to France during the invasion of the Continent; this project was carried forward by the Corps of Engineers and later by the British.[177] The Transportation Corps collaborated with the Association of American Railroads in developing the Mareng Cell, a rubberized container that made possible the transportation of petroleum in open-top rail cars.[178]

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[173] Barge, refrigerator, knockdown, design 435 (standard); Lifepreserver, yoke type, combat type, kapoc; Memo, Tech Staff for Contl Br Off of Dir of Matériel and Sup, 12 Jun 45, sub: Status Report; all in OCT HB Dir of Sup Research and Devel; Rpts, Rail Div, FY 1944, p. 25, and FY 1945, p. 21, OCT HB Rail Div Rpts. Only one hospital train was built for oversea use because of the decision to convert passenger cars in the theaters and thereby save shipping.

[174] OCT HB Monograph 28, pp. 164-67.

[175] Memo, Lt Col Russell F. Oakes, Tech Info Off OCT, for Wardlow, 20 Sep 46, and attached review of development of DUKW, and other documents in OCT HB Topic Amphibious Vehicles; James Phinney Baxter, 3rd, *Scientists Against Time* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946), pp. 76-81, 243-51; Vannevar Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949), pp. 35-36; Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, p. 163.

[176] Memo, CofT for COMINCH US Fleet, 31 Dec 43, sub: Brodie System; Note by author, 5 Dec 46, recording statements by Gen Wylie; and other documents in OCT HB Topic Brodie System.

[177] Memo, Col John H. Leavell, OCT, for Ross, 8 Mar 43, sub: Underwater Pipeline, OCT HB Wylie Petroleum; Memo, Leavell for Gross, 4 Mar 44, par. (5), OCT HB Gross Petroleum; WD press release, 2 Sep 45, sub: TC Planned Oil Pipelines in Channel in 1942.

In these technical matters, as in other aspects of the supply operation, ASF headquarters kept a close supervision over technical service activities. The basic regulations were formulated in that headquarters and its representatives sat informally with the Transportation Corps Technical Committee. ASF headquarters, moreover, expected the technical services to keep it informed on all significant technical developments and to obtain its approval for the opening or closing of research projects. When the Chief of Transportation's Director of Supply failed to comply with the latter requirement, he was sharply reminded of the omission.[179] While ASF headquarters kept such matters under close scrutiny, it apparently did so for the purpose of observing progress or lack of progress rather than of supervising the technical aspects of the work.

In view of the fact that so many items of Transportation Corps equipment were adaptations of commercial designs, the aid of private industry in making the adaptations was of great value. During the war this aid was sought informally as it was required, but the need for a standing arrangement with industry was recognized and steps were taken in that direction.[180] Not long after the end of the war the Chief of Transportation announced the establishment of the Technical Advisory Board consisting of fifty-two outstanding experts representing all branches of transportation.[181] These men were requested not only to stand ready to give assistance on matters referred to them by the Chief of Transportation, but to bring to his attention any developments or possibilities of development that might be of interest to the Army. This arrangement reflected the importance of the role that the Army's marine and railway equipment had played in the conflict just finished; it also reflected a recognition of the desirability of constant technical improvement to enable the Transportation Corps to keep its equipment abreast of developments made through private research and adequate for the needs of another war.

Summary of Successes and Failures

The Chief of Transportation's success in meeting the matériel requirements of the theaters varied with the different oversea commands and the different types of equipment. The needs of the Pacific commands for small vessels and materials-handling equipment developed rapidly, and, because of his late start in the procurement field and his difficulties in attaining adequate production, the Chief of Transportation was not able to meet those needs fully and promptly. Shortages of such equipment were severely felt in the Pacific during 1942 and 1943, although they could not be termed critical in the sense that they adversely affected the outcome of important military undertakings. By 1944 the shortages were being steadily overcome. In the Mediterranean and European theaters the requirements for marine and materials-handling equipment developed more slowly, and since these commands held top priority their needs were adequately met, although deliveries sometimes were slower than the theaters desired. The calls for railway equipment were relatively light until 1943 and did not reach their peak until 1944, so that the Chief of Transportation was able to build up a stockpile that enabled him to meet most demands as they arose.[182]

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[178] Memo, Buford, Vice Pres AAR, for Metzman, C of Rail Div OCT, 14 Jul 42; Memo, Maj Cheshire for CofT ETOUSA, 4 Nov 42; both in OCT 457 Mareng Cell.

[179] Memo, CG ASF for CofT, 9 Sep 44, sub: TC Development Projects, OCT HB Dir of Sup Research and Devel.

[180] Ltr, Lewis to Buford, Vice Pres AAR, 9 May 45, OCT 334 Tech Adv Bd.

[181] TC Cir 5-29, 17 Jan 46, revised 7 Feb 46; WD press release, 3 Mar 46.

The equipment that the Chief of Transportation procured was technically adequate, except for some items hastily obtained during the early part of the war. The great variety of uses to which boats and other floating equipment were put in the oversea theaters, and the hard and unusual treatment that they often received, could not be fully foreseen. The vessels hastily constructed during the early part of the war to meet the theaters' urgent needs were in some cases makeshifts and consequently unsatisfactory from the standpoint of both operation and maintenance. But considerable progress was made toward eliminating engineering faults, and as the theaters reported their experiences with particular types of equipment the designs were improved to meet the operating requirements.[183] The technical problems were not so great with rail equipment. Some time was required to establish the sizes, gauges, and other physical characteristics of locomotives and rolling stock for service in the several theaters, but when these requirements had been ascertained there was no difficulty in fulfilling them, since the contractors for such equipment were well-established and technically competent concerns.

The research work carried on by the Chief of Transportation during the war, with a view to developing new and more effective types of equipment, was limited. No doubt much could have been accomplished in that direction had the Chief of Transportation entered the war with an adequate research staff and with objectives and procedures already established. Since these conditions did not obtain, he proceeded on the basis that the most immediate and satisfactory results could be obtained by adapting equipment already in use by the Army or the commercial transportation industry. Basic needs were met in this way.

Failure to make adequate provision for spare parts for Transportation Corps equipment was probably the most serious shortcoming chargeable to the Chief of Transportation's supply organization. The effects of this shortcoming were felt most severely in the marine field; the military railway services overseas also were affected but not to the same degree. It does not excuse the fault in the Transportation Corp's program to point out that shortage of spare parts was a common experience in the theaters, involving all technical services. But it seems fair in extenuation to reiterate the fact, which has been so often cited in this chapter, that the Chief of Transportation inherited the procurement program after the demands for equipment were already large, and that for a time his resources were severely taxed to supply the most urgently needed end items.

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[182] Except as otherwise indicated, this summary is based on facts presented earlier in this chapter and conversations with Transportation Corps officers. See also Memo, ACofT for Sup for CofT, 1 Oct 45, sub: Rpt on Accomplishments and Handicaps, and attached reports of divisions, in OCT HB Dir of Sup Rpts.

[183] Probably the most unsatisfactory item was the knockdown barge, which was contrived to save shipping space. During a visit to the Pacific theater in the fall of 1943 General Gross reported that this barge would have to be improved, since after assembly overseas it too often did not float; Ltr, Gross to Wylie, 26 Sep 43, par. 5, OCT HB Wylie Gross Letters Sep–Nov 43.

The Chief of Transportation was slow in fulfilling his supply responsibilities in other respects; these included the provision of information regarding the operation and maintenance of the equipment that he had shipped overseas, of catalogues to indicate the types of equipment that were available for shipment, and of spare parts lists to assist the theaters in ordering replacement parts against future needs. It would have helped the theaters if they had been furnished specifications and blueprints for some of the larger equipment that involved difficult operating and maintenance problems. The earlier adoption of standard nomenclature and descriptions would have encouraged the theaters to requisition items that were in production, and would have discouraged the practice of "inventing" new types of equipment to meet their peculiar needs.[184] These aspects of the supply responsibility, like the procurement of spare parts, were forced into a position of low priority by the urgency of the basic need for the equipment itself.

The failure of the Chief of Transportation to concentrate in one division the responsibility for establishing and enforcing maintenance policies and procedures was the source of some of the weakness in that field. The explanation of this failure lies chiefly in the fact that other divisions, particularly the Water and Rail Divisions, already had technical personnel qualified to deal with these matters, and the procurement of similar personnel exclusively for the Maintenance Division not only would have been difficult in view of the existing manpower shortage, but also would have been wasteful. In addition, having assigned certain maintenance responsibilities to the operating divisions in the early part of the war, the Chief of Transportation found it difficult to transfer those responsibilities later. Yet it seems likely that the assignment of full maintenance responsibility to a unit set up expressly for that purpose would have produced better results.[185]

There was some co-operation between the Army and the Navy in the procurement of marine equipment and in related technical matters, but it fell short of the possibilities. Procedures for such co-operation had not been established in peacetime, and the pressures of war as well as habits of independence militated against their rapid development after Pearl Harbor. The Army and the Navy joined with the Maritime Commission in an arrangement to assign boatbuilders to work primarily for one agency so that each could know fairly accurately the production capacity on which it could rely. The agreement under which the Navy became responsible for the procurement of all amphibious landing craft and that under which the Navy provided spare parts for internal combustion engines in Army equipment were logical and beneficial. Otherwise, the two departments followed parallel but independent courses. The need for standardization, particularly of marine engines, was recognized, but a concerted move in that direction was not made until fairly late in the war, and although there was some discussion in joint committee there were no appreciable results.

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[184] Consolidated Operational Report on TC Activities in ETO, May 42 through V-E Day, Annex 3, Rpt of Supply Division, gives a general review of problems in that theater; in OCT HB ETO.

[185] See comment by C of Maintenance Div, 19 Sep 45, attached to Memo, ACofT for Sup for CofT, 1 Oct 45, sub: Report on Accomplishments and Handicaps, OCT HB Dir of Sup Rpts.

Certain phases of the Transportation Corps supply operation have been deliberately omitted from this discussion, since they did not present problems that were essentially different from those encountered by other technical services. Two of them—depot operations, and stock control—were substantially affected by the lateness with which the Transportation Corps came into being.

During the first two years of the war the Chief of Transportation had no facilities that could properly be called depots. Transportation Corps matériel was placed in service almost as soon as it was manufactured, and when temporary storage was required it was provided at the holding and reconsignment points. Supply officers were placed at those installations to assume accountability for Transportation Corps items and fill requisitions as they were received. As stockpiles gradually grew, more formal depot operations became necessary, and on 1 January 1944 space was assigned for this purpose at the four holding and reconsignment points located at Voorheesville, New York; Marietta, Pennsylvania; Montgomery, Alabama; and Lathrop, California. Later three subdepots were established at the holding and reconsignment points at Yermo, California; Auburn, Washington; and Elmira, New York. Each depot stocked particular types of equipment rather than the entire range. The officers in charge were provided with certain services by the commanders of the holding and reconsignment points, but they were responsible to the Director of Supply for their depot activities.[186]

Late compliance with the ASF plan of stock control was a corollary of the late establishment of the Transportation Corps depots. This plan, set up in the spring of 1943, was designed to enforce the maintenance of proper stock levels at depots and other installations in the zone of interior, to keep the depot stocks in line with the probable requirements of the oversea commands, and to provide an over-all co-ordination to prevent uneven distribution with shortages in some places and overages in others.[187] In July 1944 The Inspector General, following a survey, reported that stock control was still in its initial stages at Transportation Corps headquarters and in different stages of development at Transportation Corps depots and ports of embarkation. In response to a request from General Somervell for comments on this report, the Chief of Transportation stated that stock status reports had been initiated by his Director of Supply, excesses and shortages at depots and other field installations were being studied, and depot stock records were being brought into balance with physical inventories. While there was still much to be accomplished, he felt that considerable progress had been made.[188]

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[186] For space occupied by the depots, see Table 20, above. OCT HB Monograph 28, pp. 169–94, briefly discusses depot functions and operations.

[187] *Logistics in World War II*, pp. 79–80; monograph prepared in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, History of Stock Control, Army Service Forces, U.S. Army, January 1948.

[188] Memo, CG ASF for CofT, 6 Jul 44, sub: Stock Levels; 1st Ind by CofT, 12 Jul 44; both in OCT 400.212.

CHAPTER VIII

Observations and Conclusions

The record of the Chief of Transportation in meeting his responsibilities for the movement of Army personnel and matériel, the training of troops, and the procurement of supplies and equipment in World War II was a good one, and this fact was recognized throughout the Army. The staff that General Gross gradually assembled was technically proficient, and under his leadership it devoted itself to the tasks of the Transportation Corps without reservation. But there were some other factors that weighed heavily in the results. The new Chief of Transportation had to establish the place of his office in the Army organization and plan of operation before it could properly perform its mission. In building up personnel and facilities adequate for the job the Chief of Transportation had to contend with personnel ceilings and materials priorities at every step. Wartime transportation was a co-operative business in which several civilian and military agencies were concerned, and it presented problems growing out of divergent interests and differing opinions. And as an overriding factor there was the extraordinary scope of the military operations, which gave to the Army the greatest transportation task ever undertaken by a single agency.

The desire of the Chief of Transportation to have all Army transportation functions performed under his supervision was based on the firm belief that this arrangement would facilitate co-ordination and promote economy in operations. While the desire was not completely realized, the exceptions did not constitute serious handicaps. The Chief of Transportation did not control passenger and freight movements by air, and he unwillingly delegated authority to the Army Air Forces to route their own domestic freight moving by surface carriers. These exceptions interfered with the Chief of Transportation's plan of over-all co-ordination of movements, but the volume of traffic thus placed outside his jurisdiction was relatively small. The bulk of the traffic was under his control and the procedures that were developed for handling it proved very successful. These procedures were successful not only because military traffic was moved promptly and safely, but also because congestion was avoided and the means of transportation were used intensively so that the maximum amount of commercial as well as military traffic could be moved.

The importance that the Chief of Transportation attached to having unbroken control of troops and supplies throughout their movement from the zone of interior to the oversea commands seems to have been well justified; it appears to have warranted the vigorous protests that he made whenever the integrity of his control was threatened. Careful co-ordination of the movements to the ports with the loading and dispatch of ships was necessary to avoid a waste of transportation and delays in the arrival of shipments overseas. The Chief of Transportation worked on the simple theory that such co-ordination would be relatively easy if he controlled the shipments at all stages, and that it would become more difficult if he had to depend on the co-operation of other elements of the Army in order to achieve it. This did not mean that he wanted these movements to be outside the control of the War Department General Staff, which was responsible for carrying out strategic plans; it meant only that the Chief of Transportation did not want his ability to execute authorized movements to become dependent on the readiness or unreadiness of other operating agencies of the Army to adjust their activities to the plans of the Transportation Corps.

The first and only serious threat to the continuity of the control the Chief of Transportation exercised over troop movements was the proposal, in the summer of 1942, to remove the staging areas from the jurisdiction of the port commanders and to place them under the service commands. The reasoning behind this proposal was logical enough. The command, training, and equipping of troops while they were at the ports awaiting transshipment overseas were not basically transportation functions; they were, in fact, functions that the service commands were qualified to perform. But the Chief of Transportation had practical reasons for wanting the staging operations to remain under the direction of his port commanders. Those commanders were responsible for dispatching the various types of troop units and replacements overseas in accordance with movement orders and theater priorities, and they were responsible for having enough troops ready for embarkation to fill the ships that were placed on berth. The Chief of Transportation believed that there was less chance of failure in fulfilling these responsibilities if the staging process was under the direct control of the port commanders than if they had to rely on the service commands to get the troops ready for delivery to the shipping terminals. Considering the complexity of the staging process, the urgency with which wartime movements had to be executed, and the frequent changes made in the priorities, the force of the Chief of Transportation's logic is difficult to deny. At any rate, the plan that he favored worked remarkably well during World War II, and, although the staging operation was placed under the control of the army commanders after the war, provision was made that in the event of a major mobilization the staging areas would revert to the control of the Chief of Transportation.[1]

The possibility that the Chief of Transportation might lose control of the movement of a large part of the freight destined for oversea areas arose in the spring of 1943. At that time proposals were considered to make the oversea supply divisions at the ports of embarkation responsible to ASF headquarters rather than to the port commanders and the Chief of Transportation, or to transfer their functions to new agencies that would be responsible directly to ASF headquarters. The oversea supply divisions' main responsibilities were to process requisitions received from the oversea commands, and to schedule the movement of shipments from depots to ports in accordance with the priorities and the availability of ships to lift them. The handling of theater requisitions and the enforcement of priorities were not essentially transportation functions, but the Chief of Transportation felt that they were inseparable from the task of co-ordinating the arrival of shipments at the ports with the readiness of the ships, a task that was definitely a transportation function. The basic reason for the proposal to remove the oversea supply divisions of the ports from the supervision of the Chief of Transportation was that, in carrying out the latter's policies regarding the use of ships and ship space, the ports had not been sufficiently responsive to the policies and plans fostered by ASF headquarters relating to the distribution of supplies.

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[1] See DA SR 55-720-5, 28 Jun 51, pars. *2c–d*.

Since General Goodman set up and directed the very successful Oversea Supply Division at the New York Port of Embarkation, his views on this subject are of special interest. From his experience he became convinced that the OSD, while it should be located at or adjacent to the port, should be responsible directly to ASF headquarters (or the branch of the Army having corresponding responsibilities), rather than to the port commander or the Chief of Transportation. He had observed that under the Chief of Transportation's policy that ships must be loaded as nearly to capacity as possible, low-priority items sometimes were shipped because they contributed to balanced cargoes, whereas some higher-priority items were held back because they would have contributed to unbalance; he considered the subordination of supply to transportation considerations a logistical mistake. Although he had received good support from the port commander at New York, General Goodman saw a potential hazard in a system under which a port commander could require that all communications regarding oversea supply be passed through his office, for the delays involved in such a procedure would be incompatible with good service to the oversea theaters. He concluded, moreover, that since the oversea supply division had to bring pressure to bear on the various technical services to insure that supplies were shipped in accordance with schedules it had prepared, it could do this more effectively as an agent of the commander of all of the service forces than as a representative of one of them.[2] These views were substantially in accord with those held by General Lutes, ASF Director of Operations, as presented earlier.[3]

The fundamental issue was whether supply considerations or transportation considerations should govern the loading of ships. It is understandable that the view of the Chief of Transportation, who was under constant pressure to get more ships for the Army and to use those available to utmost capacity, should have differed from that of General Lutes, who was responsible for the proper distribution of all ASF supplies, and that of General Goodman, whose job was to insure that the European and Mediterranean theaters received the items they had requisitioned in accordance with the priorities they had established. It is obvious, also, that under the pressure of wartime operations these points of view could not always be reconciled. The trend of Army thinking on the subject is indicated by the fact that, after the issue came into prominence in the spring of 1943, the influence of the ASF Director of Operations over the operation of the OSD's was greatly increased, and that after the war the OSD's, although they remained physically located in the port establishments, were placed directly under the control of the Logistics Division (G-4) of the General Staff, which had taken over the supply functions previously performed by ASF headquarters.[4]

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[2] Ltr, Goodman to author, 14 Apr 52, OCT HB PE Gen Oversea Sup.

[3] See above pp. 337-38.

The disagreements between the ASF Director of Operations and the Chief of Transportation, because of the staff function that the latter performed, were inevitable in view of the overlapping of the responsibilities of the two offices as the incumbents interpreted them. Both Lutes and Gross took broad views of their duties, and neither was inclined to give up any authority he considered necessary to their fulfillment. Gross believed that the transportation and logistical studies that his transportation experts and planning staff prepared were essential to the strategic and logistical decisions the commander of the Army Service Forces and the General Staff were required to make. Lutes objected to this as an intrusion into his sphere as the staff officer for planning and coordinating ASF operations. But Lutes also considered his staff responsibility justification for intervening in matters that Gross considered purely operational.

The problem of drawing a dividing line between staff and operating functions is a familiar one in military circles. The establishment of SOS (ASF) headquarters as an additional echelon between the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, on the one hand, and the technical or operating services, on the other, rendered the problem more, rather than less, difficult. When plans were being laid in early 1942 for the establishment of the Services of Supply, General Lutes, as prospective Director of Operations in the headquarters organization, expressed the view that transportation should be under his control if he were to effectively regulate the distribution of supplies.[5] It is not surprising, therefore, that he subsequently should have had differences with General Gross, who, having been made chief of an independent transportation service, jealously guarded the prerogatives that he believed necessary to the proper conduct of his office.

A great deal has been said in this volume about the handicaps under which the Chief of Transportation operated because of the fact that his office was not established until after the nation had gone to war. Anyone who has studied the records must concede that these handicaps were very real. Naturally some activities were more deeply affected than others.

The handicap was less severely felt in the execution of troop and supply movements than in some other fields. Movements of increasing size had been handled during 1941, and a good working relationship with the railroads had been developed. But methods that were adequate before Pearl Harbor were inadequate for the exceptionally heavy movements that became necessary thereafter. A comprehensive system for controlling port-bound shipments of freight did not become fully effective until the summer of 1942, and consequently there was disturbing congestion at the major ports during the early months of the war. The standard operating procedures that were necessary to insure that all agencies of the Army concerned with movements understood their functions and performed them properly were evolved slowly and did not reach maturity until 1943. As a result, port commanders had a heavy task preparing troops and equipment for shipment to the theaters because home stations, depots, and technical service headquarters sometimes failed in fulfilling their responsibilities. How much a permanent Chief of Transportation would have been able to accomplish in forestalling these difficulties is of course problematical, but at least he could have visualized the situation and laid plans for dealing with it.

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[4] See DA SR 730-5-1, 15 Jul 49, par. 11.

[5] Leighton and Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943*, Ch. IX, p. 228.

The controversy over supervision of the oversea supply divisions at the ports was in part attributable to the fact that this activity was not assigned to the ports until January 1942, after the United States had entered the war. The organizations and procedures necessary to perform this complex and vital function had to be developed from the ground up, and virtually nothing had been done in that direction when the ports were placed under the control of the new Chief of Transportation in March 1942. The relationships of the oversea supply divisions, which were subsequently organized, with the other operating divisions at the ports had to be worked out, as well as the relationships with the Office of the Chief of Transportation and SOS headquarters. The shortcomings of the oversea supply divisions during the period of development accentuated the conflict between supply and transportation interests, which kept the Office of the Chief of Transportation and the headquarters of the Services of Supply in a state of agitation for many months. This was one of many instances that demonstrated the shortsightedness of maintaining in peacetime organizations and procedures that must be completely revamped to cope with the greatly expanded requirements of war.

In the matter of training troops the handicap was more severe. Until the summer of 1942 the Chief of Transportation had virtually no training staff at his headquarters; training doctrine and tables of organization and equipment for port units were prepared by The Quartermaster General, and the actual training was accomplished at the ports of embarkation. It is not surprising, therefore, that when the Transportation Corps was established in July 1942 and given full responsibility for troop units to operate ports and small boats, little had been done to visualize the requirements of global warfare and to prepare for meeting them. The training of railway troops, amphibian truck companies, and some other types of units was added to the Chief of Transportation's responsibilities still later. The assembling of an adequate headquarters staff, the acquisition of appropriate training facilities, and the formulation of training doctrine and programs were accomplished step by step. Under the circumstances it was inevitable that the demand for port and marine units, which began to build up rapidly in the summer of 1942, should have soon outstripped the ability of the Chief of Transportation to meet it promptly, and that some units should have been sent overseas without sufficient training. The Chief of Transportation eventually did a creditable training job, which he might have done earlier if he had had the opportunity to prepare for the task sufficiently far in advance. The preparation of rail units was not as greatly affected by this situation, since a Military Railway Service headquarters had been functioning for some time when the Chief of Transportation took over this activity from the Chief of Engineers and most of the men for these units were drawn from the commercial railways and already had technical skill.

The most serious disadvantage that the Chief of Transportation suffered because of his delayed start was in connection with the procurement of equipment. Here again his responsibilities were acquired gradually, the build-up of his headquarters staff was not started in earnest until the late summer of 1942, and his field establishment to deal with contractors and supervise production did not begin to take shape until some months later. This incipient organization naturally experienced difficulties in determining the amount of equipment to be procured, finding reliable contractors, mastering the intricacies of the controlled materials plan, setting up production schedules, forecasting deliveries, standardizing designs, and meeting the technical requirements of those who used the equipment. Although definite progress was made during 1943 in catching up with the demand for marine equipment—the main source of difficulty—it was not until 1944 that satisfactory results began to emerge. Because of the necessity of concentrating attention on overcoming the backlog of unfilled requisitions for end items, the matter of maintenance and spare parts received only belated attention, and the Chief of Transportation was still struggling with this problem as he entered the last year of the war.

Scientific research to develop more effective types of marine, rail, and highway equipment for military use in the various oversea areas began late and remained on a modest scale. The needs of the Army were met chiefly by modifying commercial types, and, while the accomplishments in that field were considerable, they were of an engineering rather than a scientific nature. The conception and development of basically new equipment requires time. Results are best achieved in an atmosphere of unhurried study and experimentation, and this is difficult to achieve in an organization beset with wartime operating problems. The outstanding new transportation item introduced during World War II was the amphibious truck, and while the Chief of Transportation foresaw the need and encouraged the development of this vehicle, the technical work was accomplished by a civilian agency that was able to draw upon the talents of numerous scientists and to conduct research and make tests free from the pressure of operating responsibilities.

The relations of the Chief of Transportation with the civilian agencies of the government concerned with transportation must be viewed in the light of the fact that they were all wartime creations and had to organize their operations and learn to work with each other while meeting their heavy day-to-day responsibilities. It may seem futile to reiterate the theme that peacetime organizations and procedures should provide at least a foundation upon which wartime operations can be built. As has been demonstrated, even after belligerency has become virtually inevitable the hope still lingers that somehow it can be averted and that the complete changeover that becomes necessary with the advent of war can be avoided. For this reason some of the vital transportation lessons taught by World War I were disregarded in 1940 and 1941. It is to be hoped that the lessons of World War II will not be wasted.

Beyond the question of mutually acceptable standards and procedures, the relationship between military and civilian transportation agencies may be a difficult one because of the difference between the military and commercial points of view. This difference was encountered during

World War II in both the ocean shipping and domestic transportation fields, but the situation became particularly acute in connection with the latter.

Ships capable of transoceanic service were devoted almost entirely to the war effort, civilian traffic being held to that which was absolutely essential. The Allied leaders considered the transportation of lend-lease goods and civilian aid supplies as much a war necessity as the transportation of matériel to the fighting forces, and, although the Chief of Transportation sometimes protested when these programs were assigned vessels that he urgently needed to move Army cargoes, it was inevitable that the broader point of view should prevail. The controversy over the attempt of the War Shipping Administrator to have the loading of military cargoes placed under his control brought the divergence of the military and commercial attitudes into prominence for a time, but when the issue was once settled in favor of the military agencies, it remained settled. Thereafter the differences that arose between the Army's transportation officers and the representatives of the War Shipping Administration were concerned more with details than with basic concepts.

With domestic transportation the situation was essentially different; civilian traffic increased during the war and, in addition, a heavy military traffic had to be handled. Against the greatly enlarged volume of traffic only a limited amount of new transportation equipment could be provided because of the heavy inroads that the demands for military equipment and for ships to move the military forces made on the supplies of raw materials. The military authorities were willing to concede only limited amounts of these materials to the transportation industry at the expense of the military programs, because they believed that civilian traffic should be reduced to whatever extent might be necessary to enable the carriers to meet the demands made upon them. The carriers, on the other hand, did not want to cut down civilian traffic more than was absolutely necessary, and in this they were supported by the Director of Defense Transportation. As a result, although the carriers did a remarkable job in handling the inflated volume of traffic, the requests of the armed services for railway equipment were not always met to their satisfaction. Equipment for handling military freight was not seriously affected, but passenger equipment for troop movements was tight throughout the war. During redeployment after V-E Day and the repatriation period after the Japanese surrender, there was widespread criticism, both official and public, because some troops were not moved promptly from the ports of debarkation and many soldiers were required to travel in unsuitable equipment.

The obvious lesson from this experience is that since the same domestic transportation facilities must serve both civilian and military needs in time of war, there should be an understanding or a policy declaration regarding the curtailment of civilian privileges when the requirements of war demand it. Any such pronouncement would have to issue from the President, and considerations of political expediency might argue against it. But the salutary effect in assuring proper transportation for military purposes and in harmonizing the relationships of the military and civilian transportation agencies in carrying out the war programs would unquestionably be helpful. In the countries of Europe that were fighting for their existence the military requirements made heavy inroads into the civilian's right to use transportation for nonessential purposes. The American military authorities believed that the people of the United States would readily yield their privileges to the extent that the military effort might require. In fact, they did this during the late stages of World War II, and the complaint of the military authorities was only that the substantial curtailment of civilian traffic was not decreed soon enough to obviate the necessity of transporting thousands of returning soldiers on long trips in day coaches, and to forestall the widespread resentment that this treatment engendered. The curtailment of civilian privileges should be the timely result of deliberate decision rather than the belated consequence of public criticism.

Another question that should be settled in advance, rather than after it has become a critical issue, is who shall provide such additional transportation equipment as becomes necessary to meet military needs. The Army Chief of Transportation and other military officers were of the opinion that the railroads, because of their greatly increased revenues, should provide such additional locomotives, freight cars, and passenger cars as were required for the wartime traffic. This applied, of course, only to cars of standard designs and not to hospital cars and other specialized equipment that would be of no value to the carriers after the war. The railroads, although they acquired considerable new equipment, were not inclined to go beyond what they could reasonably expect to use after the military crisis was over; they believed that the additional wartime requirements should be met at government expense. This difference of opinion became apparent as early as the summer of 1940. The impasse was not broken until May 1943, when the government belatedly placed an order for special troop sleepers and troop kitchen cars. Two years later a duplicate order was placed with a view to meeting the unusually heavy requirements of redeployment and demobilization. In both instances the action was precipitate rather than deliberate, and in the latter case it was taken so late that most of the cars were not delivered in time to be of service during the period of heaviest troop travel in the summer and fall of 1945.

This summary would be incomplete without specific reference to the system devised for controlling freight traffic, which was one of the outstanding accomplishments of the war in the domestic transportation field. The need for such control was one lesson that had remained vivid in the memory of both military and railway men since World War I, when lack of it seriously threatened the effectiveness of the American forces in France. Although the subject was often discussed during 1941, no system of over-all control had been developed when the United States entered World War II. For a time it seemed that the effort to work out an adequate plan might become stalled over the question of whether it should be administered by a civilian or a military agency. But the need was too great to permit a long delay; basic agreement on a co-operative plan was reached in March 1942, and a comprehensive system had been placed in operation by early summer. The central element of the plan was a committee representing the armed forces and the civilian transportation agencies. Its over-all control measures, supplemented by controls applicable to individual shipments, proved highly effective. The only reason for complaint was that the system was not set up soon enough to deal with the traffic congestion that became threatening during the early months of the war.

The necessity of capitalizing on the lessons taught by World War II, as a form of insurance on national security in the event of another world conflict, has been widely recognized and frequently voiced. The special committee of the Senate that devoted several years to investigating the failures and successes of the national defense program expressed the view that it would be "a tragic mistake to allow the knowledge thus gained to become stale and to fail to set it down as a definitive guide for the future."[6] In 1946 Secretary of War Patterson, pointing to the need for continuous planning and research in the field of military transportation, predicted that in another great war the competition between the belligerents for the most efficient means of transport will be exceedingly keen and that "changes in favor of speed and flexibility will make what we now have seem primitive."[7]

These statements point up the conclusion, with which few at present will take issue, that the effort to constantly improve the procedures and equipment of military transportation must be no less persistent and imaginative than those in the field of military aeronautics, communications, and ordnance. With World War II and the conflict in Korea fresh in memory, this conviction is now clear and strong. The establishment of the Department of Defense, with its implication of greater unity among the armed services, is a favorable factor. But the question that remains to be answered is whether the present state of alertness would be able to survive an interval of peace such as existed between World War I and World War II.

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[6] Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Fifth Annual Report,* September 3, 1946, p. 12.

[7] Address at meeting of the Army Transportation Association, Chicago, 13 Nov 46.

Bibliographical Note

In preparing this volume use was made of material from many sources, but the chief source of information was the records of the Office of the Chief of Transportation (OCT). This was natural because so much of the account is concerned with the procedures and practices of the Transportation Corps, all of which came under the observation and supervision of the Chief of Transportation. The OCT records include those maintained by The Quartermaster General while he was responsible for Army transportation; these OQMG records were turned over to the Chief of Transportation when the transportation function was transferred to him in March 1942. In addition to subject files, the OCT records include sets of serially numbered directives of the Chief of Transportation such as circulars, office orders, and miscellaneous letters. All of these records are at present in the custody of the Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's Office, except as stated below.

During and after the war the Historical Branch in the Office of the Chief of Transportation (OCT HB)* built up a special file of documents of historical significance as an aid to research. This file includes periodical reports submitted by the OCT divisions, by the Transportation Corps field installations in the zone of interior, and by the transportation officers with the forces overseas; copies of especially significant documents located by Transportation Corps historians in the course of their research; personal files of the Chief of Transportation, and of certain of his principal assistants, that were turned over to the Historical Branch after the war; and monographs prepared by Transportation Corps historians covering specific aspects or phases of the Corps' activities. These records are presently in the custody of the Historical Research Office in the Office of the Chief of Transportation, but it is anticipated that eventually they will be placed with the other OCT records in the custody of the Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's Office.

The special historical file was of great value in preparing this volume as well as the other volumes of the Transportation Corps' history. While copies of most of the documents may also be found in other records, the file contains some material that is unique. The personal files of officers who performed important functions were of exceptional value. They include both subject files and chronological files, the latter also called day files, reading files, or staybacks. The subject files often contain information not found elsewhere, and the chronological files sometimes opened up avenues of research that might otherwise have been overlooked. Unfortunately, many personal files were not turned over to the Historical Branch but were destroyed or dissipated when the war was over.

The transportation activities of the Army were under the supervision of the Supply Division (G-4) of the General Staff up to March 1942, and thereafter they were under the supervision of the Commanding General, Services of Supply, later known as the Army Service Forces. These agencies dealt with a wide range of activities, including all aspects of supply. It was not practicable, therefore, to search their records with the same thoroughness that was applied to the OCT records, and the research was limited to files that dealt with basic transportation subjects. The records of these agencies are now in the custody of the Departmental Records Branch, TAGO. In addition to subject files, the SOS-ASF records include sets of all serially numbered directives issued by the Commanding General, and complete sets of the monthly progress reports (MPR's), which cover many activities, including transportation.

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*During the war period the Historical Branch was also called Historical Section and Historical Unit.

The same plan of selective research was followed in examining the records of other agencies of the War Department. These agencies included the Office of the Secretary of War (OSW), the office of the Under Secretary of War (USW), the Office of the Chief of Staff (WDCSA), the War Plans Division (WPD) of the General Staff, the Operations Division (OPD), which succeeded WPD, and the Plans and Operations Division (P&O), which succeeded OPD. On some occasions research also led to the files of other divisions of the General Staff—G-1, G-2, and G-3. The records of The Adjutant General were used extensively, and they were especially valuable in establishing the background of the many War Department directives bearing on transportation and in tracing the evolution of Army regulations and War Department circulars.

While many of the minutes and papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and their various committees were found in the records of the several agencies of the War Department, it was frequently necessary to consult the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure complete coverage. These records include, in addition to JCS and CCS documents, the minutes and papers of the Joint Board, which was the principal Army-Navy co-ordinating agency before the establishment of the JCS. They also include studies of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, a high-level civilian agency that worked closely with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on problems pertaining to the efficient use of Allied shipping resources.

Unquestionably much interesting information regarding the execution of the policies and procedures of the Transportation Corps could have been found in the files of the field agencies that functioned under the supervision of the Chief of Transportation. But to have undertaken direct research in the records of the many ports of embarkation, zone and district transportation offices, port agencies, holding and reconsignment points, et cetera, would have meant giving less attention to other records that seemed more essential to the purpose of this volume. Study of the activities of the field agencies, therefore, was based upon the voluminous correspondence between those agencies and the Office of the Chief of Transportation, periodical historical reports submitted to the Chief of Transportation by the field agencies, reports of conferences between headquarters personnel and officers from the ports and zones, and special reports on specific subjects made at the request of the OCT Historical Branch.

Since this volume deals primarily with policies, procedures, and activities peculiar to the Transportation Corps, chief reliance was perforce placed on the primary sources mentioned above, yet considerable use was made of secondary sources. Several of the volumes in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II deal extensively with logistics and therefore with transportation. Official publications of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force have provided information pertaining to those branches of the defense establishment. Some of the published accounts of specific military campaigns have shown the interrelationship of transportation and military operations. A report of the Chief of Transportation issued soon after the end of the war, and a report on the war period published by ASF headquarters somewhat later, contain useful information and interesting opinions. The same is true of reports covering the activities of the U.S. Maritime Commission, the Office of Defense Transportation, and the War Production Board—civilian agencies that exercised a broad influence over wartime transportation.

Guide to Footnotes

Documents of many types are cited in the footnotes of this volume, and they are to be found in the records of many offices and agencies. The principal records have been identified in the bibliographical note. The abbreviations that have been used as a means of saving space are defined in the list of abbreviations. The purpose of this guide is to make clear to the reader how the footnotes have been formulated, so that he may better understand the nature of the source material and more readily locate any documents that he desires to examine.

The type of document most frequently cited is the memorandum (Memo), the form used chiefly for correspondence within the War Department. The indorsement (Ind) was used extensively within the War Department as a substitute for separate memoranda, especially when it was anticipated that a number of offices would make comments on the original document. The disposition form (DF) was often used for transmitting documents within the War Department, but on occasion it also included comments and instructions. The report (Rpt) gave the results of an investigation, inspection, or study; while it sometimes showed an addressee, it often did not. The letter (Ltr) was the form generally used for communication between agencies of the government, but the less formal memorandum was sometimes employed in this way. The principal forms of electrical transmission were the radiogram (Rad), the telegram (Telg), and the teletype message (TWX). When the copy consulted did not indicate the means by which the message had been sent, it is cited as a message (Msg).

In citing communications the descriptive information is given in the following order: the form of the communication, the sender, the addressee, the date, and the subject. To save space, nonessential parts of long subjects are omitted, and the subjects are omitted altogether when in the author's opinion they are not essential to the identification of the documents.

The last part of each citation identifies the office or agency in whose records the document is located, and also the file. Sometimes files are identified only by a decimal number, but often both a decimal number and a subject are used. When a number of documents are to be found in the same location, the identification of the agency and the designation of the file are given only once—after the last cited document.

In citing serially numbered documents the location is usually omitted, because these documents are to be found in complete sets in the records of the agencies that originated them. Such War Department documents are the Army Regulations (AR), Circulars (WD Cir), General Orders (GO), Technical Manuals (TM), and Field Manuals (FM). Serially numbered circulars, orders, and manuals were issued by the Commanding General of the Services of Supply, later the Army Service Forces, and similar publications were put out by the Chief of Transportation. Locations are not given for documents originated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff organizations; the JCS records include the minutes of these agencies filed chronologically, and other papers filed serially.

Two other devices were used to shorten the footnotes. In many instances the citations for a number of statements on the same general subject are combined in one footnote, rather than having a separate footnote for each statement. Usually such a footnote applies only to statements preceding it, but sometimes it applies also to statements immediately following. When a file contains many documents pertaining to the subject under discussion, only the documents considered more significant are cited.

Glossary of Technical Terms*

Accessorial services	Services rendered by a carrier in addition to transportation, such as sorting, packing, and storing.
Balanced cargo	A mixture of heavy and light cargo, which approximately fills the cargo space and weighs the ship down to its legal maximum draft.
Ballast	Heavy material, other than cargo, carried in the hold of a vessel to provide stability.
Balloon cargo	Items that occupy an exceptionally large amount of space in relation to their weight.
Bareboat charter	A form under which the charterer hires the vessel only, and provides the crew, supplies, fuel, and other operating requisites.
Bottom cargo	Dense and heavy cargo, particularly that stowed in the bottom of a ship's hold to improve stability.
Broken stowage	Ship space lost, or left unfilled, because of the size or shape of packages or other items of cargo.
Class I installation	One wholly under the command of the service commander. (See service command.)
Class II installation	One under the command of the service commander with certain activities exempted. In general, this class included the posts, camps, and stations utilized by the Army Ground Forces.
Class III installation	One under the command of the Army Air Forces, at which the service command performed limited services.
Class IV installation	One under the command of the chief of a technical service or staff division of the Army Service Forces, at which the service command performed certain functions.
Combat loader	A vessel specially equipped for combat loading. The Navy provided two types—APA (transport, attack), and AKA (cargo ship, attack).

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*Like most industries, transportation employs technical terms that are not familiar to the lay reader. Certain Army terms also are not understood outside military circles. These brief nontechnical definitions will save the reader the inconvenience of seeking explanations elsewhere.

Combat loading	Loading a ship with an assortment of equipment and supplies required by troops entering combat, and stowing the various items in such a manner that they can be unloaded quickly and in the order needed.
Combat zone	Forward area of a theater of operations, where combat troops are actively engaged.
Communications zone	The part of a theater of operations behind the combat zone, where supply, transportation, and other facilities are located and services performed.
Corps area	One of nine commands in the zone of interior before July 1942, with functions similar to those of the service commands. (See service command.)
Deadheading equipment	Moving transportation equipment from place to place without a pay load, that is, without revenue passengers or freight.
Dead-weight tonnage	The number of long tons (2,240 pounds) that a ship can transport, including cargo, fuel, water, stores, crew, and passengers.
Dry cargo ship	Any ship, except a tank ship carrying liquids in bulk. As used in World War II the term applied to passenger ships as well as freighters.
Echelons of maintenance	Categories ranging from the first echelon, which included the simpler forms of upkeep, to the fifth, which included the heavier types of repairs. (See ASF Manual M 807, Glossary, 25 Oct 44.)
Filler cargo	Packaged and bagged supplies which can be stowed in small and irregularly shaped spaces in the hold of a ship.
Full and down	Term indicating that a vessel has all cargo space filled and that the cargo is sufficiently heavy to take the ship down to the legal maximum draft.
General cargo	Broadly used, the term includes all except bulk cargoes, but in Army usage it may exclude explosives.
Gross tonnage	The internal cubic capacity of a ship's holds, 'tween decks, and permanently enclosed spaces on or above the upper deck (except certain exempted spaces) measured in tons of 100 cubic feet.

Impedimenta	Military and personal equipment and supplies accompanying a troop movement.
Landing craft	A vessel designed to carry troops and combat equipment ashore for a landing attack.
Line haul	Haul over a railroad line, as distinguished from switching.
Long ton	Weight ton of 2,240 pounds; customarily used in connection with ocean freight, whereas the railroads customarily use the short ton of 2,000 pounds.
Measurement ton	Forty cubic feet; sometimes called ship ton, since it is used chiefly in connection with ocean transportation.
Organizational equipment	(Also called organic or unit equipment.) Articles issued to troop organizations as such, rather than to individual soldiers.
Reefer ship	A vessel with refrigerator space for perishable cargo. The term reefer is also applied to railway cars and trucks with cooling equipment.
Service command	One of nine commands in the zone of interior after July 1942 (replacing the corps area); a field agency of the Services of Supply, and later of the Army Service Forces. It furnished certain services to other elements of the Army within its area, including administrative, legal, financial, medical, construction, and fixed communications. (See Class I, II, III, and IV installations.)
Short ton	Weight ton of 2,000 pounds, customarily used by the domestic carriers.
Tanker	A tank ship for transporting petroleum products and other liquids in bulk.
Theater of operations	An Army command including the area of actual fighting (combat zone) and the adjacent area utilized for supporting administrative and supply activities (communications zone).
Zone of interior	The area that furnishes manpower and matériel to the forces in theaters of operations. The United States and Canada constituted the zone of interior for the U.S. Army in World War II.

List of Abbreviations

AAF	Army Air Forces
AAR	Association of American Railroads
ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff
Actg	Acting
Adm	Administrative
AFHQ	Allied Forces Headquarters
AGF	Army Ground Forces
AGO	Adjutant General's Office
AKA	Cargo ship, attack
Am	Ammunition
ANPB	Army-Navy Petroleum Board
ANSIA	Army-Navy Shipping Information Agency
APA	Transport, attack
APH	Evacuation ship
APO	Army Post Office
AR	Army Regulations
ARB	Army reservation bureau
ASC	Air Service Command
ASF	Army Service Forces
Asgmt	Assignment
Assn	Association
Asst	Assistant
ATAA	Air Transport Association of America
ATC	Air Transport Command
Atchd	Attached
Atty Gen	Attorney General
BAS	British Army Staff
BMWT	British Ministry of War Transport
BPE	Boston Port of Embarkation
Br	Branch
Bull	Bulletin
BuPers	Bureau of Personnel (Navy)
BUPERS	Chief, Bureau of Personnel (Navy)
Bur	Bureau
BUSHIPS	Chief, Bureau of Ships (Navy)
C	Chief
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
CG	Commanding General

Chm	Chairman
CINCAFPAC	Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific
Cir	Circular
CKD	Completely knocked down
CM-IN	Classified message, incoming
CM-OUT	Classified message, outgoing
CMP	Controlled Materials Plan
CMTC	Combined Military Transportation Committee
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CO	Commanding officer
CofCA	Chief of Coast Artillery
CofEngrs	Chief of Engineers
CofOrd	Chief of Ordnance
CofT	Chief of Transportation
Com	Committee or commission
Comd	Command
Comdr	Commander
COMINCH	Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet
COMNAVEU	Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
Compt	Comptroller
COMZONE	Communications zone
Conf	Conference
Cong	Congress
Consol	Consolidating
Const	Construction
Contl	Control
Conv	Conversation
CPA	Central Pacific Area
CPE	Charleston (S. C.) Port of Embarkation
CSAB	Combined Shipping Adjustment Board
CTB	Commercial Traffic Bulletin
DA	Department of the Army
DCofS USA	Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Def	Defense
Demob	Demobilization
Dept	Department
DF	Disposition form
Dir	Director or directive
Disp	Disposition
Div	Division
DUKW	2½-ton amphibious truck
Emb	Embarkation
EO	Executive Order
Equip	Equipment

ESF	Eastern Sea Frontier (Navy)
Estab	Establishment
ETO	European Theater of Operations
ETOUSA	European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
Evac	Evacuation
Exam	Examination
Exec	Executive
FAS	Forwarding authorization serial number
FM	Field Manual
FY	Fiscal year
G-1	Personnel Division, War Department General Staff
G-2	Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff
G-3	Organization and Training Division, War Department General Staff
G-4	Supply Division, War Department General Staff
GAO	General Accounting Office
Gen	General
GHQ	General Headquarters
GO	General Order
Govt	Government
Gp	Group
GRB	Government reservation bureau
H&RP	Holding and reconsignment point
Hist	History or historical
Hosp	Hospital
Hq	Headquarters
HRPE	Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation
Hwy	Highway
ICC	Interstate Commerce Commission
IG	Inspector General
IMC	Interterritorial Military Committee of AAR
Imped	Impedimenta
Incl	Inclosure
Ind	Indorsement
Indiv	Individual(s)
Info	Information
INS	International News Service
Insp	Inspection
Int	Intelligence
Interv	Interview
JAGO	Judge Advocate General's Office
JANASB	Joint Army-Navy Ammunition Storage Board
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JLC	Joint Logistics Committee

JMPA	Joint Military Passenger Agreement
JMPEA	Joint Military Passenger Equalization Agreement
JMTC	Joint Military Transportation Committee
JPSC	Joint Production Survey Committee
LAPE	Los Angeles Port of Embarkation
LCL	Less-than-carload
LST	Landing ship, tank
Mar Com	Maritime Commission
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MCC	Movement Coordinating Center
MDW	Military District of Washington
Med	Medical
MI	Military impedimenta
Mil	Military
Min	Minutes
Misc	Miscellaneous
MKD	Medium (partially) knocked down
Mob	Mobilization
MOS	Military occupational specialty
MP	Military Police
MPR	Monthly progress report
MRS	Military Railway Service
Mtg	Meeting
MTO	Mediterranean Theater of Operations
MTOUSA	Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
MTS	Military Transportation Section, AAR
MTV	Motor transport vessel
MTX	Expedited military shipment
Mvmt	Movement
NATOUSA	North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
NOPE	New Orleans Port of Embarkation
NTS	Naval Transportation Service
NYPA	New York Port Agency
NYPE	New York Port of Embarkation
OCNO	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OCS	Officer candidate school
OCT	Office of the Chief of Transportation
ODT	Office of Defense Transportation
Off	Officer
OPD	Operations Division, War Department General Staff
Opn	Operation
OQMG	Office of The Quartermaster General
Ord	Ordnance
Org	Organization

OSD	Oversea Supply Division
OSW	Office of the Secretary of War
OUSW	Office of the Under Secretary of War
OWM	Office of War Mobilization
OWMR	Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion
Pass	Passenger
PE	Port of embarkation
Pers	Personnel
PL	Public Law
Plng	Planning
PMG	Provost Marshal General
POW	Prisoner of war
Pres	President
Proc	Procurement
Prod	Production
QMC	Quartermaster Corps
Rad	Radiogram
RAMP	Recovered Allied Military Personnel
Readj	Readjustment
Recap	Recapitulation
Redepl	Redeployment
Reg	Regulation or regulating
Reorg	Reorganization
Rep	Representative
Repl	Replacement
Reqmt	Requirement
RFC	Reconstruction Finance Corporation
RO	Rotational group
Rpt	Report
RR	Railroad, or readjustment regulations
RTC	Replacement training center
Ry	Railway
SB	Supply Bulletin
Sch	School
SD	Shipping document
Secy	Secretary
Sen	Senator
SF	San Francisco
SFGD	San Francisco General Depot
SFPE	San Francisco Port of Embarkation
SG	Surgeon General
SGO	Surgeon General's Office
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
Shipt	Shipment

SKD	Semi-knocked down
SN	Secretary of the Navy
SOP	Standard operating procedure
SOPAC	South Pacific Area
SOS	Services of Supply
Sp	Special
SPA	South Pacific Area
SPE	Seattle Port of Embarkation
St	Staging
Sta	Station(s)
Stg	Storage
SUP	Single-unit pack
Sup	Supply
Sv	Service
SvC	Service command
SW	Secretary of War
SWPA	Southwest Pacific Area
SWPC	Smaller War Plants Corporation
Tab	Table or tabulation
TAG	The Adjutant General
TAT	To accompany troops
TC	Transportation Corps
TCC	Transportation Control Committee
TCPI	Transportation Corps Procurement Instructions
TD	Temporary duty
Tech	Technical
Telg	Telegram
TIG	The Inspector General
TM	Technical Manual
Tng	Training
T/O	Table of Organization
T/O&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
TQMG	The Quartermaster General
Traf	Traffic
Trans	Transportation
TUP	Twin-unit pack
TWX	Teletype message
UK	United Kingdom
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
USA	U.S. Army
USAT	U.S. Army transport
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USN	U.S. Navy
USW	Under Secretary of War

UTC	Unit training center
VCNO	Vice Chief of Naval Operations
VSD	Vendor's shipping document
WAC	Women's Army Corps
WD	War Department
WDGS	War Department General Staff
WDPR	War Department Procurement Regulations
WDSS	War Department Special Staff
WPB	War Production Board
WSA	War Shipping Administration
ZEC	Converted Liberty ship
ZI	Zone of interior
ZTO	Zone transportation officer

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department
  - *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*
  - *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*
  - *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942*
  - *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944*
  - *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943*
  - *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945*
  - *The Army and Economic Mobilization*
  - *The Army and Industrial Manpower*

The Army Ground Forces
  - *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*
  - *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*

The Army Service Forces
  - *The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces*

The Western Hemisphere
  - *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*
  - *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts*

The War in the Pacific
  - *The Fall of the Philippines*
  - *Guadalcanal: The First Offensive*
  - *Victory in Papua*
  - *CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul*
  - *Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls*
  - *Campaign in the Marianas*
  - *The Approach to the Philippines*
  - *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*
  - *Triumph in the Philippines*
  - *Okinawa: The Last Battle*
  - *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations
  - *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West*
  - *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*
  - *Salerno to Cassino*
  - *Cassino to the Alps*

The European Theater of Operations
  - *Cross-Channel Attack*
  - *Breakout and Pursuit*
  - *The Lorraine Campaign*
  - *The Siegfried Line Campaign*
  - *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*
  - *The Last Offensive*

The Supreme Command
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II
The Middle East Theater
The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia
The China-Burma-India Theater
Stilwell's Mission to China
Stilwell's Command Problems
Time Runs Out in CBI
The Technical Services
The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War
The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field
The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat
The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment
The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan
The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany
The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States
The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior
The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters
The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War
The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply
The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II
The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan
The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany
The Signal Corps: The Emergency
The Signal Corps: The Test
The Signal Corps: The Outcome
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The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply
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Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt
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Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors
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The Employment of Negro Troops
Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb
Pictorial Record
The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas
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